ML20094L735

Special Rept 95-09:on 951006,auxiliary Bldg Mechanical Sleeve Was Breached Beyond 7-day LCO Due to Tubing Inside Penetration Was Crossed & Sealant Was Removed from Sleeve. Unacceptable Seal Matl Was Removed

ML20094L735
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	11/13/1995
From:	Shell R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
95-09, 95-9, NUDOCS 9511210099
Download: ML20094L735 (4)

Text

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6 Tennessee Valley Authcrity, Post Office Box 2000. Soddy-Da'sy, Tennessee 37379-2000 November 13,1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commir,sion ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority )

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 1 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 95-09 The enclosed special report provides details concerning the breaching of a Unit I auxiliary building mechanical sleeve and five fire doors. The fire barriers were intentionally removed from service to facilitate the inspection of tubing inside the mechanical sleeve and to perform a surveillance instruction that required the breaching of the fire doors. The fire barriers were nonfunctional for a time period greater than allowed by TSs.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

Ifyou have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone S. D. Gilley at (423) 843-7427.

Sincerely, ko Y.

R. H. Shell Site Licensing Manager Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Enclosure cc: See page 2 on-9511210099 951113 h\

[DR ADOCK 05000327 PDR

e U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 November 13,1995 '

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager

' U.S. Nuc! ear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Feny Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711

e ,. l

'. j ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 95-09 1

I. Auxiliary Building Mechanical Sleeve Penetration Breach ,

Das, don of Condition .

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On October 6,1995, the auxiliary building mechanical sleeve, Mark No. 422F, on -

Elevation 690 was breached in order to inspect the tubing inside the sleeve. This i

. inspection was to determine how the tubing was routed and to facilitate the subsequent removal of two of the four tubing assemblies as part of a modification. The attempt to  ;

reseal the sleeve failed and resulted in the sleeve being breached beyond the 7-day limiting condition for operation (LCO).

Cause ofCondition l The tubing inside the penetration was crossed, and the sealant was removed from the ]

sleeve to trace the lines and verify that the proper lines were identified for isolation.  :

After the lines were traced, they were isolated to facilitate subsequent removal as part of a modification. Following the removal of two of the tubes, sealant was applied to j the penetratica to reestablish the fire barrier. Following the 24-hour cure time, the seal  !

was inspected and failed to meet the acceptance criteria for cell structure. As a result,  !

this breach exceeded the seven days allowed by TSs.  !

Corrective Action f r

In accordance with TS.3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was l immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified  ;

operable. The roving fire watch was maintained until the fire barrier was reestablished. l The unacceptable seal material was removed, and sealant was reapplied and was  ;

determined to meet the acceptance criteria on November 6,1995.

II. Fire Door Breaches l Descriotion of Condition 1

On October 26,1995, with Unit 1 in a refueling outage, five fire doors were intentionally breached to support preplanned outage activities. The doors were breached by routing instrumentation cables through the doorways. The breached doors are: A-25 (Room A-6, turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump room); A-26

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-. . - . _ . - - . - ~ - . , . . . . - - . . . - . - . - - . . . - . - - - .

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i (Room A-7, pipe gallery); A-138 (Room A-25, Auxiliary ControlInstrument Room 1 A); A-139 (Room A-26, Auxiliary ControlInstrument Room IB); and A-140 -

(Room A-1, auxiliary control room).  ;

The penetration fire barriers have been breached in excess of the TS allowable l l timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Can- of Condition  !

l The fire doors were breached to route instrumentation cables that are required for the .

performance of a surveillance instmetion (SI) associated with the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The SI cannot be performed until adequate steam output is available to support equipment operation after the unit is in Mode 3 operation.- The fire j doors were breached just before Mode 3 entry for the installation of test equipment and

! SI performance. However, as a result of problems experienced with reactor coolant pumps, the unit was returned to Mode 5 before the SI was completed. This caused a delay in completing the SI and resulted in the fire door being breached beyond the 7-day timeframe. The test instrumentation and associated cables were not disconnected to restore the fire barriers because of the complexity of the test configuration and the time required to install the test equipment.

Corrective Action In accordance with TS.3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified l operable. The roving fire watch was maintained until the fire barriers were

. reestablished. The fire barriers were reestablished on November 7,1995, after Mode 3 l was entered and the associated SI was completed.

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