IR 05000247/1997013
| ML20236M581 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1998 |
| From: | Miller H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Kinkel P CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236M585 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-247-97-13, 50-247-98-02, 50-247-98-2, EA-97-576, EA-98-028, EA-98-056, EA-98-192, EA-98-28, EA-98-56, NUDOCS 9807140145 | |
| Download: ML20236M581 (7) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _
_
pca a5%q g
UNITED STATES g
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
j REGloN I
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES - $110,000 (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-247/97-13;97-15; and 98-02 and investigation Report No. 1-97-038)
Dear Mr. Kinkel:
This letter refers to three NRC inspections conducted between October 27,1997, and March 23,1998, at your indian Point 2 nuclear facility for which exit meetings were held on January 23, January 30, and April 23,1998. This letter also refers to an investigation conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) to determine if a technician deliberately falsified an emergency light surveillance test record. Based on the results of the inspections and investigation, apparent violations were identified as described in our letters dated February 10, February 13, February 25, and May 15,1998, transmitting the inspection reports and Ol synopsis. On May 6,1998, Predecisional Enforcement Conferences (conferences) were conducted with you, and members of your staff, to discuss the violations identified during the first two inspections and the investigation, their causes, and your corrective actions. With respect to the apparent violation described in inspection Report 98-02, sent to you on May 15, 1998, the NRC decided that an additional enforcement conference was not needed to discuss
,
this issue.
j :j r
Based on the information developed during the inspection.s and the investigation, and the information provided during the conferences, seven violations of NRC requirements are being cited and are described in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). The violations reflect fundamental performance problems related to conduct of surveillance test activities, maintenance of accurate records, and completion of
,jk appropriate corrective actions to preclude repetition of problems at your facility, b'
The first two violations, which are set forth in Section I of the enclosed Notice, involve the failure by your staff to perform certain surveillance testing activities, and creation of inaccurate documents to indicate that these activities had been performed. Specifically, your internal investigation, as well as the 01 investigation, found that a Nuclear Production Technician (NPT)
9807140145 980706
~
gDR ADOCK 05000247 PDR
- _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _
_ _ _ __ _ __ _ _________________ _ __ ___ _
Consolidated Edison Company of
New York, Inc.
falsified surveillance test records. The records indicated that the NPT had performed inspections of emergency battery lights in the primary auxiliary building (PAB), as well as a second verification of two steps in an emergency diesel generator (EDG) surveillance test.
Both tests are required by your license or Technical Specifications (TS). The investigations revealed that the emergency battery light tests could not have been performed as required by the test procedure, because the NPT, and another NPT who was assigned to assist with the emergency light tests, were not in the PAB for a sufficient period of time to complete the checks of the 33 emergency lights. In addition,10 days after the emergency light tests were documented as completed, several of the emergency lights in the PAB were found to have low water levels in the battery cells. If the tests had been performed, this condition would have been identified, and adherence to the test procedure would have required correction of the degraded conditions. Similarly, the investigations concluded that the second verification of steps in the EDG surveillance test could not have been performed because the NPT did not enter the EDG building on the day that the activities were documented as having been performed. These record falsifications were considered deliberate because the evidence shows that the tests were not done. that the NPT understood the procedures requiring performance of the tests, and that the NPT knew that the tests were not done and admitted that he had signed the test records.
While the NRC is concerned with the actions of the NPT in this case, of even greater concern is the consideration that the emergency battery light tests n"y not have been performed in accordance with the procedure on multiple occasions in the last several years. The 01 investigation determined that it was not uncommon for NPTs to sign records for completion of actions that they had not personally performed. It also indicated that the NPTs did not have a clear understanding of their responsibility for adhering to procedures. It appears that there was an informal attitude toward procedural adherence among the NPTs. This is troubling as it is consistent with previously documented procedure adherence problems. At the conference you acknowledged that, although you had communicated management's expectations regarding procedural adherence, you had not provided supervisory oversight in the field to reinforce those expectations. Therefore, considering the significance that the NRC attributes to deliberate violations of requirements, and the lack of management attention towards licensed responsibilities that these violations represent, the violations set forth in Section I of the Notice are classified in the aggregate as a Severity Levelill problem in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600 (Enforcement Policy).
The third violation, which is set forth in Section 11 of the enclosed Notice, involved your f ailure to determine the cause and take adequate corrective actions to preclude repetition of a significant condition adverse to quality involving 480 volt (V) safety-related circuit breakers.
Specifically, between August 1993 and May 1997, there were multiple instances in which Westinghouse DB-50 480V circuit breakers failed to close on demand. Although you had recently upgraded your root cause analysis process in response to previously identified weaknesses in your corrective action processes, the root cause analysis for the DB-50 breaker failures performed using the new process was inadequate for the following reasons. In May 1997, you assembled a team, and hired contractors with expertise on Westinghouse DB-50 circuit breakers to conduct a root cause analysis, using the upgraded process, of the recurring breaker failures. The root causes identified by the team were not clearly supported by the "as
Consolidated Edison Company of
New York, Inc.
found" condition of the breakers. More importantly, because your root cause analysis focused on restoration of the original design basis of the breakers, and did not consider potential deficiencies in the original casign, the analysis did not address all credible failure modes that
!
could have prevented the breakers from closing. As a result, although you initiated corrective actions in July 1997 based on the results of the team's root cause analysis, additional breaker failures ocr.urred in August 1997 and October 1997.
The potential safety consequences of the DB-50 breaker failures are significant because approximately 60 DB-50 breakers are installed at Indian Point 2 and are used to provide power to safety-relate 4 loads, including the containment spray pumps, auxiliary boiler feedwater (AFW) pumps, icaidual heat removal pumps, and safety injection pumps. In many cases, these breakers are relied upon to close automatically, such as in response to a safety injection signal or upon the occurrence of a loss of offsite power. Failure of the breakers to close on demand would require operator action to reset and manually reclose the breaker to restore the equipment to service. Therefore, given the potential safety consequences of the breaker failures, as well as your continuing difficulties in implementing effective corrective action processes, this violation is also classified at Severity Level lli in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.
The fourth violation, which is set forth in Section lli of the Notice, involved the failure to assure that all testing, required to demonstrate that systems and components will perform satisfactorily in service, as specified in the TSs, was incorporated into surveillance test procedures. In February 1998, you conducted a review of the TS surveillance program which identified apprc~mately 170 discrepancies between the TS testing requirements and the surveillance test procedures. These discrepancies included cases in which: (1) the TS surveillance requirement or TS basis statements did not match the plant design; (2) no surveillance test existed to implement a TS requirement; (3) the surveillance test acceptance criteria were not consistent with the TS, or lacked supporting engineering analysis to document the basis for the criteria; (4) surveillance tests were not performed at the required frequency specified in TS; and (5) inconsistencies existed within TS surveillance requirements.
The NRC also identified some additional discrepancies while evaluating your review process.
Collectively, these discrepancies represent a programmatic weakness in implementing TS requirements; therefore, this violation is classified at Severity Level 111 in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.
A base civil penalty in the annount of $55,000 is considered for each Severity Level lil violation or problem. Since Indian Point 2 has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for
/ identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section V' B.2 of the Enforcement Policy for each of the Severity Level 111 violations and problem. With respect to the violatione in Section I, credit for identification is not warranted.
' e.g., A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $110,000 was issued on October 7,1997 (EA 97-367), and a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $205,000 was issued on May 27,1997 (EAs96-509,97-031,97-113, and 97-191). Both of these actions included violations for failure to identify and correct problems at the facility.
_ _ _ _ _
-
-
.
.j
-
,
Consolidated Edison Company of
New York, Inc.
Although you identified the violations during your investigation, that investigation was l
conducted as a result of NRC identification of the degraded battery conditions. With respect to the violation in Section ll, credit for identification is not warranted because the failure to preclude recurrence of the DB-50 breaker failures was self-revealing when the additional
. breaker failures occurred, and the ~ NRC subsequently identified the deficiencies in your root
- cause analysis. With respect to the violation in Section lil, credit is warranted for identification
!
i because the vast majority of the testing discrepancies were identified by your review effort.
For all of the violations in Sections I, ll, and Ill, credit is warranted for your corrective actions because those actions were considered prompt and comprehensive. These actions included:
-(1) review of other surveillance test records to ensure that all required tests had been performed; (2) discussions with plant staff to emphasize management's expectations for
. procedure adherence and documentation of activities; (3) revisions to the emergency battery light test procedure; (4) development of a NPT training program; (5) additional analysis of the DB-50 breaker failures; (6) implementation and testing of DB-50 breaker design modifications; i
(7) improvements to your root cause analysis process including training of team members and i
l improved use of industry experience; and (8) testing, procedure revisions, and changes to TSs to address the testing deficiencies. The NRC plans to continue to follow your actions closely to determine the effectiveness of your actions in precluding future problems.
Based on the above, separate $55,000 civil penalties ais warranted for the Severity Level ill problem in Section I and the Severity Level lli violation En Section il of the enclosed Notice.
-Therefore, to emphasize the importance of (1) performing activities in accordance with
procedures and accurately documenting such performance, and (2) preventing recurrence of I
problems at the facility, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties in the cumulative amount of $110,000for the violations in Sections I and ll of the Notice. No civil penalty is warranted for the violation in Section ill of the Notice.
Three other violations identified during the inspections hwe been classified individually at Severity Level IV and are set forth in Section IV of the enclosed Notice. These violations involved the failure to take prompt corrective actions for identified deficiencies in the post accident containment vent (PACV) and hydrogen recombiner systems and an inadequate
' procedure for operation of the PACV system.
I You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. As provided for in the enclosed Notice, you are required to include a description of the reasons for the violations, if admi*ted, and your corrective action. This description should address the actions taken following identification and the long term comprehensive actions taken or that will be taken to prevent recurrence.
' Your response should be submitted under oath or affirmation and may reference or include previous docketed correspondence if the correspondence adequately addresses the rec;uired response. In addition, if you dispute any of the enclosed violations or their severity levels, you I
should describe the' basis for the dispute in your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
!
~-
.
_.
._
__ -
. - _- __ - _ -- _-_- - _ __ _ _ _
.-.
.
,
.
Consolidated Edison Company of
New York, Inc.
With resper.t to the violation set forth in Section lli of the enclosed Notice, based on the information developed during the inspection, the NRC had sufficient information to conclude that a civil penalty is not warranted; therefore, this action is being issued without holding a predecisional enforcement conference, it the NRC is satisfied with your response to this violation, you will be notified that this enforcement action is completed. However, if your corrective action, as documented in your required response, is not sufficiently prompt and comprehensive such that a civil penalty may be warranted, we may telephone you or schedule a predecisional enforcement conference with you. Further, you may request that an enforcement conference be held to discuss this violation, in which case, please adv.a Mr.
John Rogge at (610) 337-5146 within sever days of the date of this letter. In the absence of such a request but where matters are disputed, we may also elect to hold an enforcement conference. in the event that a conference is to be held, it will be schduled at least two weeks after receiving the written response to the Notice. Following review of any disputer and the record of the conference, if held, a decision will be made to modify, withdraw, or affirm the Notice and, if warranted, issue a civil penalty, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure and ycur response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
Sincerely,
&
Hubert J. Miller Regional Administrator
.
Docket No. 50-247 License No. DPR-26 Enclosure: Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties
.
_-- - _ - --
- - _ - -
- _ _ _ _
-__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
.
!
Consolidated Edison Company of
New York, Inc.
oc w/enct; G. Hutcherson, Chief Nuclear Engineer C. Jackson, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensir'g B. Brandenburg, Assistant General Counsel C. Falson, Director, Nuclear Licensing, NYPA J. Ferrick, Operations Manager D. Murphy, Work Control Manager
,
C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law I
P. Eddy, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York T. Rose, Secretary, NFSC F. William Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority
.
l l
l l
l l
!
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _
- - - _ _ _
_ _
_ _.
- ____ ___.
I l
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
!
l DISTRIBUTION:
PUBLIC
~SECY CA LCallan, EDO l
AThadani, DEDE MSatorius, OE HMiller, RI FDavis, OGC SCollins, NRR RZimmerman, NRR Enforcement Coordinators l
Rl, Ril, Rill, RIV
)
BBeecher, GPA/PA
)
GCaputo, 01 l
DBangart, OSP HBell, OlG TMartin, AEOD OE:Chron OE:EA DCS NUDOCS DScrenci, PAO-RI NSheehan, PAO-RI
,
LTremper, OC l
Nuclear Sabty Information Center (NSIC)
i l
NRC Resident inspector -Indian Point Unit 2
.
140001