ML20065Q602
| ML20065Q602 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1994 |
| From: | Power K TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 94-04, 94-4, NUDOCS 9405030044 | |
| Download: ML20065Q602 (4) | |
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Tennessee vanoy ALAhonty. Post Othce Box 2000, Soddy-Dasy. Tennessee 3/379 2000 Ken Powers l
Vice Presglont, Sequoyah Nuoear Plant I
l April 22, 1994 i
l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
ATTN: Document Control Desk l
Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of
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Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority
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50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TSs) 3.3.3.8 AND 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 94-04 i
l The enclosed special report provides details concerning the ffre j
detection instruments in Fire Zone 116 for the auxiliary building cask loading area being inoperable for a period greater than the allowable TS timeframe. Also provided in this special report are details concerning Fire Barrier Door A-197 and Fire Barrier Wall A-8 in the auxiliary building between the Units 1 and 2 480-volt board rooms being breached
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and nonfunctional as fire barriers for a period greater than the allowable TS timeframe. This report is being submitted in accordance with TS Action Statements 3.3.3.8(b) and 3.7.12(a).
If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.
Sincerel Ken Powers Enclosure cc:
See page 2 9405030044 940422 gDR ADOCK 0500o327 h)
PDR n
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 April 22, 1994 cc (Enclosure):
Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland-20852-2739' NRC Resident Inspector.
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600;Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy,. Tennessee 37379-3624 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite.2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711 1
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s ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 SPECIAL REPORT 94-04 I.
FIRE DETECTORS IN CASK LOADING AREA IN AUXILIARY BUILDING 11emiption_nLCondition On March 14, 1994, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 coming out of a refueling outage and Unit 2 in Mode 1, the ionization fire detection instrumentation in the auxiliary building cask loading area (Fire Zone 116) was declared inoperable, and Limiting Condition for j
operation (LCO) 3.3.3.8 was entered.
Cause of Condition l
l The detectors in the auxiliary building cask loading area were l
disabled to prevent the exhaust of diesel trucks from initiating l
invalid fire alarm signals. This area is used to unload fuel casks and equipment needed to support the Unit 1 outage and the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage. The detectors were disabled for a period of time that exceeded the technical specification allowable timeframe as specified in LC0 3.3.3.8 Action Statement (b).
Corrective Acilon In accordance with LCO 3.3.3.8 Action Statement (a), an hourly fire patrol was established to inspect the auxiliary building cask loading area. The patrol will be maintained until the outage activities in the area are completed, the detectors are returned to operable status, and LCO 3.3.3.8 is exited.
II.
AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE BARRIER WALL A-8 AND FIRE BARRIER DOOR A-197 Dejictiption of _ Condition On April 4, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 coming out of a refueling outage and Unit 2 in Mode 1, the fire barrier wall between the Units 1 and 2 480-volt board rooms and Fire Barrier Door A-197 on Elevation 749.0 of the auxiliary building were breached, and LC0 3.7.12 was entered.
Cause of Condition A design change notice (DCN) modification involving the installation of heating and ventilating ductwork is being implemented. This DCN requires the breaching of Fire Barrier Wall A-8 between the Units 1 and 2 480-volt board rooms on Elevation 749.0 of the auxiliary building.
Fire Barrier Door A-197 will be breached to facilitate the movement of personnel and equipment and also to route cables necessary to accomplish the modification.
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Carrective Action In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors were verified operable on one side of the breach, and an hourly fire patrol was established to inspect the area affected by the breach.
The patrol will be maintained until the modification is completed, the fire barriers are reestablished as functional fire barriers, and LC0 3.7.12 is exited.
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