IR 05000498/1990023

Insp Repts 50-498/90-23 & 50-499/90-23 on 900601-30.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Status,Onsite Followup of Events,Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings

ML20055G821
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	07/19/1990
From:	Joel Wiebe NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20055G820	List: IR 05000498/1990023 ML20055G819
References
50-498-90-23, 50-499-90-23, NUDOCS 9007240205
Download: ML20055G821 (15)

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APPENDIX:

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.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-7 .m , > REGION:IV j f, ,  : 3 , 1 E,d* .NRC Inspection Report: '

50-498/90-23 ' Operating Licenses: -NPF-76 *

yp f 50-499/90-23 -NPF-80; ,

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50-498-  !

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50-499

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% f m * Licensee: _ Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)

P.O. Box'1700

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.f Houston, Texu -77251 m, >w

, Facility Nt,me: . South Texas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2 1

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'.Inspectica At:- STP, Matagorda County, Texas y s

y* -Inspectit n Conducted:: June 1-30, 1990 1 db '

Inspectors: Tapia, Senior Resident Inspector, Project- Section D  ?

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wision of Reactor Projects

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R. J. Evans,. Resident Inspector, Project 1 Section D

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Division of Reactor Projects *

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k$ Approved: ~

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. S. Wiebe, Chipf, Project Section D.

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' Division'of Reactor'Projectse Date ' . l

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. Inspection: Summary n

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L Inspection Conducted June -1-30,1930 (Report 50-498/90-23: 50-499/90-23) '

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$ . Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection which included plant statu ]

I)f ? :onsite followup of events at operating p~ower reactors, licensee action on ,

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previous inspection findings, onsite followup-of written reports of nonroutine '

&' events at power reactor facilities, operational safety verification, monthly y  ; maintenance observations, monthly surveillance: observations, plant startup from

T = refueling, and balance of plant inspectio ! d> 'Results

Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified. The end  !

of the Unit 1 second refueling outage.was accomplished with an outstanding lo dosage'ofionly 59 man-Re The licensee's. response to plant events was very -

thorough in scope and always conservative with respect to safety l . implications. Housekeeping-was generally good; however, several areas were noted.as needing additional attention. Inspectior: of routine maintenance and ,

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surveillance ' identified well trained personnel per'orming their work with an obvious dedication to doing a good -job and adhering to procedural requirements, l t g

9007240203 900719 8 3 -

DR ADOCK 0500

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E m DETAILS

, Persons Contacted-

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• H. Kinsey,_ Plant Manager

, *R. W: Chewning, Vice President Nuclear Support _

• C A, Ayala,- Supervising Engineer, Licensing J

• S. M. Dew, Manager, Nuclear Purchasing Material Management

• W. L. Jump, Maintenance Manager

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• A. McBurnett, Nuclear Licensing Manager

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• A. K. Khosla, Senior Engineer, Licensing 1*D J. Denver, Manager, Plant Engineering

• J. R. Lovell, Technical Services Manager  !

• J W. Loesh, Plant Operations Manager  :

• K. L. Christian, Operations Manager, Unit 1 .

• J. R. Moore,' Manager, Security Support

• V. A. Simons,1 Manager, Emergency Prepardness

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• M. R. Wisenburg, General Manager Assessment

• T. J. Jordan, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance .t

• D. R. Keating, Director, Independent Safety Engineering Group i; *A. W. Harrison, Supervising Engineer, Licensing rn addition to the above, tr.e inspectors also held discussions with ,

various licensee, architect engineer-(AE), maintenance, and other *

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contractor personnel during this inspection, g p,

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• Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on ;

[ June'29, 199 * Plant Status M

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Unit.1 began this inspection period in Mode 5, cold shutdown. The unit ?.

was brought critical at 10:05 a.m. on-June 14, 1990, and Mode 1, power:

operation, was reached at 3:05 p.m. on June 18, 1990. Unit 1 experienced F a reactor trip from 15 percent power at 4:10 a.m. on June 20, 1990, on a '

loss of power to all four reactor coolant pumps. The unit was again brought critical and the main generator breaker was closed on June 21, 4 l 1990, at 7:10 p.m. This breaker closure signaled the.end of_the second .

. refueling outage which lasted 84 days. The outage was_ origin _ ally ;

scheduled for 65 days. A significant achievement of the outage was the- .

very smallitotal personnel exposure of 59 man-Rem. On June 28. 1990, the !

unit tripped from .70 percent power at 5:54 a.m. when an electrohydraulic l

, ' control (EHC)-line ruptured on a result of pressure oscillations in the L EHC system. The unit was again taken critical on June ~ 28, 1990, and the i; generator breaker was closed on June 30, 1990. At the end of this l' -

_ inspection period, Unit I was in the process of increasing power in a l -systematic approach to 100 percen Unit 2 began this inspection period at 100 percent reactor thermal powe Unit 2 was taken offline on June 13, 1990, at 10:30 p.m. in order to perform inspection of Conax junction boxes for the reactor coolant l

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system (RCS) resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) as a result of at

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problem identifiea in Unit Unit 2 again reached 100 percent on; June 14, 1990..-Due to a problem witn the: speed control #treuitryzon Main Feedwater Pump 21, Unit _2 power was reduced to 99.7 percent power on June 18, 199 Unit 2 remained at this power level at the close of this inspection perio _

~ Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702).-

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On June 9,1990, cross-calibrations of the RCS RTDs were ~being performed in Unit I when one RTD was.found to be malfunctioning. A maintenance work; request (MWR) was issued to replace the RTD. ~During. implementation of the MWR, fit was discovered that the o-ring gasket on the Conax junction box cover was missing. Since Unit I was in Mode 3, only 22 of 42 RTDs could be-inspected on that day. Twelve were found to be' missing o-rings. The remaining 20 RTDs were inspected the next day, and an additional 10 were

?' identified as not having o-rings. An inspection was-initiated of the 6 accessible RTDs outside the biological shield in Unit 2, which was'at 100 percent power. All 6 RTDs had the o-ring installed. The licensee initiated a documentation review and determined that 10 of the 22 RTDs with documentation review included Unit 2 and disclosed only one'MWR associated with an RTD. Based on this inconclusive documentation review, the licensee conservatively decided to reduce power in Unit 2 and perform-an/ inspection of all RTDs. Unit 2 was taken offline on Monday, June 13, 1990, at 10:30 p.m. ' Inspections were then performed and it was determined that 6 of._42 RTDs were found with missing o-rings. All missing o-rings were replaced during the course of the inspection The' narrow-range RTDs are used for the overtemperature delta T'(OTDT) and i overpower delta T (0PDT) reactor trip functions. The wide-range RTDs-are

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.used for postaccident monitoring (PAM) and_ remote shutdown. The concern raised by lack of the o-ring was that, during a postulated high energy line break accident, if the junction box is unsealed, moisture may enter an ,

RTD_ assembly.and degrade'the insulation resistance of the RTD cable. Such degradation would introduce additional errors'into the RCS temperature measurement which have not been accounted for in the safety analyse Under these circumstances, indicated ' temperature could be lower than actual, a nonconservative error for OPD A review was conducted of the Westi_nghouse. transient analysis data of the steam line break events for which the narrow range RTDs provide the primary trip signa From this review, it was determined that the maximum time needed is approximately 14 seconds for an OPDT trip which occurs from a single-ended steam line break. During this perind, containment' pressure reaches less than 8 psig. The licensee has conducted testing of similar thr6 ded connections without 0-rings and demonstrated that integrity of these connections would be maintained at pressures up to 15 psig for short periods but wel' in excess of 14 seconds. This testing was performed to address previous concerns with the use of flexible cable and involved pressurizing-the entire RTD assembly with nitrogen to 50 psi. The RTDs were, therefore, expected to perform their trip function successfully based on the test results, the low pressure, and the short period of time involve !

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n - Although the trip function-of th'e RTDs was shown to have been operable, '

L the long-term operability of the~ wide-range RTOs could not be assured, L This'1ong-term operability is required to monitor the RCS during l postaccident monitoring. The licensee, therefore, notified the NRC of.the L ' failure to maintain the environmental qualification of three wide-range ';

E cold: leg and'one wide-range hot leg RTDs for postaccident monitoring per ,

? Technical Specification-(TS) 3.3.3.6.' '

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'The licensee initiated a detailed review of this problem to determine the

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i root caus This review included both a review of maintenance'and b .

construction records and a review of the Environmental-Qualification (EQ) .

Program by a consultant. These reviews were expected.to address both the l L ' apparent relation to frequency of opening the assemblies for testing /

h maintenance and the potential contribution from a lack of-a clear document -l trail'regarding vendor information. The broad scope EQ review will review ,

how EQ requirements are translated into the configuration control process, d how EQ' requirements are implemented, EQ-related training, and the

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P EQ-related data bases and their control. It will also include a review of'

l - approximately 200 components for both documentation and field verification. These reviews are scheduled to be completed by the end of August 1990, l

The licensee's response to the identification of the missing-o-rings was i prompt,and followup actions were conservative. The licensee immediately f - addressed the concern for operability of the reactor protectior system and i- subsequently considered the potential for broad scope implication At 4:10 a.m. , on June 20,'1990, Unit I tripped from 15 percent power. The ,

licensee had successfully completed the-turbine overspeed. test and was ~

i! attempting to parallel the turbine on.the grid when the generator breaker H tripped open and a transformer: blackout occurred. This caused a loss of

- power-to the switchyard breakers and the auxiliary bus supply breaker This in turn caused a le a of power'to-all four reactor coolant pumps, which then gave a reactor trip, No. 11-emergency diesel generator started and sequenced properly onto the bus (EIA) supplied by the auxiliary bu '

H The-other two diesels were associated with buses being supplied by the standby. transformer which remained energized. Feedwater isolation and

, auxiliary feedwater actuation-occurred with no complications. Mainsteam

&' isolation valves were manually closed to limit coollawn until power was

@b restored to the reactor coolant pumps. The technical support center (TSC)

diesel'(nonsafety-related) started but did not load. .This caused a loss

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of power to the digital rod position indication (DRPI), and the operators, f' therefore, had to emergency borate for about 15 minutes, at which time power was restored and it was verified that the rods were in, Auxiliary V feedwater actuated on lo-lo steam generator level. The main steam isolation valves were closed manually to limit cooldown. Source range

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.a channels energized automatically and steam dump valves actuate Subsequent investigation of the trip identified the probable cause as a generator breaker pole relay failure. This relay is a Westinghouse SLB-type relay which will not allow the closing of the generator breaker x

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i and initiates a generator breaker failure lockout to open the switchyard breakers when the current comparison logic detects a failure of one or J more poles during a breaker close operation not involving a faul Subsequent testing of the generator circuit breaker revealed no pole'

problems. In addition, a redundant pole failure relay of.a diverse-type hadinot operated, giving further evidence that an actual breaker: failure -

,had'not occurred. The cause of the trip was determined to be a' result of l erratic _ operation of the Westinghouse SLB relay due to drift of the I-L set) sints. With respect to the TSC diesel, the underfrequency/overvoltage module breaker was found to be defective and subject to tripping due to vibration. Both relays were replaced, t

On June'28, 1990, at 5:54 a.m., Unit 1 tripped from 76 percer a result of a ruptured-EHC line to the No. 3 turbine throttle' v- plant systems responded as required. Just prior to the trip, cont. 9 mom -[

operators-noted a load swing of about 50-60 megawatts. Plant opert ..

were sent out to investigate and found severe oscillations occurring.in -

-the No. 1. governor valve. The EHC lines to the No. 3 throttle valve.and

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m the No I governor valve are connected to a common line. It was subsequently determined that the oscillations of the No. 1-governor valve caused the EHC, line to the No. 3 throttle valve to rupture. The "

oscillations were found to have resulted from a loose lead on the No. 1-governor-valve control _ circuitry. This valve had been subject to maintenance during the recent outage. The licensee was continuing its investigation of this trip at the close of this inspection perio . Li_censee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

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(Closed) Open Item (498/8739-09): Incomplete Review of Unit 1 Prooperational Tests

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.During a previous inspection, NRC inspectors reviewed the results of selected preoperational tests. Portions of three tests could not be L reviewed prior.to initial Unit 1 fuel loa The' procedures were to be

performtd during initial plant startup. Because final review of the ,

test results could not be performed at that time, the subject area wa identified as an open item (498/8739-09).

During this inspection period, the three procedures were reviewed for compliance with the following attributes: (1) test results met specified L acceptance criteria; (2) problems encountered were documented and resolved; and (3)-test results were properly reviewed by the licensee. The three L procedures reviewed were: (1) 1-RC-P-11, Revision 1, " Pressurizer Level ,

and Pressure Control Preoperational Test;" (2) 1-SP-P-03, Revision 0, '

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" Solid State Protection System Response Time Test" (portions of the test

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were documented in Procedures 1TEP04-SP-0001, Revision 0, "SSPS Response Time Test," and ITEP04-SP-0004, Revision 0, "SSPS Response Time Test;" and (3) 1-EW-P-05, " Essential Chiller Condenser Valves," Revision 2, (1-EW-P-05 was superseded by Procedure JTEP04-EW-0001, Revision 0). No concerns were identified by the NRC inspector during the procedure revie This open item is close q

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6: Onsite Followup'of Written-Reports of-Nonroutine' Events at Power Reactor Facilities -(92700) ,

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.(Closed) Unit 1 Licensee' Event Report (LER) 87-23: Loose Valve Shaft to ;

Actuator Drive Keys in' Motor Operator Valves In October 1987, several safety-relai J motor operat ' valves were found to be.ve loose er displaced valve-to-actuator drive keys. The valve keys in" question were supplied by.Rockwell. International and were suspected to 1 have:become loose or displaced during shipment or installation. A total of 4 14 Unit I valves were identified with loose or displaced keys. Correctiv :

actions proposed by-the ~ licensee included updating. vendor manuals, . <

inspection of all installed valves supplied by Rockwell, and inspection of ..

all valves, at time'of receipt, for loose key Since the event, the licensee: (1) determined that all valves at STP were installed.in accordance with NRC recommendations; (2) replaced or i reworked all loose or. displaced keys to ensure a snug-tight fit; (3) revised the associated vendor manuals to ensure snug-tight fit of 3 all keys;-(4) inspected all-Unit 2-valves, nonsafety-related Unit 1 '

valves, and spare valves:for loote keys; and (5) added 4 quality control *

check to ' ensure that all-Rockwell /alves are inspected for loose or j displaced keys at time' of initial riceipt, ll

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6; Operational Safety Verification (71707)

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' The purpose of:this inspection was to ensure that the facility was bein operated _ safely and:in conformance with license and regulatory requirement F This inspection also included verifying'that selected activities of-the~ .

' licensee!s radiological protection program were being implemented in  !

conformance with -requirements and procedures and that the licensee was in o compliance with its approved physical security pla .

The inspectors visited the control rooms on a routine basis and verified '

that control room staffing, operator decarum,-shift turnover, adherence to- 3'

TS limiting conditions for operation (LCOs), and overall control room decorum were in accordance with requirement The inspectors conducted tours in various locations of the plant to observe work operations and to ensure that the facility was being operated in conformance with license '

and regulatory requirement Housekeeping and loose object control was being maintained in most areas of the: plant. However, several areas required additional cleaning. The mechanical auxiliary building (MAB) truck bay rooms for both units were inspecte Loosely rolled electrical cables, tools, rags, dirt, and e insects (truck bay doors were left open) were observed. The essential cooling water system sump in the Unit 1 MAB was also inspecte Miscellaneous trash was observed in the sump, including tools (wirebrush, level, paint brush), one glove, and one light bulb cove i

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, As part of the operational safety verification portion of'the inspection, the MAB. ventilation system for Unit 2 was inspected to verify the-y : operability and status of-the system. The. inspection included' comparison m 1 of as-found control switch, power supply breaker, and valve positions.to

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those required by the operating procedure (2 POP 02-HM-0001, "MAB Ventilation," Revision 2) and piping and, instrument _ diagrams (P& ids).

1 ' Items noted during a technical review of the MAB' Ventilation (HM) system

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Y- 'Four valves were noted to be missing 'from the procedure valve' lineu 'The four valves were Radio Chemical Lab Exhaust Filter Drain Valves 2-ED-401-and -402 and Sample Room Exhaust Filter Unit Drain s% * Valves 2-ED-403 and~-40 "

Typographical errors were observed throughout the procedure. For y example,- the power supply for Supplementary Exhaust Fan 21A was Motor o' Control Center-(MCC) 2J3 but was listed as 2JB in the power suppl lineup. Also, the location of the power supply for the' Valve Cubicle a Room 226 fan was in the electrical auxiliary building (EAB) at the b '

60-foot elevation, but the procedure lineup stated the-location _was y EAB 35-foot elevatio : Local control stations were available for local starting and stopping

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of system fans, however, no mention of the local controls were provided in the procedur Items noted during a walkdown of.the HM system includedi w

F Four system controllers used for maintaining building temperature or differential pressure were inspected. The as-found setpoints

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were compared to setpoints required by design document None of

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the controllers were found to be correctly se The controllers included: (1) 2-HM-TIC-9203, MAB Air Supply Fan Discharge temperature controller, the required setpoint was 60 F, but the. controller was found set at 55 F; (2) 2-HM-TIC-9327, Locker Room /0ffice Air Supply temperature controller, the required setpoint was 53 F,-but the controller was found set at 39 F; (3)= 2-HM-PDIC-9394, Radio. Chemical Lab / Sample Room differential pressure controller, the require setpoint was 0.100 inches water column (wc), but the controller was found set at 0.31 inches wc; and (4) 2-HM-TIC-9438, Radwaste counting room temperature controller, the required setpoint was 60 F, but the controller war fowJ set at 50 These discrepancies were reoorted to the Unit 2 whift supervisor, who initiated corrective actions to retu'"t 'c9fitrollers to required setpoint Four typographical errva were noted on Main Control Board 2-CP-02 the word " INLET" was misspelled on the switch nameplate engravings for Valves 2-HM-FV-9240, -9200, -9205, and -924 s J ,

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o IThe Procedure Electrical. Lineup 2 POP 02-HM-0001-1 stated that A ' Distribution. Panel DP0 297 was located behind MCC 2L4 but was.actually-

' ' located behind MCC 2J4. The same lineup stated that MCC 2GB wa's-

, s 4 1 Mated in the MAB, but the MCC was located in the EAB. Also, the

- lineup failed to mention the MCC breaker numbers (just the MCC-itself -

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g, was listed) of the Supplementary Exhaust Fans 21A and 21 l

' The MAB ventilation-to Radio Chemical Lab / Sample Room heater power supply, located at MCC 2K4,' Breaker F3, was- found off, but should'

have'been on. There were no " danger" or other informational tags on-fi:

the breaker. However,: the heater was not required to1be operable due

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to ambient conditions present during the month of June (1990).

' Sections of th'e Fire Protection (FP). system were also inspected to verify the operability and status of.the system. The section of the FP system inspected included.the fire water pumps, fire water storage tanks, and-other components-located within the fire pump house. The inspection

, included a-comparison of as-found control switch, power supply breaker,

-and-valve positions to those. required by the operation procedure

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• (1 POP 02-FP-0001, Fire Protection System Operation, Revision 6) and th < system P& id *

Items not'ed during a technical review of the FP system in:1uded:

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" Errors were noted on system P&ID 70270F00006,-Revision 10, Fire Protection Storage and-Pumps. ' Test Connection Valve 1-FP-1262 was shown as being located inside'the fire pump house but actually was

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located outdoors. V:.1ves 1-FP-1702 and -1707 were normally closed valves that were'showh normally open on the P&ID. Drain Valve 1-FP-0889 was shown as' Valve-1-FP-0899 on the P&I Fire Pump Diesel Driver'1' cooling water. discharge drain line had a drain valve

• ' connection that was incorrectly drawn on the P&ID. Three instrument root valves were-listed in the valve lineup (no-identification numbers were provided) but were not shown on the P&I Several procedural errors were noted. Eight test valves located on the fire water test Fead were shown on the system P&ID and were located in the field, but these valves were not listed in the Valve Lineup 1 POP 02-FP-0001- Per the P&ID, numerous system valves located in the yard should have had a unit number prefix of "O," meaning common to both units, but actually were prefixed with a "1" in the

~e" valve lineup, meaning applicable to Unit 1 only. Fifteen valves were r listed in the valve lineup without identification numbers, although

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Ventilation system operating instructions for buildings in the yard were usually provided with the operating procedures of the systems

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located within these buildings. Instructions on how to operate the

. g" fire pump house ventilation system was not provided in the FP system operating procedure but should have bee l l

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h *- The system operating procedure instructions were compared t y? " ~ instructions provided in the vendor manual: for the fire pump ,

i Several discrepancies.were noted, including diesel start 11mitations,

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1. N* ensuring that a minimum water temperature" existed (twot of f three,

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diesels did not. meet.this recommendation'of 120 F),fshut'down' L ;

V instructions, and instructions on how to start a' diesel if it. failed y, '

to start the first time. The licensee stated that;a' review would be

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performed to determine if these additional instructions.were necessar :

Items noted during the walkdown of the FP system' included:

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The vendor nameplate was missing.from two.of the three fire pump

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diesel drivers. Valve 1-SW-0084, Fire Water Storage Tank 2 Fill  !

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Isolation Valve, had two identification tags installed. One correctl .!

,. identified the valveLas 1-SW-0084, while the other one incorrectly j E'

D identified the valve as 1-FP-0084. Drain Valves 1-FP-1263and -1265:

h =had their tags reversed in the field. Seven valves were noted to be'-

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missing their identification tags (1-FP-1262, -0007, -1698, -1702,: ' s em ;. -1700, -1705, and the root valve for Pressure Indicator (PI) 8647.(no M number provided for this valve).

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Valves 1-SW-0083 and -0084 had packing leaks but did not'have MWR' tags K ', , , -attached. The handle on Valve 1-FP-1704 was' broken off=and no MWR tag

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Both.the system P&ID and valvt neup liste'd a test line test

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connection vent valve as being . part of the system, but no.suc *

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valve was located in the plant. The' valve lineup, listed a p ,

Valve-1-FP-1123 labelled as Valve 1-FP-1662 in the plant and on the ;

system P&I '

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lf" l The jockey pump suction valve (1-FP-0006) and discharge-valve

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(1-FP-0040) were found locked open. -Locks were not required per F mi Valve Lineup 1 POP 02-FP-0001-2 and-the plant's locked valve program.

1 . FP Header Isolation Valves 1-FP-580 and -581 were required to be ME locked open per the valve lineup; however,-these two valves were not

' required to be locked per the locked valve progra The wrong jockey pump control switch was installed in the' fire pump

[W" house. The required switch per design documents was to. read e STOP-NORMAL-START, but the installed switch reads HANDS-OFF-AUT g- ,

jy C Fire Pump Diesel 1 Jacket water heater power supply breaker, located *

pH at Distribution Panel DP 5304, Breaker llo. 4, was found 0FF, but M

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. should have -been ON. This was reported to the Unit I shift supervisor L who initiated corrective actions and turn 9d the power back on. This .'

heater being off would not have prevented i.he fire pump from l

, starting; therefore, no concern existed, u,

K, All components of the HM and FP system were in the correct positions to i support plant operation, with the exception of two nonsafety-related heater

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power supplies. The items. noted by the'inspp ctor did not appear to

.directly impact safe operation of the plant. All procedural observations were referred to the licensee for inclusion in the licensee's long-term 1 program for procedure upgrad .

No. violations or deviations were identified in this area of the. inspectio . : Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703)

-Selected maintenance activities were observed to verify whether the activities were being conducted in accordance.with approved procedures.'

..The activities' observed included:

Preventive Maintenance (PM) IC-0-EM-89003886, Meteorological ,

Monitoring System Weekly Inspection

Wo-k Request (WR) DJ-62421, Replacement of 130 VDC Battery Charger ~EIA11-2 DC Ammeter The inspector verified that the-activities were conducted in accordance-

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with. approved work instructions and procedures, test eouipment was within the current calibration cycles, and housekeeping was being-conducted in'an-

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acceptable. manner. 'All observations' made were referred to the-license', -

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for appropriate actio PM IC-0-EM-89003886 was performed by- an instrumentation-and controls (I&C)-

-e technician at the primary and-backup meteorological monitoring. system tower structures. The work consisted 1of structure inspection for faults,. ,

ensuring the. ventilation systems were operating properly,: replacing

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recorder charts or pensLas necessary, and' replacing the . tape on; the system's tape: deck. The technician noted that the system's digital clocks were incorrectly set at central daylight time. The technician then rese I the ..acks to the correct setting of: central standard time. The NRC ,

11nspector noted that the weeds surrounding the backup tower / structure.had not been- mowed, otherwise, housekeeping was.being maintained in',both

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primary and secondary tower structures. No other concerns were identifie ,

WR DJ-62421 was perfortred by. electrical technicians on the 130 VOC Battery

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Charger E1A11-2 OC ammeter. The work consisted of obtaining a new panel ,

meter, calibrating the new meter, and replacing the-old meter on the  !

. battery charger. The new meter was sliohtly different from the old meter, therefore, the lugs on the electrical cables would not fit the new' mete I

'The- technicians then removed the old meter lugs and replaced them with lugs of the appropriate size. The NRC inspector compared the work

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performed to criteria established by Procedure OPMP02-NZ-0013, " Cable

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terminations," Revision 1. No concerns were identified by the NRC inspecto The= licensee had effectively implemented the PM and corrective maintenance program as demonstrated by the above two observed maintenance activitie 'l Proper management supervisior was provided that assured the activities were performed in accordance with the established program requirement '

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No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)

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Selected surveillance activities were observed to ascertain whether the surveillance of safety significant systems and components were being conducted in accordance with TS and other requirements. The following

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. surveillance tests.were observed and the documents reviewed:

• OPSP05-EM-0001, " Primary Meteorological- System Calibration (60. meter tower),"' Revision 3;

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1 PSP 03-AF-0007, " Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 14 Inservice Test,"

Revision 5; and

• - 1 PSP 03-HE-0002, "'B' Train Control Room Emergency Ventilation

System ,'. Revi si on ' Specific' items! inspected included-verifying-that as-left data was within cacceptance'crittria limits, test equipment used was within current calibration cycles, and test performers were adhering to approved procedures. In addition to observation by the inspector of the

'surveillanc'e activities, the procedures were reviewed for technical accuracy and for conformance to TS requirement Procedure.OPSP05-EM-0001 was performed by I&C technicians on the primary-meteorological system-instrumentation. The procedure provided. instructions on h'ow.to perform calibration checks of-the' meteorological. tower

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instrumentation. The procedure was required to be performed on a semiannual basis. A calibration check of the wind direction meter was inspected. Step-7.2.5L instructed technicians to record a voltage on -

-Terminals 5:and 6Lon Terminal Board TB 1.in the carriage junction bo The box contained two. terminal boards but neither were labeled. The

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correct terminal board was located byLtrecing wiring leading.to th . te'rmi nal s . Step-7.2.13 provided instructions to record as-found data at an' indicator ~1ocated on Control Room Panel 1-CP-022. The data sheet for the wind direction.-indicator was in units of degrees, while the -control roon-indicator was-in units of direction (north, east, south, west). The

. technicians had~to suspend testing until they. understood what each increment on the direction indicator meant in units of degrees. The

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_ procedure should have provided more specific information on performance of this step. No other concerns were identifie Procedures 1 PSP 03-AF-0007 and IPSP03-HE-0002 were performed by Unit 1 operations personnel. Procedure 1 PSP 03-AF-0007 was performed to verify operability of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 14 and system check valve Procedure 1 PSP 03-HE-0002 was performed to verify operability of the Train B control room emergency ventilation system. No concerns were identified with these two surveillance test '

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J Mg ? Personnel performing the surveillance activities were cognizant of,the ,

3, , S - intent-of each surveillance observed and the procedural. requirement .

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No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio Xw Plant Startup From-Refueling '(71711).

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Following the Unit I refueling outage and prior to. unit operation at, _'

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full power, an inspection was performed to: (1). ascertain whether: systems w , disturbed during the outage were returned to an operable status an ,e E ' v ,'< ~ (2) determine if the plant startup and core physics tests were: conducted'

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in accordance with approved procedures. The inspection consisted of '

$;' hy7 observation'of control-room activities, plant walkdowns'of two systems

$s worked on during the outage, and witnessing of selected. tests. The

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control room activities were inspected to ensure that the startup- q

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procedures Ond plant personnel adhered to TS and procedural requirement ., ,w .,

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The two s:/ stems walked down included the essential cooling water system,- }

-Train C, and the essential. chilled water system, Train B. LThef systems y

1. ' were inspected to ensure that they were returned to service in accordance- :

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with plant procedures following disturbance during the outag i

,J The essential cooling water (ECW) system, Train C, was inspected toiverify

. .that the system was correctly lined up to support plant ope' ration. The

+ ., valve, electrical, and switch lineup checklists of system Operating J o

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fJ-Procedure IPOP02-EW-0001, Essential Cooling Water Operation, Revision 9, were-compared to.the system P& ids and to the as-found' positions in the-j F

, ? ~p lant. All components in the plant were found in the correct positions to M support' plant operatio Several observations were made that.were reported-

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, to the licensee for resolution: (1) several< motor operated valve and. pump- ;

space heater. power supplies were missing from the electrical' lineup but

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Q .thelpower supplies to the heaters were found in the correct! position.o ,

y ON; (2) ECW to Component Cooling Water. Heat Exchanger 1C inlet,and outlet'

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K drain. valves were tagged in reverse in the plant; (3) several.. minor 7 L typographical errors were observed in Procedure 1 POP 02-EW-0001;

-(4) Valve 1-EW-293 was missing its identification tag in the plant-o

W (5) four instruments were listed twice in the instrument vent checklist'; 't 4, Land (6) several minor system P&ID errors were observe ;

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&^ .The essential chilled water (CH) system, Train B, was also inspected y to verify that the system was correctly lined up.to support plant

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hU operation. The checklists of Procedure IP0P02-CH-0001,-Essential Chilled

y Water System, Revision 7, were compared to the system P&ID and as-found positions in the plant. All components were found in the correct positions to support plant operations. Observations made and reported to

@R, M the licensee fer resolution included: (1)' Valve 1-CH-0382, CH Common Makeup Valve, was missing its handwheel and no maintenance work request l

%g 5 -tag was attached to the valve; (2) 12 minor P&ID errors were observed on l J

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13- t the system P& ids;L (3) , Valve L1-CH-1503 was missing its identification . tag in the plant;:and (4), several minor typographical errors-were observedJin Train B Checklists IPOP02-CH-0001-2 and IP0P02-CH-0001-8; The. performance of three surveillance tests was witnessed to ensure that?

Ethey-were performed correctly and the requirements of.TS were met. The~

, procedures that were witnessed and reviewed by the inspector included:-

OPSP10-0M-0001, " Rod Drop Time Measurement," Revision 2;

• .OPOP02-II-0001, " Moveable Incore Detector System Operation,"

Revision 3;--and 4 M .o :0 PSP 10-RC-0001~, " Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Flow Determination,"

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Procedure'0 PSP 10-DM-0001 was performed to demonstrate that individual shutdown and control rod drop times from the fully withdrawn positions were less than TS requirements. Procedure OPOP02-II-0001 was performed to-obtain data required'for core flux map analysis. Procedure OPSP10-RC-0001 wasjperformed to ensure that the RCS ' flow rate was within its' limit prior to plant operation above 75 percent reactor power, as required by TS:4.2.5.1. A review of the procedures was performed, test performance was witnessed, and no concerns were identifie The 11censee properly restored the Unit 1 systems to operable following

.the refueling outage.. This was confirmed, in part, by the inspectors

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'during;their system w'alkdowns. The. reactor refueling operation was verified to be within the design. analysis by the successful completion of-the core physics testin No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio , Balance of Plant Inspection (71500)

.An inspection of'a Unit 1 balance of plant system was performed to

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determine: (1) the adequacy of modifications made to the system; (2) the adequacy of the operating. procedure; and (3)-the effectiveness of preventive and corrective maintenance made to the system. The system inspected was the Open Loop Auxiliary Cooling System (OC system). The system provided cooling water to the steam generator feed water pump turbine lube oil coolers, turbine generator hydrogen coolers, mechanical

auxiliary building chillers, reactor containment building chillers, and-turbine lube oil coolers. The system was classified as nonsafety-relate The inspection consisted of an operating procedure review (1 POP 02-0C-0001,

'"Open Loop Auxiliary Cooling System," Revision 5) and a system walkdow A review of the maintenance history of the OC system pumps was also performed. Items found during the procedure review included:

Reference Step 2.2 listed the wrong system P&ID number. Vent Valves 1-0C-409 and -410 were listed twice in the Procedure Valve

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Lineup 1 POP 02-0C-0001-1. The location for Valve.1-0C-0017:was incorrect in thelva'1ve lineup. -Seve,11 seal water (LW)' system'

indicators were identified as OC system' indicators in the

Instrument Vent Checklist IPOP02-0C-0001- '

. Butterfly valves.were. drawn the.same on the system P&ID.; Valve positions were to'be designated by. acronyms, suchlas1"N0" for,norna11y-

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Lopen, on the P&ID. A total of 55 valves were shown without position ,

acronyms on-0C s' y stem P&ID-6T249F00033 No, 1, Revision 13. Norna11y '

' Shut Drain Valves 1-0C-359 and -360 were;shown,normally open on the

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system P&ID. Valve 1-0C-339 was a vent valve that was not shown as vent valve on the system P&IO. Vent Valves 1-0C-0358'and;-0356 were normally-shut' valves but-were shown as normally open on the syttem P&I Items noted during;the system walkdown included:

The identification tag for Valve 1-0C-0168 could not beirea The valve and: associated tag was located outdoors and the tag.had deteriorated due to exposure to the environment. Valve:1-0C-310 was missing its: identification tag.- Valve 1-0C-0368 was' identified as Valve 1-0C-363 'in . the plant. The tag for Valve 1-0C-PSV-6762 was-found on the floor in the vicinity of the valv Isolation ,

Valve =1-0C-0101 was noted to be missing its handwhee ,

The Procedure' Valve Lineup 1 POP 02-0C-0001-1 included instrumentfair supply valves to chiller flow valves. -The procedure did not provide- ~~7 valve numbers in the lineup (only the names-were used) although valve

. numbers.did exist. The procedure valve lineup should.have been updated'to include the new valve number ,

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The localoidentification labels:were noted to be reversed on the steam generator feedwater pump turbine-lube oil-coolers. Each~ 'l

"A" cooler was labeled "B," and each "B" cooler was labeled "A". j All components were found in the correct position to support system and plant operation. ' Additionally, despite the errors found, the system ,

operating procedure was noted to be better than average in-qualit !

During the recent Unit 1. refueling outage, corrective maintenance was performed on-the OC system. The work consisted of valveLreplacement-and piping rework (repair leakage). An incpection of the final results i'

was performed. The work was visually noted to be of acceptable qualit Some of.the work was performed under Work Packages No. 002840-EP-01 and 002839-EP401 One work 6Ettvity step in each package stated, " Tools, cords, equipment, etc. have been removed. Final area cleanup has been completed." These steps were signed off as complete; however, one temporary light and associated electrical cord and one rope sling were found installed in the vicinity of the work activit ,

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A review ~of the maintenance history of the system pumps was performe j Routine preventive maintenance was noted to be performed by the licensee 1 on:the pumps. During the system walkdown, Pumps L12 'and.13 were- operatin ~L , , The packing of.the two pumps was notedito be -leaking excessively; Algae-and corrosion was noted on and around all-three. pumps. However,;the:  ;

licensee was. aware of the problems and MWRs were noted=to be outstanding; i on the pumps to investigate:and correct the problem .,

o.; In conclusion, the modification,Lmaintenance, and operation of the open:

loop auxiliary cooling water system was determinedLto be of' acceptable . j qualit "

No' violations or deviations were -identified in this ' area -of: the inspectio . - ExitlInterview-The-inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted'in paragraph 1)

on June 29,'199 The inspectors summarized- the Escope and findings of the ,

inspection.- The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of= the' M-information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector .

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