IR 05000498/1998007
| ML20237B266 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237B260 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-98-07, 50-498-98-7, 50-499-98-07, 50-499-98-7, NUDOCS 9808180148 | |
| Download: ML20237B266 (16) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.: 50-498 50-499 License Nos.: NPF-76 NPF-80 Report No.: 50-498/98-07 50-499/98-07 Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Dates: June 14 through July 25,1998 inspectors: N. F. O'Keefe, Senior Resident inspector D. P. Loveless, Senior Resident inspector W. C. Sifre, Resident inspector G. L. Guerra, Resident inspector Approved By: J. l. Tapia, Chief, Project Branch A Attachment: Supplemental Information
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY South Texas Project Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-498/98-07; 50-499/98-07 This inspection included aspects of licensee or,erations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week periM sf resident inspectio Operations
Operators exhibited good teamwork during Unit 2 control rod testing and startup activities. Operators responded well to several minor equipment problems and j
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remained focused on plant safety. The schedule for this brief-duration outage was detailed and realistic, resulting in an improvement of material condition of the plant and confirmation that all rod control cluster assemblies were functioning as expected (Section O1.2).
Maintenance
- Performance of observed maintenance and surveillance activities was good, increasing the frequency of main steam safety valve testing appeared to be adequate to assure the time-dependent nature of the seat bonding did not excessively affect the setpoint (Section M1.1).
- - Following governor stem work on the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump I turbine, maintenance workers experienced difficulty aligning the governor linkages due to unclear work instructions. In the process of troubleshooting, the governor was damaged and required replacement. Operations and system engineering and design engineering personnel provided close support during troubleshooting and repair efforts 1 (Section M1.2).
Enaineerina
- Design engineering reviewed a potential operability concern identified during testing of the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump and was able to show through calculations and test data that water observed draining from the turbine exhaust line was condensed in the cool exhaust line due to low flow rate and lack of warming following
. maintenance. The analysis indicated that the water would not be present or affect turbine operability during startup from a normal standby condition. Design engineering was responsive and thorough in addressing this issue (Section E2.1).
Plant Support
- Chemistry personnel were instrumental in the prompt identification and isolation of a condenser tube leak in Unit 2. Recommendations of actions to minimize the effects on steam generator materials while cleaning up the impurities from chemistry personnel were timely and appropriate. As a result, steam generator chemistry was quickly controlled and a power reduction and plant shutdown were avoided (Section R1.1).
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- Security was observed providing good support of various maintenance activitie Guards were determined to be knowledgeable of their responsibilities in regards to the work activities. Central alarm station watchstanders were also observed to be knowledgeable of conditions, with (,ne exception caused by lack of communication (Section S1.1),
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Report Details Summarv of Plant Status Unit 1 began this inspection period at 100 percent power. On June 14, operators reduced power to about 10 percent in response to the failure of a transformer in the Train B switchgea Following repairs to the transformer, Unit 1 was returned to 100 percent power on June 15, and
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remained at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
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l Unit 2 began this inspection period at 100 percent power. On July 24, the plant shut down for a 8 brief planned outage. Following control rod testing and some corrective maintenance, the plant was restarted late the following da l. Operations
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01 Conduct of Operations 0 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious; specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections belo On June 14, the failure of a transformer in the Unit 1, Train B safety-related switchgear resulted in an apparent fire. Operators deenergized the associated buses and activated the site fire brigade in response. Preparations were made to shut the plant down, and power was lowered to about 10 percent. Following repairs, power was returned to 100 percent. This event is discussed in detail in Special Inspection Report 50-498;499/981 .2 Ooerator Performance Durina Unit 2 Outaae and Startuo Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operators during control rod testing and l
subsequent startup during the weekend of July 24-26. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures for these evolutions, including " Conduct of Operations." i
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Observations were discussed with the Unit 2 Operations Manage Observations and Findings The licensee scheduled a short duration outage in order to perform control rod testing to verify proper scram times. Tnis testing was in accordance with industry recommendations in response to previous problems with incomplete insertions. The outage schedule included a number of corrective maintenance items intended to improve the material condition of the plant, as well as walkdowns inside containment to identify deficiencies to be worked during the upcoming refueling outage.
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2-The inspectors noted that the outage schedule was detailed. Task scheduling was based on historical performance data, and appeared realistic based on very close previous adherence by all involved organizations. All scheduled work and testing was completed, resulting in an improvement to the material condition of the plan Control Rod Testina Observations l
The inspectors observed control room operators' performance during rod drop testing, performed in accordance with Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP10-DM-0003, Revision l 6," Automatic Multiple Rod Drop Time Measurement." During the test, the automatic !
multiple rod drop system deenergized the digital rod position indication (DRPI) syste The inspectors verified that the reactor trip breakers were then opened within one minute as required by Technical Specifications. The automatic multiple rod drop system then reenergized the DRPI system providing control room indication of final rod positio During the first test, inspectors observed that the DRPI system did not reenergize as expected. Control room operators determined that 120 volt AC Non-Class Vital Distribution Panel DP003 was deenergized. The unit supervisor suspended the rod )
drop test and began reviewing Plant Operating Procedu;e OPOPO4-VC-0001, Revision 6 " Loss of 120 VAC Non-Class Vital Distribution"in an attempt to determine the cause for the observed indications. The unit supervisor then entered the appropriate section of the procedure after being prompted by a reactor operato Upon investigation, maintenance and engineering personnel determined that DP003 had attempted to switch from normal to the emergency power source, but had hung up in an intermediate position. Troubleshooting efforts were unable to duplicate the problem or determine the cause. This event was documented in CR 9811474 and the panel was reenergized. Rod drop testing was then successfully completed without further inciden i l
Through discussions with the shift supervisor and the Unit 2 electrical maintenance manager, the inspectors determined that DP003 had previously failed to properly switch power supplies. The inspectors will review the results of the licensee's root cause investigation for this event and evaluate the effectiveness of previous corrective actions as an inspection followup item (50-499/98007-01). Startuo Observations During the reactor startup, the inspectors observed that the approach to criticality was appropriately cautious. Shift supervision was focused on reactivity manipulation Neutron monitoring indications and system responses were discussed and verified to be as expected. However, the inspectors noted that as the startup progressed through different phases, briefings were not held consistently. Trainee control was observed to be very good, and training discussions reinforced good operating habits without
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distracting operators from plant condition Throughout the observed evolutions, the inspectors observed that control room activities were parformed in a professional manner. Communications were formalin most case Teamwork and communications were effective among the control room operators,
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-3-Operators were thoroughly familiar with and followed procedures. Past experience was observed to be frequently discussed among operators. Unexpec'ed alarms were promptly investigate Control room staffing was supplemented for the startup, reducing individual workload With trainees and augmented staff, the number of personnelin the control area at times exceeded the guideline limit specified in " Conduct of Operations."' However, safe operations were observed in all case Operators responded appropriately to several minor equipment problems, including
' difficulty shutting an auxiliary steam isolation valve, a fluid leak from electro-hydraulic control (EHC) Pump 22, and turbine exhaust hood spray valves not working in automatic. The inspectors noted that Plant Operating Procedure OPOP03-ZG-0005, Revision 19, " Plant Startup to 100 Percent," did r.ot direct starting a second EHC pump to perform turbine throttle valve-governor valve swap following turbine roll up, even though operators knew from experience that a second pump was necessary to handle the large hydraulic loa Conclusions:
Operators exhibited good teamwork during Unit 2 control rod testing and startup activities. Operators responded well to several minor equipment problems and remained focused on plant safety. The schedule for this brief-duration outage was j
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detailed and realistic, resulting in an improvement of material condition of the plant and confirmation that all rod control cluster assemblies were functioning as s: pecte O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O Unit 1. Train B Safety Iniection System and Unit 2 Containment Walkdowns (71707) l The inspectors performed a walkdown of the accessible portions of the Unit 1, Train B
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safety injection system to verify proper valve alignment, power supply configuration, and component material condition. The following documents were reviewed:
- Plant Operating Procedure OPOP02-SI-0002, Revision 7, " Safety injection System initial Lineup"
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- Piping and Instrumentation' Drawing SN129F05014," Safety injection System"
- Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 6.3, " Emergency Core Cooling
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System" The inspectors observed that the system components were properly aligned and in a l
ready standby condition. Containment isolation valves were verified to be locked in the correct positions. System components were properly labeled. Power was available to system components and circuit breakers were properly aligned for standby operation The physical area had adequate cooling and ventilation. Based on visualinspection and l
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t l -4-on a review of the system health report, the material condition of the system was considered to be excellen The inspectors conducted an inspection of the material condition inside the Unit 2 containment during the brief plant outage. Despite the unit having been operating throughout the majority of a full operating cycle, very few leaks were observed. The material condition of equipment was observed to be excellent. Radiological conditions were properly posted, and updated surveys were made at the beginning of the outag The licensee conducted similar walkdowns to identify deficiencies to be worked during the upcoming refueling outage, with results similar to those of the inspector . Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance !
M1.1 Maintenance and Surveillance Observations !
l Inspection Scope (62707,61726) ,
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance and surveillance activities:
Maintenance:
- Troubleshooting and Card Replacement on Unit 2 Main Steamline Radiation Monitor RT-8046
- Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Overspeed Trip Test and Repai Surveillance:
- Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP03-AF-0001, Revision 10 " Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 21 Inservice Test."
- Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP10-DM-0003, Revision 6," Automatic Multiple Rod Drop Time Measurement."
- Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP11-MS-0001, Revision 11, " Main Steam Safety Valve Insen, ice Test." Observations and Findinas The observed activities were performed well. Prejob briefings included discussion of l potential risks to the plant, personnel safety, and contingency actions. The inspectors i reviewed the work packages and found that the work instructions were appropriately j
detailed and included vendor information when applicable. Surveillance procedures were properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors verified that surveillance
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activities satisfied Technical Specifications requirements. Plant operators and craft were knowledgeable of their duties. System engineers provided good support during l
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test performances. Technicians exhibited good system knowledge and preparation for the Unit 2 main steam line radiation monitor repai Main s" am safety valve testing was performed for two Unit 1 valves and four Unit 2 valves, which were on an increased frequency of every 62 days due to a recently demonstrated history of excessive setpoint drift. The inspectors discussed the licensee's root cause investigation results with systems and design engineering personnel. The licensee had concluded that tricro-bonding and micro-galling was caused by having refurbished the valve seating surfaces to an excessively fine surface finish. This condition was scheduled to be corrected to the manufacturer's original specifications during the next refueling outage in each unit. The increased testing frequency was changed to the current value in response to failures in April 1998. Each of the valve setpoints tested within the allowed Technical Specification values during the observed test Conclusions Performance of observed maintenance and surveillance activities was good. Increasing the frequency of main steam safety valve testing appeared to be adequate to assure the time-dependent nature of the seat bonding did not excessively affect the setpoin M1.2 Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumo 24 Testina Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed periodic testing to verify proper operation of the overspeed protection for the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The inspectors observed and assessed troubleshooting efforts and repair work to correct a governor problem, Observations and Findinas immediately prior to the overspeed testing, maintenance was performed on the governor stem. With the pump disconnected from the turbine, a manual system start was performed. However, the governor did not function to control the turbine steam flow and as a result, the system was shutdown a number of times. While attempting to verify that the governor's limiter was at the minimum stop, maintenance workers apparently damaged the governor manual adjustment positioner, such that the adjustment knob continued to rotate, never reaching a stop. This necessitated replacement of the governor.
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6-The system was restarted, but the linkage required additional adjustment before proper control was observed. Maintenance workers identified that the maintenance procedure instructions were not sufficiently detailed to properly align the linkage without repetitive adjustments. Following a number of governor linkage adjustments, the turbine was successfully overspeed teste The inspectors observed that system engineering, design engineering, and maintenance provided close support to workers during testing and repairs. Operations briefed those present during testing. The operations field supervisor maintained proper control during the evolution, working closely with support personnel in determining the course of actio l l
During one test run, the inspectors observed a significant quantity of water draining from the turbine exhaust line drain. The source of the water and effect on turbine operability were questioned. This issue is discussed in Section E Conclusions:
Following governor stem work on the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump turbine, maintenance workers experienced difficulty aligning the governor's linkages due to unclear work instructions. In the process of troubleshooting, the governor was damaged and required replacement. Operations and system engineering and design engineering personnel provided close support during troubleshooting and repair effort M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 { Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 50-498/97-002: Safety injection System Logic Circuitry not Fully Tested by Surveillance Procedure ,
On January 15,1997, as a result of a clarification of the NRC position on Generic Letter 96-01, the licensee identified that the quarterly actuation logic test surveillance for ;
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" Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump" for the safety injection pumps, Technical Specification 4.3.2.1, Table 4.3-2, item 7.a, did not appear to have been satisfied. Test ,
procedures for the actuation logic associated with the safety injection minimum flow f valves did not test all logic strings individually. Corrective actions included changing the l test method to properly check the affected logic circuitry, reviewing similar actuation l logic circuitry for other occurrences, and completing the surveillance procedure review L required by NRC Generic Letter 96-01. The inspectors reviewed completed testing of the actuation circuitry, revised surveillance procedures, and reports on the review of Generic Letter 96-01 items. The above corrective actions were tracked through the l issuance of Condition Reports 961120 and 97-587. Corrective actions were adequat .
The significance of this issue was low because prior safety injection system actuation !
surveillance had determined that the system would respond as required. The failure to test all actuation logic associated with the safety injection system was identified as a violation of minor significance and not subject to formal enforcement actio '
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Ill Enaineerina E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 Enaineerina Evaluation of Water in Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 24 Steam Line Inspection Scope: (37551. 62707. 92903)
During overspeed testing of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 24 turbine, the inspectors observed a significant quantity of water draining from the turbine exhaust line drain. The source of the water and effect on turbine operability were questioned. The resulting engineering evaluation was reviewed and discussed with system and design engineering personnel. Inspectors reviewed system prints, and walked down portions of the system. Previous corrective actions for a similar issue were reviewed and discussed with operators to determine the effectiveness of those action Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed that during the first turbine start on July 14, a solid stream of water flowed from the turbine exhaust drain for the entire 5 minutes the turbine was ru The inspectors questioned the source of water and its potential to impact system operability. The system had been tagged out since the previous afternoon, and was started shortly after clearing tags. However, the inspectors noted that the usual waiting period to ensure the steam inlet line was warmed and free of water was not per%med prior to starting the syste The inspectors were concerned because the plant had experienced excessive water buildup in the steam lines to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater turbine prior to 1994 and actions had been taken to eliminate the problem. These actions included system modifications and procedure enhancements to ensure that the presence of water would be recognized and correcte The inspectors reviewed the tagouts and restoration steps, as well as system prints, i then walked down the system. The condition of the system and system indications were discussed with operators. Proper indications that no water was present had been observed prior to the start, but water was observed after starting in the exhaust drain line for several minute Design engineering was able to show through calculations and test data that manually slow-starting the disconnected, unloaded turbine resulted in both rapid condensation in the coci exhaust line and insufficient steam flow to cany the condensate up the exhaust
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stack. As a result, the condensate fell back down the line and drained. The licensee i l
concluded that this condition was peculiar to the conditions established for this l
infrequent test, and would not impact system operability while in a standby lineup. The inspectors reviewed the calculations and concluded that they were reasonable and adequately explained why there were no indications of water at the turbine inlet, l
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8- Conclusions ,
Inspectors identified a potential operability concern during testing of the Unit 2 turbine i driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Design engineering was able to show through calculations and test data that water observed draining from the turbine exhaust line was condensed in the cool exhaust line due to low flow rate and lack of warming following maintenance. The inspectors were satisfied that the water would not be present or affect turbine operability during startup from a normal standby condition. Design engineering was responsive and thorough in addressing this issu IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 Licensee Response to Unit 2 Condenser Tube Leaks Lnspection Scope: (71750. 71707)
On July 13, chemistry personnel identified indications of a condenser tube leak in Unit The inspectors reviewed chemistry sample results with chemistry personnel. Chemistry and plant procedures for responding to abnormal chemistry were discussed with the ;
chemistry manager. Water box inspections were also observe l Observations and Findinas Following a partial bypass (15 percent) of the condensate polishing system for maintenance, chemistry personnel observed indications that conductivity, chlorides and sodium levels were increasing in condensate and steam generator samples. With the l condensate polishers in partial bypass mode, the overall impurity removal rate of the condensate polisher system was reduce In response to chemistry recommendations, operators returned the condensate polishers to a normal lineup (no bypass flow; and increased the steam generator blowdown rate. Preparations were made to reduce power. Chemistry personnel were able to quickly locate the source of the leak in the 22N water box. Operations promptly isolated and then drained the water box without having to reduce powe The inspectors determined that Unit 2 chemistry was in Action Level 2 for about 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 16 minutes before corrective actions allowed exiting that condition. Plant procedures required power to be reduced to 30% if the condition was not exited within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and shutdown if not corrected after 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />. The licensee identified and repaired five condenser tubes with a combined leak rate of 3 gpm.
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I Chemistry personnel were instrumentalin the prompt identification and isolation of a condenser tube leak in Unit 2. Recommendations of actions to minimize the effects on
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steam generator materials while cleaning up the impurities from chemistry personnel were timely and appropriate. As a result, steam generator chemistry was quickly controlled and a power reduction and plant shutdown were avoide S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Security Performance Observations Inspection Scope (71750k
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The inspectors obsersed security measures taken in response to various site work activities. Vital area access control and protected area integrity were observed and discussed with members of the guard force. Observations were made of routine activities in the central alarm statio Observations and Findinas:
The inspectors observed security actions in support of emergent repairs to the Unit 2 condenser tubes. Multiple tube leaks necessitated draining a portion of the circulating water system and entry into one of the water boxes, which constituted a breach in a protected area security barrier. The inspectors verified that the work was coordinated with security, and that the security barrier was properly transferred to the chain locked valves used to isolate the work area. However, the inspectors questioned the security operators in the central alarm station shortly after the work was begun and determined that they had not been informed of the barrier change by the Security Force Superviso The inspectors observed security actions in support of surveillance testing of Unit 1 containment tendon tension, which was ongoing throughout the inspection period. This work necessitated opening a number of vaults which allowed access to vital areas. The vault openings were normally inaccessible, and were located in roof areas. The inspectors observed that guards were appropriately posted in positions where they were l able to safely observe the entries without being close to crane lifts into the vault !
Guards questioned were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and of the significance of both the work in progress and the area being guarde During several observation periods in the central alarm station, inspectors reviewed the status of security equipment and compensatory measures. The licensee was observed to have very few compensatory measures in place, and to quickly repair equipment problems. The watchstanders were knowledgeable of the condition of security equipment. Communications between the central alarm station and patrolling guard force members were clear and professional. Alarm responses were observed to be prompt.
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Security was observed providing good support of various maintenance activitie Guards were determined to be knowledgeable of their responsibilities in regards to the work. Central alarm station watchstanders were also observed to be knowledgeable of conditions, with one exception caused by lack of communicatio S1.2 Loss of Power Event On July 7 while removing a supply circuit breaker from service for planned maintenance, the transfer switch that supplies power to a 20KVA inverter switched from the normal supply source to the alternate supply source position. With the circuit breaker removed from service, the alternate supply was not energized. This cor.dition resulted in a loss of power to portions of the security system. The inspectors determined that appropriate compensatory measures were taken and that power was restored within 6 minute This event appeared to be similar to the event reported in Safeguards Event Report 50-498;499/97-S02. The inspectors will review the licensee's root cause determination results for this event and the effectiveness of corrective actions for the previous event as an inspection followup item (50-498;499/98007-02).
F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection issues F [Qiosed) Violation 50-498:499/98003-01: A fire protection header in Unit 1 containment was isolated for 2 month This violation was written to document the failure of licensed operators to properly restore the fire protection header supplying five fire hose cabinets installed inside the Unit 1 reactor containment building. The failure was caused by improper processing of an equipment clearance order. In addition, the inspectors had determined that the position of the header isolation valve had remained in an alarm condition throughout the time that it had been closed without being recognized or investigate )
The licensee documented that the valve was inside the equipment clearance order boundary. However, it had not been listed for restoration to the correct position. As corrective action, the event was discussed with the personnel involved and included in lesson plans for licensed operator requalification. The inspectors reviewed the lesson j plans and found them to adequately cover the issue. This event was also referred to the !
licensee's multi-discipline task force established to review the equipment clearance ,
I order procedure. This issue will be reviewed further via NRC closure inspection of l Violation 50-498;499/97005-03.
l Additionally, licensee personnel established expectations for the overall use of the fire protection computer. The inspectors reviewed Plant Operating Procedure OPOP02-FA-0001, Revision 8," Fire Detection System." The procedural guidance was enhanced for using the fire protection computer to determine plant configuration status of the fire protection systems. In addition, Plant General j
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l Procedure OPGP03-ZF-0018, Revision 8, " Fire Protection System Operability l Requirements," was revised to establish operations shift responsibilities. in addition,
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conditions and for maintaining cognizance of trouble conditions on the fire protection computer. Corrective actions were adequate. This item is closed.
i V. Manaaement Meetinos X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 28,1998. Management personnel acknowledged the findings presented. The inspector asked whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie l
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION i PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee i i
P. Arrington, Licensing Specialist W. Bullard, Supervisor, Health Physics T. Cloninger, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering W. Dowdy, Manager, Plant Operations Unit 2 J. Drymiller, Supervisor, Security Operations R. Fast, Manager, Unit 2 Work Control J. Groth, Vice President, Nuclear Generation S. Head, Lead, Licensing Engineering B. Jenewein, Supervisor, System Engineering Department J. Jot.. con, Manager, Engineering Quality T. Jordon, Manager, System Engineering Department M. Kanavos, Manager, Mechanical / Civil Engineering A. Kent, Manager, Electrical / Instrumentation and Controls System D. Leazar, Director, Nuclear Fuel and Analysis R. Lovell, Manager, Generation Support F. Mangan, Vice President, Plant Services L. Martin, Vice President, Nuclear Assurance and Licensing '
M. McBurnett, Director, Nuclear Licensing G. Parkey, Plant Manager, Unit 1 D. Rencurrel, Manager, Electrical Instrume.itariar and Controls, Design Engineering Sheppard, Vice President, Business Sb'c ,
d. Thomas, Manager, Design Engineering Department G. Weldon, Manager, Staff Training i
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED ;
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observation j IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support IP 92901: Followup - Operations IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance IP - 92903: Followup - Engineering
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ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-499/98007-01 IFl Root cause assessment and material history review for power transfer switching for distribution panel DP-000 :499/98007-02 IFl Root cause assessment and corrective action effectiveness assessment for loss of power to portions of the security syste Closed 50-498/98003-01 VIO Fire protection header in Unit 1 containment was isolated for 2 month /97-002 LER Safety injection System Logic Circuitry not Fully Tested by Surveillance Procedures I
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