ML19309C465

Forwards Response to IE Circular 78-08 & IE Bulletin 79-01 Re Environ Qualification of safety-related Electrical Equipment.Basic Requirements of FSAR Have Been Met. Transmitters Environmentally Qualified

ML19309C465
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	06/13/1979
From:	Bayne J POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
IEB-79-01, IEB-79-1, IEC-78-08, IEC-78-8, NUDOCS 8004080632
Download: ML19309C465 (78)

Text

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'e POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK INDIAN POINT NO. 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT $U i

P. C. BOX 21's SUCHANAN.N.Y.los11 TakspHon s, 914-739 8200 8 June 13, 1979 IP- JPB-5069 Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

IE Bulletin 79-01 Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment

Dear Sir:

As a. result of NRC Circular 78-08 and bulletin 79-01 related to Environmental Qualification of Safety related electrical equipment, and discussions,with the Site Resident NRC Inspector, a detailed search of

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records and reports documenting the environmental qualification of safety related equipment was conducted.

The scope of the components required to be environmentally qualified was determined by reviewing the FSAR, Plant Emergency Procedures and responses to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Table I, lists the major documents reviewed for this determination. The most limiting accidents requiring environmental qualified components were determined to be a loss of coolant accident and a steam line break inside of containment.

Table II lists components requiring environmental qualification and summarizes the method of qualification and the technique used to verify that qualification was actually done. Several components were selected from this list and field inspected to insure that they were of the same type as described in the FSAR and environmental tests. A typical sample consists of the electrical component itself and its feed to the electrical penetration, including cables, splices, limit switches and terminal biccks as appropriate.

After the completion of the detailed review, it was concluded that basic requirements of the FSAR have b'een met. Howaver, as a result of additional testing for long term qualifcation or lack of documentation (or traceability to it), on items not in the original s; cope of qualifcation, several components will be replaced with ones that have been environmentally

_ qualified to the later requirements. Summarized below is a list of those

/ components which will be replaced. Details of each category are discussed (j in the appropriate attachment:

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,, June 13, 1979 a) Terminal blocks are generally associated with instrumentation or limit switch circuitry used for valve position indication. Due

.to the lack.of traceability to a terminal block manufacturer, verification o' environmental qualification is not always possible.

Replacement of, such terminal blocks with qualified' types will be [

under a en during the next refueling outage scheduled to-start September 1, 1979.

b) Several stem mounted limit. switches associated with safety related . ,

valves have been found to be of the type that are not environmentally  !

qualified. These switches were reported as such in letter IPN 79-5 to Director Division of Operation Reactors from P. Early dated. February 16, 1979. - The justification for continued operation '

is contained in this letter.

The. limit switches will be replaced at the next refueling outage scheduled to start September .15,1979, or at aa earlier outage of sufficient duration if replacement switches a;e available sooner.

Additionally stem mounted limit switches are also used to indicate component position. Since failure of these switches will not prevent positioning of the associated component and other means to determine position are available, such as, flow 1

,h _ indication, pressure indication or redundant qualified position indication, replacement of these switches is not considered j- necessary..

c) Instrument transmitters have been environmentally qualified in

• accordance with the FSAR requirements. Following the initial i 4

testing program, further testing of , selected components was i

prescribed to determine capability for long term operation. As a result of this additional testing, replacement of the  ;

following group of transmit;ters with an improved type will be done. '

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Pressurizer Level Reactor Coolant Pressure Steam Generator Level _

The transmitters will be replaced when they become available and during an outage of sufficient duration..

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The following appendicies address the specific results .of the investigations-conducted:

A. Description of the Accident Environment B .. Penetrations .

C. Cables and Splices -; .

D. ' Connectors E Limit Switches .

F. Instrumentation G. Terminal Blocks -

H. Solenoid Valves I. Motors and Motor Operated Valves J. Hydrogen Recombiner Very truly yours,

. P. Bayne f Resident Manager CMC: s

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U POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK INDIAN POINT NO. 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT e P. O. Box 215 BUCH AN AN, N. Y.10511 TaLaPHoNs 914 7394200 9 June 13, 1979 IP-JPB-5069 Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

IE Bulletin 79-01 Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment

Dear Sir:

As a result of NRC Circular 78-08 and bulletin 79-01 related to Environmental Qualification of Safety related electrical equipment, and discussions with the Site Resident NRC Inspector, a detailed search of records and reports documenting the environmental qualification of safety related equipment was conducted.

The scope of the components required to be environmentally qualified was determined by reviewing the FSAR, Plant Emergency Procedures and responses to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Table I lists the major documents reviewed for this determination. The most limiting accidents requiring environmental qualified components were determined to be a loss of_ coolant accident and a steam line break inside of containment.

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9 Table II lists components requiring' environmental qualification and summarizes the method of qualification and the technique used to verify that qualification was actually done. Several components were selected from this list and field inspected to insure that they were of the same type as described in the FSAR and environmental tests. A typical sample consists of the electrical component itself and its feed to the electrical .

penetration, including cables, splices, limit switches and terminal blocks as appropriate.

Af ter the completion of the detailed review, it was concluded that basic requirements of the FSAR have been met. However, as a result of additional testing for long term qualifcation or lack of documentation (or traceability to it) , on items not in the original scope of qualifcation, several components will be replaced with ones that have been environmentally qualified to the later requirements. Summarized below is a list of those components which will be replaced. Details of each category are discussed in the appropriate attachment:

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June 13, 1979 a

a) Terminal blocks are generally associated with instrumentation or limit switch circuitry used for valve position indication. Due to the lack of traceability to a terminal block manufacturer, verification of environmental qualification is not always possible.

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! Replacement of such terminal blocks with qualified types will be 1 undertaken during the next refueling outage scheduled to start September 1, 1979.

b) Several stem mounted limit switches associated with safety related valves have been found to be of the type that are not environmentally qualified. These switches were reported as such in letter IPN _ [

V 79-5 to Director Division of Operation Reactors from P. Early dated February 16, 1979. The justification for continued operation is contained in this letter.

The limit switches will be replaced at the next refueling outage j scheduled to start September 15, 1979, or at an earlier outage of sufficient duration if replacement switches are available sooner.

j< Additionally stem mounted limit switches are also used to

'O i indicate component position. Since failure of these switches will not prevent positioning of the associated component and p other means to determine position are available, such as, flo'w 0 indication, pressure indication or redundant qualified position s indication, replacement of these swi'.ches is not considered necessary.

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s c) Instrument transmitters have been environmentally qualified in accordance with the FSAR requirements. Following the initial testing program, further testing of selected components was prescribed to determine capability for long term operation. As a result of this additional testing, replacement of the following group of transmitters with an improved type will be '

done.

Pressurizer Level Reactor Coolant Pressure l Steam Generator Level The transmitters will be replaced when they become available and .-

during an outage of sufficient duration.

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. June 13, 1979

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The following appendicies address the specific results of the investigations [

, conducted:

I i l A. Description of the Accident Environment ,

B. Penetrations I

,, C. Cables and Splices

. D. Connectors F E. Limit Switches F. Instrumentation

• l G. Terminal Blocks J

H. Solenoid Valves I. Motors and Motor Operated Valves i J. Hydrogen Recombiner Very truly yours,  :

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. P. Bayne d Resident Manager j CMC:rmb i

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' DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT The large break loss of coolant accident is postulated to occur.

from a double ended severance (Guillotine) of the largest cold leg pipe.

(Refer to FSAR Section 14.3) This accident ansumes that there is a flow of water from both ends of the pipe but no transnission between the ends. The ,

containment temperature is expected to rise to 258'F. Refer to Figure 1.

The pressure is expected to rise to 39 psig. Refer to Figure 2. The, .

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radiation dose during 40 years of operation is assumed to yield a total integrated dose 4X10 ~rnds.' The containment atmosphere integrated dose is

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calculated to be 1.5X10 rads. Refer to Figure 3. The chemistry due to a containment spray of sodium hydroxide (40%) and boron (2000 ppm) will yield a ph of 10.0. The chemistry expected in containment was submitted in response to Bulletin 77-04 from Consolidated Edison to the NRC.

For the steam line break the peak containment temperature is expected to be approximately 262*F. The containment pressure is expected to rise to 41 psig. ^ Refer to Figure 4 for pressure transient. No adverse chemistry or radiation levels are expected due to this postulated accident.

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n While the calculated steam line break containment conditions established

the temperature conditions, the radiation doses were established based on ,

! . Total Internal Dose source terms with credit taken for shielding based on j the' location of the transmitters. The resultant doses are overly conservative ,

with respect to both the postulated loss of coolant accident and the postulated steam line break accident.

i Testing of the various instruments was completed in mid 1976. Test results  !

showed that all RTD models successfully not their test requirements and. i l survived throughout the initial portion and post accident monitoring phase ,

of the accident. The Fischer and Porter tre.nsmitter and the Foxboro Transmitter a were both tested for initial automatic protective function initiation and -

were deemed to have successfully met their test requirements. Details of l the testing have been reported in Westinghouse's WCAP-9157. '

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u While the results of the testing for the Barton, Veritrak and Foxboro i indicated that the transmitters could provide automatic short term (order l "

of seconds) protective functions (e.g. reactor trip, safety injection) ,

none of the transmitters met the (4 month) requirement establ.ished by l Westinghouse for long term post accident monitoring. The resd ts of this 1

testing were provided to the NRC under Westinghouse letter NS-Cb 1179, C.

Eicheldinger to J. F. Stolz (NRC) dated August 26, 1976. Subsequent investigation identified the cause of the unsuccessful long term Barton results to be i steam and chemical environment leaking into the transmitter casing.

I Further testing of the Barton transmitter has been performed and will be discussed later on in this report.

The testing and analysis presented above was generic for fourteen Westinghouse -

plants. The following is an analysis applicable to Indian point No. 3.

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j TABLE II .

Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified Penetration H35 Pressure Westinghouse Not,e 2

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Boundary and Document Review

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.l Penetration H23 Pressure Westinghouse Note 2 Field Inspection l

Boundary -

• and Document Review Penetration H57 Pressure Westinghouse Note 2 Field Inspection Boundary and Document Review .

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I Penetration H42 Pressure Westinghouse . Note 2 Field Inspection Boundary and Document Review

, Penetration H28 Pressure ' Westinghouse Note 2 Field Inspection Boundary , and Document Review

.; Penetration H53 Pressure Westinghouse Note 2 Field Inspection i Boundary and Document Review Penetration H27 Pressure Westinghouse Note 2 Field Inspection Boundary , and Document Review Panetration H25 Pressure Westinghouse Note 2 Field Inspection

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. .e and Document Review

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. 0 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOFAL FIDW Residual heat removal flow is monitored by 4 transmitters. Flow trans-bitters FT-946A, B, C and D are used to indicate flow through each of the four low head injection legs. They are Foxboro Model E13DH-MCA with radiation re-sistant amplifiers. Testing by Westinghouse was performed and documented in NS-PLC-5023 T.M. Anderson (Westinghouse) to E. G. Case (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) dated April 26, 1978. Foxboro Model E13-DM-MCA with radiation re-sistant amplifier (this model transmitter is similar to the E13DH-MCA with radiation resistant amplifiers model) was the subject of the test. The ir-radiation exposure consisted of an intergrated dose of 1.8 x 107 rads. The output of the test units experienced no change as a result of radiation exposure.

The transmitters then underwent autoclave testing at Westinghouse Forest Hills test facility. The profile consisted of chemical spray injection (1.140% boric acid and .17% sodium hydroxide) at the start of the test with a temperature rise to 320*F maintaining 75 psig. At the end of the initial 20 minutes the test conditions were gradually reduced to 220*F and held there for 5 1/2 days (equivalent to 4 weeks) before the first unit became inoperable and exceeded the + 25% accuracy limit set for long term monitoring.

Foxboro performed environmental tests on the same type of transmitter and documented it in report Q9-6005. The profile of the test consisted of steam at 318'F at 90 psi for one hour then decreasing to 228'F @ 56 psi for an additional 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The output of the transmitter decreased by a maximum of 9.00% during the 318'F period and to 5.58% during the 288'F period.

In addition, the following tests were performed by Foxboro on a separate offects testing basis:

1) Irradiation testing of various type electronics amplifiers used in transmitters, report T2-1075.

, 2) Irradiation testing of various electronics amplifiers used in 1 transmitters, report T3 4097.

3) Loss of coolant environment and chemical spray performed on various

transmitters, report T3-1013.

4) Loss of coolant environment without chemical spray supplement to report T3-1013.

5) Irradiation testing of gaskets used in transmitters, report T4-6045.

6) Transmitter amplifier irradiation, report T3-1068.

7) Oil bath transmitter test, report T4-6061.

All of the above mentioned tests were performed at Franklin Institute-Research Laboratory except the supplement to report T3-1013 which was performed l by Foxboro.

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Based on the above testing the individual low head injection transmitters are qualified for long term monitoring in the order of four weeks. This period encompasses time required to change over to the recirculation phase. The need for additional long term monitoring and duration of same is being undertaken by Westinghouse in addition to qualification testing of new model transmitters.

Assurance of adequate flow can be obtained during recirculation by using pump capacity curves, containment pressure instrumentation, reactor soplant temperature and the position of the motor operated valves to deterr; 4 fTow j paths.

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PESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL FIDi Additionally FT- 638 measures- the total flow of FT-946C and FT-946D and

- FT- 640 measures the total flow of FT-946A and FT-946b. FT-640 is the same model transmitter as' the individual loop flow transmitter where as FT-638 is a model E13-DH-MCA.

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- CONTAINMENT AND RECIRCULATION StJMP LEVEL

• Two containment and two recirculation sump level instruments are used to monitor level of water in containment during a loss of coolant accident.

The instruments are manufactured by DeLaval (Model LS-1900s), and are designed for submerged service at 295'F and 60 psig. Westinghouse WCAP 9157 analyzed instruments of this design and found that since these devices have seen considerably more severe service than the postulated accident, environmental testing is not required.

The primary function of the sump level instrumentation is to ensure adequate water inventory to the suction of the recirculation pumps and containment sump pumps. This can be achieved via the refueling water level instrumentation and equating the volume of water injected to a water level in containment.

The lowest safeguard equipment that will be affected by flooding is located at elevation of 52' 7/8". The post accident water level is 50' 1 1/2" as submitted in William J. Cahill (Consolidated Edison) to R.C. Young (NRC) letter dated January 9, 1976. 158,000 gallons of water would need to be added into containment before the water level would reach the lowest safeguard component. This amounts to approximately 90% of all water available

, on site that could be added.

It is our intention not to replace the containment or recirculation sump level instrumentation.

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURL Three narrow-range pressurizer transmitters and two wide-range loop transmitters monitor the pressure of the reactor coolant system.

The pressurizer pressure transmitters initiate a reactor trip signal at high pressurizer pressure and an engineered safeguards actuation and reactor trip on low pressurizer pressure. The wide-range loop pressure transmitters are used to monitor pressure conditions during and after a postulate accident. The two wide-range pressure loop transmitters are "oxboro Model EllGH. The three pressurizer pressure narrow range transmitters are Foxboro Model E11GM.

For short term tripping functions (applicable to narrow range trans-mitter) testing of this type of transmitter is documented in Westinghouse WCAP 7410-L Volume I. The profile of the test consists of supplying approx-imately 60 psig and 2900F steam for two hours. The output signal from the transmitter stayed within -10% of the initial value -hour after the start of the test. The output then decreased to approximately -14% after the two hour test period.

The acceptable accuracies for short term agtomatic protective functions of the pressurizer pressure instrumentation is _10% as established and sub-mitted in NS-CE-743, C. Eicheldinger (Westinghouse) to K. B. Vassalo (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) dated August-8, 1975.

i Foxboro performed environmental tests on a similar type of transmitter and documented it in Report Q9-6005. The profile of the test consisted of.

steam at 3180F at 90 psi for one hour then decreasing to 2880 F @ 56 psi for an additional 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The output of the transmitter decreased by a maximum of 9.00% during the 3180F period and to 5.58% during the 288 F period.

In addition the following tests were also performed by Foxboro on separate effects testings basis:

1.) Irradiation testing of various type electronics amplifiers used in transmitters, Report T2-1075.

2.) Irradiation testing of various electronics implifiers used in transmitters, Report T3-1097.

All of the above mentioned t5.sts were performed at Franklin Institute Research Laboratory. The testing program demonstrates short . term qualifica-tions.

The need for long term monitoring (applicable to wide range transmitters) and duration of same has been undertaken by Westinghouse. Based on that

, analysis both reactor coolant loop transmitters will be replaced when they become available,at an outage of sufficient duration.

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PRESSURIZER LEVEL The pressurizer level instrumentation consists of three hot calibrated and one cold calibrated transmitter. Both the hot and cold calibrated transmitters can be used for long term monitoring of the pressurizer level. All four pressurizer level transmitters are Foxboro Model E13DH.

Foxboro performed environmental tests on the same type of transmitter and documented it in report Q9-6005. The profile of the test consisted of steam at 318'F at 90 psi for one hour then decreasing to 288*F 0 56 psi for an additional 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The output of the transmitter decreased by a maximum of 9.00% during the 318'F period and to 5.58% during the 288'F period.

In addition, the following tests were performed by Foxboro on a separate effects testings basis:

1) Irradiation testing of various type electronics amplifiers used in transmitters report T2-1075.

2) Irradiation testing of various electronics amplifiers used in trans-mitters, report T3-1097.

All of the above mentioned tests were performed at Franklin Institute Research Laboratory. The need for long term monitoring and duration of same has been undertaken by Westinghouse. Based on that analysis and subsequent en-vironmental testing the three hot calibrated transmitters will be replaced when

, they become available and at an outage of sufficient duration.

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, STEAM FIDW The steam flow instrumentation consists of eight transmitters, two on each of the four main steam lines. The trancmitters are Rosemount Model ll51DP5A.

The intent of transmitter is to generate an Engineered Safeguards Initiation for a break in the Main Steam Line downstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV). Since the MSIV's are located outside of containment the steam flow transmitters would not be affected by this accident. If a steam break occurs in containment the steam line pressure transmitters which are located outside of containment are designed to sense it and initiate an Engineered Safeguard Initiation. Since the adverse containment environment would not effect either steam line break protection environmental qualification is not considered necessary.

However Rosemount perfomed radiation and environmental tests on this type of transmitter and documented it in report RMT67710A. The profile consists of irradiation to 1.34107 rads then subjecting the transmitter to seven hours of steam saturated at 303"F followed by 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br /> at 2308F.

The error at 303*F and 230'F were .5% + .75% of the span respectively.

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d b CONTAINMENT PRESSURE d

The containment pressure is monitored by six Foxboro transmitters Modql EllGM. The transmitters initiate a safety injection signal at 3.5 psig.

and will generate a containment spray' signal when the pressure builds up to j approximately 22 psig. The transmitters are located outside of containment l

i with a sensor line in containment, therefore they will not see the adverse '

containment environment and do not require'either short or long term qualification.

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IIICH HEAD INJECTION FLOWS The high head flow to the cold legs of the reactor coolant system are monitored by eight transmitters. There are two injection points into each of the four loops. All eight transmitters are Foxboro Type EllDM.

Testing of this type of transmitter is documented in Westinghouse WCAP 7410-L Vol. I. The test profile consists of raising the temperature to approximately 285 F. and 60 psig and maintaining this condition for approx-imately two. hours. During the first five minutes of the test, the output deviated to a maximum +6%. During the total two hour test period, the transmitter experienced a maximum error of +14%.

Foxboro performed environmental tests on the same type of transmitter and documented it in Report Q9-6005. The profile of the test consisted of steam at 318 F at 90 psi for one hour then decreasing to 2880F @ 56 psi for an additional 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The output of the transmitter decreased by a maxi-mum of 9.00% during the 3180F period and to 5.58% during the 2880F period.

In addition, the following tests were also performed by Foxboro on a separate effects testing basis:

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Irradiation testing of various type electronics amplifiers used in transmitters, Report T2-1075.

2.) Irradiation testing of various electronics amplifiers used in transmitters, Report T3-1097.

All of the above mentioned tests were performed at F.ranklin Institute Research Laboratory. The testing program demonstrates short term qualifica-tion., The need for long term monitoring and duration of same is being under taken by Westinghouse in addition to qualification testing of new model transmitters. Assurance of adequate flow can be obtained during recirculation by using pump capacity curves, containment pressure instrumentation, reactor coolant temperature and the position of the motor operated valves to deter-mine flow paths.

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STEAM GE!!ERATOR LEVEL

'The level instrumentation on each'of the steam generators consists of four transmitters, three narrow and one wide-range. The instrumentation is used to monitor the parameter during either a steam break or a loss of coolant accident.

The narrow range transmitter will initiate a reactor trip and start the auxiliary boiler feed system on a low-low steam generator level condition. The intent of the system is to maintain a heat sink for the reactor via the steam generators. Since this tripping function will occur at the outset of an accident, the transmitters need only to be short term environmentally qualified. The existing transmitters are Foxboro Model E13DM which were qualified for short term tripping functions in Westinghouse WCAP 9157. The transmitter was initially irradiated to 4 x 104 rads with no change in output after exposure. The envi-ronmental profile in WCAP 9157 consisted of increasing the temperature to 320*F and 66 psig in a rapid period. After a short time the transmitter exceeded the i los accuracy requirement, but remained.within the accuracy required for trip functions during the first 30 seconds.

In addition the following tests were also performed by Foxboro on a separate effects testing basis:

1) Irradiation testing of various type electronics amplifiers used in transmitters, report T2-1075.

2) Irradiation testing of various type electronics amplifiers used in transmitters, report T3-1097.

All cf the above mentioned tests were performed at Franklin Institute Research Laboratory.

The need fcr long term monitoring and duration of same has been undertaken by Westinghouse.

Based on the results of that analysis we intend to replace four wide-range transmitters, one per steam generator. This,will assure proper heat sink for the reactor through the steam generator by monitoring its water inventory. The transmitter will be replaced when they become available and at an outage of sufficient duration.

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r ACCUMULATOR LEVEL AND ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE The accumulator _ level instrumentation consists of eight transmitters monitoring

- four tanks. Each tank has two Rosemount model 1151DP5A' transmitter to measure level.

The accumulator pressure instrumentation consists of eight transmitters monitoring four tanks. Each tank has two Foxboro Model EllGM transmitters to measure pressure. '

The intent of the level instrumentation is to assure the proper water inventory exists in the accumulator. The pressure instrumentation assures that the proper driving force exists to inject the contents of the accumulators into the core. Since these parameters are monitored prior to the accident and no operator actions are required to activate the passive injection system, environmental qualification of both the accumulator pressure level transmitters is not considered necessary.

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RECIRCULATION SPRAY FLOW

. Two recirculation flow transmitters are used to monitor flow in the containment spray header during a recirculation phase. The transmitters are Foxboro Model E13DM.

Foxboro performed an environmeratal test on the same type of transmitter and documented report Q9-6005. The profile of the test consisted of steam at 318'F at 90 psi for one hour then decreasing to 288'F at 56 psi for an additional 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The output of the transmitter decreased by a maximum of -9.00% during the 318" period and to -5.58s during the 288'F period.

In addition the folowing tests were also performed by Foxboro on a separate effects testing basis:

1. Irradiation testing of various type electronics amplifiers used in transmitters, report T2-1075.

2. Irradiation testing of various electronics amplifiers used in transmitters, report T3-1097.

All of the above mentioned tests were performed at Franklin Institute Research Laboratory. The need for long term monitoring and duration of same is being undertaken by Westinghouse in addition to qualification testing of new model transmitters. Assurance of adequate spray flow can be obtained by using pump capacity curves, containment pressure reactor coolant temperature, and the position of the motor operated valves to determine flow paths.

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TRANSMITTER REPLACEMENT The following transmitters will be replaced with improved environmental qualified transmitters when they become available and at an outage of - -

sufficient duration.

Pressurizer Level (3) -

Reactor Coolant Pressure- (2)

Steam Generator' Level (Wide Range) (4)

As stated earlier Westinghouse has undertaken a review of the need for long term monitoring and duration of same in addition to qualification testing of new model transmitters. We intend to review their recommendations and if deemed necessary replace transmitters when they become available -

and at an outage of sufficient duration.

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- APPENDIX G TERMINAL BLOCK The review of terminal blocks encompassed all of the components listed in Table II. In order to determine if terminal blocks were used in a particular circuit the wiring diagrams were reviewed and in some cases a field inspection was performed. In all cases terminal block qualification documentation could not be obtained. The following is an analysis of the components effected planned actions and justification for continued operation.

FCV 1170, 72 During an accident the valves go closed from a containment ventilation isolation signal (CVIS) by removing power to their solenoid valve. Terminal block failure would not open the valves since power is needed to do so.

Failure of the terminal block could conceiveably cause the valves to open if the CVIS is not present. A control switch on the control room supervisory panel when positioned to close will maintain the valves in the closed position. This switch will be maintained closed except during purging operation and will be checked closed if it becomes necessary to reset containment ventilation isolation following a loss of coolant accident.

However, it is our intention to replace the terminal blocks with ones having documentation of qualification when they are available and at an outage of sufficient duration.

PCV 1190 The containment ventilation isolation system will close the valve by removing power to its solenoid. Terminal block failure would not open the valve since pvwer is needed to do so. Containment integrity is further ensured by two valves in series with PCV 1190 which are located outside of containment. However, it is our intention to replace the terminal blocks with ones having documentation of qualification when they are available and at an outage of suf ficient duration.

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES The power feed to the motors of the valves do not use externally mounted terminal blocks. The wires are terminated inside of the motor operator which have been fully qualified as described in Appendix I, entitled Motors and Motor Operated Valves. The motor operator internal limit switches used for control' and indication circuits generally use a terminal block internal to the motor operators and have been fully qualified _

as described in Appendix I, entitled Motors and Motor Operated valves. The following is an analysis of those motor operator 10mit switches and stem a mounted limit switches of those motor operator limit switches and stem mounted limit switches associated with terminal blocks which are not within the motor operators.

MOV 730, 731 - (RHR RETURN FLOW)

Contacts off the internal limit switches within the motor operator are

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routed to a terminal block housed in a terminal' box. The circuit is used to activate an alarm entitled " Valve 730 or 731 Not Fully Open". This alarm

{.).{ , is not necessary during an accident. However position of the Salves can be '

q determined by the valve position lamps in the control room which feed off

& internally qualified limit switches and terminal blocks. Based on the Mish. above it is our intention not to replace the terminal blocks.

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- MOV 746, 747, 899A, (RHR SUPPLY FLOW) i Contacts off an internal valve limit switch within the motor operator are routed to a terminal block housed in a terminal box. The contacts are used to illu ninate a red lamp associated with recirculation switch number

5. (This sw. tch is used during the recirculation phase of an accident) .

The red lamp is intended as a convenience to the operator which indicates ,

to the operator that several valves required to be operated by recirculation switch have ccmpleted their operation. Failure of this circuit will not affect the ope. ability of the valves. The individual valve positions are obtained by the limit switch and terminal blocks located with the motor operated valves previously qualified as described in Appendix I. In 1

addition valve position can be established by flow path indication. However, it is our intention to replace the terminal blocks with qualified ones when '

they are available and at an outage of sufficient duration.

" SAFEGUARDS VALVE OFF NORMAL POSITION ALARM" i

This alarm is intended for use prior to an accident to alert the operator to a valve which is not positioned in the safeguards position.

i Individual valve positions are also monitored by the valve position lamps which are operated off the internal limit switches and terminal block t qualified as described in Appendix I. Based on the above it is our intention not to replace the terminal blocks. The individual valve position indications are utilized during accident conditions to monitor position of these selected

valves.

"DE-ENERGIZED SI VALVES CORRECT POSITION ALAPR" This alarm is intended for use prior to an accident to alert the operator to an incorrect valve position for selected de-energized valves.

Individual valve position indications are also monitored by valve position lamps which are operated off the internal limit switches and terminal block qualified as described in Appendix I.

i Following energization of these valves, required indication via qualified limit switches and terminal blocks would be available. Based on the above is our intention not to replace the terminal blocks. -

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,. Th3 following valvsa tra ezzocietcd with the alcrm

, MOV 894A, B, C, D - Accumulator Discharge Isolation Valve MOV 856 B & G .110t Leg High Head Injection Valve

,MOV 744 - RHR Pump Discharge Valve

• MOV 882 - RHR Pump Suction MOV 1810 - RWST Discharge Valve MOV 842 - Safety Injection Test Line MOV 843 - Safety Injection Test Line PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AIR IOCKS Terminal blocks are used on the air locks for control room indication and alarm of airlock door position. Prior to a postulated accident, the status of the door would be known by the alarm and indication in the control room. Furthermore, the containment is considered a high radiation area and at lease one door is closed and maintained locked. During an accident the doors are not expected to be open. Based on the above it is our intention i not to replace the terminal blocks.

_ CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION FANS Terminal blocks are used in various circuits associated with the recirculation fans. However, none of these circuits would make the fans inoperable if they failed. The dampers, go to emergency condition when power is removed from the solenoid. The remaining circuits are alarm devices. It is our intention not to replace the terminal blocks.

INSTRUMENTATION Terminal blocks are generally used in instrumentation circuits. The manufacturer of the terminal block could not be obtained hence qualification documentation could not be located. At next outage of sufficient duration, a more detailed inspection will be conducted and if qualification of blocks cannot be obtained the blocks will be replaced with blocks whose qualification have been documented.

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e APPENDIX H o

SOLENOID VALVES The following components located within containment that are controlled by solenoid valves and are required to operate during accident conditions. >

Pan Cooler Dampers Unit 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 FCV 1170, 72 - Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust Valves FCV 391A, B, C, D - Air Operated Containment Isolation Valves Nitrogen to Accumulators)

PCV-1190 - Containment Pressure Relief Valves Air Locks - Pressure Instrumentation Isolation Valves A review was performed to determine what type of solenoid valves were actu ally installed and the type of qualification performed.

The results indicated that all components except the fan cooler damper use various types of ASCO Valves. Westinghouse _WCAP 7744 and Westinghouse letter NS-CE-755 addresses the environmental qualifications of the ASCO solenoid valves. 'The following evaluation was presented in NS-CE-755 which analysed the possible failure modes of the solenoids and showed that the components which are actuated by the solenoids are able to perform their function.

The potential modes of failure are loss of air supply, electrical failure, environmentally failure caused degradation of material of construction, and the plunger binding due to thermal expansion of the plunger to the core. The components and solenoid valves are designed such that a failure of the solenoid valves would make the component go to the safe position.

In the event of a break in the air supply or rupture of the solenoid, the air would be removed from the component making it go to the safe mode.

Potential electrical failure modes in the coil are short or open circuits. Either failure would make the coil drop out and remove air to the actuator positioning it in the safe mode. In addition, the design of the engineered safeguards actuation system is such that the power to the solenoid valve is removed from a point outside of containment at the start of the loss of coolant accident thereby further decreasing the potential for electrical failures.

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The interior of the solenoid valve would not'be subjected to the -

containment environment unless the solenoid valve is in the safe mode ~i.e.,

the vent is open to containment atmosphere in the de-energized state.

Th'e potential for binding of the plunger to the core due to thermal expansion was evaluated by the manufacture and Westinghouse, and determined that clearance used in the solenoid valve are acceptable in order to prevent its failure.

• a Tha fan coolsr dampers uma a solenoid valva manufccturzd by Skimmer Electric. These valves are not environmentally qualified, however, as s,tated above failure of the solenoid would make the damper go to the safe mode.

With regard to NRC Bulletin 79-OlA (deficiencies in the environmental qualification of ASco solenoid valves) we have analyzed the failure of the solenoid components. In summary, the degradation of the internals of the solenoid valves would not cause a safeguard component to failure in an unsafe mode. In particular, for the purge and exhaust valves if the solenoids coils fail the valves would not go open. Failure of the non-metallic internal parts of the solenoid would not allow enough air supply pressure to build up in the actuator to open the valve. Also failure of the solenoid would would make the valve go to the closed position. However, will further review solenoid operated components and if deemed necessary replace them with qual'ified ones.

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APPENDIX I MOTOR AND MOTOR OPERATED VALVES Motor Operated Valves All motor operated valves required to be functional during a loss of coolant accident were identified in Table II. For each valve identified, the Westinghouse purchase orders (PO 91710 and 67762) and specification G676258 were reviewed, or a field inspection was concluded. The field inspection revealed that all of the valves inspected were Class HR insulation. Approximately 60% of the safety related valves were inspected.

The limitorque motor operated valves were tested to IEEE 382 1972 by Limitorque '

Corporation. The details of the testing are documented in Limitorque Test Report Project #600456.

Westinghouse WCAP 7744* summarizes additional tests performed on limitorque motor operated valves. These tests indicated that the limitorque operator with Class H insulation, along with associated limit switches operated satisfactorily in a LOCA environment.

Prior to the chemical, temperature, pressure and humidity tests documented in WCAP 7744, the limit and torque switch mounted in the operator was subjected to a dry heat test for approximately 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> at a temperature of 375'F. The components were actuated by hand periodically during the test.

The operation was satisfactory and no malfunctions occurred. A completely assembled Limitorque Operator was tested by placing it in an oven where the temperature was maintained at approximately 325'F for a duration of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The unit was electrically operated every thirty minutes for a period of approximately two minutes per cycle using the geared limit switches to stop the actuator at the full open and full closed position of travel. Indicating light circuits were also wired to the geared limit switches. Another complete Limitorque actuator was tested by setting up for electrical operation and live steam was piped into the conduit taps on the top of the ILmit switch compartment. One of the bottom conduit taps was left open to drain off any condensate. The operator was set up on a timer basis for operation over a period of approximately nine hours and operating every thirty minutes for two minutes per cycle. In addition, the limit switches were wired up to indicating lights.

The environonmental test profile included increasing the temperature in the

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test chamber to 329'F and the pressure to 90 psig. Af ter 40 minutes chemical spray was injected into the chamber yielding a ph of 7.67. The spraying continued for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The pressure was reduced to the following values in the time frame specified below:

After 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> pressure equals 70 psig Af ter 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> pressure equals 40 psig After 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> pressure equals 20 psig After 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> pressure equals 15 psig The pressure remained at 15 psig and 250'F for 6 days.

• WCAP 7744 is Non-proprietary Report of 7410L 4

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Prior to plant licensing, six motor operators for safety injection system high head valves 856B, G, C, H, E, J, were relocated to a higher elevation to ensure they would not be submerged following a loss of coolant accident.

. The , drives between the remote motor operators and the valves were environmentally qualified through Franklin Institute Research Laboratory. The test profile consisted of subjecting the drive units to 286*F temperature, 60 psig pressure and a chemical spray at a ph of 9.8. The conditions were maintained for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The above has been documented in EUP-1430, LE-1796 E. U. Powell (WEDCO) to Dr. M. S. Silberstein (Con Edison) dated January 22, 1976.

Recirculation Pump Motor The qualification of the recirculation pump motor was performed by seperate effects and is discussed in Westinghouse WCAP 7829 and 7410 L vol. II.

WCAP 7829 discussed a type test of a typical motor using the following i

environmental parameters: motor aging to 40 years, cherdcal spray at a ph of 9.5, 80 psig and 324*F. The motor was run for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> at approximately the above conditions, then stopped and restarted without spray for approximately 1 1/2 hours before stopping. This test sequence was performed four times at the above environmental profile then, repeated each day for one week at 2 psig and 240*F. In addition to the type test, a component test was ,

performed on insulated bars to qualify the epoxy insulation used on the stators of the motors.

Thebarswereagedto40 years,thengumidifiedand g mechanically stressed prior to the radiation exposure of 2X10 rads. The tbreakdown voltage was satisfactorily determined thru destructive testing of ,

!the insulated bars.

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The motor which was tested was designed such that all standarized features tnd material were included. Other non-standard parameters were equal to I.he least conservative that might be used in later design. Acceptance of he generic test to the specific motor utilized at IP3 are addressed in

'etters to the NRC from Westinghouse NS-CE-1009 dated 3/31/76, NS-CE-728 1 ited 8/1/75 and NS-CE-692 dated 7/10/75.

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AP 7744 volume II discussed irradiation test of motor coil insulation The St profile for the coil insulation qualification consists of:

1. 3 samples were irradiated to 1.25X106 , 1.3X107 and 1.41X108 rads followed by thermal aging for 336 hours0.00389 days <br />0.0933 hours <br />5.555556e-4 weeks <br />1.27848e-4 months <br />.

• 2, 3samplesgerethermglagedfor3g6hoursfollowedbyirradiation to 1.25X10 , 1.60X10 and 1.40X10 rads.

3. 6 Thermal aging for 25,00 hougs followed by irradiation go 1.25X10 rads for 2 samples, 1.43X10 for 2 samples and 1.25X10 rads for samples.

il insulation was then subjected to a "HiPot" of 1880 volts and then kdown voltage in .5KV steps. The results of both tests indicate ictory performance with respect to insulation characteristics.

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a A field inspection confirmed that the model number installed in the field

, was the same as that indicated on the Westinghouse purchase order.

Containment Recirculation Fans The recirculation pump motors and the containment fan motors are of the 6 same generic design,.therefore, the qualification tests, associated letters profile are also applicable to the containment recirculatoin fan motors.

The verification of the fans was investigated by the same methods as the recirculation pumps. The field inspection, technical manual and mechanical equipment alingment report all yielded the same model number. The Mechanical Equipment Alignment Report was performed by the constructor during the construction phase.

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APPENDIX J-

. HYDROGEN RECOMBINER '

' The Hydrogen Recombiner consists of the following components: temperature detector, ignitor, ignitor exicter, flow switches, motor and blower.

Westinghouse WCAP 7744 summarizes the tests performed on the hydrogen recombiner components.

As submitted in WCAP 7744, the blower, igniter and temperature detectors were not included in the Westinghouse tests since past operating experience indicates they are capable of functioning in the containment environment.

The flow switches were also not tested. The failure of the flow switch would not prevent the recombiners from operating satisfactory since loss of flow would be detected by other instruments within the recombiner's control panel located outside of containment.

Ignitor Exciter Test Prior to the three week tests documented in WCAP 7744 the ignitor exciter was subjected to 3.7X107 rads, 1.13X108 rads and 1.73X108 rad exposure.

The ignitor, after the exposure indicated satisfactory performance.

The ignitor exciter was then operated 15 minutes per day for a three week period and functioning properly.

Blower Motor Westinghouse WCAP 7744 discusses tests performed on a 2 Hp blower which is the same design as the 15 Hp blower used in the actual hydrogen recombiner.

The blower was operated for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> each day for the three week period.

Prior to the environmental tests documented in WCAP 7744 the motor was subjected to 2X108 rads exposure.

The environmental test ~ profile for both the ignitor and blower consisted of supplying steam to the test chamber to produce approximately 60 psig in 9.5 second then maintained 55 psig and 285*F for two hours. The test chamber's pressure and temperatures were reduced to 20 psig and 220*F for t

22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />, then maintained at a few psig and 155'F for a three week period, A boric acid spray was turned on inside the test chamber approximately 1 k 1/4 hours after the start of the test, and it was maintained for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at a spray rate of 10 gal /hr. The spray solution was prepared by dissolving 1.5 percent of boric acid (by weight) in water, and adding sodium hydroxide to buffer the ph to a value of 9.25.

Document review and field inspection verified that the equipment '

actually installed was consistent with that designed for the Hydrogen Recombiner.

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, TABLE I 1 t

1) Bulletin 79-01 '

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2) ' Circular 78-08 and all Referenced Documents. .

4 3) Circular 77-02 Terminal Blocks

4) Circular 77-04 Limit Switches  !

5) Circular 77-05,77-05A - Connectors 6)

Circular 77-06 Penetrations

7) Plant Emergency Procedures-Engineered Safeguards. Systems Actuation

8) FSAR

9) IEEE Standards i i

10) Raychem Splice Specifications ,

11) UE&C Cable and Conduit Schedule j f 12) Construction Records  !

i 13) Regulatory Guides i

14) Consolidated Edison Correspondence on Environmental Qualifications t 4

15) UE&C Correspondence on Environmental Qualifications t

i 16) HRC Correspondence on Environmental Qualifications i

17) Various Utilities correspondence on Environmental Qualifications

18) Foxboro Test Reports

19) Rosemount Test Reports , [

20) Crouse Ilinds Test Reports

21) Limitorque Test Reports

22) . Franklin Institute Test Reports 1

23) ACME Limit Switch Test Reports.

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24) Westinghouse Test Reports

25) ' Westinghouse WCAP 7744 Environmental Safety Features Related Equipment

[ Volume 1 and 2 i

(' 26) Westinghouse WCAP 5829 Fan Cooler-Motor Unit Test l

l- *27) Westinghouse WCAP 7410-L Vol. I & II Topical Report- Environmental Testing of Engineered Safety Related Equipment

-42'.

4 TABLE II Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified V-856B High Head Injection Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-856C Ifigh Head Injection Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-856A High Head S.I. Limitorque WCAP7410L, . . Field Inspection and Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-856D High Head S.I. Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-856F High Head S.I. Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-856K High Head S.I. Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-856E High Head Injection Limitorque UCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-856G High Head Injection Limitorque ' WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-85611 High Head Infection Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-856J High Head Injection Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-746 RHR Heat Exchanger Limitorque UCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Limitorque 600456 Document Review

. V-747 RHR Heat Exchanger Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-889A Recire. Spray Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Limitorque .600456 Document Review

• V-889B Recirc. Spray Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Limitorque 600456 Document Review

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TABLE II Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified V-880A F.C.U. Charcoal

. Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Dousing Limitorque 600456 Document Review.

V-880B F.C.U. Charcoal Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and .

Dousing Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-880C F.C.U. Charcoal Limitorque */ CAP 7410L, Field Inspection and Dousing Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-880D F.C.U. Charcoal Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Dousing Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-880E F.C.U. Charcoal Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Dousing Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-880F F.C.U. Charcoal Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Dousing Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-880G -

F.C.U. Charcoal Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Dousing Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-880H F.C.U. Charcoal Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Dousing Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-880J F.C.U. Charcoal Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Dousin9 Limitorque 600456 Document Review U-880K F.C.U. Charcoal Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Dousing Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-894A Accumula tor Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Isolation Limitorque 600456 Document Review t

V-894B Accumulator Limitorque >

WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and Isolation Limitorque 600456 _ Document Review

, V-894C Accumulator Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection and.

Isolation- Limitorque 600456 Document Review 45 -

Table II::

Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified l' V-894D Accumulator Limitorque WCAP7410L, Document Review Isolation Limitorque 600456 4

V-1802A Recirculation Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection 1> ump Discharge Limitorque 600456 and Document Review V-1802B Recirculation Limitorque WCAP7410L, . Document Review Pump Discharge Limitorque 600456 V-1869A High Head Limitorque WCAP7410L, Document Review Limitorque 600456' V-1869B High Head Limitorque WCAP7410L, Document Review Limitorque 600456 V-745A RHR Heat Exchanger Limitorque WCAP7410L Field Inspection Limitorque, 600456 and Document Review

'V Z745B- RHR Heat Exchanger Limitorque WCAP7410L. Field Inspection Limitorque 600456 and Document Review

-V-899A RHR Heat Exchanger Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection

,Limitorque 600456 and Document Raview V-899B RHR Heat Exchanger Limitorque WCAP7410L, ,

Limitorque 600456 Document Review V-638 .RHR Control Valves Limitorque WCAP7410L, - -

Field Inspection Limitorque 600456 and Document Review V-640 RHR Control Valves Limitorque WCAP7410L, Field Inspection Limitorque 600456 and Document Review Rahire. Pump Recirculation Westinghouse WCAP 7829, NS-CE-G92 Field Inspection and

1. 31 NSE-CE-728,NS-CE-1009 Document Review WCAP 7410L, Vol. II R;. circ. Pump Recirculation -Westinghouse WCAP 7829, NS-CE-692 Field Inspection and

1. 32 NSE-728,NS-CE-1009 Document Review WCAP 7410L, Vol. II t.

Cont. Fan Cont. Cooling & Westinghouse WCAP-7829, NS-CE-728 Field Inspection and

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Filtration NSE-CE-692,NS-CE-1009 Document Review

. WCAP 7410L, Vol.II -

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Table II Component Function MFG Type Qualification Verified Cont. Fan #32 Cont. Cooling Westinghouse WCAP-7829, NS-CE-728 Field Inspection and NS-CE-692, NS-CE-1009 Document Review WCAP 7410L, Vol. II -

Cont. Fan #33 Cont. Cooling Westinghouse WCAP-7829, NS-CE-728 Field Inspection and NS-CE-692, NS-CE-1009 Document Review WCAP-7410L, Vol. II

' Cont. Fan #34 Cont. Cooling Westinghouse WCAP-7829, NS-CE-728, Field Inspection and NS-CE-692, NS-CE-1009 Document Review WCAP-7410L, Vol. II Cont. Fan #35 Cont. Cooling Westinghouse WCAP-7829,NS-CE-728 Field Inspection and NS-CE-692, NS-CE-1009 Document Review WCAP-7410L, Vol. II

- Tarminal Block Various See Note 1 See Note 1 Field Inspection and Document Rev'lew Limit Switch ' I!igh Head S.I. Limitorque and WCAP-7744 NS-CE-755 Field Inspection V856B NAMCO Limitorque 600456 and Document Review Limit Switch- High Head S.I. Limitorque WCAP- 7410L Field Inspection

. V856C Limitorque 600456 and Document Review

,. Limit Switch- High !!ead S.I. Limitorque WCAP- 7410L Field Inspection 856E Limitorque 600456 and Document Review Limit Switch- High Head S.I. Limitorque and WCAP- 7410L NS-CE-755 Field Inspection 856G NAMCO Limitorque 600456 and Document Review Limit Switch- High Head S.I. Limitorque WCAP -7410L Field Inspection 856H -

, Limitorque 600456 and Document Review Limit Switch- High Head S.I. Limitorque WCAP - 7410L Field Inspection V856J - Limitorque 600456 and Document Review 6

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Table II

, Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified

. Limit Switch- RHR Heat Exchanger Limitorque WCAP- 7410L Fi' eld. Inspection V746 ,

Limitorque 600456 and Document Review ,

Limit Switch- RHR Heat Exchanger Limitorque WCAP *7410L Field Inspection V747 Limitorque 600456 and Document Review

• Limit Switch - Recire. Spray Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection 889A Limitorque 600456 and Document Review Limit Switch- Recirc. Spray Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection -

V889B Limitorque 600456 and Document Review Limit Switch _ Accumulator Isol. Limitorque and WCAP 7410L Field Inspection V894A NAMCO Limitorque 600456 and Document Review Limit Switch- Accumulator Isol. Limitorque and WCAP 7410L Field Inspection V894B NAMCO Limitorque 600456 and Document Review ,

Limit Switch- Accumulator Isol. Limitorque and WCAP 7410L Field Inspection i V894C NAMCO Limitorque 600456 and Document Review Limit Switch- Accumulator Isol. ,Limitorque and WCAP -7410L Field Inspection V894D NAMCO Limitorque 600456 and Document Review Limit Switch- FCU Charcoal Dousing Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection V880A Limitorque 600456 Document Review Limit Switch- FCU Charcoal Dousing Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection V880B Limitorque 600456 and Document Review Limit Switch- FCU Charcoal Dousing Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection

. v880C Limitorque 600456 and Document Review Limit Switch-- Charcoal Dousing Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection

. V880D Limitorque 600456 and Document Review Limit Switch- Charcoal Dousing Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection

.V880E Limitorque 600456 .and Document Review 48 -

W --

Table II Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified Limit Switch- Charcoal Dousing Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection and V880F Limitorque 600456 Document review Limit Switch- Charcoal Dousing Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection and V880G Limitorque 600456 Document Review Limit Switch- Charcoal dousint Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection and V880!! Limitorque 600456 Document Review .

Limit Switch- Charcoal Dousing Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection and V880J Limitorque 600456 Document Review l

. Limit Switch- Charcoal Dousing Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection and V880K Limitorque 600456 Document Review Limit Switch- RIIR !! eat Exchanger Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection and i

V899A Limitorque 600456 Document Review Limit Switch- RHR Heat Exchanger Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection and V899B Limitorque 600456 Document Review Limit Switch- Recirculation Pump Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection and V1802A Discharge Limitorque 600456 Document Review Limit Switch- Recirculation Pump Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection and V1802B Discharge Limitorque 600456 Document Review Limit Switch- High Head Recire. Limitorque VlB69A.

WCAP -/410L Field Inspection and' Limitorque 600456 Document Review Limit Switch- High Head Recirc. Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection and V1869B -

r Limitorque 600456 Document Review Limit Switch- RIIR Heat Exchanger Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection and V745A '

Limitorque 600456 Document Review e

.- . - - - _ . __ _ - - . ._ . _ _ _ _ _ - ~ - . ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _

Table II Coeponent Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified Limit Switch- RHR Heat Exchanger Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection and V745B Limitorque 600456 Document Review ,

I Limit Switch- RHR Control Valve Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspection and .

V638 Limitorque 600C5 Document Review Licit Switch- RHR Control Valve Limitorque WCAP 7410L Field Inspc.ctio'n and i V640 Limitorque 600456 Document Review Limit Switch FCV Cont. Purge Valve NAMCO Analysis ~ Field Insleection -

1170 and Document Review Li=it Switch Cont. Purge Valve NAMCO Analysis Field Inapection FCV 1172 and Document Review Limit Switch Cont. Pressure Relief NAMCO Analysis. Field Inspection PVC 1190 -

and Document Review , -

Limit Switch- N 2 SUPP l y to NAMCO Analysis Field Inspection V891A Accumulator and Document Review Limit Switch- N 2 SuPP l y to , NAMCO Analysis Field Inspection V891B Accumulator and Document Review Limit Switch- N2 Supply to NAMCO Analysis Field Inspection V891C Accumulator and Document Review Limit Switch- N 2SUPP l y to NAMCO Analysis Field Inspection V891D Accumulator and Document Review Limit Switches for Cont. Ventilation NAMCO Analysis Field Inspection Fan Cooler Unit #31 and Docr3ent Review +

Limit Switches for Cont. Ventilation NAMCO Analysis Field Inspection Ft.n Cooler Unit #32 and Documemt Review O g h

9

- , .. , s.. -

.m _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ . _ . . _ . __ _

Table II Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified _

Limit Switches for Analysis Fan ' Cooler Unit #33 Cont. Ventilation NAMCO Field Inspection and Document Review Limit Switches for Analysis Fan Cooler Unit #34 Cont. Ventilation NAMCO Field Inspection and Document Review Limit Switches for Cont. Ventilation NAMCO -

Analysis Field Inspection Fan Cooler Unit #35 and Document Review Solenoid- Containment Purge ASCO WCAP 7410L NS-CE-755 Field Inspection FCV-ll70 and Document Review Solenoid- Containment Purge ASCO WCAP 741on NS-CE-755 Field Inspection

" FCV-Il72 and Document Review Solenoid ' Containment Pressure ASCO WCAP 7410L NS-CE- 755 Field Inspection PCV-Il90 Relief and Document Review Solenoid- Nitrogen Supply ASCO WCAP 741on NS-CE-755 Field Inspection V891A to accumulator and Document Review Solenoid- Nitrogen Supply ASCO WCAP ~741on NS-CE-755 Field Inspection V891B to Accumulator and Document Review Solenoid- Nitrogen Supply ASCO WCAP -741oL NS-CE-755 Field Inspection V891C to Accumulator and Document Review Solenoid- Nitrogen Supply ASCO WCAP 741oL NS-CE-755 Field Inspection ,

V891D to Accumulator and Document Review Anaiysis:

^

Solenoid'-PCU-# 31 ' ' - Containment '

Skimmer Elec Field Inspection Ventilation

,T- ! *

. +

. O O

e g

i~

TABLE II .

Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified Solenoid-FCU-f32 Containment Skimmer Elec. Analysis Field Inspection

, . Ventilation Solenoid-FCU-#33 Containment Skimmer Elec. Analysis Field Inspection Ver+ilation 4

Solenoid-FCU-#34 Containment Skimmer Elec. Analysis Field Inspection Ventilation i' .

Solenold-FCU- #35 . Containment Skimmer Elec. Analysis Field Inspection Ventilation Hydrogen Recombiner Hydrogen Removal Fabrication WCAP 7744 Field Inspection and

1. 31 Engineering Document Review Hydrogen Recombiner ' Hydrogen Removal Fabrication WCAP 7744 Field Inspection and

1. 32 Engineering Document Review PT-936A Accumulator Foxboro Document Review Pressure EllGM Analysis 9

.t PT-936B- Accumulator Foxboro- Analysis Document Review

, Pressure EllGM . .

_ s 2, _

TABLE II ,

i Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified LT-938 Recirculation GEMS Analysis Document Review Sump Level LS-1900 t

LT-939 Recirculation GEMS Analysis Document Review Sump Level LS-1900 LT-940' Contair. ment GEMS Analysis Document Review  ;

Sump Level LS-1900 LT-941 Containment GEMS Analysis Document Review

• Sump Level LS-1900

+

l FT-640 Residual Heat Foxboro MS-PLC-5023 Document Review Flow E13DH FT-638 Residual Heat Foxboro Foxoboro Q9-6005 Document Review Flow E13DH

- FT-946A Residual Heat Foxboro NS-PLC-5023 Document Review Flow E13DH t.

FT-946B' Residual Heat Foxboro NS-PII-5023 Document Review I Flow E13DH O

9

54. -

_ .-. - ,_ . . _- .- - .- . . .. ./

. TABLE II

' Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified PT-936C Accumulator Foxboro Analysis

• Document Review Pressure EllGM .

PT-936D Accumulator Foxboro Analysis' Document Review Pressure EllGM ,,

8 PT-937A Accumulator Foxboro Analysis Document Review

~

Pressure EllGM _

PT-937B Accumulator Foxboro Analysis Document Review Pressure EllGM PT-937C Accumulator .,Foxboro Analysis Document Review EllGM Pressure PT-937D Accumulator Foxboro Analysis Document Review Pressure EllGM

. FT-945A- Recirculation Foxboro Foxboro Q9-6005 Document Review Spray E13DM FT-945B* Recirculation Foxboro. Foxboro Q9-6005 Document, Review Spray Flow E13DM e

6

- 53

• TABLE II

. Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified FT-946C Residual Heat Foxboro NS-PIf-5023 Document Review Flow E13DH FT-946D . Residual Heat Foxboro NS-PLC-5023 Document Review Flow E13DH PT-402 Reactor Coolant Foxboro Analysis Document Review Pressure EllGH PT-403 Reactor Coolant Foxboro Analysis Document Review Pressure EllGH LT-934A Accumulator hosemount Analysis Document Review Level Model 1151DP5A LT-934B Accumulator Rosemount Analysis Document Review Level Model 1151DPSA LT-934C Accumulator Rosemount Analysis Document Review Level Model 1151DPSA

. LT-934D Accumulator Rosemount Analysis Document Review Level Model ll51DP5A O

m55 #

TABLE IX Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified LT-935A Accumulator Rosemount Analysis Document Review Level Model ll51DPSA 4

LT-935B Accumulator Rosemount Analysis Document Review Level Model 1151DPSA .

LT-935C Accumulator Rosemount Analysis Document Review Level Model ll51DP5A LT-935D Accumulator Rosemount Analysis Document Review PT-455 Pressurizer Foxboro WCAP 7410-L Vol. I Document Review Pressure EllGM Foxboro Q9-6005 PT-456 Pressurizer Foxboro WCAP 7410-L Vol. I Document Review Pressure EllGM Foxboro Q9-6005 PT-457 Pressurizer Foxboro WCAP 7410-L Vol. I Document Review Pressure EllGM Foxboro Q9-6005 PT-474 - Pressurizer Foxboro WCAP 7410-L Vol. I Document Review Pressure EllGM

• Foxboro Q9-6005

~

. _ _ _ f

TABLE 22 4

Component. Function MFG Type' Qualificaion Test Verified ,

LT-459 Pressurizer Foxboro Foxboro Q9-6005 Document Review  ;

Level E13DH 1

LT-460 Pressurizer Foxboro Foxboro Q9-6005 Document Review Level E13Dl!

LT-461 Pressurizer Foxboro Foxboro Q9-6005 Document Review Level E13DH ij -

LT-462 Pressurizer Foxboro Foxboro Q9-6005 Document Review Level E13DI!

i

FT-924A High Head Foxboro WCAP 7410-L Vol. I Document Review Flow EllDM Foxboro Q9-6005-l FT-925 High Head Foxboro WCAP 7410-L yol, I Document Review Flow EllDM Foxboro Q9-6005

' FT-926 High Head Foxboro WCAP 7410-L Vol. I Document Review Flow EllDM g Foxboro Q9-6005

. ' FT-927 High Head Foxboro WCAP 7410-L Vol. I Document Review i Flow EllDM- Foxboro QO-6005 i 4 .

k

._ 57 _

./, -

TAB 2.E II .

Component Function . MFG Type Qualification Test Verified FT-926A High Head Foxboro WCAP 7410-L Vol. I Document Review Flow EllDM Foxboro Q9-6005 FT-980 High Head Foxboro frCAP 7410-L Vol. I Document Review

• Flow EllDM Foxboro Q9-6005 FT-981 High Head Foxboro WCAP 7410-L Vol. I Document Review Flow EllDM Foxboro Q9-6005 -

FT-982 '.figh Head Foxboro WCAP 7410-L Vol. I Document Review Flow EllDM Foxboro Q9-6005 FT-419A Steam Flow Rosemount Rosemount 67710A Document Review ll51DP5A FT-419B Steam Flow Rosemount Rosemount 67710A Document Review llSIDP5A FT-429A Steam Flow 'Rosemount Rosemount 67710A Document Review ll51DPSA FT-429B Steam Flow Rosemount Rosemount 67710A

• Document Review ll51DP5A-

'l.

_ 58 #

, TABLE II Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified FT-439A Steam Flow Rosemount Rosemount 67710A Document Review 1151DP5A

+

FT-439B Steam Flow Rosemount Rosemount 67710A Document Review 1151DPSA ,

s FT-449A Steam Flow Rosemount Rosemount 67710A Document Review 1151DPSA 9

FT-449B Steart Flow Rosemount Rosemount 67710A Document Review 1151DP5A LT-417D Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157 Document Review Level E13DM LT-427D Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157 Document Review Level E13DM LT-437D Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157 Document Review Level E13DM ,

, LT-447D Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157 Document Review

Level E13DM

'O 1

, _ _ _ . - _ . . . , _ . , _ . . . _ , _ . . ..59.- ,. _. ,. _ , # . . _ . . . .

. - - _. - - .._ . - . . _ - - .. - = . . . - -

TABLE ZI

• Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified i

.LT-417A Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157 Document Review Level E13DM LT-417B' Steam Generator - Foxboro -

WCAP 9157 Document. Review Level E13DM . ,

LT-417C Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157 ' Document Review Level E13DM i .

1 i

a 'LT-427A Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157 Document nyfiew Level E13DM

. LT-427B Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157- Document Review Level E13DM 7 LT-427C Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157 Document Review Level E13DM LT-437A Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157 Document Review.

Level E13DM , .

,LT-437B . Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157 Document Review Level E13DM k

+

_ . - . _ __ , - .. m.. . . - . , . _ - . .v, c-

TABLE II Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified LT-437C Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157 Document Review Level E13DM LT-447A Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157 Document Review Level E13DM LT-447B Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157 Document Review Level E13DM LT-447C Steam Generator Foxboro WCAP 9157 Document Review Level E13DM TE-413A Hot Leg #31 Loop Sostman .WCAP 9157 Document Review Temperature 11901B-1 Wide Range TE-423A Hot Leg #32 Loop Sostman. WCAP 9157 Document Review Temperature 11901B-1 Wide Range TE-433A Hot Leg #33 Loop Sostman i WCAP 9157 Document Review Temperature 11901B-1 Wide Range s

_ 61 -

_ - _ _ - - - - _ . . . . . ...- -. _ .= .-_. . - . . ._ - . - .

TABLE TI Component

• Function ' MFG Type Qualification Test Verified TE-443A Hot Leg #34 Loop Sostman WCAP 9157 Document Review Temperature 11901B-1 Wide Range .

TE-413B Cold Leg #31 Loop Sostman WCAP 9157- Document Review Temperature 11901B-1 ,

Wide Range TE-423B Cold Leg #32 Loop Sostman WCAP 9157 Document Rev.:.:w Temperature 11901B-1 Wide Range TE-433B Cold Leg #33 Icop Sostman WCAP 9157 Document Review Temperature 11901B-1 8

Wide Range TE-443B Cald Leg #34 Loop Sostman WCAP 9157 Document Review-femperature 11901B-1 Wide Range 1

1

^*

. TE-410B,TE-411B Cold Leg #31 Loop Sostman WCAP 9157 Document Review -

Narrow Range 11901B-2

, TE-410A,TE-411A Hot Leg #32 Loop Sostman WCAP 9157 Document Review

, Narrow Range 11901B-2 j

~ ~

' TABLE II j Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test Verified TE-420B, TE-421B Cold Leg #32 Loop Sostman WCAP 9157 Document Review Narrow Range 11901B-2 a

i

). . TE-420A, TE-421A -

Hot Leg #32 Loop Sostman WCAP 9157 Document Review Narrow Range 11901B-2 ,

i j' 'TE-430B, TE-431B Cold Leg #33 Loop Sostman WCAP 9157 Document Review Temperature 11901B-2

. Wide Range

, TE-430A,TE-431A Hot Leg #33 Loop Sostman WCAP 9157 Document Review I

Temperature 11901B-2 Wide Range 4

l TE-440B,.TE-441B Cold Leg #34 Loop Sostman WCAP 9157 Document Review Temperature 11901B-2 Wide Range 4

TE-440A, TE-441A Hot Leg #34 Loop Sostman WCAP 9157 Document Review Tempera ture 11901B-2 Wide Range PT948A . Containment Foxboro Analysis Document Review

, Pressure EllGM -

• e t

. .,e.,., -,- . _ ,< -- < s - , .e -

"Y ,e

TABLE II Component MFG Type Function Qualification Test Verified PT-948B Containment Foxboro Analysis Document Review Pressure EllGM .

PT-948C Containment Foxboro Analysis Document Review Pressure EllGM

- PT-949A Containment Foxboro Analysis Document Review Pressure EllGM PT-949B Containment Foxboro Analysis Document Review Pressure EllGM PT-949C Containment Foxboro Analysis Document Review Pressure EllGM -

Panetration H27 Pressure Westinghouse ~ Note 2 Field Inspection Boundary and Document Review Panetration H52 Pressure Westinghouse Note 2 Field Inspection Boundary  ! and Document Review Panetration H55 Pressure Westinghouse Note 2 Field Inspection-Boundary and Document Review i

a O

hABLE II ,

Component Function MFG Type Qualification Test ~ Verified ..

Panstration H46 Pressure Westinghouse Note 2 Field Inspection Boundary -

and Document Review Panatration H48 Pressure Westinghouse Note 2 Field Inspection Boundary and Document Review Panstration H51 Pressure Westinghouse Note 2 Field Inspection Boundary and Document Review Panetration H56 Pressure Westinghouse Note 2 Field Inspection Boundary - and Document Review P natration H47 Pressure Westinghouse Note 2 Field Inspection Boundary and Document Review Panstration H49' Pressure Westinghouse Note 2 Field Ispection Boundary ' and Document Review Pan 2tration H36 Pressure Westinghouse No'te 2 Field Inspection Boundary and Document Review

• Pinetration H37 Pressure Westinghouse Note 2 Field' Inspection

'. Boundary and Document Review

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. APPEMDIX B - PENETRATIONS The penetrations ware ranufactured by Westinghouse from the Crousa

, . liinds design. This design was environmentally qualified as described in responses to IE Bulletin 77-06, Cahill to Grier dated December 2, 1977.

Sample penetrations were selected for detailed inspection from the j uatal of 55 penetrations installed. The intent c f this inspection was to t earch for documentation which could relate back to previous environmental testing.

)

The following is a listing of sampled penetrations and one of the associated components which uses that penetration.

Penetrations Component _

j H46 Valve 856B H55 856C H48 856E l  !!51 856H H56 889A

!!37 Fan Cooler Units 31 115 7 Fan Cooler Units 32 H53 Fan Cooler Units 34

!!32 Fan Cooler Units 35 H50 .

Recirculation Pump 31 H45 Recirculation Pump 32 li27 Flow Transmitter - FT-945B ,

In order to verify the proper penetration was used, a field inspection r was performed in which the serial number was recorded. The serial number was verified against a Westinghouse letter, Woodward to Caputo dated 10/2/78-which listed a type of penetration, number of conductors, size of conductors and its serial number, which according to Westinghouse records were installed at Indian Point #3.

Each penetration, was inspected by WEDCO Quality Control following

~

installation in accordance with " Containment Electrical Penetrations Canister Location Verification". This document was reviewed to ensure consistency.

A Westinghouse drawing entitled " Electrical Penetration Composite Drawing" which described penetraion type and conductor size was also reviewed to ensure the information on this drawing agreed with the above.

Finally it was verified that the cable rating of the penetration was consistent with the cable installed - i.e. , a 350 MCM cable was installed in a 350 MCM rated penetration.

Environmental Tests 1

A prototype of a Crouse-Ilinds penetration was tested for'90 minutes at a peak pressure of 90 psig and a temperature range between 275 and 320 Several tests were performed by Westinghouse on their penetrations.

!, One type of penetration was tested at 340*F an'd 105 psig for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> decreased-l *to 270*F and 24 psig over the next 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.

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r Another type of penetration was subjected to 340*F and 56 psig conditions

', for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and then decreased to 248*F and 22 psig over the next 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.

=

The results of the above tests which evaluated leak tightness insulation t resistance and Corona Tests, indicated that the penetrations :would satisfactorily i perform their functions under adverse environmental conditions.

t In addition, leak-tightness was verified by introducing a 15 psig pressure between the seals of the penetration and monitoring any leakage.

For test profile refer to Appendix C since it was performed concurrent with environmental qualification tests for cable and splices.

It is therefore concluded that the electrical penetrations installed at Indian Point #3 have been environmentally que.lified.

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-* APPENDIX C - CABLE AND SPLICES 4  :

A. Cable Installation  ;

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Documents specifying design requirements of the cable, purchasing and actual installation of the cable were reviewed to ensure that the

' cable specified by the design organization was in fact installed.

Additionally, environmental testing documentation of type of cable and splices used at IP 3 was also reviewed. The results of those reviews ,

are described below.

The review of cables and splices initiated with a detailed review of ,

various sampled safeguard cables. The investigation consisted of a review of records for both cable and splices and a field inspection of splices at the penetration area of the following components.

Component I

Valve 856B 856C 856E

- 856G j 856H i 856J _

746 747

• I ~~

889A 889B e Fan Cooler Units 31 ,

j Fan Cooler Units 32 Fan Cooler Units 33 Fan Cooler Units 34 Fan Cooler Units 35 ,

Recirculation Pump 31 Recirculation Pump 32 FT-945B - Spray Header Flow Transmitter  !

A review of the United Engineers and Constructors (UE&C) schematic .

, drawings and Westinghouse elementary drawings was performed which identified the kind of cable and " cable number". The " cable reel  :

number" was determined from the " Cable Pull Inspection Check List".

This.is Quality Control document used to verify that the cable was j pulled properly.

't The " Cable Designation" was determined by cable reel acceptance form.

This is a Quality Control document which accepts a reel and approves

it for pulling.

F The " Cable Type" and the purchase order was then obtained from UE&C's ,

cable and conduit schedule general instructions. The " Cable Type" was also verified.against Report A of the Cable and Conduit Schedule which lists the " Cable Number" and " Cable Type". The " Cable Type" dictates the splice procedure required. ,

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An " Electrical Termination Inspection Check List" was then reviewed to ensure the splice was performed according to the s}. ice procedure.

, Additionally, a field inspection was performed on til splices in the sample group.

A review of the purchase order was performed to assure it was consistent with the cable that was pulled.

After the review of the sampled cable and splices was complete, a study of all safeguard equipment cable and splices required for, during and after a loss of coolant accidents was undertaken. This review detailed the type of cables and the splice / termination procedures used.

B. Environmental Qualification of Cable and Splices Sample cables and splices typical of those used at IP 3 were environmentally qualified by Westinghouse and documented in WCAP 7744 Volume II. From each of these cables, Raychem Corporation prepared test rings for pre-environmental testing. Each ring was closed by a cable splice prepared by Raychem. The cables were thermally aged to an equivalent of 40 years. Af ter the thermal aging to 40 years process, the specimen were divided into sets; each set containing one of each type of cable. In order to try and establish the possible effects of radiation exposure on the operation of the cables, each set was subjected to the following different pre-environmental conditions.

Set Number

1) Irradiation exposure to 2 X 108 rads Irradiation exposure to 5 X 107 rads.

2)

3) Irradiation exposure to 5 x 106 rads.

4) Unirradiated ,

5) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> steaming at 287'F and 60 psig followed by 2 X 10 8 rad I exposure.

6) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> steaming at 287'F and 60 psig followed by 5 x 107 rad exposure.

Franklin Institute Research Laboratories then received the cables and performed environmental tests detailing the results in Technical Report F-C2709.

1 The test profile consisted of supplying steam to the test chamber to

, produce approximately 60 psig in 9.5 seconds, then maintain 55 psig

>' and 285'F for two hours. The test chamber's pressure and temperatures t were reduced to 20 psig and 220*F for 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />, starting with the 1 second day approximately 3 psig was maintained at 155'F for a three week period.

A boric acid spray was turned on inside the test chamber approximately.

I 1/4 hours after the start of the test, and it was maintained for 2-hours at a spray rate of 10 gal /hr. The spray solution was prepared by dissolving 1.5 percent of boric acid (by weight) in water, and adding sodium hydroxide to buffer the ph to a value of 9.25.

During tha tGct, current w2s pas::ed through tha cables to simulated pocaible loads could that be expected.

After the three week test, the insulation resistance was measured at room conditions. The results indicated that satisfactory performance could be expected from the cable and splices.

N o

- 13. .-

. APPENDIX D - CONNECTORS There are no connectors located within containment that are associated with safeguard equipment used to nitigate an accident condition. The only connectors used on safety related equipment located in containment are used on the Nuclear Instrumentation System and the Control Rod Drive System.

Failure of these connections would, in no way, affect the safeguard system.

Refer to the Cahill to Grier letter dated 12/13/77 in response to IE-Bulletin 77-05 and 77-05A.

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M APPENDIX E LIMIT SWITCH l Two basic types of limit switches are in use, internal gear driven and external stem mounted. The gear driven switches are used in valve control and indication circuits, hence their failure could affect the operability of the valve. The stem mounted limit switches'are used in indication circuits only with exception of three valves which will be discussed later. .

Y I g0 / The gear driven limit switches are built into the Limitorque valve operator which is used in containment on safety related motor operated valves. '

IN{q M These . limit switches were environmentally qualified in tests-performed by q Franklin Institute Research Laboratory and Limitorque Corporation and f

'7 I documented in reporta,WCAP 7410__L_and Report 600456 respectively.' For j / details of tests and list of valves applicable, refer to Appendix I entitled fu ( Motor and Motor Operated Valves and Table II.

gi

'/g[ h The second type of limit switch is an external stem mounted switch. These Se limit switches have been found to be unqualified for accident environment.

The following is a list of components which uses a stem mounted limit switch.

856B, G Hot Leg Safety Inje'ction Valves - NAMCO Limit Switch Fan Cooler Units 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 Dampers NAMCO Limit Switch FCV 1170, 72 Purge Supply and Exhaust Valve - NAMCO Limit Switch PCV 1190 Pressure Relief Valve - NAMCO Limit Switch PCV 891A, B, C, D Air Operated Nitrogen Supply Valves to Accumulators - NAMCO Limit Switch -

894 A, B, C, D Accumulator Discharge' Valves - NAMCO Limit Switch Air Locks Limit Switches - Micro, Allen Brady The stem mounted limit switches for the 856B and G valves are used for valve position and are redundant to the qualified Limitorque Limit Switches in the valve operator which also indicate valve position. These valves are normally closed and power removed during operations above cold shutdown per J

the Technical Specification requirements. They are operated only during the recirculation phase of safety injection. The failure of the stem mounted limit switch will neither prevent the valve from operating, nor prevent its position from being indicated in the Control Room, since the Limitorque Operators have qualified limit switches. Based on the above continued operation of the plant is justified, however, the existing limit switch will be replaced when they become available and at an outage of ,

sufficient duration to allow change out. The unqualified limit switches -

were previously reported by Salvatore Zulla in accordance with Bulletln 79-01 and followed by a written report to the office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on February 16, 1979 by Mr. Paul J. Early of the Power Authority of the State of New York.

.m -

1 The pressure relief valve PCV-1190, and purge supply and exhaust valves FCV

. , 1170, 72, use the unqualified steam mounted limit switches in their control

! circuits and also for valve indication. Failure of the stem mounted limit

[ switch on the pressure relief valves will not result in inadvertent valve i

operation since this valve limit switch is interlocked with its redundant t valve outsido containment which has a qualified stem mounted limit switch l

! for its environment. In addition, a third isolation valve is also located i outside containment in the pressure relief line in series with the other two valves thus further ensuring containment integrity.

1 The stem mounted limit switches on the purge supply and exhaust valves are j in series in the valve opening circuitry. Failure of both switches could  ;

j cause these valves to open (the redundant valves outside containment are l

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not affected). However, if a containment ventilation isolation signal is present, the valves will remain closed. A control switch on the control ,

room supervisory panel when positioned to close will also maintain the >

valves in the closed position regardless of the limit switches' operation.

j This switch will be maintained closed except during purging operation and i

will be checked closed if it becomes necessary to reset containment ventilation j

isolation following a loss of coolant accident. Based on he above continued ,

operation is justified. The existing limit switches will be replaced when they become availabic and at an outage of sufficient duration to allow change out. The unqualified limit switches were previously reported by '

Salvatore Zulla in accordance with Bulletin 79-01 and followed by a written .

report to the office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on February 16, 1979 by 3 Mr. Paul J. Early of the Power Authority of the State of New York.

The stem mounted limit switches on the air operated nitrogen supply valves ,

4 891A, B, C, D to the accumulators are used for valve indication only. The f

valves are normally closed during power operations and opened only for  ;

short periods of time to maintain nitrogen pressure in accumulators. They received a close signal as a result of the containment isolation system.

l Presently, the valves are containment isolation valves, however an additional check valve has been installed in series with these valves and meets all  !

l requirements for containment isolation. A Technical Specification change '

t has been initiated in order to delete them from the containment isolation

! valve list, and is awaiting approval by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

I Replacement of these switches is therefore considered unnecessary.  ;

f i The accumulator discharge valve 894A, B, C, D have Limitorque motor operators. l The 894A, B, D valves each have a single stem mounted limit switch used for  !

valve position indication and are redundant to the qualified Limi. torque ,

limit switch which also indicates valve position. Since the 8940 valve  !

will be submerged during a loss of coolant accident, two stem mounted limit -

, switches were installed to indicate valve position. The accumulator discharge

• i valves are normally open with their motor operator de-energized during  ;

_ normal operation. Limit switches provide indication of valve position ,

! prior to a postulated accident. Since the valves do not have to be cycled l' during a loss of coolant accident, replacement of these limit switches is not considered necessary.  :

The fan cooler damper limit switches are used for indication only. Failure of a switch would not affect damper position hence replacement of these i switches is not considered necessary. i l

~ 1G ~  ?

o The air lock limit switches are used to indicat.a an open air lock door via an alarm in the central control room Since prior to a postulated accident, the status of the door would be known from the above circuit and during an accident the doors are not expected to be opened replacement of these switches is not deemed necessary.

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APPENDIX'F INSTRUMENTATION

. Iqtroduction.

Westinghouse, initiated a series of environmental qualification tests on l transmitters to demonstrate the ability of the instruments to carr/ out their applicable safety function under postulat'ed loss of coolant accident

[- " environmental conditions. The instrument testing performed was documented

). in WCAP7410-L and indicated satisfactory performance, i G '

l' The review of the topical report by the Atomic Energy Commission (now

\f I

Nuclear Regulatory F 7.'

methods and acceptar. .

. ...u.'9d in several questions regarding test

. ceria. To respond to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) concerns regarding instrument qualification Westinghouse committed to provide accuracy requirements, by plant type, for Westinghouse supplied sensors located inside containment that initiate short term automatic protective functions to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents.

Additionally Westinghouse agreed to provide an experimental basis for demonstrating the capability of instruments utilized in long term post accident monitoring applications to function throughout their duty cycle in the accident environment.

Upon receipt of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's letter accepting the Westinghouse programs as meeting IEEE-323-1971 Westinghouse initiated development of a detailed test program and procurement of instruments for test. The test program included irradiation of the instrument followed by simultaneous testing of the instrument under steam, temperature, pressure and chemical spray conditions. At the time in which the program was being developed,' calculated containment temperature conditions resulting from postulated steam line break accidents were exceeding those calculated temperature conditions resulting from a postulated loss of coolant accident.

Consequently an effort was undertaken to establish environmental conditions to be used in the test program that would envelope both the postulated loss of coolant accident and the postulated steam line break accident.

The results of this effort yielded a temperature profile which exceeds that previously used in transmitter testing. As there was continuing diaglogue between the industry and the NRC concerning the modeling techniques and assumption for calculating containment conditions follcwing a postulated steam line break accidents, Westinghouse decided to requiro the test pressure conditions to be equal to the saturation pressure corresponding to the temperature envelope. This results in an overly conservative test whose pressure conditions exceed plant design conditions. Included in the temperature . ,

test envelope is an extended post accident duty period at elevated temperature -

I conditions. This extended duty period represents long term post accident

_ monitoring and is simulated by higher than expected temperatures. . Successful operation under these environmental conditions will provide confidence in 1 the ability of the instrument to function under prolonged post accident i conditions. '

l 4

_18 -