IR 05000498/1987058

Insp Repts 50-498/87-58 & 50-499/87-58 on 870907-1016.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Piping Sys as-built Verification, Reactor Pressure Boundary Piping & safety-related Piping

ML20236Q772
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	11/16/1987
From:	Constable G, Garrison D, Clay Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236Q759	List: IR 05000498/1987058 ML20236Q757
References
50-498-87-58, 50-499-87-58, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8711200279
Download: ML20236Q772 (15)

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APPENDIX

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l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION- i REGION IV i i

NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/87-58 Operating License: NPF-71 50-499/87-58 Construction Permit: CPPR-129

. Dockets: 50-498 50-499 Licensee: ' Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) ,

P. O. Box'1700 '

Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP)

Inspection At: STP, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Conducted: September 7 through October 16, 1987 l

Inspectors: Au/& //I///7 C'

1. . E. J p nson, Senior Resident Inspector Dat4 i Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects I

Nduh) // 6 "I D. L. Gar /ison, Resident Inspector, Project D/ty'

Sectiofi D, Division of Reactor Projects i

Other 1 Contributing Inspectors: J. I. Tapia, Project Engineer, Project Section A L. D. Gilbert, Reactor Inspector, Material &

Quality Programs Section

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Approve D t: Constable, Chief, Project Section 0 Date

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Division of Reactor Projects j 8711200279 871117 PDR ADOCK 05000498  :

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Inspection Summary'

-Inspection Conducted September 7 through October 16, 1987 (Report 50-498/87-58; 50-499/87-58)

'.licensee Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection including site tours; action on~ previous inspection findings; piping systems as-built verification; reactor pressure boundary piping; safety-related piping; pipe supports and restraints; structural masonry construction; concrete expansion anchors; safety-related components; and pressurizer code safety valve misalignmen Results: Within the 10 areas inspected, no violations were identifie I l

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Prihcipal Licensee Employees

'J.' T. Westermeier, Project Manager

• J. Geiger, Manager, Nuclear Assurance

• T. J. Jordan, Project Quality Assurance Manager

'*D. King, Construction Manager

• J. Phelps, Project Compliance Supervisor

• M. Brumer, Principal Engineer

• S. Phillips, Project Compliance Engineer Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)

B. Senn, Material Control

• R. Bryan, Construction Manager

• L. Hurst, Project Quality Assurance Manager

• R. Medina, Quality Assurance Supervisor A. Lopez, Civil / Structural EGS Ebasco Service Inc. (Ebasco)

D. Frey, Civil Quality Control

• D. White, Construction Manager

• A. Cutrona,, Quality Manager In addition to the above, the NRC inspector also held discussions with other members of the HL&P, Bechtel, and Ebasco staff l

• Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on )

October 19, 198 ! Site Tour, Unit 2 j The NRC inspectors made frequent tours of the reactor containment building (RCB), fuel handling building (FHB), mechanical and electrical auxiliary building (MEAB), isolation valve cubicles (IVC), diesel generator building (DGB), outside storage areas, warehouses, reservoir and turbine generator building (TGB). These site tours were performed during normal working hours, on the weekends and backshift period . License Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation 498/8727-01 This iter concerned the external cleanliness of stainless steel safety-related piping systems that was not to be insulated. Pipe that is

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to be. insulated has NRC-verified effective procedural controls which assure' cleanliness before the insulation is installed. The licensee has-removed the deleterious foreign material from all the stainless steel safety-related. piping in Unit 1 and instituted procedural controls.to

. assure that .the piping in Unit 2 will be kept clean during construction

.with inspections.to be performed at turnover and again before fuel loa . Piping Systems As-Built Verification, Unit 2 The NRC inspectors selected two safety-related piping system lines to determine if.the as-built. drawings and specifications correctly reflect the as-built condition of'the plan _

The following isometric drawings were selected as. a representative sample of the piping systems:

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Isometric Drawing 4C369 PSI 472, sheet 04, Revision 5 for the safety injection (SI) system piping from'the "A" accumulator to the reactor cold leg which included approximately 50 feet of 12-inch diameter Class 1 piping,190 feet of 12-inch Class 2 piping, two Class 1 check valves, one Class 2 motor operat'ed control valve and 12 pipe hanger Isometric Drawing 4C369PRH459, sheet 03, Revision 9 for the residual heat removal (RHR) piping system from the "A" RHR pump discharge to

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the.RHR heat exchanger inlet which included approximately 60 feet of 8-inch and 10' feet of 12-inch Class 2 piping, one Class 2 check valve, one Class 2 control valve and 11 pipe hanger In the areas inspected, the piping systems were consistent with the drawings and codes for welding, location, size, configuration, component location, valve orientation and identificatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Reactor Pressure Boundary Piping, Unit 2 An inspection of the reactor pressure boundary piping was performed in order to assess the adequacy of the specifications and procedures, the quality and workmanship of the completed system and the adequacy of the ecords, Quality' Assurance (QA) Review (Procedures)

The NRC inspectors reviewed the applicable commitments concerning the

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program for field fabricating of the piping systems. The following were reviewed:

Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Section 3 Specification SL019PS004, Revision 15, " Criteria for Piping Design" I

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Specification'5A010PS002, Revision 12, " Piping Erection and

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i Field Fabrication" Specification 4LO20PS0100, Revision 7, " Fabrication of ASME,Section III, Piping 2 1/2 inches and Larger" Standard Site Procedures (SSP) 10, " Installation of Field Fabrication of Piping," Revision 4 SSP'18, " General ASME III~ Welding Requirements," Revision 4 The quality' programs appear to be adequate to assure that the

. licensee commitments and regulatory requirements are fulfilled. - Work Observation The NRC inspectors inspected the 12-inch ASME Class 1 reactor coolant (RC) line on the "A" loop from the cold leg to the first check valve. This line is between the "A" accumulator and the RC loop and is shown on Isometric Drawing 4C369PRC457, sheet 10, ,

" Reactor Coolant," Revision Pipe Spool Pieces RC-2125-A, RC-2125-B, RC-2125-C, and RC-2125-D on Line RC-2125-BB1 were inspected for workmanship and identification of the welds, dimension of piping sections, dimensions between welds, external damage, identification of sections that makeup the complete lines and overall configuratio It was determined that the line inspected was correct and in  ;

accordance with the drawings including field change requests (FCR). Record Review The.NRC inspectors reviewed the code data packages RC-2125-A, RC-2125-B, RC-2125-C, and RC-2125-D for Line RC-2125-BB1. The records were examined for completeness, retrievability, accuracy, correctness when compared to'the actual configuration, and shop and field weld (FW) documentatio The record packages for FWs 0001, 0005, 0005a, 0006, 0010, and F50001 were examined for compliance to the requirements of the inspection procedure SSP 18, specifically for cleanliness, preheat, fit up, purge, visual inspection, nondestructive examination, and inspection sign off. The documents in the packages reviewed were:

piping checklists, process data checklist, nondestructive examination, thickness measurement, and piping fabrication checklis The records for shop welds were examined for completeness and code stampin The material certifications for filler material and piping were reviewed for compliance to the material code _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ .

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l .No violations or deviations were observed in the inspection and-l review of the reactor pressure boundary pipin . Safety-Related Piping, Unit 2 An inspection of safety-related piping was performed in order to assess the licensee quality program for offsite fabricated piping spool pieces and the on site field welding and erection of the piping spool pieces into completed piping system Quality Assurance Review (Procedures)

The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee commitment concerning the program for shop and field fabrication of piping systems. The following documents were reviewed:

FSAR, Section 3 Bechtel Specification SL019P5004, " Criteria for Piping Design,"

Revision 15 Specification 5A010PS002, " Piping Erection and Field Fabrication,"

Revision 12-Specification 4LO20PS0100, " Fabrication of ASME Section III Piping 2 1/2 inches and Larger," Revision 7 SSP 17, " General American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 83 Welding Requirements," Revision 2 SSP 18, " General American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) III Welding Requirements," Revision 4 i SSP 10, " Installation and Field Fabrication of Piping," Revision 4 It appears that the licensee's program for safety-related piping meets the above commitment I Work Observation '

The SI and RHR piping systems in the RCB were selected for inspection. The following portions of these completed systems were inspected:

Safety injection, from the "A" accumulator to the reactor coolant line which encompassed approximately 65 feet of 12-inch Class 1 and 2 pipe, a 12-inch Class 2 control valve and two 12-inch Class 1 check valves. This system is detailed on j Isometric Drawing 4C369 PSI 472, sheet 04, Revision 5, i Lines SI2123-KB2, 2124-882, and 2125-8B {

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RdR, from the discharge of'the_"A" RHR pump to the bottom of the RHR heat exchange Components in this' system included 7 feet of 12-inch and 60 feet of 8-inch Class 2 piping, one 8-inch

' Class'2 check valve and one 8-inch Class 2 control valve. The

. applicable isometric drawing was 4C369PRH459, sheet 03, Revision 9, Line RH-2163-KB The.NRC. inspectors visually examined and measured the systems for correctness of length from weld to weld, damage, field and shop weld identification, code data plates, check valve direction of flow,.

inclusicn of FCRs, weld quality, hanger location, and overall'

configuratio .It was verified that the piping systems were installed in accordance with the installation drawings and specification requirement Records The.NRC inspector reviewed the completed records for each of the inspected field welds and the shop welding and fabrication records for each piping spool assembl lhe following records were found to be representative of.the installations, properly stored and easily retrievable:

RHR Line 2103-KB2 Field Welds - FW0001, FW0002, FW0003, FW0004, FW0005, FW0006, FW0007, FW0008, FW0010, FW0011, FW0012, FW0029, FW0030, and FW0033 Spool piece'- RH-2103-A, RH-2103-B, RH-2103-C, RH-2103-D, RH-2103-E, RH-2103-F, RH-2103-G and RH-2103-H

'SI Line 2123-KB2 Field helds - FW0001 and FW0002 Spool piece - SI-2123-A SI Line 2124-BB2 Field Welds - FW0001, FW0002, FW0003, FW0004 and FW0005, FW8250 and FS5561 Spool Piece - SI-2124-A, SI-2124-B, SI-2124-C and 5I-2124-D SI Line 2125-BB1 Field We'ds - FW0001 and FW0001A Spool Piece - SI2125-A RC Line 2125-BB1 Field Welds - FW0001, FW0005, FW0005A, FW0006, FW0010 and FS0001 Spool Pieces - RC2125-A, RC2125-B, RC2125-C and RC2125-D

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l 1T he licensee's record system for preparing, reviewing, packaging, identifying, filing, storing, and retrieval appears to be functioning

. properl No violations or deviations were identified in these area . Pipe Supports and Restraints,' Unit 2 An inspection of safety-related pipe supports and restraints was performed in order to verify the adequacy of the construction process and adherence

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to procedural requirement Work Observation The NRC inspectors visually examined 23 pipe supports which were located'in the RCB. These supports were examined.for conformance to the details as shown on the isometric drawings; which included

' clearances, weld sizes, dimensions, orientation, clamps, bolting, type of restraint, location of the support, and shapes and sizes of structural stee The following hangers were examined:

Drawing Hanger RH-2103-KB2 RR03, RR04, RR06, RR07, RR09, RR11, SH05, SH08, SH10, HL5001 HL5004 SI-2124-BB2 RR01, RR02, RR03, RR04, HL5001 HL5003, HL5004 .i RC-2125-BB1 HL5001, HL5007, HL5008, HL5009 HL50010  ;

The inspection verified that the items inspected were built to the drawing requirements, Records The NRC inspector reviewed the records for 18 of the restraints and

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supports that were inspected. These were reviewed for completeness, accuracy, and packaging. The following files were reviewed:

RC-2125-BB1 HL5003 and HL5010 SI-2124-BB2 HL5001 and HL5003, RR01, RR02 and RR04 RH-2103-KB2 HL5001 and HL5004, SH05, SH08 and SH10 RR03, RR04, RR06, RR07, RR09 and RR11

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The packages were found to be complete, in order, and properly stored. Review of the pipe support records indicate that the licensee's program for the generation, review, collection, filing, and retrieving of records appears to be adequat No violations.or deviations were identified in these area . Structural Masonry Construction, Unit 2 The purpose of this inspection was to determine the status of the overall program of concrete masonry unit (CMU) walls. Although the CMU walls are classed as nonsafety, nonload bearing, the NRC inspector reviewed the FSAR requirements, specification, procedures, purchase order requirements,

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drawings,'and performed a building inspectio These. reviews and inspections were also made to verify compliance wit additional requirements in IE Bulletins (IEB) 80-11 " Masonry Wall Design,"

and IEB 79-02 and 79-14 which concern piping and pipe supports attached to or near CMU wall The only area in the plant which utilizes CMU walls with mortared joints are the persnnnel areas on the 41-foot elevation of the mechanical auxiliary building (MAB). These CMU walls are within'an area enclosed b reinforced load bearing concrete walls and do not present a problem. The balance _of areas in the plant where removable walls are needed, utilize free standing stacked concrete blocks secured on both sides with structural steel framing. The licensee is in compliance with the regulatory requirement No violations or deviations were observed in this are . Concrete Expansion Anchors Procedures / Specifications The NRC inspectors reviewed the QA program pertaining to the concrete expansion anchors. The review included two procedures and one specification. This review indicated that sufficient inspection / installation requirements are addressed including references to the ANSI, ASME, and American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC).

The NRC inspectors also interviewed the licensee's engineers and reviewed the documentation in response to IEB 79-02,'" Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts." It appears that the licensee has taken appropriate corrective measures and responded adequately to the action items listed in IEB 79-0 . _ _ _ _

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Procedures and specifications reviewed were:

Specification SA010SS1000,'" Installation of Expansion Anchors, Rock Bolts, Grouted Anchor Bolts, and Core Drilling,"

Revision 9,. dated' January 20, 1987 SSP 14, " Stud Anchor Installation.and Inspection," Revision 2, dated March 13, 1987 SSP 40, " Maxi-Bolt Installation and Inspection," Revision 2, dated August 7, 1986 b. Observations The NRC inspector selected 27 completed supports from various systems for inspection. The.. sample' selection included mechanical pipe supports with'Hilti and Maxi bolts; and electrical supports which were predominately installed with Hilti bolts. The bolt diameters'

ranged from 1/2-inch'to 3/4-inch. The following are attributes that were observe during the inspection:

- correct anchor identification and markings minimum embedment depth minimum edge distance minimum spacing between anchors minimum torque oversized holes in base plates torque seal indicating final quality control (QC) acceptance During the inspection, one 1/2-inch maxi bolt on support RH-2203-HL5007 was found to have a lower torque value than require It appeared that the bolt was in a difficult position to acquire a proper torqu Creep in concrete and some relaxation of the bolt could have contributed to a lower torque value. This one bolt will be treated as an isolated cas The NRC inspector observed the work of the craft and questioned QC inspectors on various inspection attributes and installation method Supports examined are as follows:

Maxi Bolts Hilti Bolts RH-2101-HL5002 2122600 (Electrical)

RH-2101-HL5001 2122560 (Electrical)

RH-2105-HL5003 2122559 (Electrical)

l RH-2115-GU002 2122554 (Electrical)

l RH-2105-SH04 SI-2128-HF5007 (Pipe)

l' RH-2201-HL5001 SI-2128-HF5006 (Pipe)

! RH-2202-SH01 2122532 (Electrical)

RH-2203-SH03 2120897 (Electrical)

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RH-2203-HL5007 2120898.(Electrical)

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RH-2206-HL5002 2120849 (Electrical}l RH-2217-HL5005L RH-2207-HL5002 (Pipe);

RH-2216-HL5001- SI-2220-HF5001 (Pipe)

CC-2214-RH16-(Pipe)

.CC-2215-HL5005 (Pipe).

2131616.(Electrical).

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' .TrainingJ The.NRC inspector reviewed the. training records'of'six civil / structural; inspectors who had been-specifically qualified in L, .the1 inspection of expansion anchor ,

The qualifications'of the inspectors were compared to the requirements of:the ANSI N45.2.6-1978, document " Qualification of-

. Inspection, Examination, and Testing. Personnel for Nuclear Power'

Plants." This is-the base document to'which the licensee has committed in the area-inspected.~

The training file folders for each inspector contained the required documentation to substantiate the-inspectors. qualifications. The.NRC-inspector reviewed the personnel work history and background, educational requirements, site training, tests and test results,-and certificates of qualificatio In.each case,.the' documents that were

, reviewed met the ANSI standard requirement . Storage

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The NRC inspectors reviewed the storage requirements for bolting and made an inspection of the storage area The bolting is required to be stored or warehoused to ANSI-Standard N45.2.2 ". Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage and-Handling of Items of Nuclear Power Plants," specifically to Level- This level requires protection fromlthe elements and physical damag To. meet these. requirements the bolting is stored-inside the warehouse area The main warehouse, three mini warehouses, the Unit 2 buildings and the pipe hanger bolt storage areas were inspected. In each case the

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bolts were found to be properly stored and identified. The .QA program on expansion anchors appear to be functioning properly.

L No.significant deficiencies were observed in the examination of concrete. expansion anchors.

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1 Safety-Related Components, Unit 2 An~ inspection was conducted of activities related to selected safety-related components other than the reactor pressure vessel and 1'

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i piping. This inspection was performed to determine whether specific activities associated with the components selected for review were being controlled and performed according to NRC requirements, FSAR commitment and licensee procedure Procedure Review

.The following applicable procedures were reviewed by the NRC inspector:

SSP 8, "Nonconformance Reporting," Revision 3-SSP 11, " Fabrication, Erection and Bolt-up of Structural and Miscellaneous Steel," Revision 2

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SSP 12, "On-Site Shop Fabrication," Revision 2 SSP 13, " Material.' Control," Revision 2 SSP 16, " General Structural Welding Requirements," Revision 3 SSP 18, " General'ASME III Welding Requirements," Revision 4

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SSP 24, " Disassembly / Reassembly of Safety and Non-Safety Related Valves," Revision 2 SSP 25, "ASME Section XI Work," Revision 2 SSP 31, " Welder Qualifications," Revision 1 SSP.44, " Storage and Maintenance of Permanent Plant Equipment,"

Revision 0 SSP 47, " Inspection And Rework of Class IE MOVs," Revision 0 SSP 52, " Installation, Assembly and Disassembly of Permanent ,

Mechanical Plant Equipment," Revision 1 d Work Observation The NRC inspector inspected the following equipment for which work had been completed or was in progress in order to ascertain conformance with the applicable procedural requirements: )

RHR Heat Exchanger No. 2R161NHX201C Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger No. SR172NHX203A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump No. 35142MPA01 Low Head SI Pump No. 2N122NPA202A SI Motor Operated Valve (MOV) No. XSI0008A SI M0V No. XSI0018A l

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. equipment previously listed. Documents reviewed included-installation drawings,. vendor drawings, mechanical equipment installation travelers, materials lists, welding inspection reports, process data checklists, and Manufacturer's Code Data Report .;

.No violations or deviations were identified in these area . Pressurizer Code' Safety Valve Misalignment, Unit 1 Summary The code safety valve problem was identified on September 6,-1987, during filling and venting of the RC system. A leak was identified on the pressurizer safety valve (No.1-RC-PSV-3451) inlet flange at a system pressure of about 30' psi. During an investigation by Nuclear Plant Operations Department (NP00) maintenance, it was found that Valve 1-RC-PSV-3451 was leaking due to misalignment and appeared to have a 1/16-inch gap between flanges. Two other deficiencies found were: (1) Four inlet flange fasteners had improper and uneven torque, some as low as 50-foot pounds and (2) Drain plugs on the discharge side of the valve body were not instaH e I Maintenance Work Request (MWR) No. RC-87025481 was prepared to perform the rewor Upon reinstalling Valve 1-RC-PSV-3451, it was found that it could not be set because of the misalignmen Similar misalignment also existed on Valves 1-RC-PSV-3450 and 1-RC-PSV-3452, but not as severe. Nonconformance Report (NCR) No.87-160 was initiated to reinstall the valves using engineering directions, as stated on the NC Valves 1-RC-PSV-3450 and 1-RC-PSV-3452 were  ;

correctly installed with minimal difficulty, however, '

Valve 1-RC-PSV-3451 could not be installed because of unacceptable misalignmen Several meetings were held to determine the correct method for installing the valve; the final decision was to cut out the discharge piping flange to pipe weld and refit the flange to achieve alignmen This rework was completed on September 19, 198 ,

New drain plugs were installed in all three valve bodies. It has not at this time been determined how the Unit 1 drain plugs were omitte The Unit 2 drain plugs were found to be installed. It has been assumed that the vendor could have left them out or removed them when the valves were refurbished earlier in the vendor sho Inspection I and receiving records did not indicate inspection criteria for drain l

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. The NRC' inspector : reviewed the installation. documentation of the

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three. pressurizer safety valves. The installation records were those

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of.the previo'us crew (Ebasco. support)~who also installed Valves PSV-3451 and PSV-3452 after the hot functional test (HFT);-

these' valves have not been removed since that time. The records indicated that the installation.was performed'in accordance with the vendor l recommendations and instruction One deficiency identified in:the original' installation was that Westinghouse installation. instructions suggested that the support collar set' screws should be loosened prior to the torquing of the safety valve inlet flange. fasteners. This step was not performed sincesthe valve was: considered' temp'orarily installed during the bolt up of the pressurize safety r and relief' valve (PSARV) manifold-

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the-option of' backing off the set screws. This and other sequences

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of installation.could have led to the misalignmen Probable'Cause During this investigation there. appeared to be several. contributing n factors concerning.the misalignment of the' valves which lead to the leak. -The installation of the pipe loop seal from the pressurizer to

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the safety' valve (1-RC-PSV-3451) was performed by temporaril installing the. safety valves and locking the inlet flange (pipe). to the' support collar. The pipe fitup and' weld out was then completed; however, one of the, field welds required ~a~ major. weld repair and the resultant weld shrinkage and. residual stresses could have caused the flange offset and misalignmen After HFT, the valve (1-RC-PSV-3451) was removed and had approximately 1/8-inch machined off of the inlet flange face at the vendors shop and reinstalled. When the valve was reinstalled, the flange alignment was apparently acceptable prior to bolt-u However, during bolt-up.one side of the flanges was drawn up metal-to-metal as evidenced by scoring on.one side of the flange face. The torque on the other side of the flange _was inadequate to overcome the uneven condition of the flanges. Thus, the flanges were cocked and the gasket was not properly compressed on one sid The loss of torque on four of the bolts was also possibly caused by slippage between the set screws on the support collar and the inlet

. flange following the torque check by Q It appears that the support collar may have contributed to the ,

problem. Further investigation indicated that Westinghouse deleted I the support collar from the design without notifying HL&P. A letter '

dated August 27, 1987, was sent to HL&P stating that extensive analysis completed several years ago determined that, generically,

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the ring support is, fin fact; not needed for valve support'and that the standard practice is.to back off the screws after valve installation. This letter was sent after the licensee had inquired about the support collar having some set screws' engaged and some

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backed out. .This was observed during a system walkdow The licensee has. requested Westinghouse to address any safety.or generic implications associated with the apparent breakdown in design control. Westinghouse has verbally stated, "that to the best of our

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knowledge, no other items have been deleted from th. original design without notifying the project."

.. Conclusion

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Based upon the NRC inspectors surveillance.and~ inspections, review of

. records and procedures; and interviews with QC craft,.and HL& engineers; the NRC inspector has concluded that there was no apparent wrongdoing or an overall QA/QC. programmatic breakdow Discussions with management were held to preclude this problem from-occurring in Unit . Exit Interview The NRC inspector met with the licensee (denoted in paragraph 1) on October 19, 1987, and summarized the scope and findings of this inspection.

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