IR 05000333/1985019

Insp Rept 50-333/85-19 on 850601-0714.No Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Ler Review,Operational Safety Verification & Surveillance & Maint Observations

ML20137A710
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	08/06/1985
From:	Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137A659	List: IR 05000333/1985019 ML20137A654
References
50-333-85-19, IEB-80-25, NUDOCS 8508210461
Download: ML20137A710 (11)

Text

.

~

'

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

DCS Numbers 50333-850511 50333-850524 50333-850601 Report No. 85-19 50333-850610 Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59 Priority -- Category C

Licensee

Power Authority of the State of New York P.O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name: J. A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Scriba, New York Inspection Conducted: June 1 - July 14, 1985 Inspectors: L.T. Doerflein, Senior Resident Inspector A.J. Luptak, Rep) dentt Inspector Approved by: hih r i L i inville,' Chief, Rd ctor

[

Date

'

jects Section 2C Inspection Summary:

Inspection on June 1 - July 14,1985 (Report No. 50-333/85-19)

Areas Inspected: Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours by two resident inspectors (132 hours0.00153 days <br />0.0367 hours <br />2.18254e-4 weeks <br />5.0226e-5 months <br />) of licensee action on previous inspection findings, licensee event report review, operational safety verification, surveil-lance observations, maintenance observations, followup on plant trips, licensee action on IE Bulletin 80-25, licensee response to mispositioned control rod events, engineered safety feature system walkdown, and review of periodic and special report Results: No violations were identified in the areas inspected. However, we are concerned about the personnel errors during the removal of the "B" Main Steam Line flow instrumentation from service which resulted in a plant trip (details paragraph 7.a.) and the inadequate followup on a deficiency identified during surveillance testing (details paragraph 5.).

.

8508210461 850812 PDR ADOCK 05000333 G PDR

,

y - - e -

m -

.

3 m

-

\_)

DETAILS Persons Contacted R. Baker, Technical Services Superintendent

• J. Brons, Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation

• R . Converse, Superintendent of Power M. Curling, Training Superintendent

- Fernandez, Operations Superintendent

• H. Glovier, Resident Manager H. Keith, Instrument and Control Superintendent D. Lindsey, Assistant Operations Superintendent R. Liseno, Maintenance Superintendent E. Mulcahey, Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent R. Patch, Quality Assurance Superintendent T. Teifke, Security & Safety Superintendent

,

The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspection including shift supervisors, administrative, operations, health physics, security, instrument and control, maintenance and contractor personne * Denotes those present at the exit intervie . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (333/81-06-05): As part of the Analog Transmitter Trip System modification (no. F1-82-53) installed during the

-

1985 refueling outage, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System isolation subsystem thermocouples were connected to trip unit The inspector noted that this modification eliminated the isolation temperature switches and, therefore, the need to disconnect and reconnect the thermocouple leads, which resulted in their frequent failure, during routine monthly surveillance testing. The inspector had no further questions regarding this ite (Closed) Deviation (333/81-07-01): The inspector noted that, during the 1983 refueling outage, the licensee installed isolation valves capable of remote manual operation from the control room on the Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water System influent and effluent lines penetrating the primary containment. The inspector reviewed the package for this modification (no. F1-81-26) and had no further questions regarding this ite (Closed) Violation (333/83-01-01): The inspector reviewed procedure F-0P-37, " Nitrogen Ventilation and Purge; Containment Atmosphere Dilution; Containment Vacuum Relief and Containment Differential Pressure Systems,"

Revision 22, dated June 25, 1985, and verified that the licensee revised the procedure to include a method of inerting the primary containment directly from the truck nitrogen fill connection. The inspector had no further questions regarding this ite .

.

O O

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (333/83-04-01): As documented in paragraph 3. of inspection report 50-333/83-04, the inspector had

,

previously determined that facility operation had been conservative

'

despite the error in the Reload 4 analysis which resulted in nonconservative delta Critical Power Ratios for pressurization transients since a nonpressurization transient had been the most limiting during the cycle. The inspector noted that the licensee submitted a Technical Specification change request to revise the Critical Power Ratios, however, this change was not issued by the time Cycle 5 ended. The inspector noted that this item was only applicable to Cycle 5 and considers this item close (Closed) Unresolved-Item (333/83-10-01): The inspector reviewed procedure PS0 No. 31, "IST Program for Pumps and Valves," Revision 3, dated March 27, 1985, and verified that the licensee revised the procedure to specify maximum permissible leakage rates for individucl containment isolation valves and to provide for trending of the leak rate test results. The inspector noted that the specified individual maximum permissible leakage rates were utilized during the 1985 refueling outage.

i The inspector had no further questions regarding this ite (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (333/84-18-01): The inspector reviewed General Electric (GE) Test Report No. 81TR-880 on the HFA relay case fracture investigation. The inspector noted that the HFA relays sent to GE all successfully passed hi pot, functional, accelerated aging, and vibration tests. The report concluded that the fractures observed in the licensee's HFA relay cases were similar to those observed in the relays that were used to qualify the HFA relay for nuclear service and that the fractures would not affect HFA relay function. The inspector had no further regarding this ite . Licensee Event Report (LER) Review The inspector reviewed LER's to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported. The inspector determined that reporting requirements had been met, the report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared

, appropriate _to correct the cause, the form was complete and generic appli-1 cability to other plants was not in questio LER's 85-14, 85-15, 85-16 and 85-17* were reviewe *LER selected for onsite followu LER 85-17 reported that the reactor scrammed from 29 percent power due to a false high steam flow isolation. The high steam flow isolation resulted from improperly. removing the "S" Main Steam sLine Flow transmitter from ser-vice for maintenance. Details of this event are discussed in paragrap5-7. of this inspection repor .- - --

.

.

.

O O

4. Operational Safety Verification Control Room Observations Daily, the inspectors verified selected plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with limiting conditions for operation of the plant Technical Specification Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understoed and corrective action, if required, was being taken. The inspectors observed shift turnovers biweekly to ensure proper control room and shift manning. The inspectors directly observed the operations listed below to ensure adherence to approved procedures:

--

Plant shutdown on June 4, 198 Reactor startups on June 11 and 25,198 Routine power operatio Issuance of RWP's and Work Request / Event / Deficiency form No violations were identifie Shift Legs and Operating Records Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to obtain information on plant problems and operations, detect changes and trends in performance, detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regulatory requirements, determine that records are

'

being maintained and reviewed as required, and assess the effec-tiveness of the communications provided by the log No violations were identifie Plant Tours

- During the inspection period, the inspectors made observations and conducted tours of the plant. During the plant tours, the inspectors conducted a visual inspection of selected piping between containment and the isolation valves for leakage or leakage paths. This included verification that manual valves were shut, capped and locked when required and that motor operated valves were not mechanically blocked. The inspectors also checked fire protection, housekeeping / cleanliness, radiation protection, and physical security conditions to ensure compliance with plant procedures and regulator requirement No violations were identifie ~ Tagout Verification The inspector verified that the following safety-related protective tagout records (PTR's) were proper by observing the positions of breakers, switches and/or valve ,

f m 9 m

-

.

pb q

-

b

--

PTR 851019 on the "A" Standby Gas Treatment Syste PTR 851092 on the Shutdown Cooling Inboard Containment Isolation Valv PTR 851109 on the North-South cable tunnel isolation fire dampe No violations were identifie , Emergency System Operability The inspector verified operability of the following systems by ensuring that each accessible valve in the primary flow path was in the correct position, by confirming that power supplies and breakers were properly aligned for components that must activate upon an initiation signal, and by visual inspection of the major components for leakage and other conditions which might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirement Standby Liquid Control Syste Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start and Fuel Oil System Standby Gas Treatment Syste Fire Protection Water Syste No violatic.!s were identifie . Surveillance Observations The inspectors observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified person-nel, limiting conditions for operation were met, and the system was correctly restored following the testing:

--

F-ST-5C, IRM-APRM Instrument Range Overlap Check Revision 2, dated November 7, 1980, performed June 4, 198 RAP 7.3.10, Control Rod Scram Time Evaluation, Revision 10, dated September 8, 1983, performed June 10, 198 ISP-64-1, Main Steam Radiation Monitor Instrument Calibration, Revision 14, dated August 1, 1984, performed June 14, 198 F-ST-16G, LPCI Battery Monthly Test, Revision 1, dated May 19, 1982, performed June 19, 198 During a review of shift logs, the inspector noted that the Low Pressue Coolant Injection (LPCI) battery monthly surveillance test (F-ST-16G),

performed on June 19, 1985, was signed off as unsatisfactory because the

"A" battery charger input current meter did not read zero when the input breaker was opened. The licensee initiated work request No. 71/34733 to investigate this discrepancy. During the troubleshooting, maintenance personnel verified proper system operation by monitoring currents and voltages when the "A" battery charger input breaker was opened, and Instrument and Control personnel determined that the input current meter

_ _ _ _ _

-

was reading within tolerance for a 0-1500 Ampere meter. Based on this .

information and because proper meter response was noted when the input breaker was shut during the surveillance test, the licensee determined that operation of 'the "A" LPCI battery was satisfactor The licensee reperformed surveillance test F-ST-16G on June 19, 198 The inspector witnessed this test and verified that the charger input current meter response was proper but noted that the meter range was only 0-200 Amperes. The inspector also reviewed the completed surveillance test data and noted that the maintenance department memorandum used in determining that the surveillance test on the "A" LPCI battery charger was satisfactory, incorrectly referred to troubleshooting performed on the "B" LPCI battery charger. The inspector informed the licensee of the discrepancies with the maintenance department memorandum and the input current meter range, and expressed concern over the poor communications and the lack of atten-tion to detail in resolving the problem noted during the initial surveil-lance test. The inspector informed the licensee that, although the opera-tion of the LPCI battery chargers was satisfactory, such poor followup could result in a degraded condition remaining uncorrected. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors concerns. The inspector will continue to monitor licensee performance in this area during future inspection . Maintenance Observations The inspector observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components were operable, these activities did not violate the limiting conditions for operation, required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, approved procedures were used or the activity was within the " skills of the trade," appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented, igni'.fon/ fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and r.quipment was properly tested prior to returning it to servic During this inspection period, the following activities were observed:

--

WR 01-125/39471 for *eplacement of the charcoal filter in "A" Standby Gas Treatment Syste WR 06/39482 for troubleshooting "B" Main Steam Line flow indicatio WR 07/34791 for troubleshooting and repair of "C" Transversing incore

--

Probe drive control uni No violations were identifie . Followup on Plant Trips At 4.00 p.m. on June 10, 1985 the reactor scrammed from 29 percent power due to closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV). The MSIV closure was caused by a false high steam flow signal which was

. .. .. .. ..

..

.. .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

.

O O

generated when the "B" Main Steam Line flow instrument was improperly removed from service for maintenance. Additional details of the problems with the "B" Main Steam Line flow instrumentation are discussed below. Following the scram the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System was manually initiated, but the turbine tripped on overspeed. The licensee subsequently found a loose wire on the ramp generator section of the RCIC speed control circuit. The circuit

, was repaired and RCIC was tested to verify system operability prior to plant restart. There was no Emergency Core Cooling System actua-tion or radioactive release associated with this even The inspector arrived in the control room within minutes after the scram and observed the operators response to the event. The inspector also reviewed the process computer alarm printout, the post trip log, various chart recorders and the completed data sheets for procedures No. 00S0 23, " Post Trip Evaluation." Based on these observations and reviews the inspector determined that the operator's actions in response to the event were proper and in accordance with approved procedures, the plant responded as designed (with the exception of RCIC as noted above), and the licensee's review of the trip was adequat As part of the followup on the plant trip, the inspector reviewed the sequence of problems with the "B" Main Steam Line flow instrumentation. All Main Steam Line flow instrumentation was replaced as part of the Analog Transmitter Trip System modification (No. F1-82-53) during the 1985 refueling outage. However, due to a drawing error, the licensee incorrectly swapped the sensing lines for one of the "A" and one of the "B" Main Steam Line (MSL) flow instruments (2-DPIS-116A and 2-DPIS-117A respectively) after a discrepancy between the drawings and as-modified condition was identified during an " informal" system walkdown prior to turnover from the maintenance contractor. The inspector reviewed the drawings used for construction and determined these drawings, which were developed from the plant drawings, incorrectly depicted the system configuration for MSL flow instruments 2-DPIS-116A and 2-DPIS-117 The inspector also reviewed the modification installation promure and noted that the procedure had no sign-off for verifying that the MSL flow instruments were connected to the applicable sensing line The inspector pointed out this apparent deficiency with the installation procedure to the licensee although the inspector acknowledged that, in this case, such verification would not have helped as the drawings were incorrect. The inspector also noted that, as a result of a different problem with the Analog Transmitter Trip System, the licensee did perform a complete " formal" walkdown of all instrument sensing lines outside the Primary Containment. These walkdowns were performed by teams of Quality Control Inspectors, Instrument and Control Technicians,'and site engineering personne .

The results of these walkdowns were documented. '

.

O O

Following the startup on May 28, 1985 from the refueling outage, the licensee identified during MSIV testing, that the "A" and "B" MSL flow instrumentation were reversed. The inspector reviewed the drawings for the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) and determined that the swapped instrumentation did not affect the opera-bility of the PCIS functions. The licensee prepared a safety evaluation to justify continued operation, however, when the plant

,

was required to shutdown on June 4, 1985 due to turbine vibration problems, the licensee decided to reverse the "A" and "B" MSL flow instrumentatio During the June 4,1985 shutdown, the licensee performed a walkdown of the "A" and "B" MSL flow instrument sensing lines, including inside primary containment, to verify the as-built condition. As a result of this walkdown the licensee verified that the "A" and "B" MSL flow instrument sensing lines were swapped. A work request was initiated to correct the problem, however, due to a personnel error during the walkdown, the high and low pressur: sensing lines on the

"B" MSL flow instrument were reversed during t.he rewor Following reactor startup on June 9,1985, the licensee discovered that the "B" MSL flow indication remained downscale and subsequent investigation discovered the problem with the high and low sensing lines. In this case, the licensee determined that the PCIS was inoperable and entered a 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> action statement as specified in Technical Specification Table 3.2- The licensee decided to reverse the high and low pressure. sensing lines on the "B" MSL flow instrument while operating. The operators tagged the instrument root valves shut, however, the system was not drained or vented prior to turnover to the maintenance contracto Prior to cutting the sensing lines, contractor personnel opened the instrument high side vent, causing a false high steam flow signal, which resulted in a reactor tri The licensee critiqued the trip and determined the inadequate system turnover was caused by personnel error while trying to expedite the job. The inspector expressed concern to the licensee that contractor personnel operated valves and that the system was not vented prior to turning it over. The licensee acknowledged these concerns and issued a memorandum, which was placed in the night order book, that only Instrument and Control personnel can perform valve manipulations associated with placing safety related instrumentation in or out of service. The licensee also informed contract maintenance personnel that they are not to operate valves unless given permission by the Shift Supervisor. The inspector will continue to monitor licensee performance in this area during future inspection b. At 3:22 p.m. on June 24, 1985, the reactor scrammed from full power due to high Average Power Range Monitor levels. The high neutron '

.

'

o o l 9 l

flux was caused by a recirculation flow transient which occurred due to a malfunction in the "B" Recirculation Flow Control System. The malfunction caused a rapid decrease of approximately 30 percent in the "B" recirculation loop flow followed by a rapid increased in flow of approximately 40 percent. The rapid increase in recirculation flow caused a void collapse and the high neutron flux levels. Just prior to the event, an operator had restored the recirculation system to normal by unlocking the "A" and "B" recirculation motor generator scoop tubes following the completion of a feedwater flow transmitter calibration. There was no Emergency Core Cooling System actuation or radioactive release associated with this even During the initial troubleshooting of the Recirculation Flow Control System, the licensee was unable to positively identify the cause of the system malfunction. However, during the analysis of the event, the licensee determined that the most likely source of the problem was in the scoop tube positioner amplifier or demodulator circuit boards as any other failure would have locked up the scoop tube. The

. licensee replaced the amplifier and demodulator circuit boards and commenced a plant startup on June 25, 1985. During the startup, the :

"B" recirculation motor generator scoop tube was locked up, and the i flow control system input and feedback signals were monitore Subsequent to the startup, the licensee identified a faulty input diode in the replaced demodulator circuit board and determined that this diode failure had caused the transien The inspectors arrived in the control room within minutes after the scram and observed the operator response to the event. The inspectors also questioned the operators involved and reviewed the process com-puter alarm printout, the post trip log, various chart recorders, and the completed data sheets for procedure No. 00S0 23, " Post Trip Evaluation." Based on these observations and reviews the inspectors determined that the operator's actions in response to the event were proper and in accordance with approved procedures, the plant responded as designed, and the licensee's review of the trip and determination of the root cause were adequat . Licensee Actin on IE Bulletin No. 80-25, " Operating Problems with Target Rock Safety - Relief Valves at BWRs" The inspector reviewed the package for modification no. F1-81-14 to verify that the licensee modified the Target Rock safety. relief valve (SRV)

pneumatic supply as committed in the response, dated March 19, 1981, to IE Bulletin No. 80-25, " Operating Problems with Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves at BWRs." The inspector noted that the modification, which was completed during the 1981 refueling outage, added two relief valves (each with a setpoint of 135 psig) on the nitrogen supply line for the Target Rock SRVs. In addition, the nitrogen supply line pressure switch (27-PS-100) was modified to provide a computer alarm, " Nitrogen Supply Pressure Trouble," on high pressure (75 psig). The inspector also m

.- - - _ _ _ . - - . - .- . .

.-

'

o o i 10 l

reviewed procedure F-0P-37, " Nitrogen Ventilation and Purge; Containment Atmosphere Dilution; Containment Vacuum Relief and Containment Differential Pressure Systems," Revision 22, and drawings OP-37-1A,

, Revision 9, and FM-18A, Revision 24, and verified that the procedure and j drawings were revised to reflect modification no. F1-81-14 and that the

! procedure contained appropriate steps for responding to the " Nitrogen [

j Supply Pressure Trouble" alarm. The inspector also performed a walkdown i of the applicable section of the nitrogen supply line and verified that

the drawings reflected the as-built condition. The inspector had no

further questions and considers IE Bulletin No. 80-25 closed.

-

I Licensee Response to Mispositioned Control Rod Events j i

l The ir.spector reviewed Operating Experience Review No. 229, various

] procedures and training records, and held discussions with licensee

-

personnel to determine the licensee's actions in response to the Institute ,

of Nuclear Power Operations' Significant Operating Experience Report N !

! 84-02 on control rod mispositioning. The inspector noted that the '

licensee developed a lesson plan on control rod mispositioning events and

included it in the operator requalification program. The inspector ,

also noted that the operators have received training on the proper movement

'

i

of control rods and on the function and operation of the Rod Worth Minimizer,

<

the Rod Sequence Control System, and the individual rod scram test switches.

This training consists of classroom and simulator training, and is part of j 1 the operator requalification program.

i The inspector reviewed procedures OP 26, " Control Rod Drive Manual Control j System," Revision 2; Op 64 " Rod Worth Minimizer," Revision 3; OP 65

"Startup and Shutdown Procedure," Revision 24; and RAP 7.3.27 " Reactor i Analyst Group Instructions," Revision 3 and verified that the licensee had already implemented or revised procedures to include: guidelines on the use of the " emergency in" mode of rod insertion and the notch override i

! switch in continuous withdrawal; conditions under which the Rod Worth i Minimizer may be bypassed; and the requirement that written instructions

be provided to personnel making reactivity changes when a reactor analyst representative is not present in the control roo The inspector noted i that no procedure specifically prohibits the use of scram timing equipment

for rod insertion. However, procedures RAP 7.3.10, " Control Rod Scram

!

Time Evaluation," and F-A0P-34, " Alternate Control Rod Insertion," (used j only after a reactor trip when all control rods fail to insert) properly cover the use of scram timing equipment for testing and emergencies. The inspector determined that these approved procedures combined with the training noted above provided adequate control over the use of the scram timing equipment.

l No deficiencies were identified.

,

10. Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown

'

,

The inspectors verified the operability of the following ESF system by performing a complete walkdown of accessible portions of the system to i

J

_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

_ _ _ _ _ _

o

'

.-

'

o

confirm that system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuration, to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that instrumentation is calibrated and functioning, and to verify that valves are properly positioned and locked as appropriat '

--

Emergency Service Water Syste No violations were identifie . Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports. The review included the following: Inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems; and reportability and validity of report information. The following periodic reports were reviewed:

,

--

May 1985 Operating Status Report, dated June 10, 198 June 1985 Operating Status Report, dated July 3,198 ,

i

'

12. Exit Interview

, At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. On July 18, 1985, the inspector met with licensee representa-tives (denoted in paragraph 1) and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are described in this repor Based on his review of this report, the inspector determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restriction I l

.

,

.