ML20083M288

Special Rept 95-03:on 950404,auxiliary Bldg Pipe Sleeve Located on Floor Elevation 690 Breached to Support Routing of Drain Hose.Roving Fire Watch Established & After Fire Detectors on One Side of Penetration Verified Operable

ML20083M288
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	05/09/1995
From:	Shell R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
95-03, 95-3, NUDOCS 9505190192
Download: ML20083M288 (5)

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Temessee Valley AurNny, Post OMe Bon 2000. Soddy Daisy Tennessee 37379 May 9,1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12- SPECIAL REPORT 95-03 The enclosed special report provides details concerning a pipe sleeve, various fire doors, and an equipment hatch that are nonfunctional as fire barriers. The pipe sleeva fire barrier was intentionally removed from service to support the routing of a temporary hose. Two auxiliary building fire doors were intentionally breached open to facilitate the repair of ventilation system chillers. Four control building fire doors and an equipment hatch will be intermittently breached to support the replacement of the plant's 250-volt batteries. The pipe sleeve and the auxiliary building fire doors were nonfunctional as fire barriers for a time period greater than the TS allowable timeframe. The control building fire doors and equipment hatch will be nonfunctional as fire barriers for time periods greater than the TS allowable timeframe.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a),

if you have any questions conceming this submittal, please telephone J. Bajraszewski at (615) 843-7749.

Sincerely, l N a R. H. Shell Manager SON Site Licensing l

Enclosure cc: See page 2 I I SU r '

9505190192 950509

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PDR ADOCK 05000327 S PDR ,

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1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Page 2 ' l May 9,1995 j

cc (Enclosure):

. Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager -!

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 i NRC Resident inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-?624 ,

Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,

Region ll 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 ,

Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711 P

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ENCLOSURE- ,

- SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1' AND 2' SPECIAL REPORT 95-03 l

1. PIPE ' SLEEVE Descriotion of Condition - ,

On April 4,- 1995, an auxiliary building pipe' sleeve (Mark No. 574) that is ,

located on Floor Elevation 690 was breached. This fire barrier was intentionally  :

removed from service to support the implementation of a temporary alteration l that routed a drain hose through the pipe sleeve. The pipe sleeve provides ,

access between the hot sample room and the general auxiliary building floor a area. The penetration has been breached in excess of the technical specification j (TS) allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition i The pipe sleeve was breached to support the routing of a temporary drain hose.

The temporary drain hose reroutes drain lines from the hot sample room -

' chemistry monitors and sample sink to prevent the unnecessary processing of j the liquid (approximately 1200 gallons per day) in the liquid radwaste system.  ;

Corrective Action

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in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified ,

operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the penetration fire  !

barrier is reestablished. The fire barrier will be reestablished after the completion' >

of permanent plant modifications to the chemistry monitor and sample sink drain i lines in the hot sample room. The modification is anticipated to be complete i three months after the completion of the upcoming Unit 2 Cycle 7 refueling .

outage. .,

ll. AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE DOORS Descriotion of Condition 1

On April 18,1995, two auxiliary building fire doors ( A-180, Unit 1 and A-193, Unit 2) located on Floor Elevation 749 were breached. These fire doors provide access between the A and B 480-volt (V) electric board rooms for each unit.

The doors have been breached in excess of the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a). l i

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Cause of Condition The A 180 and A-193 doors were intentionally breached to facilitate cross ventilation between the Unit 1, A and B 480-V electric board rooms and between the Unit 2, A and B 480-V electric board rooms during the performance of maintenance activities on related ventilation system chillers.

Corrective Action in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the penetrations are reestablished as fire barriers. The fire barriers will be reestablished after the completion of maintenance activities on the associated ventilation system chillers. The maintenance activities are expected to be complete by July 17, 1995.

Ill. CONTROL BUILDING FIRE DOORS AND EQUIPMENT HATCH Descriotion of Condition t

On May 1,1995, two control building fire doors (C-6 and C-7) located on Floor Elevation 669 and an equipment hatch between turbine building Floor Elevation 685 and control building Floor Elevation 669 were breached. The fire doors provide access for two of four 250-V battery rooms. These fire doors are being breached by temporary electrical cable routed through the door transoms to support the replacement of the plant's 250-V batteries. The equipment hatch will be opened for multiple 10-day intervals for battery movement throughout the duration of the battery replacement proje r. After the batteries in these two rooms are replaced, Fire Doors C-4 and C-5 will be breached in a similar manner for battery replacement. The fire doors and equipment hatch will be breached in  ;

excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable timeframe of seven days.

This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition The fire doors and equipment hatch are being intentionally breached to f acilitate the replacement of the plant's 250-V batteries. The work was preplanned and is being performed in stages to minimize plant impact.

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i Corrective Action j

< in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a), a roving fire watch was. 4' established after the fire detectors on one side'of the penetration were verified ' .

.' operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the penetrations are i reestablished as fire barriers. The fire barriers will be reestablished after the -

completion of the battery replacement project. The project is expected to be i complete by October 30,1995. Ji

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