IR 05000498/1988063

Insp Repts 50-498/88-63 & 50-499/88-63 on 880901-30.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Status,Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Monthly Surveillance Observation & Monthly Maint Observation

ML20206A704
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	10/27/1988
From:	Holler E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206A697	List: IR 05000498/1988063 ML20206A694
References
50-498-88-63, 50-499-88-63, NUDOCS 8811150220
Download: ML20206A704 (18)

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APPENDIX U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/88-63 Operating License: NPF-76 50-499/88-63 Construction Pemit (CP): CPPR-129 Dockets; 50-498 50-499 Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)

P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP)

Inspection At: STP, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Conducted: September 1-30, 1988 Inspectors- J. E. Bess, Senior Resident Inspector, Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects

D. L. Garrison, Resident Inspector Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects J. I. Tapia, Senior Resident Inspector, Project Section Division of Reactor Projects D. M. Hunnicutt, Senior Project inspector, Project Section Division of Reactor Projects Approved:

C"Tib11er, chief, Project Section D Division

/MM/98-ITate of Reactor Projects Inspection Sumary Inspection Conducted Septeniber 1-30, 1988 (Report 50-498/88-63)

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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection included plant status, licensee action on previous inspection findings, monthly surveillance

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. observation, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification, containnent conbustible gas control system (hydrogen recombiners), engineered sefety feature system walkdown, and hurricane / storm protection and special comunications demons + ration / test at STPEG Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were Tdentifie PDH ADOCK 05000490 0 PNU

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G 2-I,nspection Conducted September 1-30, 1988 (Report 50-499/88-63)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection includeo plant status, electrical / mechanical components, systems and structures, structural integrity test (SIT'., integrated leakage rate test (ILRT), fuel receipt and storage, licensee action on previous reported items, and containment combustible gas control system (hydrogen recomuiners).

Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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-3-DETAILS Persons Contacted HL&P

• P. Evans, Licensing Engineer

• S. M. Dew, Manager Operations Support

• A. W. Harrison, Supervising Engineer

• S. M. Head, Supervisor Licensing Engineer

• L. Giles, Plant Operations Manager, Unit 2

• W. S. Blair, Manager, Maintenance Support

• J. E. Geiger, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance

• J. W. Loesch, Plant Operatinns Manager

• T. J. Jordan, Project Quality Assurance Manager

• Ondriska, Startup Supervisor

• G. Wellborn, Supervising Proziect Engineer

• J. N. Bailey, Manager, Engineering Licensing

• A. R. Mikus, General Supervisor

• W. H. Kinsey, Plant Manager

• G. P. Smith, ISEG Engineer Bechtel

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• R. W. Miller, Project Qu lity Assurance, Manager

• P. McNeal, Project Quality Assurance Engineer

• F. O'Neil, Unit 2 Engineering F,anager Ebasco

• J. Beach, Manager, Unit 1 In addition to the above, the NRC inspectors also held discussions with various licensee, architect engineer (AE), constructor and other contractor personnel during this inspectio *0enotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on October 6, 198 . Plant Status STP Unit I hat been op7 rating at 100 peicent reactor power for most of this inspc-tion On September 23, 1988, at approximately 6:00 p.m., (CDT), theperio unit was shutdown as part rr a planned outage to support the bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) inspections. In additior, to the BMI inspections, several maintenance tests will be completed while the plant is shut down. The outage is presently scheduled to last for approximately 14 days. At the end of the inspection period, the plant was in Mode _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ __

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STP, Unit 2, is 98 percent complete. The Structural Integrity Test

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(SIT) and the Integrated Leakage Rate Test (ILRT) were successfully completed during this inspection period. Six shipments of new fuel nave ')een received, making a total of 48 fuel elements in the fuel storage pit. Preparations are in progress for the commencement of Engintered Safeguards Features testin . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)

(Closed) Violation 499/8821-02 and Open Item 499/8821-01 This concerned the use of a "U" joint on a torque wrench to torqu1 the articulated connecting rod fastener in a cramped space in the diesel crankcase. The required torque value was 15 foot pounds. Generally, a calibrated torque wrench with a "crows foot" is used in this application. In this case, an engineer improvised by using a U-joint because of the congested locatio The licensee took corrective action by clarifying the procedures to cover unusual conditions that require special tools to torque bolts in difficult location Personnel have been instructed in correct procedure The fasteners in question were verified to be correctly torqued.

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(Closed) Violation 499/8727-03 This item concerned under-torqued bolts on the Residual Heat Removal

Pump support This problem developed due to a mechanica' procedure t (Standard Site Procedure (SSP) 52) with insufficient detail being used rather than the structural procedure (SSP 11). The supports have been properly torqued and the procedure (SSP 52) revised to require the use of SSP 1 for general structural support erectio (Closed) Violation 499/8824-02

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This violation concerned the failure to properly implement the

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established program of installing guards on the sharp edges of cable trays to prevent cable cuttin The licensee performed a major reinspection program and installed 260 i additional edge guards. Additionally, the licensee instructed construction personnel concerning the importance of these feature (Closed) violation 499/8824-03

! This violation concerned an isolated event regarding the Unit 2 "B" Isolatien Valve Cubicle (IVC) where housekeeping was not adequat Immediate corrective action was taken to clean the area and instruct the personnel responsible for the activit __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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-5-IEB 85-02 - Undervoltage Trip Attachn=r.ti of Westinghouse Type DB-50

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Reactor Trip Breakers (25572J STP, Unit 2, installed Westinghouse Type DS-416 reactor trip breakers (RTB). Type DS-416 RTBs require actuation of the RTB shunt trip coil on all automatic reactor trip signal Procedure OPMP05-NA-0008,

"Westinghouse 480 Volt Breaker Test," Revision 5, dated August 8, 1988, provided instructions and guidelines for maintaining Westinghouse Type 05 and DSL low-voltage power circuit breakers. These breakers are part of a low voltage metal enclosed switchgear of the four-position drawout type. The procedures required performance of specific tests which included performance of "Shunt Trip Attachment Test" and "Undervoltage Trip Attachment Force and Load Check." STP, Unit 2, does not have any Westinghouse Type 08-50 breakers installed as RTB; therefore, IEB 85-02 is not applicabl This IEB is close . Monthly Surveillance Observation - Unit 1 (61726)

The NRC inspector observed selected portions of the procedures iisted below to verify that the activities were being performed in accordance with the Technical Specifications (TS) and surveillance procedures. The applicable procedures were reviewed for adequacy, test instrumentation was verified to be in calibracion, and test data was reviewed for accuracy and completenes The inspector ascertained that identified deficiencies were properly reviewed and resolved, Procedure 1 PSP 03-0G-0003, "Standby Diesel 13 Operability Test,"

' Revision 5. The NRC inspector observed portions of this test and verified that the Diesel Generator (DG) performed in j accordance with the T No deficiencies were identifie Procedure 1 PSP 03-0G-0009, "Standby Diesel 13 Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) Test," Revision 3. The NRC inspector observed pottions of Test Procedure 1PSPC3-0G-0009 on Standby Diesel Generator 13 and verified that the DG performed in accordance with the TS. The NRC inspector verified that data was accurate and complet Procedure 1 PSP 03-DG-0017, "Standby Diesel 12 Twenty-Four Hour Load Test," Revision 4. The NRC inspector witnessed portions of the data acquisition during the performance of Procedure 1 PSP 03-0G-0017. The inspector ascertained that any deficiencies identified were properly reviewed and resolved. No problems were identified, Procedure 1 PSP 03-DG-0018. "Standby Diesel 13 Twentj-Four Hour Load Test," Revision 4. Ocring the initial performance of this procedure, the DG operated approximately 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> into the 24-hour run before the test was terminated. The test was terminated when a fuel oil

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strainer gasket (1 of 8) fciled. The licensee issued Faintenance Work Request (MWR) DG-49697 to replace the gaske The NRC inspector i reviewed the MWR, observed the completed work, and verified that the gasket installation was dore in accordance with the MWR instructio The NRC inspector's investigation regarding this matter determined that the ability of the DG to perform its safety function would not have been affected by the failed fuel oli strainer gasket. The system is designed such that during operation of the DGs, 2 of 4 strainers, arranged in series, are required to be operating. The system features a manual vabe which allows the operator to switch to the two offline strainers if there is a problem with either of the two strainers in use. The filter switching operation does not require shutdown of the DG Further investigation by the NRC inspector revealed that this is the first time a gasket failure of '

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this type had occurred and the problerr does not appear to be generi To improve the reliability of the fuel oil strainers, the licensee plans to replace the gaskets presently installed with gaskets made of Viton. The gaskets presently installed in the filters are made of Buna-N. Three MWRs have been issued to complete this work during the current BMI outage. The MWRs written to perform this work are DG-59264, DG-59265, and DG-59266. Following the completion of MWR DG-4969/ (replacenent of the blown fuel oil strainer gasket), the DG 24-hour load test run was completed satisfactorily. The NRC inspector observed portions of the test and reviewed data acquisition. The NRC inspector verified that the DG performed in accordance with TS requirement No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Monthly Maintenance Observation - Unit 1 (62703)

The station maintenance activities listed below were observed and documentation was reviewed to verify that the activities were conducted in dCCordance with approved procedures and T Maintenance Work Request. The NRC insoector observed portions of the maintenance being performed by IAC technicians on the Moisture Separator Reheater (MSR) Temperature Control Valve Controllers. The work involved the recalibration of controllers which control the valve position for primary and secondary shutoff valves to MSR 11N '

and 12N. Tha maintenar.ce technician performed the recalibration of the controller in accordance to Procedure OPGP03-ZM-0021. "Control cf Configuration Charges During Maintenance or Troubleshooting,"

Revision 0. The inspector witnessed portions of the recalibration and found no problems, i

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-7- MWR BS-46996. The NRC inspector observe the replacement of the f primary power supply in Panel ZRR-040. The work was done in accordance with Procedure OPGP03-ZM-0021, "Control of Configuration Changes During Maintenance or Troubleshooting," Revision 0. The l inspector verified that the removal and relanding of power supply wires were in accordance with procedures. The power supply was tested and verified to be operable. No problems were identifie The NRC inspector attended several shift turnover briefings on midshifts (12:30 a.m. - 8 a.m.) and swing shifts (3:30 p.m. - 12:30 a.m.) and observed the briefings by offgoing shift personnel to oncoming shif t personnel. The briefings given by the offgoing shift supervisors were clear, detailed, and informative. However, the NRC inspector did not observe maintonince personnel participation in these briefings. Procedure OPGP03-ZA-0064, "NP0D Preshift Briefing," Revision 0, Section 6.1 states, in part, that the maintenance manager shall designate selected personnel to attend these briefing When this concern was discussed with the shift and unit supervisors, it was apparent that the maintenance groups (Electrical I&C, and Mechanical)

were not providing information concerning plant status to on-coming shift personnel. Further questioning of the shif t supervisors by the inspector revealed that there were instances during plant operations when maintenance activities are being performed and neither the shift nor unit supervisors were cognizant of these activitie Problem Report 88347, written on August 30, 1988, further amplified this concern. Problem Report 88347 was written when it appeared that Essential Chillers 11A and 12B were intentionally tripped. An investigation by the licensee revealed that a construction work request had been issued and work had started the previous day and carried over to the day the incident occurred. The on-shift supervisor was not aware that maintenance work was scheduled for that equipmen It appears that the foreman of each maintenance group is the only individual on the shift that can identify the maintenance activities that are being worked during that shift. This concern was brought to the attention of the licensee managemen The NRC inspector will monitor licensee activities to ascertain if this situation is leading toward a potential proble No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Operational Safety Verification - Unit 1 (71707)

The objective of this portion of the inspection was to ensure that the facility is being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory

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-8-requirements, and to verify that management controls are effective, that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection programs are implemented in compliance with regulatory requirements, and that the licensee is in compliance with the approved physical security pla The NRC inspector observed control room activities on a daily basis to verify that control room staffing, operator behavior, shift turnover,

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adherence to TS Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs) and overall control room decorum were being conduced in accordance with NRC requirements. Inspections were conducted throughout the plant to observe work in progress. Proper radiological work practices, posting of barriers, and correct use of dosimetry were observed. A review of six Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) was made to determine whether the work process was as required by licensee procedures regarding the performance of work in a safe manner and under controlled condition During an inspection of the Mechanical Auxiliary Building (MAB), the NRC inspector noticed that the door to the Boric Acid Storage Room (018) on Elevation 10 ft. was not locked. A review of the Combustible Material Storage Authcrization Form (0PGP03-ZF-004-1), which was attached to the door, stated in the required storage conditions and precautions paragraph that this docr would be locked when personnel were not working in this area. The NRC inspector informed the radwaste operator that this door was

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not locked and an operator was immediately dispatched to lock the doo The NRC inspector informed the licensee that the safety concern was minimized because the door, which acts as a fire barrier, was closed and the fire barrier was not breached. However, the NRC inspector stated that all instructions written on the Material Storage Authorization Form should be followed as writte . No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the l inspectio l 7. Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown - Unit 1 (71710)

l The NRC inspector conducted a walkdown of the accessible portion of

! Standby Diesel Generator No. 11 to independently verify the operability of t

the system. A review was performed to confirm that the licensee's system operating procedure matened plant drawings and the as-built configuratio , Equipment condition, value nosition, housekeeping, labeling, and support l' subsystems essential to actuation of the DG were inspected. The equipment was walked down using the drawing and procedures as follows:

. Procedure IP0P02 DG-0001, "Emergency Diesel Generator No. 11,"

Revision . Drawing SQ159F00060 No. 1, "Standby Diesel Generator Miscellaneous l Systems," Revision 11.

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. Drawing 5Q159F00045 No.1, "Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Transfer System," Revision 1 No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Electrical / Mechanical Components, Systems and Structures - Unit 2 (50073 and 51053)

The NRC inspectors inspected and obseryn xork efforts in various installations for adequacy of construction, workmanship and completion of the work. The following equipment / structures were inspecte . Main and auxiliary transformers and transmission line towers were inspected for completeness of installation and included the iso phase duct, insulators, water deluge system, oil circulators, cable, oil pits, fans, and structural components. The components were inspected for damage, oil leaks, inoperative fans, insulator cleanliness, deluge nozzle direction, and general workmanship. It was noted and reported to the licensee that six 3/4-inch boits were missing from one leg of structural steel on the northwest tower and at Mechanical Switch No. G029. The licensee took imedirte corrective action and installed the necessary bolts. These units now appear to be installed in accurdance with design practic .

The West side guard facility is primarily for security personnel and weapon storag The building is a standard design structural steel building, modified internally for security personnel needs. The erection of the building meets the criteria for standard construction practices for structural steel building .

Deluge Valve House No. 22 and three separate houses, o,1e at each diesel generator door, were inspected. The fire equipment in these facilities included valves, piping, gauges, control panels, lighting, an/ ventilation. The NRC inspector checked for correct valve position, correct gauge readings, equipment damage, and cleanlines Also inspected were three yard hydrant stations and related equipment within the hydrant house which included hoses, spanner wrenches, clay pipes, and nozzles. All of the equipment appeared to be in new condition. No items of concern were noted with the equipmen .

The Balance of Plant (BOP) diesel generator is a packaged unit consisting of a Detrout, 4 Turbo, V12 diesel and a 700 KW Wankesha-Pierce generator. The NRC inspector inspected the control s panel internal wiring and electrical components; heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system; water cooling system; piping; batteries; fuel tanks and system; and room condition, grounding, and foundation. The unit and related equipment appeared to

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-10-be complete to this stage of construction. The unit has not been started and run ir. and, at this time, is being checked out by startup personne . The three Emergency Safeguard Features transformer units are located east of the diesel building and were inspected for general appearance, water deluge nozzle direction, damage, rectifier condition, foundation, and oil leakage. These transformers appeared to be complete and in satisfactory conditio . Three concrete security door / barriers on the diesel generator building (DGB) and three structural steel securi' ' arriers on the east wall of the mechanical auxiliary building (cG) were inspecte These are removable wall barriers that cover the entrances to the three emergency diesel generators and three component cooling water heat exchangers. The structures were inspected for completeness of installation and bolting. The equipment appears to be satisfactor . Switchgear house (Bldg No. 27) and Load Center 12G, located southwest ofthefuelhandlingbuilding(FHB)wereinspected. The structural steel building was examined for completeness and the load center was inspected for damage or missing equipment. The structure and the electrical equipment therein was in satisfactory conditio . Battery charger and switchgear room for 80P equipment was in satisfactory conditio . The B0P battery room contains 120 C&D and 59 Exide single cell batteries divided into 12 groups according to the voltage and service load. The NRC inspector examined the room and equipment for cleanliness, HVAC system, water / acid letel construction cocpletion, rack assembly, battery connections, and attached cables. The inspection did not identify any problem area Technical service center diesel generator set (Bldg. No. 45) is a Caterpillar dual turbo V16 with a 1200 KW Marathon synchronous AC generator and self cooling system. The NRC inspector inspected the fuel oil system, cooling components, air supply and starting system, engine, generator, batteries, cooling fan motor, switchgear, and structu re. The unit is mounted on a pad in the service yard with a structural steel roof and is open sided. No items of nonc wpliance were nuted and the installation appeared nearly complet .

The turbine building switchgear room ir.cludes 4160 V. tratal clad Switagear 7E152ESG051D and motor control Centers (MCC) 2F4 and 2G The cable, cable trays, HVAC system, cabinets and all externally

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-11-m.ounted over current trip /alann relays, switches and control devices were inspected for damage and appearance. The equipment and room areas were in satisfactory conditio . Startup Steam Generator Feed Pump 85132MPA007, as shown on Drawing 6G019M0019, Revit, ion 7, is an open environment motor pump set consisting of a 7000 horsepower Westinghouse electric motor, powered off of a 13,200 V. bus; a Bingham pump; and a lubrication syste New seals were installed recently in the pump and the installation is considered complete. The following individual items were inspected:

lubrication pump, oil level, filters, heat exchanger and all piping; motor coupling, cover and bolting; instrumentation leads, conduit, gauges and instrument valves; electrical work that could be visually observed including grounds, conduit and bus boxes; pipe hangers; blanket and silica insulation with logging; and foundation. There was no visual evidence of damage, deterioration, or other features that would impair the operation of the re . The liquid waste processing system, consisting of three stainless steel tanks, three waste monitor trdnsfer pumps, and one sump pump set, was inspected. These units are located on the south side of the MAB in an open area. The pumps and tanks are each located in their own catch basin with walls approximately 4 feet in height. The NRC inspector observed the installation for damage, incomplete work, quality of work, and general cleanliness. The tank shells, foundation bolting, and piping were inspected, as were the pump foundations, piping, valves, instrumentation, and electrical wor At the time of the inspection, craf t workers were aligning and coupling the "2E" motor-pump se No discrepancies were observe The following problem areas were identified to the licensee for corrective action. These items are not considered significont and are not safety-related; however, corrective action is needed to further the overall integrity of the plan . Diesel fuel oil transfer station northeast of the DGB and the main turbine generator lubricating oil conditioner tank, pump and filter station at the southwest corner of the turbine building at grade level had excessive amounts of oil leakage and represent potential fire hazards. The licensee assigned a point crew to correct this conditio .

A flange gasket is leaking on a valve connection at the cold chemistry laboratory sump located west of the lab at Valve BF3786 The maintenance department has been appraised of this leakag . .-. --

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. The auxiliary feedwater tank wa:, observed to have water leaking from the near top side of the tank. This was"determined to be an improperly set high level which was reset to the proper leve ;

No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the ,

inspectio . Structural InteP_Ity Test (SIT) and Integrated leakage _ Rate Test (ILRT) - Unit P. (70307,'/0313, and 70323)

An inspection was conducted of the containnent SIT procedure, test performance, and test results in order to detemine consistency with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments. The purpose of the SIT is to demonstrate the ability of the containment structure to withstand ,

internal loads imposed b of 56.6 psig (65.0 psig)y pressurizing

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to 1.15200195$1013 Bechtel Specification times the design pressure Revision 4,

"Specification For The Perfomance of Structural Integrity Test on Reactor

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Containment Building, Units 1 and 2," was reviewed by the NRC inspecto Prior to pressurization of the containment, the NRC inspector toured the containment and inspected the placement of instrumentation for the SI The containment was subsequently pressurized in five equal pressure increments. During the 1-hour hold periods between pressure levels,

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strains and deflections were recorded. Surface crack patterns of cracks

larger than 0.01-inch width were recorded at atmospheric pressure before 4 the test, at the maximum pressure level, and at atmospheric pressure af ter I the tes The NRC inspector monitored the acquisition of data during pressure level holding periods. Subsequent data analysis determined that the deflection

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pattern and strain measurements of the containment werf. within

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predetermined design acceptance criteria. No reportable cracks were

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identified. At the completion of the S'T, the contai,sent was i

depressurized to 31.8 psig to perform thu ;LRT.

i The preoperational containn'ent !LRT, conducte e,. . 'h Absolute Method

> as described in ANSI N45.4-1972, "Leakage Ra e % w of Containment i System Leakage Testing Requirements," was also se <i- 1d during this i inspection. The inspection involved procedure ano records review, test .

. witnessing, and independent calculations by the NRC inspector. TMs ILRT  !

was conducted in accordance with approved procedures arf satisfied the specified acceptance criteria contained in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix ;

"Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water Cooled Power Reactors," and in the proposed Plant T Preoperational Test Procedure 2-RC-P-03,rievision 0, "ContM ment Intergrated Leak Rate Test," incorporates the referenced , % irements and criteri This procedure was reviewed by the NRC insoector and no ,

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The revi6w provided verification that the following test attributes were correctly addressed:

. Containment interior and exterior requirements specified

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. Instrement locations justified by area surveys  !

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. Instrument calibration regrirements specified  :

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Instrt.;nent loss / test abort criteria delineated t

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. Instrument error analysis performed [

. ype B and C test results correction to Type A test results specified e

. Venting of internal isolated volumes required i

. Isolation valve clasing mode specified'to be the normal mode

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. Proper postaccident system alignment to prevant creation of }

artificial leakage barriers specified

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. Quality control inspection specified

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. Test log entries required for repairs needed to complete test l  !

. Acceptance criteria specified [

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. Data acquisition requirements specified Data analysis technique specified

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f l . Method of depressurization specified [

i The NRC inspector verified that the instrument calibration certifications '

, traceable to the U.S. National Bureau of Standards for the resistance k

, temperature detectors, humidity measuring devices, pressure gauges, and  :

the flowmeter used in the verificatiot, test had been reviewe The ;

guidelines of ANSI /ANS-56.8-1981 were used to select the instruments for '

i the ILRT. The formula from the Instrumentation Selection Guide (ISG) was i I

used durine th 'LRT to ensure that the data acquisition syttem accuracy j

, was suffis / ' provid.* reliable test results. This formula utilizes  ;

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sensor to deterraine an overall value for the data scqu ~. system - 'nstrumentation system for the ILRT vas

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ie information, and then outputting to the l l

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computer ,- .. ilculation of tne data. The calculations [

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inspector.

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After a pericd of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at 31.8 psig, to allow for degassing of  ;

', tructures and components inside containment subsequent to the SIT, pressurization of the containment fur the ILRT corm.enced. After the internal pressure reached 37.5 psig, the compressors were shut down and

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isolated and the stabilization period cortmenced. The atmosphere is  !

considered stabilized when the rate of change of containment temperature averaged over the last four hours minus the rate of change in containment i temperature averaged over the last hour is less than 0.5'F/ hour. After tha stabilization criteria were satisfied, the ILRT test director declared <

the start of the record 24-hour test. Continuatica of the test indicated [

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, convergence of the calculated leak rate and the upper confidence limit below the allowable leakage. At completion of tb 24-hour test, the 4-hour superimposed leak verification test was perfonned. The inspector i

, found that the result between the calculated and irnposed leakages was within the 75 percent allowable leakage (La) limi '

Subsequent to the performance of the test, the NRC inspector obtained the

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raw data and cortputed the leakage rate in accordance with the Mass Point 1 Data Analysis technique. The computations performed were compared with j the licensee's results for the purpose of verifying the calculational  :

procedure and confirming the result This analytical technique confirmed [

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! the acceptability of the results obtained by the licensee. The data i prcviding the as-left values for the Type B and C tests were also

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No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection, r 1 1 PreoperMional Test Procedures - Unit 2 (70304) l

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The NRC inspector reviewed the preoperational test procedurcs which are  !

intended to demonstrate the response of the plant's engir.dered safety r

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features under both normal accident and accident coincident with the loss l of offsite power conditions. The tests are scheduled'to be performed in l November 1988. The tests were reviewed for comp..ance with FSAR l couritments and adherence tt Regulatory Guide 1.68 principles. Within the (

< scope of the inspection, the procedures were found to comply with the [

stated requirements. The sp;cific tests reviewed were: c

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L-15-1 2-SF-P-01, Revision 0, Sateguards Systems Response - No Blackout 2-SF-P-02, Revision 0, Safeguards Systems Response - Plant Blackout 2-SF-P-06, Revision 1, ESF Block and Actuate Testing No violations or deviations were identified is this area of the

inspectio . Fuel Receipt and Storage - Unit 2 (60501)

As of September 30, 1988, 48 new fuel elaments have been received on site p.nd are stored in the.new fuel storage pit. The new fuel storage pit has

room for approxitaately 1/3 core (66 fuel assemblies) of new fuel. Upon receipt of c new shipment of fuel, each new fuel assembly is removed

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from its shipping container and inspected visually to confinn that the

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assembly has not been damaged during shipmen The NRC inspectors have -

witnessed the licensee's new fuel visual insp?ction and subsequent loading

into the new fuel storage racks on various occasions. From these observa-

tions, the NRC resident inspectors have concluded that toe censee is l properly accepting, safeguarding, and storing fuel in acco Jance with  !

the NRC literce requirements. After the new fuel storage pit is filled,

! the licensee plans to store the additional new fuel in the spent fuel j pool. The use of the spent fuel poci for the storage of new fuel is

{ contingent upon the NRC approval of HL&P's proposed license amendment .

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regsrding expansion of the spent fuel storage capacity using high dersity i

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spent fuel racks that was submittal to the NRC via letter dated Marci. 8, 193 !

No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio i a

Containment Combustible Gas Control System (Hydrogen

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Recombiners) - Units 1 and 2 (70342)

i The NRC inspector competed the inspection (review and evaluation) of the  ;

j Electric Hydrogen Recombiners (EHR) documentation initiated in NRC ,

Inspection Report 50-498;499/88-39 The preoperational test acceptance L criteria and requirements and the EHR design characteristics are addressed -

for normal operating conditions and postulated LOCA operating condition The test procedures for Units 1 and 2 adequately addressed NRC r1 quire-ments and licensee commitments relates to cesting and verification of ,

operating requirements for the EHRs in both Units 1 and i No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the I inspection, i

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-16-13. Hurricane / Storm Preparation On September e., 1988, the licensee declared a hurricane watch and initiated the "Hurricane Protection Plan" (HFP) for South Texas Project Elactric Generating Station (STPEGS). The path and progress of Hurricane Gilbert (Gilbert) was received at STPEGS through weather reports starting on September 12, 1988. The longitude and latitude coordinates of Gilbert were received and plotted on a frequent basis. The U.S. Weather Bureau and news media reported the course of Gilbert on September 12-16, 198 The reports indicated that Gilbert could land somewhere along the Texas coast. The plotted course on September 13-16, 1988, indicated a finite probability that Gilbert could land near the STPEGS site on or about September 17, 198 Subsequent weather data late on September 16, 1988, determined that Gilbert would and did make land fall south of Brownsville, Texa Gilbert's land fall was approximately 200 miles south-southwest of STPEG STPEGS did not experience excessive wind speeds (maximum about 35 miles per hour). rain (maximum about 1/2- to 1-inch) or physical damage to site structures, equipment, or component The licensee's HPP included the actions and responsibilities to be taken during a hurricane alert. The HPP provided guidelines for hurricane / tropical storm preparatory work for all STPEGS offices and buildings, saydown areas, and general site areas. Licensee personnel carried out planned protection and storage of piant records and equipment.

, Site personnel initiated activities required to minimize postulated flood and wind damage at STPEGS. Licensee activities not required for the safe operation of Unit 1 ('Jnit 1 operated in Mode 1 at or near 100 percent of reactor thermal power throughout the period between September 12 and 13, 1988) and maintenance of STPEGS were suspended at noon on September 14, 198 The licensee designated storage and assembly areas, prepared records and eoutpment for transport to these temperary storage areas in wind and flood resistant locations, and designated personnel as essential or nonessential. Essential personnel were informed of their respective duty stations and assignments for the initial phases of the an+1cipated arrival of Gilbert. Personnel not required for duty were permitted to leave the site prior to noon on September 15, 198 Records were properly stored in the records vaults or other approved locations (example: Unit 2 fuel handling building) to preclude water and/or wind damag Removal of records for storage was accomplished by licensee personnel in a timely and judicious manner. The NRC inspectors observed various licensee groups preparing, transporting, and storing records in the Unit 2 vault and the Unit 2 FH \ .

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Necessary medical supplies and several days food supplies for personnel l required to be onsite were inventoried and stored in designated locations

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at STPEGS on September 14, 198 The STPEGS site did not experience any damage from wind or rain during or l

as a result of Gilber STPEGS HPP was discontinued on September 17,

. 198 Additional operations, maintenance, and management personnel on i

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site for HPP were permitted to leave the site and precautions related to STPEGS protection from Gilbert were suspended at approximately 8 (CDT) on September 17, 1988. The NRC inspectors left the STPEGS at about  ;

8:30 a.m. on September 17, 198 l l 1 Special Communications Demonstration / Test at STPEGS i

j On September 16, 1988, a representative of the Boise Interagency Fire ,

j Center, Department of the Interior, arrived at the STPEGS site at the j 1 request of NRC with portable communications equipment. The portable  :

communications equipment consisted of a portable "L" band satellite i

commercial system; 20 portable battery operate 1, hand held radio r

units, and assorted support equipment. Similar equipment has been used i

previously in demonstrations and tests at nuclear power plants. The  !

portable equipment was used to communicate to designated official  !

, telephones within the NRC Region IV offices and licensee corporate and  ;

. site office ;

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The ability of the portable communications equipment to relay information f l via telephone to satellite and to and from the designated telephones was i

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demonstrated and verified to be functional. The communications from the i

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STPEGS Training Facility (temporary lecation for the portable communic 6tions equipment) and the designated telephones was clear and t

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easily understandat,le. Communications originated between the STPEGS and [

q the designated telephones and between these designated telephones and the r i temporary location at STPEGS were readily established by direct dia All '

i communications using this portable equipment were comparable to the results expectcd when using standard commercial communications equipmen ,

i i j The use of this p ptable communications equipment verified the ,

{ reliability, availability, and the short time required to transport and  ;

set up thfs communications equipment in remote locations. This  !

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demonstration / test verified that if commercial communications were not i available within an area, this portable equipment could be relied upon to .

- transmit information and serve as an important temporary communications [

syste j i 1 Exit Interview

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j The NRC inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in I paragraph 1) on October 6, 1988, and summarized the scope and findings of

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the inspection. Other meetings between NRC inspectors and licensee

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management were held periodically during the inspection to discuss identified concerns. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of 1 the information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors during thi,,

inspection.

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