IR 05000498/1998005

Insp Repts 50-498/98-05 & 50-499/98-05 on 980322-0502. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint, Engineering & Plant Support

ML20247M489
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	05/18/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247M458	List: IR 05000498/1998005 ML20247M454 ML20247M475
References
50-498-98-05, 50-498-98-5, 50-499-98-05, 50-499-98-5, NUDOCS 9805260281
Download: ML20247M489 (12)

Text

ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket Nos.: 50498 50-499 License Nos.: NPF-76 NPF-80 Report No.: 50-498/98-05 50-499/98-05 Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Dates: March 22 through May 2,1998 Inspector: W. C. Sifre, Resident inspector Approved By: J. l. Tapia, Chief, Proiect Branch A t

ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information 9805260201 980518 PDR ADOCK 05000498

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-498/98-05; 50-499/98-05 Ooerations

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Control room operator performance was good. Effective communication and self-verification techniques were utilized. Shift turnovers wre thoroug +

Incomplete procedural guidance combined with a failure of operators to fully understand system alignment resulted in a trip of Steam Generator Feedwater Pump 12 while aligning the balance of plant diesel generator for testin *

Operator and plant equipment response to the Steam Generator Feed Pump 12 trip were excellent. Use of abnormal procedures and communication in the control room and by radio with plant operators were excellent throughout the recovery effort. Feedwater pump turbine control systems and startup feedwater pump automatic responses performed as designe Equipment material condition was excellen Maintenance

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Technician performance during maintenance activities observed was very good. Work packages and instructions provided appropriate detail and vendor information was properly incorporate +

Surveillance testing observed was well conducted in accordance with approved procedures and properly implemented the Technical Specification surveillance requirement Enaineerina

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The engineering evaluations for the removal of the north switchyard bus from service and the reduction in hot leg injection time were thorough and provided the appropriate level of detai Plant Suocort

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in general, plant housekeeping was good. The failure to properly implement safety-related procedures for the control of transient fire loads was a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 (499/98005-02).

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Report Details Summarv of Plant Status i

Units 1 and 2 operated at essentially 100 percent power throughout this inspection perio . Operations

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01 Conduct of Operations O1.1 C90 trol Room Observations (Units 1 and 2) Insoection Scoce (71707)

Using Inspection Procedure 71707, tho inspector routinely observed the conduct of operations in the Units 1 and 2 control rooms. Frequent reviews of control board status, routine attendance at shift turnover meetings, observations of operator performance, and reviews of control room logs and documentation were performe Observations and Findinas During routine observations and interviews, the inspectors determined that the control room operators were continually aware of existing plant conditions. Operators responded to annunciator alarms in accordance with approved procedures. Annunciator alarms were promptly announced to the control room staff who, in turn, acknowledged by restating the announcement. The unit supervisors remained cognizant of ongoing activities. Operators' use of self-verification techniques was evident. The engineered safety features systems in both units were verified to be aligned in accordance with Technical Specification requirement On-shift operators provided clear and concise information to oncoming operators during shift turnover. Oncoming operators routinely reviewed the control room logs, discussed current plant conditions, and verified major equipment status, Conclus19m Control room operator performance was good. Effective communication and self-verification techniques were utilized. Shift turnovers were thoroug .2 Steam Generator Feedwater Pumo 12 Trio Insoection Scooe (71707)

On April 17, while aligning the Unit 1 balance of pl. int diesel generator for a load test, l Steam Generator Feedwater Pump 12 tripped. Tha inspector observed the control room j operators' response to the feedwater pump trip. The inspector also reviewed the j licensee's evaluation of this event as documented in Condition Report 98-619 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

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-2-b. Observations and Findinas The licensee's evaluation of this event was documented in Condition Report 98-619 l The inspector ascertained that the balance of plant diesel generator had been shut down )

during a performance test because of excessive vibration. The initial diesel generator 1 electrical alignment was performed utilizing Plant Operating Procedure j OPOP07-DB-0007, Revision 1, " BOP Diesel Generator Performance Test." To ensure l the system was properly aligned for reperforming the test, the unit supervisor decided to I align the diesel generator for automatic operation in accordance with Section 5 of Plant l Operating Procedure OPOP02-DB-0003, Revision 14, " BOP Diesel Generator Normal i

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Operation." The transition in procedures caused the local switch for the balance of plant diesel generator feeder for Motor Control Center 1G5 to be in the wrong position when the diesel generator was placed in automatic. As a result of this condition, the diesel generator automatically started and Motor Control Center 1G5 tripped and could not be energized by the generator because the generator was aligned to a load bank for testin l The deenergization of Motor Control Center 1G5 caused a loss of power to the backup lubricating-oil pump for Steam Generator Feedwater Pump 12. The backup lubricating-oil pump had been operating because the main lubricating-oil pump was removed from i service for planned maintenance. Steam Generator Feedwater Pump 12 subsequently tripped at the low lubricating-oil pressure setpoin l The startup feedwater pump started automatically, as designed, and the digital controller for Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Turbines 11 and 13 increased turbine speed to compensate for the loss of a feedwater pump. The unit supervisor directed control room operators as they stepped through Plant Operating Procedure OPOPO4-FW-0002, Revision 2, " Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Trip" and the shift supervisor provided oversight. Communication in the control room and by radio with plant operators was excellent throughout the recovery effor The licensee identified the following causes for this event:

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The electrical alignment in Section 5 of Procedure OPOP02-DB-0003 did not include the switch for the diesel generator feeder to Motor Control Center G Operators did not fully consider the effect of changing procedures while the diesel generator was in an abnormal alignmen The licensee identified the following corrective actions for this event:

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Revision of Procedures OPOP07-DB-0007 and OPOP02-DB-0003 to ensure proper switch alignment prior to placing the diesel generator in automati Discussion of this event and lessons learned with operations crews and in licensed operator training, t .-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ . - - - - - - - _ _ _ _

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-3-i Conclusions incomplete procedural guidance combined with a failure of operators to fully understand the balance of plant diesel generator system alignment resulted in a Steam Generator Feedwater Pump 12 trip. Operator and plant equipment response to the event were excellent. The licensee's evaluation and corrective actions were thorough and comprehensiv O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2) Japoection Scoce (71707)

The inspector routinely toured the accessible portions of the plant areas in Units 1 and l Areas of special attention during this inspection period included: j l

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Units 1 and 2 mechanical and electrical auxiliary buildings I

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Units 1 and 2 fuel handling buildings

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Units 1 and 2 turbine generator buildings I l

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Standby Diesel Generators 12,13,21 and 2 Units 1 and 2 isolation valve cubicles l Findinas and Observations l The inspector found that plant equipment was maintained in excellent material conditio Licensee management was routinely observed monitoring ongoing activities in the plan Plant housekeeping was good and, with one exception, only minor deficiencies were identified. A failure to properly control transient combustible materials was identified by the inspector in the Unit 2 Train A isolation valve cubicle. This item is discussed in Section F1 of this inspection report. All of the identified deficiencies were communicated to the appropriate shift or unit supervisor and were promptly correcte Conclusions in general, equipment material condition was excellent and plant housekeeping was good.

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ll. Maintenance i l

M1 Conduct of Maintenance M 1.1 General Comments on Field Maintenance Activities 1 Insoection Scoce (62707) I I

The inspector observed portions of the following ongoing maintenance activities identified by their Work Authorization Numbe ;

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136069 Troubleshoot and Repair Reactor Coolant System Loop 1C Cold Leg Wide Range Temperature Instrumentation (Unit 1)

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112511 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump 1 A Inboard Pump Bearing Seal Replacement (Unit 1)

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136521 Troubleshoot and Repair Instrument Air Compressor 21 Trip Circuit (Unit 2)

l Observations and Findings Performance of observed maintenance activities was very good. Work was performed by knowledgeable technicians with appropriate supervision. Good self-checking ard ;

peer-checking was observed. The inspector verified that the equipment clearance order boundary for the spent fuel pool seal replacement was appropriate. Work packages and ,

instructions provided appropriate detail and included work risk assessments in accordance with Plant General Procedure OPGP03-ZA-0090, Revision 18, " Work Process Program." Vendor information was properly incorporated into work instruction Prejob briefings were thorough. Troubleshooting was cautiously performed utilizing detailed plans and strong support from system engineer Conclusions in general, technician performance during maintenance activities observed was very good. Work packages and instructions provided appropriate detail and vendor l information was properly incorporate M 1.2 General Comments on Surveillance TestiDg l Insoection Scoce (61726)

l The inspector observed portions of the following surveillance activities:

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Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP11-ZH-0009, " Control Room Envelope Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning In-Place Adsorber Leak Test,"

Revision 12

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Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP03-SP-00108, " Train B Engineered Safety Features Load Sequencer Manual Local Test," Revision 5

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Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP03-DG-0001, " Standby Diesel 21 Operability Test," Revision Observations and Findinas The observed surveillance tests were well performed utilizing approved procedures. The tests properly implemented Technical Specification surveillance requirements. Plant operators were observed performing detailed walkdowns of equipment during testing activities. System engineers provided good support during the collection of data for equipment performance trending. Communication between control room operators and plant operators in the field was goo Conclusions Surveillance testing observed was well conducted in accordance with approved f

procedures and properly implemented the Technical Specification surveillance l requirement {

M1.3 Main Steam Safetv Valve Testina I Insoection Scooe (62707)

On April 1, two main steam safety valves failed to lift within the required lift setpoint tolerances stated in Table 3.7-2 of the Technical Specifications. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions associated with this and previous failure Observations and Findinos Lift tests of Main Steam Safety Valves MS-PSV-7430A and MS-PSV-7430B were performed as a preventive maintenance activity utilizing Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP11-MS-0001, Revision 10, " Main Steam Safety Valve Inservice Test."

The valves were tested to verify corrective actions for sticking problems caused by oxide locking as documented in NRC Inspection Reports 50-498;499/97003 and 50-498;499/97007 and Licensee Event Reports 50-498/97005,50-498/97009, and L 50-499/9700 The licensee had refurbished the subject valves utilizing a revised maintenance procedure as corrective action for the previous valve failures. Based on the results of the April 1 tests, the licensee reevaluated the cause and corrective actions for the sticking

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phenomena. In their evaluation, licensee engineers determined that the reason the valves failed to lift within tolerance was not fully understood and that further evaluation was require The licensee's corrective actions for the previous main steam safety valve failures and the cause for recurrence will be reviewed further by the NRC. This issue will be tracked as an unresolved item (URI 498;499/98005-01).

Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Enaineerina Evaluation Reviews Insoection Scoce (37551)

Using Inspection Procedure 37551, the inspector periodically reviewed engineering problems and plant incidents. Engineering products were evaluated to determine the ,

effectiveness of the licensee's controls for identifying, resolving, and preventing problems. The following specific engineering evaluations were selected for review: ,

- Condition Report Engineering Evaluation 97-4343-8, Validation of STP Historical Interpretations of the 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, General Design Criterion 17, As Related to the Off-Site Power Sources for the Removal of the North Bu j l

+ Condition Report 98-5868, Operability Evaluation for the Reduction to Hot Leg injection Switch over Time from 6.5 to 5.5 Hours Observations and Findinas Condition Report Engineering Evaluation 97-4343-8 was written to identify compensatory '

actions necessary to ensure General Design Criterion 17 requirements for off-site power sources are satisfied during a planned north bus outage in the switchyard. Licensee engineers determined that, during a planned north or south bus outage, the requirements l are met provided that the Dow Velasco 18 and Skyline transmission lines reniain connected to the switchyard. If either of those lines are removed from service, then the units must verify AC power sources in accordance with Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP03-EA-0002, "ESF Power Availability." This evaluation was performed in prc.paration for a short duration north bus outage to remove the Unit 1 standby transformer from service for scheduled maintenance. The evaluation was thoroug Condition Report 98-5868 was written to evaluate the effect of a revised calculation for the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) volume on the calculated time to hot leg switch-over after a loss of coolant accident. As part of a licensee setpoint review, the l

licensee previously revised Calulation MC-5037-8 for RWST volume. The revised calculation resulted in a change to the maximum injection volume from 453,500 gallons l

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-7-to 541,000 gallons. The time to hot leg recirculation calculation uses the volume and boron concentration from three water sources: RCS water volume, accumulator water volume, and RWST water volume. Of these sources, the RWST provides the largest volume of highly borated water. Based on these calculations and vendor information, licensee engineers concluded that hot leg switch-over must occur at 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> instead of 6.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to ensure proper boron concentration and pH in the containment sump. The evaluation was well founded and appropriately detailed to support the recommended chang Conclusions The engineering evaluations reviewed were thorough and provided the appropriate level of detai IV. Plant Sunogrt R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Tours of Radiological Controlled Areas (71750)

Routine tours of the radiological controlled areas were conducted throughout the inspection period. Doors and gates required to be locked in accordance with Technical Specifications or the licensee's radiation protection program were verified to be properly secured. Work observed in these areas was performed in accordance with approved radiation work permit F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities F Control of Transient Fire Loads Insoection Scoce (71750)

On April 14, the inspector identified a temporary scaffold in the Unit 2 Train A isolation valve cubicle that consisted of several fire retardant treated wood planks. The inspector asked the unit supervisor if there was a permit or evaluation for the storage of the combustible material in a room housing safety-related equipment. The inspector determined that, although the scaffold had an approved scaffold permit, the licensee did net issue a transient fire load storage permit for the scaffold. The inspector subsequently reviewed the circumstances surrounding this event and the licensee's corrective action Observations and Findinas j Through interviews and document review, the inspector determined that the scaffold had been installed in February 1997, for Work Order 343474 and that, although the work had been completed, the work order remained open. The inspector reviewed Plant General i Procedures OPGP03 ZF-0004, Revision 1, " Control of Transient Fire Loads" and 1 i

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-8-OPGP03-ZF-0019, Revision 0, " Control of Transient Fire Loads and Use of Combustible and Flammable Liquids and Gases" which superseded Procedure OPGP03-ZF-0004 in February 1998. The procedures defined combustible materials not utilized at least once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> as being in storage. The procedures required an evaluation and

" Transient Fire Load Storage Permit" for combustible materials storage areas inside plant structures. The inspector determined that the scaffold had not been utilized once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and that no evaluation or storage permit had been documented for the materia The failure to properly implement these safety-related procedures was a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 (499/98005-02).

As a result of these findings, the fire protection coordinator initiated Condition Report ,

98-6010 to address this event. The inspector reviewed the condition report and i corrective actions. The licensee identified additional examples of combustible material j which was stored without a required evaluation. The licensee identified the cause for this as a failure by plant personnel to recognize the applicability of the storage permit requirements to equipment such as scaffold, ladders, and hoses staged but not utilized '

every 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> I The licensee's corrective actions for this event included the following:

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Posting of a fire watch in the 2A isolation valve cubicle until the wood was remove I

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A walkdown of accessible rooms in Units 1 and 2 to identify any other transient fire load Evaluation and issuance of storage permits for identified transient fire load Discussions with plant personnel on the requirements of Procedure OPGP03-ZF-001 l l

- Revision of Plant General Procedure OPGP03-ZM-0028, " Erection and Use of Temporary Scaffold" to require a review by the fire protection coordinator of all scaffolds that utilize wood component c. Conclusions The failure to properly implement safety-related procedures for the control of transient fire loads was a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 (499/98005-02). The licensee's l corrective actions for this event were extensive, thorough, and comprehensive.

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-9-V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 5,1998. Management personnel acknowledged the findings presented. The inspector asked whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie !

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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee W. Cottle, President and Chief Executive Officer l J. Groth, Vice President, Nuclear Generation j A. Kent, Manager, Electrical and Instrumentation and Controls System Engineering J. Labuda, Coordinator, Fire Protection B. Masse, Plant Manager, Unit 2 i G. Parkey, Plant Manager, Unit 1 J. Pierce, Shift Supervisor, Unit 1 T. Stroschein, System Engineer F. Timmons, Manager, Nuclear Plant Protection T. Waddell, Manager, Maintenance, Unit 1 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observation IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ooened i

498;499/9805-01 URI . Licensee's Corrective Actions for the Prevention of Recurring Main Steam Safety Valve Failures (Section M1.3)

499/9805-02 VIO Failure to Propeny implement Safety-Related Procedures for the Control of Transient Fire Loads (Section F1)

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