ML20112E505

Special Report 96-03:on 960420,biological Shield Doors Removed & Equipment Hatch Opened.Caused by Need to Facilitate Movement of Equipment,Material & Personnel.Roving Fire Watch Established

ML20112E505
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	05/22/1996
From:	Shell R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
96-03, 96-3, NUDOCS 9606060120
Download: ML20112E505 (5)

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Tennessee va!:ey Authonty. Post ON<e BoM bbhdy D s Ten essce 37379 l

4 May 22,1996 l

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l ATTN: Document Control Desk j Washington, D.C. 20555 j Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-328 Tennessee Valley Authority )

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR P.LANT (SQN) - UNIT 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 96-03

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The enclosed special report provides details concerning the removal of the biological shield blocks and the opening of the Unit 2 containment vessel equipment hatch and the breaching  !

of(l) both Unit 2 reactor building personnel air locks, (2) an auxiliary building door, and (3) multiple sleeve penetrations. These preplanned fire breaches are for the support of Unit 2 Cycle 7 refueling outage activities. The fire barriers are being breached for a period of time greater than the TS allowable timeframe.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone J. Dajraszewski at (423) 843-7749.

Sincerely,

' k 8 YN R. H. Shell

Manager SQN Site Licensing

. Enclosure cc: See page 2 9606060120 960522 PDR ADOCK 05000328 B 2 h 8 ppg

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 May 22,1996 cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NRC . Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 i

i Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II  ;

101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 l Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711

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ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 96-03 I

l l I. Unit 2 Reactor Building Biological Shield Blocks and Containment Vessel Equipment Hatch Descriotion of Condition On April 20,1996, with Unit 2 entering a refueling outage, the Unit 2 reactor i l building biological shield blocks located on auxiliary building Floor Elevation 734 were removed, and the equipment hatch was opened.

The fire barrier penetration has been breached in excess of the technical specification l (TS) allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

I Cause of Condition l The shield blocks were removed, and the equipment hatch was opened to facilitate the movement of equipment, material, and personnel between the auxiliary building l and the Unit 2 reactor building. The shield blocks will be removed from position

! (i.e., maintained in a storage position) for the duration of the Unit 2 Cycle 7 (U2C7)  ;

refueling outage (RFO).

l Corrective Action j

In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished. At the completion of the outage, before entering Mode 4, the equipment hatch will be closed, and the shield blocks will be reinstalled, reestablishing the fire barrier.

j II. Unit 2 Reactor Building Personnel Air Locks Descriotion of Condition On April 21,1996, the upper Unit 2 reactor building personnel air lock door, located on auxiliary building Floor Elevation 734, was breached open. On April 22,1996, the lower Unit 2 reactor building personnel air lock door, located on auxiliary building Floor Elevation 690, was breached open.

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The fire barrier penetrations have been breached in excess of the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

I Cause of Condition The doors for l'oth personnel airlocks were breached open to facilitate the movement of equipment, material, and personnel between the auxiliary building and the Unit 2 reactor building. The doors will be breached for the duration of the U2C7 RFO.

1 Corrective Action l In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished. The fire barrier will be reestablished before entering Mode 4.

III. Auxiliary Building Door Descriotion of Condition On April 21,1996, r.uxiliary building Door A-75, located on Floor Elevation 690,  ;

l was breached. The door provides access to the Unit 2 penetration room from the l general auxiliary building area.

l The fire barrier penetration has been breached in excess of the TS allowable  ;

timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

l Cause of Condition The door is bwached to facilitate U2C7 RF0 activities, including the movement of personnel and equipment through the area and the routing of electrical cables (communications and video). The fire breach will remain open for the duration of the U2C7 RFO.-

Corrective Action In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The rov:ng fire watch will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished. The fire barrier will be reestablished upon the completion of the outage activities.

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l IV. Sleeve Penetrations Descriotion of Condition l

l During April 21 through 23,1996, the following five sleeve penetrations located in either the auxiliary building or the Unit 2 reactor building were breached.

Sleeve Number Building Elevation Mk-72 Auxiliary 717 Mk-100 Auxiliary 700 Mk-101 Auxiliary 698 X-108 Reactor 688 X-109 Reactor 688 These fire barrier penetrations have been breached in excess of the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

Cause of Condition The sleeve penetrations are breached in support of U2C7 RFO activities, including the routing of electrical cables (communication and video) and the installation ofice blowing piping. The auxiliary building fire breaches will remain open for the duration of the U2C7 RFO.

Corrective Action In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barriers are reestablished. The auxiliary building fire breaches will remain open for the duration of the U2C7 RFO. The reactor building fire breach will be reestablished before entering Mode 4.

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