ML20073F529

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Special Rept:On 940923,provides Several Fire Barrier Penetrations That Have Been Intentionally Removed from Service to Support Unit 2 Cycle 6 Refueling Outage Activities
ML20073F529
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 09/23/1994
From: Shell R
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9410030142
Download: ML20073F529 (4)


Text

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En i.mn. ssee va#, A,dw% Post OHee 60= N0 SoWDas, Tenmsee mm September 23, 1994 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-328 Tennessee Valley Authority )

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 94-12 The enclosed special report provides details concerning several fire barrier penetrations that have been intentionally removed from service to support the Unit 2 Cycle 6 refueling outage activities. The fire protection components will be inoperable for periods greater than the TS allowable timeframes. The enclosure contains details of the conditions for each component.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C.11. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely,

Y, R. H. Shell Manager SQN Site Licensing Enclosure ec
See page 2 O

4' u v ut t 4v-: -) ]

9410030142 940923 )

PDR ADOCK 05000328 i R PDR

e U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 September 23, 1994 cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711 l

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ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 94-12 I. PENETRATIONS

1. Mark No. 60A, Q-line Wall Penetration at A-13 (Elevation 701.0)
2. Mark No. 1731, A-13 Column Wall Penetration Between S and T Lines (Elevation 719 feet 7 inches) .
3. Mark No. 869, Floor Penetration (Elevation 714.0) East of S-line on A-14 Column Description of Condition With Unit 2 shut down for the Cycle 6 refueling outage (RFO), the l penetrations noted above were breached to support the Unit 2 Cycle 6 l (U2C6) RF0 activities. These penetrations will be breached in '

excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable time period of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition The penetrations were breached to support the modification to ,

replace the carbon steel hydrazine tubing, piping, and valves with stainless steel components.  ;

Corrective Action In accordance with Limiting condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 '

Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of each of the penetrations were verified operable; a roving fire watch was l immediately established and will be maintained until the breaches  !

are removed and the fire barriers are reestablished at the end of -

the U2C6 RFO.

II. PENETRATION 048-0-1 Rescription of Condition  ;

i With Unit 2 shut down for the Cycle 6 RF0, the penetration's fire barrier was breached to support the U2C6 RF0 maintenance i activities. The penetration is located in the auxiliary building on r Elevation 669.0 in Unit 2 Pipe Gallery Room A-25 (penetration room). The penetration will be breached in excess of the TS allowable time period of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

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Caust 0.t_.CandLLLDn The penetration contains a reach rod for a chemical and volume control system valve. The reach rod used to operate the valve from outside the penetration room has been damaged and is being replaced.

Correctire_Attion In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified operable; a roving fire watch was immediately established and will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished.

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