| | Site | Start date | Title | Description |
|---|
| ML24318B831 | Technical Specifications Task Force | 13 November 2024 | TSTF Slides from 11/13/24 Implementation Workshop TSTF-585, Revise LCO 3.0.3 to Require Managing Risk | |
| ML24302A210 | Technical Specifications Task Force | 13 November 2024 | NRC Staff Proposed Scenarios for November 13, 2024, Workshop TSTF-585, Revise LCO 3.0.3 to Require Managing Risk | |
| 05000333/LER-2024-002, Reactor Protection System Electric Power Monitoring System Trip Caused Primary Containment Isolation | FitzPatrick | 4 September 2024 | Reactor Protection System Electric Power Monitoring System Trip Caused Primary Containment Isolation | |
| NL-24-0334, 0 to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specifications Bases Changes, Technical Requirements Manual Changes, License Renewal 10 CFR 54 .37(b) Changes, 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report & Revised Nrc | Hatch | 3 September 2024 | 0 to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specifications Bases Changes, Technical Requirements Manual Changes, License Renewal 10 CFR 54 .37(b) Changes, 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report & Revised Nrc | |
| ENS 57298 | Browns Ferry | 30 August 2024 15:51:00 | Specified System Actuation - Automatic Start of Diesel Generators | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
At 1051 CDT on 8/30/2024, during transfer of 4KV shutdown bus 1 to support Unit 1 shutdown activities, the alternate feeder breaker failed to close resulting in 4KV shutdown boards 'A' and 'B' experiencing an under voltage condition. This resulted in 'A' and 'B' diesel generators automatically starting and tying to their respective boards. This condition also caused a loss of reactor protection system (RPS) channel 'A' on Units 1 and 2, resulting in invalid actuation of primary containment isolation system Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8. The failure of the board to transfer was identified during preparation for the evolution, contingency actions were prepared and implemented as planned. The breaker failure to close has been corrected and 4KV shutdown bus 1 is energized on alternate. 4KV shutdown boards 'A' and 'B' have been restored to offsite power supplies and the diesel generators are secured.
All systems responded as expected for the loss of voltage. This event requires an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident has been notified.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The change in reactor power from 70 percent to 40 percent was not as a result of the failed breaker, rather Browns Ferry Unit 1's change in reactor power was due to a scheduled reactor shutdown which was in progress. In regards to the Unit 2 loss of channel 'A' RPS, this was not a specified system actuation. The actuation of the 'A' and 'B' diesel generators were the specified system actuation. Although the 'A' and 'B' diesels are common to both Units 1 and 2, only Unit 1 credits these specific diesel generators for accident mitigation. As such, this event is only reportable from Unit 1. Unit 2 did not experience a specified system actuation. |
| ML24241A195 | Limerick | 28 August 2024 | License Amendment Request for Modification to Technical Specification 3.6.1.2 and Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Rate Requirements | |
| IR 05000254/2024002 | Quad Cities | 12 August 2024 | Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/2024002 and 05000265/2024002 | |
| 05000259/LER-2024-002, Reactor Scram Due to Generator Step-Up Transformer Failure | Browns Ferry | 24 June 2024 | Reactor Scram Due to Generator Step-Up Transformer Failure | |
| ML24110A049 | Quad Cities | 28 May 2024 | Audit Report Related to the TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.59 Amendments | |
| IR 05000259/2024001 | Browns Ferry | 14 May 2024 | Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2024001, 05000260/2024001, and 05000296/2024001 | |