IR 05000498/1998011
| ML20206U154 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206U150 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-98-11, 50-499-98-11, NUDOCS 9902120217 | |
| Download: ML20206U154 (18) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
' REGION IV Docket Nos.:
50-498 50-499
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License Nos.:
NPF-76 NPF-80 Report No.:
50-498/98-11 50-499/98-11 Licensee:
STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility:
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:
FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth j
Wadsworth, Texas 77483 i
Dates:
November 29,1998, through January 9,1999 Inspectors:
Cornelius F. O'Keefe, Senior Resident inspector Wayne C. Sifre, Resident inspector Gilbert L. Guerra, Resident inspector Approved By:
Joseph I. Tapia, Chief, Project Branch A ATTACHMENT:
SupplementalInformation -
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9902120217 990204 PDR ADOCK 05000498 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-498/98-11; 50-499/98-11 This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
Operations Unit 1 operators responded quickly to limit a reactor power increase caused by a
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a computer card failure that opened a steam generator power-operated relief
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valve (PORV). However, the problem recurred the following day because operators were too quick to declare the problem fixed and restore the system to operable status
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without a clear cause determination or sufficient time to demonstrate reliable performance (Section 01.1).
Unit 2 control room operators performed a Technical Specification required shut down of
the Unit 2 reactor. The S train safety injection actuation logic was declared inoperable when the solid state protection system logic train failed a surveillance test. Both the shutdown and subsequent restart the following day were observed to be performed in a controlled and deliberate manner (Section O1.1).
Unit 1 operators demonstrated a lack of understanding of inservice testing as it related
to equipment operability while responding to indications of degraded flow in the essential cooling water (ECW) screen wash subsystem. Contrary to Generic Letter 91-18, operators did not promptly evaluate system operability or obtain sufficient data to do so.
Corrective actions by maintenance personnel were unsuccessful, and the system was declared inoperable 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> later, but not backdated to the original test failure (Section 01.1).
An improper tagout restoration resulted in a maintenance preventable functional failure
I of Condensate Pump 13. Reviewers failed to recognize that the tagout for planned work on Condensate Pump 12 drained the pump but did not fill and vent it during restoration.
However, no violation of NRC requirements occurred. Operators responded appropriately by rapidly reducing power and avoiding a plant trip. The licensee's event
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investigation was detailed and thorough (Section O1.2).
I Maintenance The inspectors concluded that the licensee inappropriately responded to indications of
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degraded flow during an inservice test of Screen Wash Booster Pump 18. The surveillance program and test procedure inhibited operators from collecting a full set of data to make a determination of pump performance. Operators nonconservatively assumed it was a system problem rather than a pump problem. Following unsuccessful corrective actions, the operability of the pump was evaluated and the pump was declared inoperable 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> after the original test (Section M1.2).
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I Close maintenance and system engineering support was provided in response to test
failures in the solid state protection system in Unit 2. However, troubleshooting and analysis of the failure became confused and resulted in an unnecessary plant shutdown.
Inspectors determined that some expected results for test points were not provided in work documents (Section M4.1).
Enaineerina System engineering provided good support to operations during three emergent safety-
related equipment problems. However, engineering was not contacted when Screen Wash Booster Pump 1B was not producing sufficient flow during an inservice test. As a result, operators were unaware that the indications demonstrated that the system was inoperable until corrective maintenance efforts were unsuccessful (Section E2.1).
Plant Support Two announced fire brigade drills were observed which had good training value and met
fire protection program requirements. Fire brigade team members exhibited good knowledge and teamwork. Fire brigade equipment was available, in good condition, and correctly utilized. Very good self-critical critiques were conducted after each fire drill.
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and performance (Section F1.1).
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated throughout this inspection period at 100 percent power, except for a brief power
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. reduction on December 17 in response to an unplanned trip of Condensate Pump 13.
Unit 2 began this inspection period at 100 percent power. On December 28, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated to correct a problem with the solid state protection system. The plant was restarted on December 29 and reached 100 percent power the following day where it remained at the end of the inspection period.
1. Operations
Conduct of Operations O1.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to conduct frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations.- In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Specific comments and noteworthy events are discussed below.
The inspectors observed control room shift turnover activities and reviewed watch logs and turnover sheets. Operators consistently performed thorough shift turnovers which included detailed discussion of equipment status. Inspectors observed that this standard of performance was maintained through the holiday period. Periodic night orders to the operating shifts provided pertinent information about recent events and management expectations.
Unit 1 operators responded well to the qualified data processing system (ODPS)
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computer failure that caused Steam Generator PORV 18 to open, an isolated reactor head vent t'o open, and auxiliary feedwater flow indication to fail high. This occurred twice, on December 6 and 7. Operators took appropriate action to manually isolate the PORV and reduce power. The inspectors reviewed reactor power histories for the events and noted that power peaked at 101.2 and 100.7 percent, respectively, and that power was returned below 100 percent within 2 minutes in each case. The one hour power averages were at or below 100 percent.
The inspectors identified two instances where operators determined that safety-related equipment was operable based on inadequate or faulty information. In the first case, a portion of the ODPS computer in Unit 1 f ailed and caused actuations on December 6.
The problem cleared itself before the cause was identified. Maintenance personnel replaced the card that was considered most likely to have caused the problem and, despite being unable to replicate the problem, the affected systems were declared operable about 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the failure. Twenty-four hours after the first failure, the failure recurred. Maintenance and engineering personnel then promptly concluded that the first effort had not corrected the problem. Operators did not question when the system was first inoperable. Following the second event, maintenance personnel were able to replicate the problem by wiggling another card. A detailed investigation after the
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second failure, with vendor assistance, concluded that the only card that could have caused the observed problems was the card replaced after the second event.
The second example involved a failed inservice pump performance test. Operators incorrectly concluded that the Essential Cooling Water System Screen Wash Booster Pump 1B flow instrument was in error and requested maintenance assistance. The inspectors determined that, despite degraded system flow, the pump was considered by operators to be operable at that time without having sufficient pump performance data to demonstrate that the pump was not degraded. Following corrective actions, the pump was retested 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> later with the same results and was then declared inoperable.
The inspectors concluded that operators demonstrated a lack of understanding of the inservice test program and did not follow Generic Letter 91-18 in responding to
degraded flow during this test. This event is further discussed in Section M1.2.
On December 28,1998, Unit 2 control room operators performed an unplanned shutdown of the Unit 2 reactor to hot standby as required by Technical Specification 3.3.2, Action 14. The shift supervisor declared the S train safety injection actuation logic inoperable when the solid state protection system (SSPS) logic train failed a surveillance test. The inspectors observed the Unit 2 control room operators shut down the unit in accordance with Plant Operating Procedure OPOP03-ZG-0006, Revision 9," Plant Shutdown From 100% to Hot Standby." The shutdown was observed to be performed in a controlled and deliberate rnanner. The shutdown began at 4:25 p.m. and the unit was in hot standby at 7:16 p.m., satisfying the Technical Specification requirement. The equipment problem is further discussed in Section M4.1.
On December 29, the inspectors observed control room operators restart the Unit 2 reactor in accordance with Plant Operating Procedure OPOP03-ZG-0005, Revision 21,
" Plant Startup to 100%" Operator performance was very good throughout the evolution.
Reactivity manipulations were performed in a controlled manner. Engineering provided estimated critical position calculation verifications.
O1.2 Operator Response to Condensate Pumo 13 Trio a.
Insoection Scope (93702)
On December 17, Unit 1 operations and maintenance personnel were restoring condensate Pump 12 to service following motor refurbishment when Condensate Pump 13 tripped. The inspectors observed the control room operators' response to the loss of one condensate pump with a second condensate pump out of service and reviewed the results of the licensee's root cause investigation and corrective actions.
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Observations and Findinas At full power, each unit requires two of the three condensate pumps to be in operation.
Unit 1 started this event with Condensate Pump 12 tagged out of service and drained, with the remaining two pumps in service. A nonlicensed operator was assigned to restore Condensate Pump 12. When the suction valve was opened, condenser vacuum drew the large volume of air in the pump casing into the suction header. It then entered I
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In response to the pump trip, control room operators immediately began reducing power. Concurrently, plant operators determined the cause of the pump trip and ascertained that it could be safely restarted. Condensate Pump 13 was promptly
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restored and the power reduction was stopped at 77 percent power.
Inspectors observed that control room operators' performance was good. Repeat back communication was evident both within the control room and by radio with plant operators in the field. The unit supervisor effectively directed appropriate response actions, and the shift supervisor provided oversight and maintained command and control.
The inspectors reviewed Condition Report 98-20210 and the associated event investigation. The licensee determined that the cause of the pump trip was improper restoration of Condensate Pump 12. Reviewers failed to recognize that the tagout required draining the pump, but the restoration steps did not include filling and venting.
Licensee engineers determined that the Condensate Pump 13 trip was a maintenance preventable functional failure.
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Conclusions An improper tagout restoration resulted in a maintenance preventable functional failure of Condensate Pump 13. Reviewers failed to recognize that the tagout for planned work on Condensate Pump 12 drained the pump but did not fill and vent it during restoration.
However, no violation of NRC requirements occurred. Operators responded appropriately by rapidly reducing power and avoiding a plant trip. The licensee's event investigation was detailed and thorough.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Enoineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdowns a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to walk down accessible portions of the following ESF systems:
Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) 12 and support systems (Unit 1)
SDG 22 and support systems (Unit 2)
Essential cooling water system (Unit 1)
Auxiliary feedwater system, Trains A, B, and C (Unit 2)
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Safety injection system (Units 1 and 2)
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Observations and Findinas Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptable in all cases. The inspectors verified that the systems were properly aligned for the existing mode of operation. The inspectors conducted daily control board walkdowns to verify that ESF systems were aligned as required by Technical Specification for the existing operating mode, that instrumentation was operating correctly, and that power was available. The inspectors noted that both units were well maintained, with few existing
control room equipment deficiencies.
The inspectors identified that the discharge drain valve for the High Head Safety l
Injection Pump 1C had a small leak that was creating a small area of contamination.
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This deficiency was reported to the licensee. The leak was promptly contained, and the valve leak was entered into the maintenance program. The inspectors identified no other substantive concerns as a result of these inspections.
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II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance
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M1.1 Maintenance and Surveillance Observations a.
Inspection Scope (62707. 61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance and surveillance activities. For surveillance tests, the procedures were reviewed and compared to the Technical Specification surveillance requirements and bases to ensure the procedures satisfied the requirements. Maintenance work wac reviewed to ensure adequate work instructions were provided, the work performe" vs within the scope of the authorized work, and the work performed was adequately documented. In all cases, the impact to equipment operability and applicable Technical Specifications actions were independently verified.
Surveillances observed:
j OPSP10-ZG-0004,"End of Core Life Moderator Temperature Coefficient Test"
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(Unit 1)
OPSP03-SP-0006R, " Train R Reactor Trip Breaker Trip Actuation Device
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Operability Test" (Unit 2)
OPSP03-MS-0001," Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Testing"(Unit 2)
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l-5-Maintenance activities observed:
j SDG 12 relay replacement (Unit 1)
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SDG 21 potential transformer replacement (Unit 2)
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SSPS actuation logic train S troubleshooting and repair (Unit 2)
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed that the work performed during these activities was professional and thorough. Work observed was performed within the scope of the work package. Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks.
Supervisory oversight was evident, and engineering personnel frequently were observed participating in and observing tests.
The Unit 1 end of core life moderator temperature coefficient test conducted on December 16 involw.i measuring reactor reactivity response to coolant temperature
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changes. This evolution was thoroughly briefed and carefully run. The results were ciose to expected values. The inspectors verified that power was maintained below 100 percent. Calorimetric calibrations of nuclear instruments were performed a number of times during the test. Reactor engineers coordinated the test and provided good support to operators.
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The ODPS computer failed on December 6, causing actuations of safety equipment.
The problem cleared itself before the cause was identified. Maintenance and engineering personnel analytically determined which card was most likely to have caused the problem and replaced it. The system was declared operable within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> of the failure, despite being unable to replicate the problem. Twenty-four hours after the
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first failure, the failure recurred. Maintenance personnel were able to replicate the problem by wiggling another card. This bad card was replaced. A detailed investigation after the second failure, with vendor assistance, concluded that the only card that could have caused the observed problems was the card replaced after the second event. The inspectors discussed the failure response with personnel involved and concluded that the licensee was hasty in concluding that the intermittent problem was corrected without having more evidence of the cause of the failure or more operating time to demonstrate a reasonable assurance that the equipment would perform as intended. The expectation that the equipment was operable was based on an analytical failure determination that turned out to be in error. The licensee declared the equipment operable just 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> into a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Technical Specification action statement.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that maintenance activities were thorough and well conducted. Inspectors noted that a plant computer was prematurely declared operable based on a faulty analytical failure analysis and repair without clear evidence that the failure was corrected.
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Insoection Scope (62707. 71707. 37551)
On December 9, Screen Wash Booster Pump 1B was performance tested but was unable to produce sufficient flow for the test. The pump was not evaluated for operability until 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> later, following unsuccessful corrective actions. The issue was I
discussed with licensee plant managers, operation managers, shift supervisors, system engineering and Section XI personnel, and licensing personnel. The inspectors reviewed the surveillance test results and the following supporting documentation.
OPSP03-EW-0018," Essential Cooling Water System Train B Testing"
OPGP03-ZE-0022," Inservice Testing Program for Pumps"
NUREG 1482," Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants"
Conduct of Operations, Equipment Operability Guidelines
Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1, "Information to Licensees Regarding NRC
inspection Manual Section on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions" Generic Letter 89-04," Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Test
Programs" Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.2.1.2, " Essential Cooling Water
System" b.
Observations and Findinas Traveling screens are provided upstream of each essential cooling water (ECW) pump to minimize debris entering the ECW system. Screen wash booster pumps provide water to wash each traveling water screen. The ECW system provides cooling water to associated emergency diesel generators.
On December 9, the licensee performed Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP03-EW-0018. " Essential Cooling Water System Train B Testing."
Section 5.7 performed inservice testing of the screen wash booster pump. When operators were unable to establish sufficient flow to complete the test, the surveillance was stopped at 1:30 a.m. The shift supervisor nonconservatively concluded that there was no reason to consider that the pump was degraded and requested that maintenance personnelinvestigate the system.
The shift supervisor's conclusion was based on a lack of evidence of abnormal pump performance. However, the inspectors identified that the surveillance procedure and the surveillance program prevented collecting the necessary data to determine if the problem was in the pump or elsewhere in the system. Each surveillance test step was
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Generic Letter 91-18 states:
Recalibrating test instruments and then repeating pump or valve tests is an acceptable alternative to the corrective action of repair or replacement, but is not an action that can be taken before declaring the pump or valve inoperable. However, if during a test it is obvious that a test instrument is malfunctioning, the test may be halted and the instruments recalibrated or replaced. During a test, anomalous data with no clear indication of the cause must be attributed to the pump or valve under test. For this occurrence, a prompt determination of operability is appropriate with follow-on corrective action as necessary.
The inspectors concluded that a prompt operability evaluation should have been made following the first test, since the test instrument was behaving normally but indicating a value lower than required for the system. This was indicative of actual flow degradation, which should have been attributed to the pump until proven otherwise.
After replacing the flow gage, endalling an additional test gage, and cleaning the screen wash nozzles, the tes'. was mperformed with similar results. The ECW system was then declared inoperable Et 6.30 p.m.
The inspectors questioned why the system was not considered inoperable as of 1:30 a.m. During discussions with licensee personnel and through reviews of operability procedures, the inspectors determined that operators were not familiar with inservice testing failure requirements specified in Generic Letter 91-18 and 89-04. These requirements were correctly incorporated in the licensee's surveillance program, but were not understood by the operators.
Additionally, the inspectors identified that the licensee's program specified that Technical Specification action allowed outage times start at the time that the shift supervisor concluded that the limiting condition for operation was not met. This policy was considered to be inconsistent with Generic Letter 91-18, which specified that the time the system became inoperable must be considered. In this example, when the licensee concluded that the system was inoperable, the time of discovery was clearly the time of the first test failure.
In response to inspectors' questioning of the time of discovery, the licensee evaluated whether the screen wash booster pump was required to support operability of the diesel generator cooled by that train of ECW. This was because the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action for an inoperable diesel generator had not been performed until after the second failure.
Condition Report Engineering Evaluation 98-19724-3 cited Generic Letter 91-18 as permitting the use of judgement in evaluating whether the support function was required under the existing conditions. Since there was no debris in the cooling reservoir and none was expected, the screen wash function was not required and the diesel could be
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considered operable. The inspectors pointed out that this evaluation was open ended
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and included no provision to verify that no debris was present or expected. Without some limitation, the judgement amounted to changing the system design basis. The licensee agreed and planned to revise the evaluation. Nevertheless, the inspectors
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was not affected was reasonable, and thus no violation occurred.
The licensee subsequently determined that the cause of flow degradation was clogging of the spray nozzles. While this meant that the pump was not degraded, the system was rendered inoperable by the reduced flow rate.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that control room operators inappropriately responded to q
f indications of degraded flow during an inservice test of Screen Wash Booster Pump 1B.
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The survei;;ance program and test procedure inhibited operators from collecting a full set of data to make a determination of pump performance. Operators nonconservatively assumed it was a system problem rather than a pump problem. Following unsuccessful corrective actions, the operability of the pump was evaluated and the pump was declared inoperable 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> after the original test. The inspectors determined that operators did not have a thorough understanding of inservice testing as it related to equipment operability.
M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance M4.1. Solid State Protection System Failure a.
Inspection Scope (6270_Z)
On December 26, the SSPS failed Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP03-SP-0006S, Revision 9," Train S Reactor Trip Breaker TADOT." The failure was analytically determined to be in the test circuit, so system operability should not have been affected.
The inspectors observed the licensee's response to the failure, including troubleshooting. The inspectors discussed indications and failure modes with the system engineer.
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Observations and Findinas l
Following the test failure, the system engineer was contacted at home. He concluded that the test circuit had failed, and system operability was unaffected. Condition Report 98-20362 was written to address the failed test circuit card.
On December 28 the inspectors observed instrumentation and controls technicians replace the failed test circuit card in accordance with Work Order 98 20362-1. The technicians were accompanied by the system engineer and their supervisor who 1.
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provided direct oversight. Technicians confirmed that the failure was in the test card and replaced it. The inspectors reviewed the work package and noted that some expected values for test points were not provided in the work document.
Plant Surveilliance Procedure OPSP03-SP-0005S, Revision 9, "SSPS Logic Train S Functional Test," was performed as a postmaintenance test, a different test than was originally failed. The Phase A safety injection automatic actuation logic portion of the test failed, which was thought to be a different indication than the original failure. Based on these indications and discussions with the system engineer, the system was declared inoperable. Action 14 of Technical Specification 3.3.2 allowed no out of service time, so the plant was promptly shut down.
Instrumentation and controls technicians replaced the safeguards output driver card and reperformed the postmaintenance test. The test failed again. Subsequently, the technicians replaced the test card and clock counter card and satisfactorily completed Plant Surveillance Procedures OPSP03-SP-0005S and OPSP03-SP-0006S. Failure
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analysis of the removed cards revealed that the only failed cards were the two test circuit cards, which did not affect system operablility.
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Conclusions
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Close maintenance and system engineering support was provided in response to test failures in the solid state protection system in Unit 2. However, troubleshooting and analysis of the failure became confused and resulted in an unnecessary plant shutdown.
Inspectors determined that some expected results for test points were not provided in work documents.
I 111. Enaineerina E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 Enaineerina Support of Ooerability Questions a.
Insoection Scope (37551. 62707. 71707)
The inspectors observed engineering support during several emergent problems with safety-related equipment. The indications and causes of the problems, corrective actions, and past performance histories were discussed with operations and engineering personnel. Maintenance and corrective action documents were also reviewed.
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Observations and Findinas Main St.eam Safety Valve Testing System and performance engineering personnel were observed fully supporting special setpoint testing and evaluation of selected main steam safety valves. The licensee had a small population of valves with a history of excessive time-dependent setpoint drif t.
The five problem valves in Unit 2 were refurbished during the October 1998 refueling
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-10-outage. Engineering had planned to demonstrate that the setpoints were no longer
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changing over time by testing two valves after about 60 days of service time, two more valves after 120 days of service, and the remaining valve during the next refueling outage. However, when the first two valves demonstrated setpoint drift on December 15, all of the affected valves were tested. One valve was found to be outside the required 3 percent tolerance, and all five Unit 2 refurbished valves initially lifted more than 1 percent high. Following initial lift, all but one of the valves lifted within the required 1 percent tolerance and required no setpoint adjustment. The valve that was found to be outside the required tolerance was reported to the NRC Operations Center per License Condition 2G and in Revision 2 to Licensee Event Report 50-498;499/97009. Engineering planned to identify new corrective actions for the problem valves.
. Screen Wash Booster Pump 1B inservice Testing As discussed in Section M1.2, the 1B screen wash booster pump did not develop the required flow during inservice testing. However, engineering was not contacted to help evaluate the indications and the operability of the system. As a result, the system was declared inoperable 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> after the information was available, indicating the pump was not providing the minimum required flow.
ESF Diesel Generator 22 Trouble Alarm On December 1, the ESF Diesel Generator 22 control circuit indicated intermittent trouble. System engineering and maintenance personnel provided prompt support in analyzing potential causes. The problem was analytically determined to be in the nonemergency part of the circuit, and thus did not have any impact on system operability. The diesel engine was then successfully started in the emergency mode to demonstrate operability. The problem did not recur, and troubleshooting and part replacement was performed on December 6, when the work schedule permitted. This work confirmed that the analytical results had correctly identified the bad optical isolator card.
ESF Diesel Generator 21 Potential transformer Replacement
l On January 3, the Unit 2 shift supervisor stopped a 24-hour surveillance test of ESF Diesel Generator 21 when a voltage imbalance alarm was received at the local control panel. The shift supervisor contacted the system engineer and determined that the alarm was attributed to a failed potential transformer. The inspector observed portions of the transformer replacement and discussed the event with the system engineer. The system engineer determined through an extensive review of system drawings and discussions'with the vendor that the potential transformer only provided alarms and indications and did not affect the diesel generator operation in the emergency mode. As
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a result, the system engineer concluded that, although the diesel was rendered inoperable, the failure was not a Maintenance Rule functional failure because it would
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operability determination for ESF Diesel Generator 21.
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Conclusions l
l System engineering provided good support to operations during three emergent safety-
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related equipment problems. However, engineering was not contacted when Screen Wash Booster Pump 1B was not producing sufficient flow during an inservice test. As a j
result, operators were unaware that the indications demonstrated that the system was inoperable until corrective maintenance efforts were unsuccessful.
IV. Plant Support i
F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities F1.1 Fire Briaade Drills a.
Insoection Scoce (71750)
j The inspectors observed two announced fire brigade drills. Drill performance records and implementing procedures were reviewed. Discussions were held with fire protection
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department personnel and managers, b.
Observations and Findinas j
Good fire brigade drills were conducted meeting fire protection program requirements.
Plant General Procedure OPGP03-ZF-0002, Revision 4, " Fire Brigade Dills," governed i
planning, conduct, evaluation, and documentation of drills as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. The inspectors reviewed fire drill records and determined that the required drills had been conducted during 1998.
Fire brigade team members were well trained and knowledgeable. The licensee had made a substantial improvement in their firefighting training by sending teams to special firefighting school facilities. Familiarization training at the site was conducted at least annually with local fire departments. Additionally, offsite fire departments were simulated by site personnel during some fire brigade drills to improve realism.
The inspectors observed that the fire brigade was abundantly supplied with modern equipment. Fire brigade members demonstrated good familiarity with the purpose and use of their equipment. Good fire response plans for each fire zone were readily available to the fire brigade and control room personnel and contained an area schematic and usefulinformation for fire response.
The inspectors observed the December 15 drill simulating a fire in Electrical Bus 1L.
The fire detection system was used to give a realistic alarm, but other simulations were limited to verbal cues and written signs. Operators did not recognize cabinet fasteners
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needed to be removed, but the controller allowed the fire team to simulate opening the cabinet anyway. The fire brigade leader was very knowledgeable and did a good job controlling response and keeping the control room informed. The overhaul team did a l
good job looking in other cubicles for fire and damage.
The inspectors observed an announced fire drill simulated in the Unit 1 Technical Support Center document room on December 30. The fire detection system was used to alert operators of the simulated fire. The fire brigade response was good. As a matter of practice, the fire brigade team attached an extra length of hose to the existing fire hose nearest the fire without calculating the length of the hose, resulting in a hose that was too long. This made the response slow and awkward. The simulated fire was extinguished and inspections of adjacent areas were conducted.
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Very good self-critical performance critiques were conducted after each fire drill.
Participation was noted by all fire drill responders, evaluators, and observers in l
discussing the drill, fire fighting techniques, and problems encountered.
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Conclusions Two announced fire brigade drills were observed which had good training value and met fire protection program requirements. Fire brigade team members exhibited good knowledge and teamwork. Fire brigade equipment was available, in good condition, and correctly utilized. Very good self-critical critiques were conducted after each fire drill.
j Substantial offsite fire team training was effective in improving fire brigade knowledge and performance.
F1.2 Fire Protection Systems Testina
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Inspection Scope (71750. 61726)
The inspectors inspected and reviewed the following fire protection systems tests.
Unit 2 Standby Transformer Deluge Water Spray Actuation and Reset
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Diesel Fire Pump Test
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b.
Observations and Findinas A deluge system test was conducted on the Unit 2 standby transformer in accordance with Plant Technical Procedure OPTP03-FP-0030, " Transformer Deluge Water Spray Actuation Verification and Valve Reset," Revision 4. The standby transformer was deenergized prior to the deluge system test. During the actuation test, two spray nozzles were observed to have less flow than the adjacent spray nozzles. The spray nozzles were promptly replaced. Otherwise, the system performed as expected. The licensee used the test as an opportunity to conduct informal training and demonstration for operators of the system.
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i-13-On December 18, the inspectors observed weekly testing of the diesel driven fire pumps in accordance with Plant Operating Procedure OPOP07-FP-0001. Testing was performed in accordance with the test procedure and satisfied the requirements for weekly testing contained in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The inspectors walked down the system and observed that the system was in good material condition.
c.
Conclusions The observed fire protection systems tests were adequately conducted.
V. Manaaement Meetinos X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on January 12,1999. Management personnel acknowledged the findings presented. The inspector asked whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION L
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED J
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l Licensee P. Arrington, Nuclear Assurance and Licensing J. Calvert, Manager, Operations Training
.W. Dowdy, Manager, Plant Operations Unit 2 R. Fast, Manager, Unit 1 Maintenance J. Groth, Vice President, Nuclear Generation E. Halpin, Manager, Unit 2 Maintenance S. Head, Supervisor Nuclear Assurance and Licensing J. Johnson, Manager, Engineering Quality T. Jordan, Manager, Systems Engineering A. Kent, Manager, Electrical / Instrumentation and Controls, System Engineering M. Lashley, Manager, Reliability Engineering
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D. Leazar, Director, Nuclear Fuel and Analysis R. Lovell, Manager, Generation Support F. Mangan, Vice President, Plant Services R. Masse, Plant Manager, Unit 2 B. Mookhoek, Nuclear Assurance and Licensing G. Parkey, Plant Manager, Unit 1 G. Powell, Manager, Health Physics NRC J. Coliccino, Mechanical Engineering Branch, NRR L. Ellershaw, Division of Reactor Safety, RIV J. Luehman - Technical Specification Branch, NRR lNSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP 62707:
Maintenance Observation IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support IP 92700:
Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor
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Facilities IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance
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IP 92903:
Followup - Engineering IP 93702:
Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors
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2-ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Opened
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None.
Closed
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Discussed 50-498;499/97009 LER.
Excessive Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Drift (Section E2.1)
i LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
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CFR Code of Federal Regulations ECW essential cooling water ESF engineered safety features LER licensee event report NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC PORV
. power-operated relief valve ODPS qualified data processing system SDG Standby Diesel Generator SSPS Solid State Protection System
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TADOT Trip Actuation Device Operability Test
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