ML20056D646

Special Rept 93-14,fire Barriers Nonfunctional for Period That Exceeded Allowable TS Timeframe,After Being Intentionally Breached.Fire Detectors on One Side of Breaches Verifed Operable & Roving Fire Watches Established

ML20056D646
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	08/12/1993
From:	Fenech R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
93-14, NUDOCS 9308170252
Download: ML20056D646 (3)

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Tenrenee Vaney Authow. Post O!6ce Box 2030, Soddy-Dwsy. Tennessee 37379 2000  ;

Robert A. Fenech Vice President, SeqJoya*1 Naclear Plant August 12, 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:  !

In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-328  ;

Tennessee Valley Authority )

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79

- TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 SPECIAL REPORT 93-14 >

The enclosed special report provides details concerning three fire barriers that were nonfunctional for a period of time greater than the TS ,

allowable timeframe. This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone  !

C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely.

Y ' Nk Robert A. Fenech Enclosure cc: See page 2 f

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"U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2.

August 12, 1993 cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant l' 2600 Igou Ferry Road ,

Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624  !

Regional Administrator ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 11 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711 I

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i ENCLOSURE  ;

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 93-14 i

In support of the Unit 2 maintenance outage activities, the following

• three fire barriers were intentionally breached. The barriers have been reestablished; however, all were nonfunctional for a period of. time that exceeded the allowable technical specification (TS) timeframe.

1. Fire Door A-44 is in the auxiliary building on Elevation 669.0, i serving entrance to the Unit 2 penetration room.

I 2. Fire Door A-155A is located in the auxiliary building on Elevation 734.0, serving entrance to the steam generator blow-down room (reverse osmosis room). .;

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3. Fire Door A-75 is in the auxiliary building on Elevation 690.0, serving entrance to the Unit 2 pipe chase.

The fire doors were breached open to allow fire hoses to be routed to various areas where thn high-pressure fire protection system was being repaired. The fire hoses were necessary to comply with TS action statements requiring compensatory measures, .i.e. , back-up fire suppression water systems.

t These conditions are being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12.a. 1 CpIIective Action l l

In accordance with Limiting Condition of Operation 3.7.12 Action r Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the breaches were  ;

verified operable; roving fire watches were established. The fire i watches were maintained until the breaches were removed and the fire barriers were reestablished on July 26, 1993.

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