IR 05000333/1985018
| ML20205B563 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1985 |
| From: | Harpster T, Hawxhurst J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205B552 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-85-18, NUDOCS 8509120143 | |
| Download: ML20205B563 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORf COMMISSION i
REGION I
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Report No. 50-333/85-18 I
Docket No 50-333
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License No. OPR-59 Prierity Category C
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Licensee: New York Power Authority l
P.O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093
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Facility Name: James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant
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Inspection At: Scriba, New York
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Inspection Conducted: Jur.e 25-27, 1985
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Inspector:
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J.- Jf/Hawxht(fst,"Eme gency Preparedness date
I Specialist J
l NRC Team Members
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I. Cohen, Region I j
L. Doerflein, Region I
T. Essig, PNL
W. Lazarus, Region I A. Luptak, Region I
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i J. Pappin, PNL
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D. Vito, Region I l
J. Will, PNL
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Approved by:
_ l.] D rpster,/ectionChief, d te T. L. @(ncy Preptredness Section
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Emerg i
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Inspaction Summary:
Inspection on June 25-27, 1985 (Report No. 50-333/85-18).
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and ob-
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I servation of the partial
.. -scale annual emergency exercise conducted on June 26, 1985. The inspection involved 229 inspector hours by a team of ten
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t NRC Region I and NRC Contractor personnel, i
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PDR ADOCK 05000333 G
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Results: The licensee's emergency response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public. Six prior items of concern were also closed as a result of this inspection. One unresolved item was ocen and no violations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting on June 27, 1985.
N. Avrakotos, Emergency Planning Coordinator H. A. Glovier, JAF Resident Manager R. Converse, JAF Superintendent of Power W. Fernandez, JAF Operations Superintendent T. Telfke, JAF Security Superintendent J. Prokop, QA Engineer B. Sullivan, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Engineer R. Chase, Information Officer E. Mulcahey, Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent W. G. Robinson, QA Engineer
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J. Reiff, Associate Radiological Engineer R. Liseno, Maintenance Superintendent B. Baker, Technical Service Superintendent
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In addition the inspectors interviewed or observed the actions of numerous licensee personnel.
2.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings 2.1 (0 pen)(50-333/84-10-04) Meteorological monitoring program.
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Meterological strip charts in the control room were recalibrated
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and adjusted, daily surveillance was being performed and a
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i maintenance procedure was developed, i
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The complete description of the meteorological monitoring
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program was available in draft and is planned for the July 1985 revision.
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The J. A. FitzPatrick procedure EAP 25 Rev. O was developed to
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implement the remote interrogation capabilities of the meterological monitoring system.
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2.2 (Closed)(50-333/84-14-01) Provide a more thorough review of the annual emergency preparedness exercise scenario by establishing a review committee to evaluate the scenario and to include the NRC, NYPA corporate and plant staff comments.
The Authority established a committee to review and evaluate annual FitzPatrick emergency exercise scenarios; the scope of the committee is described in the Emergency Plan Section 8.3.3.
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2.3 (Closed)(50-333/84-14-02) Investigate:the reliability problems of the computerized dose assessment system; in the interim, develop.
priority coding practices that will alleviate system slow-down and assure the system reliability neces,sary:to provide adequate infor-mation and assessment during any radiological emergency condition.
The.nspector reviewed the licensee's response to this item dated October 15, 1984*, held discussions with licensee personne' and verified the new computer system and software were installed and operational.
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Letter to T. T. Martin from J. P. Bayne, (10/15/84)
J. A. FitzPatrick Inspection Report No. 50-333/84-14,
"Regarding Emergency Preparedness".
2.4 (Closed) (50-333/85-02-01) EAL's not discussed and agreed upon by State and Local authorities.
I The inspector noted that the licensee had meetings with the State representatives on April 24, 1985 from Radiological Emergency Re-sponse Group and on June 19, 1985 with Oswego County Emergency Management uffice. The inspector also reviewed the J.A. FitzPatrick Emergency Plan Section 8.2.1 and noted an annual review of the EAL's was planned.
2.5 (Closed) (50-333/85-02-02) Provide practicality training to shift personnel in-charge at early emergency states.
The inspector reviewed the.STA's training and a internal memo dated June 25, 1985* and noted all shift supervisors were provided with
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i practical training with the simulator.
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Memo to A. '2aremba to K. Walker. (6/25/85),
"NRC Audit Items 85-01-02 and 85-01-03".
2.6 (Closed)(50-333/d5-01-03) Provide specialized training to staff per-forming initial dose assessment.
The inspector noted that training was provided to almost all or:
shift chemistry technicians with the exception of one.
This in-dividual was scheduled for training in July prior to assuming shift responsibilities.
2.7 (Closed)(50-333/85-01-04) Make audits available to State and Local governments regarding adequacy of interface.
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The inspector noted that an independent audit was performed by a consultant. Both state and county representatives were contacted and provided with the results of the audit. The J. A. FitzPatrick Emer-gency Plan has been revised Section 8.4.3, states "The results shall be available to involved State and Federal organizations".
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3.0 Emergency E>ercise
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The J. A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant partial-scale exercise was con.
ducted on June 26, 1985, from 4:00 AM until 12:00 PM.
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3.1 Pre-Exercise Activities
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Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives had
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telephone discussions with licensee representatives and provided written comments on the scope and content of the objectives and
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scenar*o. As a result, several revisions were made by the licensee
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of the objectives and certain scenario data.
In addition, NRC ob-servers attended a licensee briefing for licensee controllers and observers on June 25, 1985 and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during various phases of the scenario.
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The exercise scenario included the following events:
The reactor is initially operating at 100% power;
Increase in off gas radiation levels, decrease in off gas
flow;
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Elevated reactor coolant activity - 36 uCi/gm I-131 equivalent;
Turbine building ventilation radiation monitor goes off scale,
failure to isolate turbine building; Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS), failure to fully SCRAM
reactor;
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Group'I and II isolation with HPCI and RCIC initiating;
A release of radioactivity to atmosphere via SBGT, overall dose
less than 1 Rem whole body, and; Recovery and reentry the following day.
- The above events resulted in the activation of the licensee's emer-gency facilities.
3.2 Exercise Observation During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team nenbers made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emer-gency organization; activation of emergency response facilities; and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response fact 11 ties.
The following activities were observed:
(1) Detection, classificati:n, and assessment of the scenario events;
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(2) Direction and coordination of the emergency response; (3) Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent information; (4) Communications /information flow, and record keeping; (5) Assessment and projection of radiological (dose) data and consideration of protective action; (6) Provision for in plant radiation protection; (7) Performance of offsite and in plant radiological surveys; (8) Performance of technical support; (9) Performance of repair and corrective actions; (10) Activation and operation of new EOF; (11) Assembly and accountability of personnel; (12) Management of Accident recovery operati.ons; and (13) Dissemination of public information The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of the emergency response facilities; and actions and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and irrplementing pro-cedures. Jhe team also noted the following areas where the licensee's activities were efficiently implemented:
The objectives and scenario package were submitted to the NRC
in a timely manner for their review. Appropriate changes were made to reflect NRC concerns.
There was no evidence of a failure to demonstrate any of the
exercise objectives nor was there evidence of prompting on the part of the controllers - evaluators who performed in a pro-fessional manner throughout the exercise.
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Emergency levels were promptly identified based upon-initiating
conditions.
Control Room staff quickly recognized plant problems and took
appropriate corrective actions.
TSC was manned expeditiously.
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Accountability was completed within 24 minutes; no missing
persons.
An up-to-date radiation exposure history was obtained for every
individual prior to plant entry into radiological c.sntrolled areas.
Transfer of dose assessment responsibility from TSC to EOF
appeared to take place smoothly, without loss of capability.
Delineation of responsibility within the dose assessment area
was clear, changes in personnel were handled well.
Radio communications with offsite teams were excellent; the
teams were thoroughly briefed and updated on plant conditions frequently.
A good plan was developed for relief of emergency response
personnel.
The following are the NRC Team Findings in areas requiring additional licensee attention. Most of these findings were also identified by the licensee as part of their critique.
Certain practices related to control room activities that could have contributed to a degraded response were:
Communications between TSC and Control Room, which was poor and
also misinformation on plant conditions was passed to TSC and this information was never verified; Operators unable to get meteorological data from computer
system, this delayed the UE notification via Radiological Emergency Communication Systen (RECS) (22 minutes), and; Operators did not follow procedure EAP 1.1, which resulted in
at least one group initially not being notified (i.e. resident inspectors and possible others).
These concerns are collectively designated as an Open Item (50-333/
85-18-01) and will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC:RI Inspection.
Certain practices conducted within the Technical Support Center that could have contributed to a degraded response were:
Information flow and handling within the center and between the
CR and TSC was slow, cumbersome and sometimes erroneous;
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Coordination of technical support of the emergency was weak,
which lead to excessive confusion in the TSC and poor communi-cation between ERFs, and;
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Plant status sheets (part III), which were late in reaching
j individuals, are hard to keep track of and also, desks became
inundated with sheets.
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This concern is designated as an Open Item (50-333/85-18-02) and
will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC:RI inspection.
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Certain practices related to operational support or inplant activities that could have contributed to a degraded response were:
Direction and control in the Radiation Protection office was somewhat weak and ill-defined. No briefings of Radiation Pro-tection staff regarding plant status, and; Inplant teams didn't check own exposures frequently enough.
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Observation of the team dispatched to take a Post Accident Sampling (PASS) indicate a potential problem as identified below:
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PASS system valve was sticking and/or leaking, reactor coolant
leaked to a location outside of the shielded collection assembly; PASS sample team appeared to deviate from sample collection
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procedure (PSP-17) because of sample system valve; and; The shield plug which covers the PASS system vial alignment
viewing part was not replaced following initial positioning of the vial.
This concern is identified as an Unresolved Item (50-333/85-18-03)
and will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC:RI inspection.
Certain practices conducted related to Dose Assessment that could
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contribute to a degraded protective action recommendation are:
Computer dispersion dose projections were based on past and
current conditions rather than estimates of future conditions; t
Initial dose assessments (prior to 1130) were based on the grab
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sample collected before the scram (as 630) rather than a failed fuel isotopic mix;
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Operators of the computer dispersion / dose model were not
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adequately trained, which delayed model execution and inter-pretation; Procedure EAP-42 does not stress the importance of determining
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and understanding current and forecast meteorological condi-tions, the emphasis is on obtaining model input, and; Offsite monitoring teams were not informed as to use of pro-
tective clothing or KI tablets.
This area of concern is designated as an Open Item (50-333/85-18-040)
and will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC:RI inspection.
Certain practices conducted within the Emergency Operations Facility that could have contributed to a degraded response were:
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The Emergency Director appeared to be too involved with plant
operation problems and other matters which should have been del-egated to his staff, and; I
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The Emergency Director neglected to have discussions with State
and local government representatives prior to the declaration
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of a General Emergency and the issuance of protective action recommendations.
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This area of concern is designated as an Open Item (50-333/85-18-05)
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3.4 Exercise Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique during
which-strengths and improvement items were presented by the evalua-tors.
In addition, the NRC team leader was given a written copy of the licensee's findings.
4.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique
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Following the~ licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise and discussed the
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areas described in Section 2 of this report.
The licensee was informed that no violations were observed.
In addition, the licensee was informed that although there were areas identified which required additional licensee attention, the NRC team determined that with-in the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
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Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appro-priate action would be taken regarding the areas identified as being in need of additional licensee attention.
At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.
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