ML20045E688

Special Rept 93-07:on 930519,0521 & 0527,fire Doors A-146 & A-44 & A-196,respectively,were Breached Open.On 930525, Mechanical Sleeve C2/J Breached to Permit Cable Pulling. Detectors Verified Operable & Fire Watch Established

ML20045E688
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	06/25/1993
From:	Fenech R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
93-07, 93-7, NUDOCS 9307020322
Download: ML20045E688 (4)

Text

- . . . _ m

. . . , .~.

.1,,2 g. ;

A

.___.,r.._-. _ . _ . . . _ _ _ . . _ . , . _ .-.-_..-_.a_ . _ .

_e....._.. ~.c_...=,_- -

Tennessee Valley Autnoray. Post Ofice Box 2000, Soday. Daisy, Tennessee 37379 2000 Robert A Fenech

%co President Gogacyah Nuclear Plant ,

June 25, 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) ,

SEQUOYAll NUCLEAR PLANT '(SQN) - UNIT 1. - FACILITY OPERATING . LICENSE DPR-77 "-

TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 SPECIAL REPORT 93-07 The enclosed special report.provides details.concerning four fire barriers that were nonfunctional for a period of time greater than the TS allowable.

timeframe. This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 .

Action Statement (a). .

t If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone 1 C. II. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely, hY -

"A Robert A. Fenech Enclosure cc: See page 2 g 020011

~ '

9307020322 930625

'PDR ADOCK 05000327 I l-S. .PDR ,

\

L

.. . . . . - . - .-. _. . .. _.. ~ . .. -

1 ..

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2-June 25, 1993 cc (Enclosure): -l Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager

.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 - ,

NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900.

Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711 ,

r t

a f

L

-1.

t vr- - -- ,e-* - - - - -

_m-~ _._-_____ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _E______..__i-.._____._

. . - _ . - - .~ .- .

n-' .

ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1-

. SPECIAL REPORT 93-07 In support of the activities associated with the ongoing Units 1 and 2 outages, the following four fire barriers were intentionally breached.

Two of the barriers.have been reestablished; however, all were nonfunctional for a period of time that exceeded the allowable technical specification (TS)'timeframe.

l

1. Fire Doors A-146 and A-147

2. Fire Door A-44 '

3. Fire Door A-196 .

4. Mechanical Sleeve No. C2/J These conditions are being reported in accordance with TS Action .

Statement 3.7.12 a.

I. FIRE DOORS A-146 and A-147 DeACI_intion_of_E. v_ cat

-I on May 19, 1993, Fire Barrier Doors A-146 and A-147 were breached open. The doors are in the auxiliary building on Elevation 734.0, serving the 480-volt (V) Shutdown Board Rooms 1B-2 and 1A-2, I respectively. The fire doors were breached to allow temporary power cables to be-routed from the 480-V shutdown board rooms to equipment needed to support the refueling outage.

CsIrn Livr M isn In accordance with Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors-on one side of the fire barrier doors were verified operable; roving fire watches were. -

established. The fire watches were maintained until the breaches were removed and the fire barriers were reestablished on May 27, 1993.

II. FIRE DOOR A-44  ;

DeScrintip3LDLEYnnL On May 21, 1993, Fire Barrier Door A-44 was breached open. The fire door is in the auxiliary building on Elevation 669.0, at the entrance to the penetration room. The door was breached to allow hoses to be routed through the door in association with the 4 essential raw cooling water (ERCW) Train B drain-down. The drain-down was necessary in order to accomplish the replacement of l ERCW piping. I w - __--_---____________m_ ___ __ _ _ - r q *'~r

i

. - ~ . . i Correntire_ Action i

. l In accordance.with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire  !

detectors on one_ side of the breach were verified operable; a )

roving fire watch was established. The fire watch was maintained- 1 until the breach was removed and the fire barrier was reestablished '

on May 30, 1993. ,

III. FIRE DOOR A-196 DeAcription of Event on May 27, 1993, Fire Barrier Door A-196 was breccTed open. . The  ;

fire door is located in the auxiliary building.on Elevation 749.0 between-Electrical Shutdown Board Rooms IB and 2B. The door was breached to allow cooling air into the 2B board room because the air conditioning (A/C) chiller package for the 2B room was:

malfunctioning and had been taken out-of-service for maintenance. ,

An assessment was performed that documented the fact that the A/C unit for the 1B board room was sufficient to handle the additional-heat load-of the 2B board room.

CoLIncilre_Aclion In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable; a roving fire watch was established. The fire watch will'be maintained until the breach is removed and the fire barrier is reestablished.

t IV. MECHANICAL SLEEVE IN CONTROL BUILDING  ;

DeSCIlplion_nf_1Yant On May 25, 1993, a spare mechanical sleeve (sleeve No. C2/J) was breached. The sleeve is in the control building and . turbine building wall. The sleeve was breached to permit a 480-V_ feeder cable to be pulled into the mechanical equipment room on Elevation 732 of the control building to support the repair of the control building A/C chiller package. I CntrettiyAAction In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable; a roving fire watch was established. The fire watch will be maintained until the breach is removed and the fire barrier is reestablished.

t i

P