ML20092H043

Special Rept 95-06:on 950810,auxiliary Bldg Sleeve Mark 1855 & 1856 Penetrating Floor Elevation Breached.Fire Barriers Will Be Reestablished After Completion of Mod Activities

ML20092H043
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	09/14/1995
From:	Shell R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
95-06, 95-6, NUDOCS 9509200231
Download: ML20092H043 (3)

Text

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• ETennessee Valley Authority, Post Offce Box 2tyJ0, Soddy-Daisy, Tenredee 37379 2000 September 14,1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

-In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority )

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 1 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 95-06 The enclosed special report provides details concerning Unit I auxiliary building sleeve penetrations that are nonfunctional as fire barriers. These fire barriers were intentionally removed from service to facilitate modification activities. The sleeve penetrations have been nonfunctional as fire barriers for a time period greater than the TS allowable timeframe.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone J. Bajraszewski at ,

l (615) 843-7749.

Sincerely, R it. JJA' R. H. Shell Manager SQN Site Licensing Enclosure cc: See page 2 9509200231 950914

/ if I I

PDR ADOCK 05000327 S PDR

1 1 'O UE, Nu lear Regulatory Commission Page 2 September 14,1995 KEM:JB:JLG cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

- 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 Regional Administrator

' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region Il 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711

. - - - . . _ - -. ~ - - -. __ -. .

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ENCLOSURE

, J SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 95-06 Description of Condition On August 10,1995, auxiliary building sleeve Mark Nos.1855 and 1856 penetrating the 690 floor elevation were breached. These fire barrier penetrations were intentionally removed from service to support the planned installation of drain lines. The drain lines will support equipment that will be installed in the Unit I hot sample room.

On August 16,1995, at Elevation 743.75 feet, an auxiliary building sleeve containing a fire damper (1-31C-661) was intentionally breached to support the modification of the sleeve.

The modification will remove the damper and convert the penetration to a maintenance sleeve. The maintenance sleeve will serve as a qualified fire barrier that will be used as a

" pass through" type of scaled penetration between the auxiliary and additional equipment buildings for Operations and Maintenance use.

These penetrations have been breached in excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

Cause of Condition During the modification process the sleeve penetrations were to be sealed by the use of a two-part room temperature vulcanizing, fire resistant silicone foam. The seal material used was 20 fluid-ounce SIMKIT, Part No. PR-855, manufactured by SEMCO. After the installation of the seal material, in accordance with manufacturer's written instructions supplied with the sealing material, it was determined that seal quality was unacceptable because of poor cell structure. Because of the installation failures in the field, seal material in storage was tested. These kits also displayed unacceptable cell structure. Subsequent discussions with the manufacturer indicated that the mixing instructions supplied with the seal material may be in error and result in the unsatisfactory installation of the foam.

Successful qualification tests were performed using revised mixing instructions provided by the vendor. As a result of the problems encountered in the placement of the sleeve sealing material, the breaches could not be restored within the TS allowable timeframe.

Corrective Action In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified operable.

The roving fire watch will be maintained until the penetration fire barriers are reestablished.

The fire barriers will be reestablished afler the completion of the modification activities.

Currently, the modifications are scheduled to be completed in October 1995.

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