IR 05000498/1998016

Insp Repts 50-498/98-16 & 50-499/98-16 on 981207-10.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Support, Including Alarm Stations,Security Equipment,Vital Area Barriers & Detection Aids & Security Event Logs

ML20198L462
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	12/24/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198L443	List: IR 05000498/1998016 ML20198L439
References
50-498-98-16, 50-499-98-16, NUDOCS 9901050026
Download: ML20198L462 (9)

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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket Nos.: 50 498 50-499 License Nos.: NPF-76 NPF-80 Report No.: 50-498/98-16 50-499/98-16 Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas Dates: December 7-10,1998 Inspector (s): D. Schaefer, Security Specialist, Plant Support Branch Aporoved By: Blaine Murrray, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Attachment: Supplemental Information ,

l 9901050026 981224 PDR ADOCK 05000498 l G PDR \

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-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-498/98-12; 50-499/98-12 l

This was an announced inspection of the licensee's physical security program. The areas )

inspected included: alarm stations; security equipment; compensatory measures; security J system power supply; vital area barriers and detection aids; and security event log Plant Su.Joort

• Alarm station operators were alert and well trained. Effective vital area barriers and detection systems were in place that would provide delay and detection to individuals

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attempting unauthorized entry. Compensatory measures were deployed in a manner consistent with the requirements of the security plan. A good security backup power !

supply system was in place. A very good program for reporting security events was in j place (Sections S1.1, S2.2, S2.3, S2.4, S3.1). 1

- A noncited violation of the security plan was identified involving the failure to immediately deactivate an individuals security badge through the security computer to

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prevent the individual from gaining re-entry to the protected area after he was removed I

for cause (Section S3.1).

• Security equipment lockers positioned inside plant buildings could be easily relocated within the buildings without the knowledge of the security department (Section S2.1),

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. l-3-l Report Details IV. Plant Support l S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities St.1 Alarm stations Insoection Scope (81700)

The alarm stations were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan. The areas inspected included the requirements and capabilities of the i alarm stations, redundancy and diversity of stations, protection of the alarm stations, l and systems securit Observations and Findinas The inspector verified the' redundancy and diversity of tl+ alarm stations. Action by one alarm station operator could not reduce the effectiveness of the security systems without the knowledge of the other alarm station operatcrs. The central alarm station and secondary alarm station were bullet resistant. The inspector questioned the station operators and determined that they were properly trained and knowledgeable of their dutie Conclusions The security alarm stations were redundant and well protected. Alarm station operators were alert and well traine S2 Security Facilities and Equipment l

' S2.1 Security Eauipment Inspection Score (81700)

The security equipment was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan. The area inspected included the availability of security msponse I equipmen !

' Observations and Findinas l

l The licensee had prepositioned some of the security response equipment in several locations inside Units 1 and 2 buildings. At each location, the equipment was locked inside approximately 4-foot high metallockers. Patrolling security officers randomly check these storage lockers several times each da i

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-4-The NRC senior resident inspector identified that while each metal storage locker was secured with an adequate lock, the cabinet was light enough that a single individual could move the cabinets to another location within the buildings. In this event, the security officers would not know the location of the lockers and the security equipment inside the cabinets would be unava!!able to responding armed response officer During the exit meeting on December 10,1998, the inspector discussed the matter of '

the security equipment lockers. The licensee stated that this matter was being reviewed and that Condition Report No. 98-18221 had been initiated to determine the feasibility of possibly permanently affixing the equipment lockers to the wall or floo The licensee's use of portable security equipment lockers is considered to be an inspection followup item to be reviewed during a future security inspection (IFl 398;-399/9816-01).

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Security equipment lockers positioned inside plant buildings could be easily relocated within the buildings without the knowledge of the security departmen S2.2 Vital Area Barriers and Detection Aids Inspection Scope (71750 and 81700)

+ The inspector observed the licensee's vital area barriers and detection aids to determine compliance with the requirements of the physical security pla , Observations and Findinos l

The inspector determined through observation and testing that the vital areas were appropriately locked and alarmed and that the vital area barriers were adequate to ensure delay of a potential adversary. The inspector's random observations determined that unescorted access into vital areas was limited to authorized personnel. The alarms ennunciated in continuously manned alarm stations. Emergency exits from vital areas were locked and alarmed. Upon entering and exiting vital areas, plant employees made ,

a concerted effort to ensure that the vital area door was properly secure ;

The inspector observed the licensee test the vital area door locking mechanisms and detection aids. All tests were properly conducted and all attempts to intrude into the vital areas were detected. The licensee's tests of the vital area detection system were performance based to ensure that system failures were discovered and correcte Conclusions Effective vital area barriers and detection systems were in place that would provide delay and detection to individuals attempting unauthorized entr '

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-5-S2.3 Compensatory Measures Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's compensatory measures program to determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan. The areas inspected included deployment of compensatory measures and the effectiveness of those measure Observations and Findinas The inspector confirmed that the licensee deployed compensatory measures in a manner consistent with the requirements in the Security Plan. The inspector determined through interviews that the security personnel available for assignment to compensatory security posts were properly trained for those dutie Conclusions The licensee deployed compensatory measures in a manner consistent with the requirements of the security pla S Security System Power Sucolv Inspection Scope (71750)

The security system backup power supply was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the Securi'y Pla Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed the licensee's design and operation of the security backup power supply system that provided emergency power to required security equipmen The licensee demonstrated that upon simulating a loss of off-site power, the internal ,

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battery system immediately took over supplying required components of the security systems with power. The inspector determined through interviews of security staff that the security backup power supply system performed as required. The inspector also verified that, upon transfer to the backup power system, an automatic indication was received in the alarm stations.

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A good security backup power supply system was in plac l l

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-6-S3 Records and Reports S3.1 Security Event Loas Insoection Scope (81700)

The inspector reviewed safeguards event logs and security incident reports to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21(b) and (c),10 CFR 26.73, and the physical security plan. The inspector also reviewed miscer meous report Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed the security event logs from July 1 to December 4,1998. The records were available for review and maintained for the time required by regulation The inspector determined that the licensee conformed to the regulatory requirements regarding the reporting of security events. The logs and supporting security incident reports were accurate, neat, and contained sufficient detail for the reviewer to determine root cause, reportability, and corrective action take The licensee's recorded also included trending and analysis of the major categories of event Licensee reports dated October 15 and November 2,1998, identified that on July 15, 1998, a contract employee was involved in a series of discussions and argument Subsequently, a site supervisor determined that the actions by the contract employee involved aberrant behavior. The licensee stated that at approximately 1715 hours0.0198 days <br />0.476 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.525575e-4 months <br />, July 15,1998, in accordance Procedure OPGP09-ZA-003, Revision 5, " Continual Behavior Observation Program," the employee was instructed to leave the protected area. The employee was allowed to retain his security badge. Subsequent to removing the employee for cause, actions were not immediately taken to deactivate the l employee's security badge in the security computer, to prevent the employee from gaining re-entry to the protected area. At approximately 1955 hours0.0226 days <br />0.543 hours <br />0.00323 weeks <br />7.438775e-4 months <br />, July 15,1998, 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> after the employee was instructed to leave the protected area, the licensee deactivated the employee's security badge in the security compute Section 4.3.5.5 of the security plan requires that when an individual no longer requires unescorted access or access is withdrawn for cause, the person's security badge shall l

be deactivated through the security computer to prevent its use in accessing protected area and vital area portals.

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! Section 5.4.2 of Procedure OPGP09-ZA-0003 requires that il those cases in which an individual's behavior represents an immediate danger to heaLh, safety, or property that the individual shall be removed from the protected area, and the Access Program Director shall be immediately notified. The Access Program Director is notified so that the individual's security badge can be immediately deactivated in the security compute .- - _ - - .- - -- _ .- - - . -. -

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. The failure of the licensee to immediately deactivate an individual's security badge

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through the security computer to prevent the individual from gaining re-entry to the

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protected area af ter he was removed for cause, is a violation of Section 4.3.5.5 of the security plan and Section 5.4.2 of Procedure OPGP09-ZA-003. This nonrepetetitive, licensee-identified, and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation I consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-498;499/9816-02), Conclusions i l

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A very good program for reporting security events was in place. The security staff was correctly reporting security events. A noncited violation was identified involving the failure to deactivate an individuals security badge through the security computer to prevent the individual from gaining re-entry to the protected area after he was removed for caus V. Manaaement Meetinas

X1. Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 23,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identifie I l

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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Bilski, Lead instructor, Security C. Brooks, System Engineer, Systems Engineering M. Burnett, Director, Quality and Licensing R. Crocken, Systems Engineer, Systems Engineering J. Drymiller, Supervisor, Security D. Keating, Director, Safety Quality Concerns Program D. Long, Supervisor, Network Services J. Morris, Engineer, Licensing K. Taplett, Manager, Licensing Contractors D. Bennetsen, Supervisor, Security Force, PTl Security L. Knox, Security Force Supervisor, PTl Security C. Sanders, Project Manager, PTl Security NRC G. Guerra, Resident inspector

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INSPECTl*0N PROCEDURES USED IP 71750 Plant Support Activities IP 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED L ltems Opened 50-498;499/9816-01 IFl Portable security equipment lockers could be easily relocated without knowledge of security departmen ;499/9816-02 NCV Failure to immediately ir'nplement actions to prevent s.,

individual from gaining re-entry to the protected area after being removed for cause

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-2-Items Closed 50-498;499/9816-02 NCV Failure to immediately implement actions to prevent an individual from gaining re-entry to the protected area after being removed for cause LIST OF DOCUMENTATION REVIEWED Safeguards Event Logs from July 1 through December 4,1998, plus security event trending -

reports and five security condition (incident) reports South Texas Project Procedures No. OPAP01-ZA-0102, Revision 4, " Plant Procedures" No. OPGP03-ZA-0107 Revision 10, " Security of the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Security Force Instructions No. 2301, Revision 5, " Compensatory Measures" No. 2402, Revision 4, " Alarm Station Operator"

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No. 3701, Revision 8, " Security Equipment Operability Tests"