ML20057B536

Special Rept 93-15:on 930902,declared Isolation Valve in One of Four Main HPFP Water Suppression Flow Paths Inoperable Upon Valve Failure of Annual Surveillance Operability Test. WR Written to Inspect,Repair or Replace Valve

ML20057B536
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	09/02/1993
From:	Fenech R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
93-15, NUDOCS 9309220202
Download: ML20057B536 (3)

Text

&4-- *A -

- 4- re2 a

? .

k .

Tennessee Vauey Authonty. Post Ofhte Box MXYJ. Soddy-Dasy, Tennessee 37379 FJ00 Robert A. Fenet,*i '

Vice Preudent. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant September 14, 1993 l

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk ,

Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.11.1 SPECIAL REPORT 93-15 The enclosed special follow-up report provides details concerning the t

inoperability of the fire suppression water system as initially reported by telephone at 2153 Eastern daylight time on September 2, 1993, in accordance with TS 3.7.11.1 Action Statement (b)(2)(a) and confirmed by a facsimile on September 3, 1993.

Details are provider' in the enclosure. The condition involves a valve in one of the fire protection water suppression flow paths that has been declared inoperable. This report is being made in accordance with TS 3.7.11.1 Action statement (b)(2)(c).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C.11. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely, S $. > =R Robert A. Fenech i

Enclosure cc: See page 2 200160 '

. m. ynfI 9309220202 930902 DR ADDCK 0500 7 g]% M.g / l4

- c

?

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 September 14, 1993 cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road .

Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711 I

ENCLOSURE i

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) UNIT 2 l 14-DAY FOLLOW-UP REPORT j SPECIAL REPORT 93-15 .

j

. SQN Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation i (LCO) 3.7.11.1 requires the fire suppression water system to be operable I with a flow path capable of taking suction from the forebay and j transferring the water through distribution piping with operable sectionalizing control or isolation valves to the yard hydrant curb .

i valves, the last valve ahead of the water pressure alarm device on each sprinkler or bose standpipe, and the last valve ahead of the deluge valve on each deluge or spray system required to be operable in accordance with TSs 3.7.11.2 and 3.7.11.4.

Deattlpilon_oLCondition on September 2,1993, at 1847 Eastern daylight time (EDT) with Unit 1 in '

Mode 5 coming out of a refueling outage and Unit 2 in Mode 5 for a maintenance outage, LCO 3.7.11.1 was entered.

An 8-inch isolation valve in one of the four main high pressure fire l protection (HPFP) water suppression flow paths failed the annual '

surveillance operability test. The valve was. declared inoperable when it could not be cycled as required by TS Surveillance Requirement 4.7.11.1.d. The valve's handwheel was free-wheeling and incapable of being used to cycle the valve.  !

Corran11Ye_Ac11pna f

This condition does not affect the ability of the HPFP system to supply ,

water to the fire protection water suppression system in the plant via the other three HPFP water suppression flow paths, nor does this ,

condition affect the ability to isolate the line. Therefore, it was determined that the HPFP system could adequately satisfy the LCO action statement requirement to establish a back-up fire suppression system. .

This decision is based on the fact that the other three flow paths were ,

operable and the valve that f ailed the surveillance was in the open position. Therefore, the four flow paths were all capable of delivering flow to the areas of the plant containing safety-related equipment. The system is tested annually to ensure that three flow paths are adequate to meet the most demanding flow requirements for TS sprinkler systems and ,

hose standpipes.

A work request was written to inspect, repair, or replace the valve.

l

,