ML20056H233

Special Rept 93-08:on 930820,LCO 3.7.11.1 Was Entered Due to Inoperable Valve.Work Request Initiated to Inspect & Correct Valve Problem.Valve Cycled & Returned to Operable Status

ML20056H233
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	09/01/1993
From:	Fenech R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
93-08, 93-8, NUDOCS 9309090027
Download: ML20056H233 (3)

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September 1, 1993  !

i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j ATTN: Document Control Desk  !

Washington, D.C. 20555 l Gentlemen: .

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328  ;

SEQUOYAII NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.11.1 SPECIAL REPORT 93-08 The enclosed special report provides details concerning the inoperability j of the fire suppression water system as initially reported by telephone .j at 2155 Eastern daylight time on August 20, 1993, in accordance with  !

TS 3.7.11.1 Action Statement (b)(2)(a) and confirmed by a facsimile on August 23, 1993.

Details are provided in the enclosure. The condition involves a valve in 'f one of the fire protection water suppression flow paths that has been i declared inoperable. This report is being made in accordance with I TS 3.7.11.1 Action Statement (b)(2)(c).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone l C. II. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210. I Sincerely,  !

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i Robert A. Fenech  ;

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Enclosure J  ;

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9309090027 930901 PDR ADOCK 05000327 5

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Page 2 I September 1, 1993 l i

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Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  ;

One White Flint, North l 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739  ;

NRC Resident Inspector i Sequoyah Nuclear Plant i 2600 Igou Ferry Road l Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 l

'I Regional Administrator  !

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Region II

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101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 ,

Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711  :

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. ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) UNIT 2 14-DAY FOLLOW-UP REPORT SPECIAL REPORT 93-08 SQN Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.11.1 requires the fire suppression water system to be operable with a flow path capable of taking suction from the forebay and transferring the water through distribution piping with operable sectionalizing control or isolation valves to the yard hydrant curb valves, the last valve ahead of the water pressure alarm device on each sprinkler or hose standpipe, and the last valve ahead of the deluge valve on each deluge or spray system required to be operable in accordance with TSs 3.7.11.2 and 3.7.11.4.

Deandation oLCondition On August 20, 1993, at 2155 Eastern daylight time (EDT) with Unit 1 in Mode 6 for a refueling outage and Unit 2 in Mode 5 for a maintenance outage, LCO 3.7.11.1 was entered.

An 8-inch isolation valve in one of the four main high pressure fire protection (HPFP) water suppression flow paths failed the annual surveillance operability test. The valve was declared inoperable when it could not be cycled as required by TS Surveillance Requirement 4.7.11.1.d.

Corrective Actiong This condition does not affect the ability of the HPFP system to supply water to the fire protection water suppression system in the plant via the other three HPFP water suppression flow paths, nor does this condition affect the ability to isolate the line. Therefore, it was determined that the HPFP system could adequately satisfy the LCO action statement requirement to establish a back-up fire suppression system.

This decision is based on the fact that the other three flow paths were operable and the valve that failed the surveillance was in the open position (would not stroke closed). Therefore, the four flow paths were all capable of delivering flow to the aretts of the plant containing safety-related equipment. The system is tested annually to ensure that three flow paths are adequate to meet the most demanding flow requirements for TS sprinkler systems and hose standpipes.

A work request (WR) was initiated to inspect and correct the problem.

The WR revealed that the valve was not inoperable but only tight and difficult to turn. The valve has been cycled and returned to operable status. The LCO was exited at 1325 EDT on August 26, 1993.

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