IR 05000498/1997007
| ML20203D270 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1997 |
| From: | Tapia J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203D248 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-97-07, 50-498-97-7, 50-499-97-07, 50-499-97-7, NUDOCS 9712160150 | |
| Download: ML20203D270 (19) | |
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ENCLOSURE O.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY QQMMISSION [
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REGION IV
Docket Nos: 50 498,50 499 ,
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License Nos: NPF 76, NPF 80 g t
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Report No: 50-498/97 07, 50-499/97-07
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Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company .
Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating. Station, .
Units 1 and 2
- Location:. 8 Miles West of Wadsworth on FM 521 Wadsworth, Texas 77483-Dates: October 5 through November 15,1997 ,
D. P. Loveless, Senior Resident inspector i Inspectors:
W. C. Sifre, Resident inspector
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Approved by: J. l. Tapia, Chief, Project Branch A '
. Division of Reactor Projects
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i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ,
South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-498/97-07; 50-499/97-07
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This resident inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, end :
plant support. The report covers a 6 week period of resident inspectio l 092Lat!9D% t
- Control room operators maintained an excellent awareness of control board indications ;
and existing plant conditions (Section 01.1), j e An action plan to resent two leaking moisture separator reheater relief valves properly included personnel safety controls, p nt impact assessment, and appropriats contingency plans. Shutting down the turbine generator to repair the valves was a conserv1tive action (Section 01.1).
e Licensed operator response to a failure of a moisture separator reheater relief valve was i excellent The shift supervision exhibited superior command and controlin directing the
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rapid shutdown of the unit (Section 01.2).
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- Licensed operators properly stabilized plant conditions following a Unit 1 reactor trip .
caused by a faulty relay in the main turbine overspeed protection circuitry However, an inadvertent auxiliary feedwater system actuation occurred while transferring the steam dumps to the steam pressure mode of control (Section 01.3).
- Equipment availabihty and material condition in the areas toured were excellent, e However, poor position indication was noted for a number of remote manually operated valves (Section 02.1).
- The implementation of the Unit 2 control room human interface modification was 4 coordinated with plant operators and well controlled. Contingency plans and compensatory actions were well developed and in place. However, one fire loading issue was identified and resolved (Section O2.2). i
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e Maintenance activities observed were conducted in a professional manner. Technicians
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demonstrated a good knowledge of systems and components and good oversight of l' activities was evident (Section M1.1).
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- Surveillanco testing observed was conducted in acenrdance tvith approved procedures and implemented the Technical Specification surveillance requirements (Section M1.2).
L e A question regarding the proper application of the ASME Code Section XI testing of main steam safety valves will oe reviewed further during the review of a related licensee event repo.1 (Section M1.2).
Engionana
- An air actuator diaphragm on a containment iso!ation valve was replaced as a renuit of conditions identified by a thorough review for the applicability of NRC Information Notice 96-68 (Section M1.1).
- The temporary modification wntten to repair a leaking high pressure seal et the seal plate was properly developed and implemented. An unreviewed safety question determination and work risk assessment were performed and specified conservative controls over the field work (Section E1.1).
- An evaluation of a concern related to the localleak rate test of a containmer.t penetretion properly bounded the potential problem. The engineering analysis and calculations were thorough and conclusions were well founded (Section E1.2).
Plant Seppod
- On one occasion, instrumentation and control technicians placed tools and parts across a contaminated area boundary adjacent to their work area. The condition was promptly corrected and no contamination occurred. However, technicians did not write a condition report until prompted by the inspectors (Section R1.1).
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83 cort Details ;
Summary of Plant Status At the beginning of this inspection period, Unit 1 was operating at 29 percent power with power !
ascension te 100 percent in progress. On October 6, the unit was rapidly shut down from l
74 percent reactor power in response to a feited open moisture separator reheater relief valv On October 8, the uWt was returned to 100 percent power operations. On November 10, the ;
unit tripped from 100 percent reactor power in response to a failed component in the turbine
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overspeed protection circuit. On November 14, the unit was returned to service. At the end of this inspection period, the Ur it i reactor was operating at 100 percent powe i Unit 2 operated at 100 percent reactor power throughout this inspection perio .
1. Operations !
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01 Conduct of Operations ;
01.1 Control Room Observations (Units 1 and 2)
l i Insoection Scoon (71707)
The incpectors routinely observed the conduct of operations in the Units 1 and 2 control rooms. Frequent reviews of control board status, routine attendance at shift turnover and
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tumover meetings, observations of operator performance, and reviews of control room Ligs and documentation were performed. The inspectors observed portions of the l following evolutions in addition to full power operations:
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- Unit 1 power ascension activities following Refueling and Equipment Outage 1REO7 (10/510/6)
e Response to a moisture separator reheater relief valve failure in Unit 1 (10/6)
e Unit i return to power operatioris (10/8)
e Implementation of Unit 2 control room human interface modification (11/411/15)
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o Response to a Unit i reactor trip (11/10)
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e Response to a Unit i turbine trip (11/12) Observations and Findinas During routine observations and interviews, the inspectors determined that the control ,
room operators were continually aware of existing plant conditions. Operators responded to annunciator alarms in accordance with approved procedures. Annunciator alarms were promptly announced to the control room staff who, in turn, acknowledged by restating the announcement. The unit supervisors remained cognizant of ongoing i
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activities. Licensed operators' use of self venfication techniques was evident. The engineered safety features systems in both units were verified to be aligned in accordance with Technical Specifications requirements during various plant operating condition The inspectors routinely attended shift turnover meetings. The on shift operators provided clear and concise information to the oncoming operators. Oncoming operators routinely reviewed the control room logs, discussed current plant conditions, and verified major equipment status. Plant managers and operations department managers were often observed in attendance during shift turnove On November 14, maintenance and operations personnel attempted to manually open -
two leaking moisture separator reheator relief valves. This effort was performed at low power and was designed to resent the valves. A thorough contingency plan had been developed and was followed. Plans for personnel safety aspects of the evolution were stellar. The evolution was suspended when the valves failed to reseat, The turbine-generator and condenser systems were conservatively removed from service, and the valves were inspected and repaire Conclusions Licensed operators in the control room performed in a professional manner and were continuously aware of existing plant conditions. Shift turnover meetings were thorough j and routinely attended by management. The action plan to reseat two leaking relief *
valves included excellent personnel safety controls, a plant impact assossment, and appropriate contingency plans. Shutting down the turbine-generator to repair the valves was a conservative actio .2 Premature Lift of a Moisture SfDatator Relief Valve
' insoection Sggpe (93702)
On October 6, at approximately 11:15 a.m., the Unit 1 Moisture Separator Reheater 11 northeast relief valve failed open. The inspectors responded to the control room to observe operator actions in response to the event. The following procedures related to
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- Plant Operating Procedure OPOP03 ZG 0006, Revision 7 " Plant Shutdown from 100 percent to Hot Stendby"
- . Plant Operating Procedure OPOPO4 TM.0005, Revision 1, Tast Load Reduction" b, Ohtemations and Findinos Licensed operators first received notification, by radio cali, of a steam leak on the turbine deck. No annunciators alarmeu in the main ontrol room. A quick assessment of plant
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3-parameters identified that main generator output had decreased. Control room operators responded to the event in a calm and controlled manner. The shift supervisor took control of the event and ensured that the response was reasonable and timely. Closed cornmunications practices were used and the reactor operators continually assessed plant conditions. Normal control room operations and communications were diverted to the one stop shop in order to decrease the administrative work load on the operator Operators quickly determined that the condenser hotwell level was decreasing at a rapid rate. The shiit supervisor directed that Procedure OPOPO4 TM-0005 be implemented, and reactor power was reduced at approxirnately 5 porcent per minute, Despite this rapid rate of shutdown, licensed operators properly controlled plant parameters and maintained control of the situation. At 20 percent reactor power, the valve reseated and licensed operators transitioned to Procedure OPOP03 ZG-0006. A briefing was held to discuss plant conditions and to verify that the turbine was ready to be removed from service for repair The opening of the valve caused an excessively loud sound that was audible for several miles around the plant. As a result, two plant personnel were injured in their haste to evacuate the immediate vicinity of the valve. A reactor operator was assigned to the one stop shop to respond to the medical emergency. This removed a potential distraction from the licensed operators. One individual was treated by site industrial safety personnel and transported offsite for a medical evaluation. The other received minor first aid on sit The cause of the relief valve lifting was the failure of the main disc seat. Failure of the seal allowed leakage of the balancing steam from above the main poppet. This leakage was sufficient to exceed steam supply through the balancing orifice. Therefore, the pressure aboy? the main poppet decreased sufficiently to cause the valve to lift prematurely. Further analysis of the failure mechanism was being performed by the licensee at the end of this inspection perio GQaCluSiODS Licensed operator response to the failure of a moisture separator lehea - relief valve was exce!!ent. The shift supervision exhibited superior command and controlin directing the rapid shutdown of the unit. Operators properly responded to the medical emergency that occurred during the event. Administrative duties were conservatively directed to the one stop shop and away from the control room operator .3 EcInonse_to a Unit i _ Reactor Trio $pection Scope (92703. 71707)
On November 10, the Unit i reactor automatically tripped on an overtemperature-deltatemperature signal. All rod control cluster assemblies fully inserted into the core and all systems and components functioned in accordance with design. The inspector
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responded to the site and observed the recovery and stabilization of the plant. The following documents were reviewed:
- Plant Operating Procedure OPOP05 EO E000, Revision 9 " Reactor Trip or Safety injection" o Plant Operating Procedure OPOP05 EO ES01, Revision 14, " Reactor Trip Response"
- Plant General Procedure OPGP03 ZO-0022, Revision 4, " Post Trip Review Report"
- Condition Report 9718170 e Condition Report 9718146
- Event Review Team Report
- Event Notification Worksheet OhicIyations and Findinas Just prior to the event, licensed operators reported observing minor swings in generator output. Automatic rod motion was then observed coincident with an alarm of the steam flow /feedwater flow mismatch annunciator. The reactor tripped on an overtemperature-deltatemperature trip signal. Operators entered Procedure OPOP05 EO E000 and responded appropriately to the event. One exception was noted. While transfemng the steam dump control from average temperature mode to steam pressure mode, an imbalance in the control circuit caused a perturbation of steam generator water level This resulted in a reinitiation of the auxiliary feedwater control system. Further review of of the causes for this actuation will be conducted upon issuance of the licensee event repor The event was caused by a spurious firing of a solid state relay which resulted in a momentary actuation of an overspeed protection control circuitry solenoid. The solenoid actuation caused the main turbine governor valves and intercept valves to rapidly clos Because the actuation was momentary, the govemor valves promptly reopene However, the intercept valves remained closed for the remainder of the event because the intercept valves responded significantly slower than the governor valves, as designed. Rapid closing and reopening of the governor valves produced oscillations in steam generator levels and pressures. This condition combined with the rapid closing of the intercept vnives produced a partialloss of turbine load and resulted in a momentary step increase in reactor coolant system temperature and pressure. The reactor coolant system transient resulted in the reactor tnp on an overtemperature-deltatemperature reactor inp signa _ _ _ . _ . . . . . . . . _ . . . . .
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. In their review of this event, licensee engineers determined that the solid state relay whose failure initiated the event was the subject of a Westinghouse vendor publication dated November 1,1976 wherein the vendor identified the possibility of failure of these solid state relays and recommended their replacement with mercury +etted design relays. Licensee technicians verified that the mercury wetteo relays had bee 1 installed in the overspeed protection control system. However, they also identified that the solid state relays had not been removed. The licensee removed the solid state ralays and tested the system prior to ter. tart. The inspectors will address the question of why the solid state relays remained installed during subsequent review of the licensee event -
repor The inspectors observed licensed operator response during the recovery and stabilization of the plant. Operators followed plant operating procedures throughout the
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recovery. Controls were manipulated in a careful and methodical manne.'. Shift supervision provided appropriate levels of oversight in ensuring that plant parameters were being maintained. Annunciator alarms were observed and quickly acknowledge The inspectors reviewed the posttrip reviaw. The plant had responded well to the event and no deficiencies were noted. All plant aquipment functioned as expected aftcr the reactor trip. This was indicative of outstanding plant system and equipment material condition prior to the reactor trip, CJDGlutl0D1 Licensed operators properly stabilized plant conditions following a Unit i reactor tri >
However, inadvertent auxiliary feedwater system actuation resulted from the failure to balance instrument signals prior to transferring to the steam pressure mode of control for the steam dumps. Licensee engineers had a prior opportunity to identify potential design problems with the relay that caused the event. Additional review of these issues will be conducted upon issuance of the licenwe event report. The material condition of plant systems and equipment responding to the reactor tilp was outstandin Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2) InsattcitQnScone (71707)
The inspectors routinely toured the accessible portions of plant areas in Units 1 and Areas of special attention during this inspection period included;
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e Circulating water intake and discharge structures o' Units 1 and 2 turbine generator buildings e . Standby Diesel Generator 21
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e Units 1 and 2 mechanical and electrical auxiliary buildings e isolation Valve Cubicle 2D e Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater pump rooms a ObscIyalions and Findinos The inspectors found tht plant equipment was maintained in excellent material condition. Plant housekeeping was good. Minor deficiencies identified were communicated to the appropriate shift supervisor and were promptly corrected. Licensee management was routinely observed in the plant monitoring ongoing activitie During routine tours of both units' mechanical auxiliary buildings, the inspectors observed position indication for various valve actuators. The inspectors noted that the indication for Valves 2 FC 0026B and 2 FC 00270, that were associated with previous events and for other valves in the general vicinity, were inadequate. These events were described in NRC Inspection Report 50-498/97-06; 50-499/97 06, Sections 01.3 and 01.4. No formal position indication was permanently leboled for multiple remoto manually operated valves. Markings and notations were handwntten in pen at the hand wheel describing expected valve positions and noted weaknesses in the valve actuators, Conclusions Plant equipment availability and material condition were excellent and plant housekeeping was good. However, position indication for remote-manually operated valves associated with previous events was inadequat O22 Unit 2 Contto1 Room Mcdification Inspection Scopo (71707)
From November 415, craftsmen installed the major portions of the human interface modification in the Unit 2 main control room. The modif cation was developed to assist in the installation of a new plant computer, to improve traffic flow and operator positioning,
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minimalimpact to plant operation Ohservations_and Findings The inspectors reviewed the modification scope and determined that the following systems and components were impacted:
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- Safety Related Equipmen Control Room Envelope Base Mat Control Room Penetrations
- Technical Specification Equipment:
Power Distribution Limits Annunciation
- Reactor Power and Core Analysis Monitoring e important Equipment:
Safety Parameter Display System
. Digital Radiation Monitoring System
- Approximately % of All Annunciators Westinghouse Operating Subroutinas
- Control Room Communications
- Fire Protection Computer Vital Area Doundaries-IEEE 338 Bypass /Inop System Emergency Operating Procedure Storage and Laydown Areas Control Room Traffic Routing Severalinterim states had been devised to enmre that equipment availability was maximized. Examples included providing temporary computer monitors on roll-away carts, interim digital radiation monitoring from outside the control room, temporary risk and dose assessment software provided on a personal computer, and metal tablea to support potential emergency response while consoles were removed The work was performed during periods when the risk associated with online maintenance was low. In addition, licensed operators had fu'l authonty to stop or rostrict work as needed to respond to plant operational occurrences. The inspectors noted that or several occasions, operators placed limits on the scope of work to be performed at that time. On one occasion, workers were expelled from the control room while operators responded to main transformer alarm The inspectors determined that a health physics technician was continuously monitoring the digital radiation monitoring system and had communications established to contact the control room should a monitor alarm. No loads were suspended or carried over the main control panels Cutting of the existing control room desks and consoles was shielded from the operators and the control panels. The ventilation system was aligned to move dust and debris away from the at-the-controls are The inspectors observed the installation of raised flooring in the unit supervisor's are The floor panels were made of sheet metallaminate over compressed wood. The inspectors reviewed the additional fire loading associated with the use of compressed wood. The design review had concluded that the sheet metal prevented oxygen from
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entering the wood, thereby, eliminating the fire potential. However, the inspectors noted I that end panels were cut to fit leaving an open end of bare wood. Licensee craftsmen i developed and installed sheet metal end caps to enclose the bare wood in response to [ the inspector's observation , Conclusions
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The implementation of the Unit 2 control room human interface modification was well ;
coordinated with plant operators and well controlled. Contingency plans and compantatory actions were well developed and in place. However, one fire loading ,
issue v as identified and resolve I
il. MaintenLnce M1 - Condu:t of Maintenance -i
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M1.1 General Comments on Field Maintenance Activities
! jn5R.ection Scoon (62707)
The inspectors observed portions of the following ongoing work activities identified by their work aWoon.!ation numbers:
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I 1 e 122386 Comparator card replacement on Steam Generator 1 A main steam outlet pressure transmitter Channel Urdt2:
- 10 r 5 Air actuator diaphragm replacement or the containment normal sump discha ge Flow Control Valve 2-ED FV 7800, Qbservations ar.d Findinas l The inspectors found t;ial the wo*k was performed by knowledgeablo, qualified t
technicians ut!': zing approved procedures. Self checking and peer reviews were routinely utilized Supervisors wero observed providing an appropriate level of oversigh System engineers were observed providing quality technical support as need e Through procedure rev'.ew and interviews with craft and technicians, the inspectors
~ ascertained that the work instructior.3 were thorough, properly scoped, and appropriately *
detailed. The inspectors verified ths adequacy of equipmerit clearance order The air actuato: viaphrag*, leplace.nent was an action taken in response to the licensee's evaluation for applicability of NRC Information Notice 96-68, .The inspector reviewed Condition Report Engineering Evaluation 96-13732. Engineers had determined
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a that several air actuators were susceptible to stretching of the diaphragm as described in j the information notice The evaluation was thorough with appropriate determinations j made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.5 t l
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Observed maintenance activities were conducted in a professional manner.- Technicians l demonstrated a good knowkdge of systems and components and good oversight of :
acti/ites was evident. The inspectors considered the air actuator diaphragm j replacement a goed response to generic communications and industry experienc l l
M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Tegag
) laspestioriScoom (61726) [
t The inspectone observed portions of the following surveillance activitie ;
e- Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP11 MS 0001, Revision 10," Main Steam !
Safety Valve Inservice Test"
- Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP11 WL 0001, Revision 7, "LLRT: M 56 Liquid ;
Waste to Holdup Tank" + Observations and Findings
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The inspectors found that the observed surveilhnee activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures. The test instruments utilized were within current i calibiation cycles. A review of the procedures indicated that Technical Specification surveillance requirements were properly implemented. Limiting conditions for operation were properly adhered to throughout the testing evolution and adequately tracked in the operability assessment syste The inspectors observed the performance of Preventive Maintenance Task 97000834
"S/G 2C Main Steam Outlet ORC Safety Relief Valve " This task directed the craftsmen to test two of the safety valves in accordance with Procedure OPSP11 MS-0001. The two valves, Safety Relief Valves N2MSPSV7430A and N2MSPSV7440, had previously !
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failed to lift within Technical Specification tolerances during testing. As documented in -
Licensee Event Report 50-498/97-009, the valves were subject to oxide layer locking .
between the nozzle and disk surface Licensee engineers stated that the preventive maintenance task had been developed because these two valves had different characteristics and maintenance history than the other 18 safety relief valves; Condition Report Engineering Evaluation 97-4410-21 was ,
prepared to address the ASME Code Section XI testing requirements associated with the
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- valves: Paragraph IWV 3513 of the Code requires that when a valve in a system fails to i
- function properly during a regular test, additional valves in the system shall be teste ;
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The engineers concluded that, becaut,e the preventive maintenance task was not a
" regular test," no additional testing would have been required had the valves faile ;
i The NRC continues to review the oxide locking phenomenon. The question regarding ;
the proper soplication of the ASME Code to testing failures during this preventive j maintenance task will be reviewed during the closure of Licensee Event }
Report 50-498/97 00 ; ConclusiQat i Surveillance testing observed was conducted in accordance with approved procedures f
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and properly implemented the Technical Specification surveillance requirements. A question regarding the proper application of the ASME Code Section XI testing of main ,
steam safety valves will be addressed during further with the review of a related lict see i event repor M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902,92700)
- M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-498/9606-03: 50-499/9606_Q3: Proteur plant computer alarms were not calibrated utilizing approved procedure ,
This violation addressed repeat concerns that plant computer consts.nts providing Technical Specification alarm functions were not being properly maintained. In addition, procedures were inadequato and quality records were not maintaine In their response, licensee management documented the following corrective actions:
- Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP03 CU 0001, Revision 0," Proteus Plant Computer System Operability," was issued to verify that plant computer functions !
required by Technical Specifications were operable; e Operations, maintenance, and engineering personnel were briefed on the new procedural requirements and related management expectations; and e Computer software was developed to verify that computer constants were correct when updated, in addition, corrective actions were implemented to address the lack of timeliness in and ,
ineffectiveness of previous actions take The inspectors reviewed Revision 1 to Procedure OPSP03-CU-0001. This procedure was wntten to verify that the plant computer constants were ccrrectly entered following a
- reboot of the Proteus computer Verification of alarm function operability for Technical Specification required parameters was also accomplished. The completed procedure ;
was required to be maintained as a quality record for 5 years from the date of ;
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11-l The inspectors performed a review of all condition reports involving proteus constants written since August 1996. Two similar events were reviewed in detail. Condition Report 9612690 documented the discovery of eight constants that did not agree with the accessible constants log. The inspector noted that the computer was out of service when the condition was identified and that the corrective actions addressed above had resulted in the identification of these incorrect constants, in addition, C,ondition Report 97-4716 documented that the accessible cor,stants log had not been updated following changes to ar!al flux difference program constants. The canstants were correct in the plant computer and corrective actions appeared to be adequate to prevent recurrenc M82 (Cloudl.Licenlee Event Recort 50-@3/20&QA Two Spare Safety-Related Circuit Breakers were not in Seismically Qualified Position This hcensee event report documented that licensee engineers had determined that two spare safety-related circuit breakers had been found in a position other than the qualified position. Based on this finding, engineers determined that the associated Unit i switchgear had been in an unanalyzeJ seir .iic condition. The cause was determinod to be the failure of site personnel to recognize the interaction between spare breaker positions and the equipment qualificatio Licensee personnel walked down all 480 volt and 4160 volt breakers in both unit Six additional breakers were identified as being out of the qualified position and were immediately returned to a qualified configuration. Training of maintenance and operations personnel was conducted. In addition, circuit breaker operation and maintenance procedures were revised to include the appropriate qualified position The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken and det irmined that they were appropriate. Based on the limited number of breakers involvr.d, the low probability of a seismic event, and the robust design of the South Texas Project, the inspectors determined that these examples were of minor significance. Inspection of spare breakers during routine inspection tours indicated that breakers were being maintained in the qualified positio IlkEDDinCMinD E1 Conduct of Engineering E11 Evaluation of LocaLLeaLRata.Iest concem InsneshoJLScona13I511)
On October 22, a licensee employee identified a concern regarding a localleak rate test performed on Containment Penetration M-46 during Refuehng and Equipment Outage 1REO7. The inspectors rev',ewed the licensee's response to the identified concern The following documents were reviewed
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- Condition Report 9717105, "A High Leak Rate was Noted During Testing of Penetration M 46" e Condition Report Engineering Evaluation 97-171051," Evaluation of LLRT Testing of Penetration M-46" e Plant General Procedure OPGPO4 ZA-0002, Revision 2 " Condition Report Engineering Evaluation Program" e Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP11 CV-0001, Revision 5, "LLRT: M-46 CVCS Letdown" b. Qhervations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed Evaluation 97171051. On September 21, craftsmen ba '
attempted to perform a test of the penetration in conjunction with ongoing check valve testing. Several problems believed to be related to the test equipment and to water in the process piping were encountered. Although the test pressure was never achieved, test personnel agreed that a pressure of approximately 40 psig had been obtained. At the end of the shift, the test was turned over to the night shift crew. The night shift crew determined that the test was not required and canceled the test. During a subsequent interview with the test rig operator, he confirmed that at the time of the turnover the flow rate had been declining as expecte d. In addition, a telltale had been used on the
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penetration and had not indicated gross leakag Licensee engineers determined that the decision to cancel the leak rate test had been appropriate. In order to address the concern regarding the condition of the subject penetration, engineers performed an evaluation of the partial con pleted test. Based on the facts compiled, an analysis of the worst case penetration leakage was performe The worst case leakage from the penetration was identified as 3935.47 standard cubic centimeters per minute (sccm). This was derived from the highest reading on the flow rate meter that had been in range when the test was abandoised. The engineers concluded that the penetration remained operable and no additional testing was deemed necessary. With this leakage, the total building leakage was calculated to be 53,363.47 scem, This was well within the Technical Specification lim t of 455,050 sec C.Qatius1001 An evaluation of a concern related to the localleak rate test of a containment penetration properly bounded the potentia' problem. The engineering analysis and calculations were thorough and conclusions were well founde r ,
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i 13-E1.2 Iemocrary Repairs for a LeahiD2 High Pre 119tejital laspection ScangEJJ5.1)
On October 2, maintenance technicians perform:ng a postmainte, ance test identified that the high pressure seal on Thimble D10 at the seal plate was leaking approximately 20 drops per minute. Temporary Modification TL 197 5525-4 was prepared to perform a leak sealant repair of the fitting. The inspectors reviewed the modification package and the circumstances surrounding this repair, QblervatiQD' ' id Findings Engineers prepared Temporary Modification TL 197 5525 4 utilizing Plant General Procedure OPGP03 ZO-0003, Revision 17, " Temporary Modifications." The design included a small enclosure clamped around the fitting and injected with a leak sealant compound. The design parameters were appropriate f. * the seal environment and the stress irnpact on the piping was bounded by a previous analysis. Rr peat injections and
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poening were prohibited and the maximum number of sealant sticks to be used was clearly delineated. A fire hazard evaluation was performed for the repai The inspectors re Wewed the eva!uatior performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and determined that the findings were well founded and upported by the doci mentation. A work risk analysis was performed and appropnately addressed the work scope, Based on a review of the work documents, the installation was well controlled and properly supervise c C2nC!uliQnt The temporary modification wntten to repair a leaking high pressure seal at the seal plate was properly developed and implemented. An unreviewed safety question determination and work risk assessment were performed and specified conservative controls over the field wor LLPJantEMannd R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R lours of Radioloa!oaLC_ontrolled Areas laspention3.coce (71750)
The insnectors ro:.'tinely toured the mechanical auxiliary and fuel handling buildings in Units 1 and 2. These tours included observation of work, venfication of proper radiological work permits, sampling of locked doors, and observation of parsonnel entrance and egress from contaminated areas and the radiological controlled area r
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14 ObicIyations and Findings Radiological housekeeping in the areas toured was very good. Doors required to be locked in accordance with Technical Specification 6.1.12.2 and with the licensee's radiological program were properly secured. In geval, work in radiological controlled areas was performed in a;cordance with appro"* indiological work permit On October 29, the inspectors observed instrumentation and controls technicians working on a valve actuator in the Unit 2 mechanical auxiliary building.1 he valve was located in the radiological controlled area approximately 2 feet outside of a contaminated area boundary. The contaminated area boundary was clearly marked with a magenta and yettow rope and a sign. The inspector noticed that the technicians had placed tools and pris across the boundary. The inspector discussed this with the supervisor who was prusent. The supervisor immediately stopped work and contacted a health physics technician who determined that the tools and parts had not been contaminated and that tne area where the tools were placed, although still within the contarr.inated area boundary, was not contaminated . The boundary was later moved to exclude the area near the valve. Condition Report 9718502 was developed to address this even However, the condition report was not wntten until the inspectors asked to see it, Conclusions With one exception, radiological performance was good. Although the breach of a contaminated area was promptly corrected, a condition report to address the inattention to detail was not wntten until the inspectors intervene Si Condut.t of Security and Safeguards Activities S Rally _EhysicaLSecunty Activ11y_ Observations (71750)
Tlie inspectors observed the practices of secunty force personnel and the condition of secunty equipment on a daily basis. Protected and vital area barriers were in good condition Temporary compensatory measures were implemented as appropriat Personnel access measures and equipment searches for contraband were routinely good, The inspectors concluded that daily security force activities were conducted in an appropriate manne MAnh9em9QLMeatinas Xi Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion cf the inspection on November 18,1997. Management personnel acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary '
information was identifie __ _ _ _ __
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ATTAClitaENI SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION i
Licentee T. Cloninger, Vice President, Nuclect Engineering J. Cook, Supervising Engineering Specialist W. Cottle, President and Chief Executive Officer B. Dowdy. Manager, Plant Operations, Unit 2 J. Groth, Vice President, Nuclear Generation E. Halpin, Manager, Maintenance, Unit 2 S. Head, Senior Consulting Engineer K. House, Supervising Engineer, Design Engineering Department M. Kanavos, Manager, Mechanical / Civil Design EnrP .ing M. Lat,hley, Manager, Reliability Engineering D. Leazar, Director, Nuclear Fuel and Analysis B. Logan, Manager, Health Physics R. Lovell, Manager, Plant Operations, Unit i B. Masse, Plant Manager, Unit 2 A. McIntyre. Director Engineering Projects G. Parkey, Plant Manager, Unit i D. Roncurrel, Manager, Electrical /l&C Design Engineering F. Timmons, Manager, Nuclear Plant Protection T. Waddell, Manager, Maintenance, Unit i INSPECTION PROCEDURES (IF4) USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Obten;ations IP 62707: Maintenance Observation IP 71707: Plant Operatiors IP 71750: Plant Support IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Wntten Reports at Power Reactor Facilities IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors IP 92902: Followup Maintenance
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Clued 50-498/9606-03; 50-499/9606-03 VIO Proteus Plant Computer Alarms were not Calibrated Utilizing Approved Procedures 50-498/96 004 LER Two Spare Safety Related Ci. uit Breakers were not in Seismically Qualified Positio,e Staluied Ooen 50-498/97-009 LER Main Steam Safety Vali's Setpoints Found Outside Required Tolerances
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