ML20045H968

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Special Rept 93-12:on 930621,portion of Fire Header in Auxiliary Bldg Removed from Svc & Sys Not Restored to Operability within TS Required Time Period.Piping Repaired & Incident Investigation Initiated
ML20045H968
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 07/16/1993
From: Fenech R
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
93-12, NUDOCS 9307220194
Download: ML20045H968 (3)


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H i Tennessee VaHey Authonty, Post Othce Box 2000. Soddy. Daisy, Tennessee 37379.?000 Robert A. Fenech '

wee Prescent sequoyan Nuclear mant July 16, 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk i Washington, D.C. 20555 i Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 >

Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NUMBERS 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 and DPR SPECIAL REPORT 93-12 The enclosed special report provides details concerning the inoperability of 'the fire suppression water system in the auxiliary building as initially reported by telephone at 1600 Eastern daylight time (EDT) on July 2,1993, and confirmed by f acsimile on July 6,1993, as required by Technical Specification (TS) Action Statements 3.7.11.1(b)(2)(a) and 3.7.11.1(b)(2)(b ), respectively.

Details are provided in the enclosure. The condition involves both Units 1 and 2 and is being reported in accordance with TS Action

  • Statement 3.7.11.1(b)(2)(c).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely, bfk Robert A. Fenech Enclosure ec: See page 2 I

9307220194i 930716 .

-PDR: ADOCK 05000327. . .1 N -i S PDR. G .f s

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 July 16, 1993 cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One. White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant j 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711

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. J ENCLOSURE i

14-DAY FOLLOW-UP REPORT SPECIAL REPORT 93-12 e

fiequoyah Nuclear Plant Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.11.1 requires that the fire suppression _ water system be operabic through the last valve ahead of.the water-pressure alarm device on each sprinkler or hose standpipe and the last valve ahead of the deluge-valve on each deluge or spray system in the auxiliary building.

Ductiptipitpf 19nditint)

On June 21,1993, at 2100 Eastern daylight time (EDT), with Unit 1 in  ;

Mode 6 for a refueling outage and Unit 2 in Mode 5 for a maintenance 1 outage, LCOs 3.7.11.1, 3.7.11.2, and 3.7.11.4 were entered.

A portion of the fire header in the auxiliary building was removed frem ,

service (isolated) on June 21, 1993, at 2100 EDT, to facilitate  ;

preplanned maintenance activities for repairing and replacing leaking piping. This portion of the auxiliary building fire protection piping was the first of several segments of piping to be repaired during the ,

current unit outages. Appropriate compensatory measures, i.e., backup i fire suppression and fire watches, were established before the header _was j isolated. t On July 2, 1993, it was discovered that during the evolution described ,

above, TS Action Statement 3.7.11.1(b)(2)(a) had not been complied' with when the auxiliary building fire protection header was isolated. The ,

24-hour telephone call required by LCO Action Statement 3.7.11.1(b)(2)(a) '!

had not been made. Therefore, upon discovery of the missed notification, NRC was informed by telephone at 1600 EDT on July 2, 1993, and the LCO ,

nction statements were complied with.

The p3 ping was repaired, the applicable portion of the system was returned to service, and LCOs 3.7.11.1, 3.7.11.2, and 3.7.11.4 were +

exited at 1900 EDT on July 5, 1993.

TVA has initiated an incident investigation (II) associated with not complying with the LCO 3.7.11.1 action statement. Corrective action (s) will be formulated and implemented as specified in the II report. The details of the event and the corrective action (s) to prevent the recurrence of this event will be reported to NRC in a following licensee event report.

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