ML20062M099

Special Rept 93-23:on 930712,failure to Functionally Test Fire Protection Instrument Panel,Associated Fire Detectors & to Comply W/Ts Action Statements.Directive Issued Requiring Periodic Test Coordinator

ML20062M099
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	12/27/1993
From:	Fenech R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
93-23, NUDOCS 9401060125
Download: ML20062M099 (3)

Text

_ - - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - - _ _ - - _ _ - _ , _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ . _ _

,j y

,. p IUA u.-- . . , . . - ~ ~ . - . - .

. - , - . . . - - . . . . . . . ~ . - . . . . - - - - . - - _ - - . . - --

Tennenee Va!'ey Authoray, Post OHce Box 2000. Soddy-Daisy. Tennessee 37379 2000 Robert A. Fonech Vce Presdent. Sequoyah Nuclear Piant December 27, 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) '50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES-DPR-77 AND DPR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.3.3.8 SPECIAL REPORT 93-23 The enclosed special report provides details concerning the failure to-functionally test a fire protection instrument panel and the associated fire detectors and to comply with the TS action statements. -A roving fire watch had been established and maintained covering'the subject area, but the fire watch had not specifically been established fer-this; situation. The functional testing of a fire protection _ instrument panel and six fire detectors in the control building was not performed because of equipment out of service and a misinterpretation of the' surveillance I instruction.

This report is being submitted in accordance with-TS 3.3.3.8 Action Statement (b).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 8h3-7210.

j. Sincerely, k A

' Robert A. Fenech

-Enclosure cc: - See page'2-

{

y 94o1o6o12s 9a1227 U F p

u4 y,.:' ~;poR: Apocn osooosa7.1*

S PDR-ty u

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ ______-_=______-_=

(

. ~ es

's- ,

t.-

?

- U.S. Nuclear-RegulatoryJCommission Page 2 December 27, 1993

.i cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission

• One White. Flint, North 11555 Rockvt11e Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NPC hisi$ent Inspector -

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant -

2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commistion  ;

Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711 ,

e I

6 6

4

s- e-a 9

ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 SPECIAL REPORT 93-23 2nacription TS 3.3.3.8 requires that a minimum of three ionization fire detectors and three thermal fire detectors in the 24-volt and 48-volt battery rooms (Fire Zones 62 and 63 on Panel 0-L-603) on Elevation 669.0 of the control

'm ilding be demonstrated operable at least once every six months. The operability of the detectors is demonstrated by the performance of a cross-zone actuation test. This test was due to be performed no later than September 8, 1993. The test was started on July 12, 1993. However, during the performance of the test, a deficiency was identified. A deficiency notice (DN) was properly initiated, but the description of the problem was incorrectly interpreted as meaning that the testing of instruments for Fire Zones 62 and 63 on Instrument Panel 0-L-603 could not be completed. The completion of the surveillance was then placed on hold pending resolution of the deficiency. When the deficiency was finally dispositioned, the TS testing interval requirement had been exceeded, and it was discovered that the required compensatory measures had not been specifically implemented for the detectors in Fire Zones 62 and 63. A roving fire watch had already been established and was maintained in association with other limiting conditions for operations (LCOs) that effectively covered Fire Zones 62 and 63. Therefore, even if the roquired compensatory measures had not been specifically implemented t

for this specific situation, the area in question was inspected on a regular basis, which fulfilled the TS action statement requirement.

LCO 3.3.3.8 Action Statement (b) rem ires that the inoperable equipment be restored to operable status within 14 days or that a special report be submitted to the commission within 30 days. This special report is in response to this requirement.

The panel and the associated detectors were subsequently functionally tested and properly verified operable. Therefore, this event did not adversely affect the safety of plant personnel or equipment.

Corrective _Attion_

Immediate corrective action for this event was to perform the surveillance for Panel 0-L-603 and the detectors in Fire Zones 62 and 63. This was successfully accomplished December 3, 1993.

A directive was issued requiring the periodic test coordinator to review any test that is placed in DN status.

The periodic test coordinator has reviewed the tests that are presently in DN status for similar problems. No problems were identified.

,