ML20073B841

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Special Rept 94-11,providing Details Re Fire Barrier Wall & Fire Barrier Penetration Intentionally Rendered Nonfunctional as Fire Barriers to Support Snp Unit 2 Cycle 6 Refueling Outage Activities.Roving Fire Patrol Established
ML20073B841
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 09/15/1994
From: Shell R
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
94-11, NUDOCS 9409220242
Download: ML20073B841 (4)


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Tennessee Vahey Authonty Pou Off<e Box 2900 Soddy-Da sy Tennessee 37379

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September 15, 1994 U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of

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Docket No. 50-328 Tennessee Valley Authority

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 94-11 The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire barrier wall and a fire barrier penetration that have been intentionally rendered nonfunctional as fire barriers. The fire barriers have been removed from service to support the Unit 2 Cycle 6 refueling outage activities. The barriers will be inoperable for periods of time greater than the TS allowable timeframe. The enclosure contains details of the conditions for each component.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely, e

R. H.

Shell Manager SQN Site Licensing Enclosure ces See page 2 n.* n n O ')

T 9409220242 940915 PDR ADOCK 05000328 pi he S

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U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 September 15, 1994 cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 i

Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711 i

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ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 94-11 j

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CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP (CCP) 2B-B ROOM WALL Description of Condition Auxiliary Building Room A-22 houses CCP 2B-B.

Room A-22 is located on Elevation 669.0 between Columns A-11 and A-12.

The T-line wall will be nonfunctional as a fire barrier for a period of time that is greater than the allowable TS time period of seven days.

This condition is being reported in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition The CCP motors are routinely scheduled to be removed and refurbished. The motor is too large to be removed through the door; therefore, an opening in the west wall located on the auxiliary building T-line column will be provided to remove the damaged motor.

The opening will also permit the new motor to be installed.

Corrective Action In accordance with Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire patrol was established after the fire detectors on one side of the fire barrier were verified operable. The fire patrol will be maintained until the wall is replaced and the fire barrier is reestablished.

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PENETRATION MARK NO. 486 Receriotion of Condition f

The penetration is a 24-inch sleeve in the floor on Elevation 690.0 of the auxiliary building. The penetration was breached by routing temporary cables through the sleeve to support the Unit 2 Cycle 6 refueling outage activities. The penetration will be breached in excess of the TS allowable time period of seven days.

This condition is being reported in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

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l Cause of condition The fire barrier was breached to route cables for Section XI j

examinations in association with the 10-year in-service inspection activities.

Corrective Action In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action statement (a), a roving fire patrol was established after the fire detectors on one side of the i

penetration were verified operable.

The fire patrol will be maintained until the breach is removed and the fire barrier is reestablished.

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