IR 05000498/1998010
| ML20198K790 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198K784 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-98-10, 50-499-98-10, NUDOCS 9812310164 | |
| Download: ML20198K790 (16) | |
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ENCLOSURE 1 l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .
H REGION IV Docket Nos.: 50-498 l
50-499 License Nos.: N.F.-76 N.F.-80
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Report No.: 50-498/98-10 50-499/98-10 Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 l Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Dates: October 18 through November 28,1998 l Inspectors: Neil F. O'Keefe, Senior Resident inspector )
Wayne C. Sifre, Resident Inspector l
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Gilbert L. Guerra, Resident inspector Ron Kopriva, Senior Project Engineer Mike Runyan, Reactor inspector Approved By: Joseph I. Tapia, Chief, Project Branch A l
i ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information l
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l- l 9812310164 981222 I PDR ADOCK 05000498 G PDR
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. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-498/98-10; 50-499/98-10 l
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection, supplemented by a regional projects inspector and a regional engineering inspecto Operations
- - Unit 1 operators attempted to start the motor for Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Pump 1 A with the pump uncoupled during maintenance, but failed to recognize that the low discharge flow interlock could not be satisfied. The motor tripped promptly after starting. Despite the motor trip and 2.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> delay during a limiting condition for operation, operators did not document the event in the corrective action program (Section 01.1).
- Unit 2 operators performed well while starting up from the sixth refueling outage and during the downpower for Forced Outage 98-02. Equipment operations were well briefed and effectively coordinated. These major evolutions were conducted without incident in a professional manner (Sections 01.2 and O1.3).
Maintenance
- Inspectors identified a declining trend in the quality of work instructions. This was based on four examples where maintenance instructions did not adequately support the i
associated work activities, which included two minor violations of 10 CFR Part 50, l Appendix B, Criterion V (Section M1.1).
- Six weeks after a Unit 2 trip due to a maintenance error, the inspectors identified that the event had not been analyzed under the maintenance rule. The system engineer had inappropriately concluded that the problem was not within the maintenance rule scope.
l The problem was subsequently determined to be a maintenance preventable functional failure. Additionally, the inspectors identified that the licensee's corrective action process and maintenance rule program were not closely married to ensure that actions were assigned at an early stage to perform a maintenance rule analysis of applicable problems. The maintenance rule applicability assessment process was not a high station priority, and was not completely formalized in the maintenance rule program. No violation occurred in this instance. This maintenance preventable functional failure did
- not impact the maintenance rule categorization of this (a)(1) system (Section M2.1).
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- Upon identification of a small reactor coolant system instrument line leak in Unit 2, the
[ licensee promptly planned a forced outage in detail. The prompt decision to conduct an
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outage was appropriately based on the location and potential for degradation. During
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the brief outage, the licensee made a number of repairs that improved the material
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l condition of balance of plant equipment in addition to the leak repair. The maintenance organization was able to correct several emergent equipment problems as well (Section M2.2).'
i * Inspectors conducted a detailed Unit 2 containment closecut inspection at the end of the sixth refueling outage. Equipment important to safety was determined to be in good physical condition. Housekeeping was restored to an excellent level, with no significant
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foreign material identified. Equipment stored in the containment during plant operation
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was properly secured (Section M2.3).
- Enforcement discretion was granted in accordance with Enforcement Policy
- Section Vll.C to permit sufficient time for the licensee to install / remove blank flanges in i
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the Unit 1 fuel handling building ventilation system following the identification of a grounded exhaust booster fan motor. Corrective actions for a similar problem in May 1998 were considered appropriate and timely, but were not yet implemented. No violation occurred as a result of this event. (Section M2.4)
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Operators failed to perform required quarterly surveillance testing on the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump in conjunction with monthly testing. Upon discovery, the pump was successfully tested. A noncited violation was issued (Section M8.2).
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- Engineering provided excellent support during preparation for and completion of the Unit 2 Forced Outage 98-02. Engineering helped interpret a declining reactor coolant loop flow indication as an instrument line leak. An onerability assessment was promptly performed for the affected instrumentation. An engineering evaluation for use of a freeze seal to isolate the work area as a contingency was completed in a timely manne Repair options were well coordinated with maintenance personnel (Section M2.2).
Plant Support a Good radiation protection support was provided during the Unit 2 forced outage which included thorough radiation surveys and a very good prejob safety brief. Radiation workers were inquisitive during the radiation safety brief and demonstrated effective as low as reasonably achievable practices by conducting as much of the reactor coolant system instrument line repair outside containment ns practical (Section R1.1).
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Summarv o'f Plant Status Unit 1 operated throughout the inspection period at 100 percent powe Unit 2 began the inspection oeriod in its sixth refueling outage. The reactor was started up on October 23, and achieved full power on October 28. The generator was taken off the line for a brief forced outage to repair a reactor coolant system instrument line leak on November 21 and was returned to full power on November 2 I 1. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 0 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to conduct frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Specific comments and noteworthy events are discussed belo While reviewing the Unit 1 control room log, the inspectors identified that on November 3, operators unsuccessfully attempted to start the motor for RHR Pump 1 A with the pump disconnected. Operators failed to recognize that with the pump disconnected, the low discharge flow interlock would not be satisfied. As a result, the motor tripped shortly after starting. The inspectors noted that, contrary to management expectations, this knowledge deficiency was not documented or addressed by the licensee at the close of the inspection perio On November 9, the pressure boundary to the Unit 1 main turbine generator breaker was inadvertently breached, causing a loss of breaker operating air pressure for a period of time. This removed the ability to operate the main generator breaker, The operators responded well to the event, transferring electrical loads from the auxiliary bus to the standby buse On November 19, Unit 2 operators afertly identified a slowly declining trend in Loop B reactor coolant system flow rate indication. With engineering assistance, they were able to identify that a leak had developed in the instrument lin .2 Unit 2 Startuo from Refuelina Outaae 2RE06 (71707)
On October 24 the inspectors observed control room operators conduct a reactor startup and place the Unit 2 main generator on line. The shift supervisor conducted a thorough pre-evolution briefing in the control room with operators, engineers,
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i maintenance personnel, and the operations manager. Operating experience, potential l , problems, and contingency actions were discussed. Reactivity manipulations and reactor physics testing were carefully controlled and closely supervised. Excellent support was provided by reactor engineer Main turbine roll up was performed without incident. However, the main generator j synchronization was delayed when the syncroscope failed. Electricians and I instrumentation and controls technicians promptly troubleshot and replaced blown fuse I No further anomalies were identified. Operators resumed restart activities and the main 1 circuit breaker was closed without inciden I O1.3 Operator Performance Observations Durina Unit 2 Forced Outaae 2F9802 (71707)
l The inspectors observed Unit 2 control room operations during power reduction, outage work, and power ascension for Forced Outage 98-02. Despite the short preparation time for this outage, the operators performed refresher training for critical operations in
! the simulator prior to reducing power. The inspectors observed that operators functioned as a coordinated team throughout the evolution. Additionally, control room l operators identified that a postmaintenance test planned for the Feedwater Regulating l Valve 2A could not be performed, as written. The test was subsequently modified to .
l permit performance with the existing plant conditions. The evolution was performed smoothly without incident.
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02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment J l
O Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707)
The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to walk down accessible portions of the following engineered safety feature systems:
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! = Component cooling water system (Unit 1)
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= Essential cooling water system (units 1 and 2)
= Essential chilled water system (Units 1 and 2)
- Train B 125V DC system (unit 2)
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= Fuel handling building ventilation system (Unit 1)
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Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were good in all case The inspectors identified no substantive concerns as a result of these inspections.
! In addition, the inspectors completed a semiannual detailed inspection of the component i cooling water system. This system was considered to be in good health in the latest system health report. The outstanding maintenance pending for the system involved
, only minor issues that did not affect the saf ety performance of the system, although the i
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inspectors noted that several items were nearly 3 years old. The inspector's walkdowns of the system verified that the system configuration matched both system drawings and j operating procedures, and that the system was configured and operated as described in the _ Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. A number of minor discrepancies were discussed with the system engineer. The inspectors concluded that the component cooling water system was in good material condition, was properly aligned, and capable )
of performing its intended safety function ,
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11. Maintenance l~
M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Maintenance and Surveillance Observations Inspection Scope (62707. 61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance and surveillance i activities. For surveillance tests, the procedures were reviewed and compared to the
! Technical Specification surveillance requirements and bases to ensure that the
, procedures satisfied the requirements. Maintenance work was reviewed to ensure that l adequate work instructions were provided, that the work performed was within the scope
- of the authorized work, and that the work performed was adequately documented. In all
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cases, the impact to equipment operability and applicable Technical Specifications actions were independently verified.
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Surveillances observed:
l- * OPSP03-SP-0006R, Revision 7," Train R Reactor Trip Breaker Trip Actuation Device Operability Test"(Unit 1)
- OPSP03-SP-0023, Revision 6,"Feedwater isolation Actuation and Response Time Test" (Unit 2)
l Maintenance activities observed:
- Cell 34 Replacement on Vital Battery E2B11 (Unit 2) ,
- Troubleshooting of Vital AC Inverter DP-002 (Unit 2) !
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- Repair of transformer on Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Turbine 23 (Unit 2)
- ' Calibration of Feedwater Regulating Valve 2A (Unit 2)
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' Observations and Findinas:
. Battery Cell Replacement
The inspectors observed the removal of a jumper on Cell 34 of Battery E2B11. Cell 34 l l was jumpered out under Temporary Modification T2-98-16568-11 after this cell had ;
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failed to meet surveillance requirements. This cell was sent to the manufacturer for a i failure analysis. A new cell was installed in the Cell 34 position and was reinserted into )
l the battery string during this activity. The licensee entered a 2-hour shutdown limiting l l
condition for operation after opening the battery breaker and the limiting condition for l
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l operation was cleared within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The inspectors observed good safety, l administrative, and technical practices during this evolution. The licensee held a i comprehensive prework brief in the control room and had developed appropriate contingency plans in the event the new cell failed to pass the prescribed postmaintenance test The inspectors walked down the ternporary modification after it was installed. The modification included hanging tags on the associated battery chargers with notes indicating the new acceptable charger output voltage range while a cell was jumpere The inspectors noted that the upper limit conflicted with the acceptance criteria specified in weekly battery Surveillance Procedure OPSP06-DJ-0001, Revision Reactor Trip Breaker Actuation Testing l During the Train R reactor trip breaker actuation test in Unit 1, licensed operators identified numerous errors in the procedure, including wrong train and wrong cabinet references. The operators stopped the test, corrected the procedure, and satisfactorily I completed the surveillance test. Subsequently, two condition reports were written j (98-18095,98-18091), one to correct the procedure and the other to document the l event as a "near miss." The inspectors discussed the procedure with the operators and determined that, if they had performed the test procedure as written, it would have resulted in a reactor trip. The inspector concluded that a questioning attitude and good operator performance compensated for an inadequate procedure and prevented an unnecessary plant transient. The inspectors considered Plant Surveillance i Procedure OPSP03-SP-0006R to be an example of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures and Drawings," in that these procedures were inappropriate to the circumstances under which an activity affecting quality was performed. This issue constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement actio Residual Heat Removal Motor Trip During Maintenance l On November 3, during the 10-year inspection of the RHR Pump 1 A motor, operators were requested to run the motor with the pump uncoupled. This was specified in Work l Order 389522 which was written to perform a number of postmaintenance check When operators attempted to start the motor, it promptly tripped. Upon review, the
- operators concluded that with the pump disconnected, the low discharge flow interlock l
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j could not be satisfied and the motor tripped as designed. After 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> of delay,
! operators started the motor from the remote shutdown panel. By doing this, the
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interlock was not part of the circuit being used and the motor was successfully run.
i The inspectors reviewed the work order and associated maintenance procedures. In a discussion with the Unit 1 electrical maintenance manager, the inspectors identified that this was the first time a 10-year inspection of an RHR motor had been performed. The inspectors noted that Plant Maintenance Procedure OPMP05-RH-0001, Revision 3,
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" Residual Heat Removal Motor inspection," did not contain specific instructions or l precautions to jumper or otherwise circumvent the low flow interlock. Additionally, the
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inspectors identified that the licensee did not document the problem or initiate corrective I actions by the close of the inspection period. The inspectors considered I
- OPMP05-RH-0001 and Work Order 389522 to be an example of a violation of j
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10 CFR Pad 50, Appendix B, Criterion V," Instructions, Procedures and Drawings,"in ;
that these procedures were inappropriate to the circumstances under which an activity 1 l affecting quality was performed. This issue constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action.
l Inadvertent Breach of Pressure Boundary to Main Turbine Generator Breaker l
On November 9, maintenance personnel were working to locate an electrical ground on ,
i the Unit 1 main turbine generator breaker. During this work, a pressure boundary seal l l was breached on the breaker cooling fan and pressurized breaker operating air was released. The loss of operating air pressure removed the ability to operate the breaker.
, inspectors determined that the cognizant engineer was not consulted in preparing for the work. The inspectors determined that the work instructions and documentation l provided were insufficient to determine the pressure boundary for the component being disassemble Conclusions Inspecto t identified a declining trend in the quality of work instructions. This was based
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on four examples where maintenance instructions did not adequately support the I
associated work activities, which included two minor violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
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M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
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M2.1 Maintenance Rule Evaluation issues (62707)
Six weeks after a Unit 2 trip due to a maintenance error that caused a loss of feed flow, the inspectors questioned whether the event had been analyzed under the maintenance rule. The maintenance rule coordinator stated that the problem should be considered a
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maintenance preventable functional failure, but had not yet been assessed. The
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licensee then identified that the syste n engineer had reviewed work documents
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associated with the event and inappropriately concluded that the problem was not within
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the scope of the maintenance rule. This was because the work was intended to impact i
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the startup feedwater regulating valve, but had inadvertently also affected the normal l feedwater regulating valve. The startup feedwater regulating valve was not within the i scope of the maintenance, while the normal feedwater regulating valve was within the j
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scop The inspectors identified that the licensee's corrective action process and maintenance l rule program were not closely married to ensure that actions were assigned at an early ;
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maintenance rule assessments were performed during routine equipment history reviews. If this assessment indicated that a maintenance preventable functional failure )
- occurred, it was then entered into an existing corrective action document. As a backup,
! the maintenance rule coordinator informally screened the corrective action reports for potential maintenance rule issues for discussion at the next expert panel meeting, normally held monthly. This process was not a documented part of the program, and l had not identified the above issue because the October expert panel meeting had not
- been held since a plant outage was in progress. Although it was difficult to distinguish l between an issue that had not yet been assessed under the maintenance rule and an l'
issue that had been missed, this wr not a violation since the maintenance preventable l functional failure did not impaw r F.;aintenanca rule categorization of this (a)(1)
l syste The licensee's processes may hava appropriately categorized this issue within the
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maintenance rule; however, the screening process is not a high priority, is not l formalized, and is not closely tied to the corrective actions process.
l M2.2 Unit 2 Forced Outaae Observations
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' Inspection Scope (62707. 37551)
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! The inspectors observed the licensee's response to identification of a small reactor l
coolant system instrument line leak. Preparations for a forced outage and the repair l effort were observed. The inspectors also observed some work activities and control room activities associated with taking Unit 2 off line and returning to full power.
! Observations and Findinas On November 19, Unit 2 operators identified a declining trend in indicated flow rate for Loop B of the reactor coolant system. System engineering personnel were able to analyze data from the new integrated computer system and determine that a small instrument line leak had developed and was degrading. The analysis was able to localize the leak location, which significantly reduced the dose expended to walk down the system at power and assess the leak. A prompt operability assessment was performed for the affected instrumentatio i The licensee appropriately concluded that the leak affected important indications and I
! was slowly degrading, and a forced outage was planned for the following weekend. The
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inspectors observed that the outage schedule and work scope were planned in a l coordinated and detailed manner, including planning for foreseeable contingency
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-10-actions. The latter preparations included the performance of an engineering evaluation and preparations to perform a freeze seal on the affected instrument line, if necessar During the brief outage, maintenance personnel were able to make severalimportant repairs to balance of plant equipment, which improved the operational readiness of the plant. The instrument line was successfully replaced and indication restored to normal, in addition to the scheduled work, maintenance personnel completed several emergent repairs to support operations without impacting the outage schedul The inspectors observed calibration of the repaired normal Feedwater Regulating Valve 2A. The actuator spring was found to be slightly bent and had been replace After the valve was stroked fully open, the valve stem coupling broke. The instrumentation and control supervisor promptly informed the control room personnel, giving a detailed assessment of the repair effort required. This timely report occurred as operators were making preparations to roll the main turbine and synchronize the main generator, which was deferred as a result. The licensee concluded that the coupling had insufficient thread engagement after replacing the spring, so a longer coupling was used. The valve actuator was repaired over the next 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Conclusions Upon identification of a small reactor coolant system instrument line leak in Unit 2, the licensee promptly planned a forced outage in detail. The decision to conduct an outage promptly was approp iately based on the location and potential for degradatim. During the brief outage, the licensee made a number of repairs that improved the inaterial condition of the balance of plant equipment in addition to the leak repair The maintenance organization was able to correct several emergent equipment problems as wel Engineering provided excellent support during preparation for and completion of Forced Outage 98-02. System engineering helped interpret a declining reactor coolant loop flow indication, which resulted in locating an instrument line leak. An operability assessment was promptly performed for the affected instrumentation. An engineering evaluation for use of a freeze seal to isolate the work area as a contingency was completed in a timely manner. Repair options were well coordinated with maintenance personne M2.3 Unit 2 Containment Closeout insoection Results (62707. 71707)
On October 21,1998, the inspectors conducted a detailed Unit 2 containment closeout inspection following the sixth refueling outage. Safety equipment was determined to be in good physical condition. Housekeeping was restored to an excellent level, with no significant foreign materialidentified. Equipment stored in the containment during plant operation was properly secure ~- --.. . .. . . - - .. . - - . - - . -- -
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iA2.4 Enforcement Discretion Granted to Allow Reolacement of the Fuel Handlina Buildina !
Exhaust Booster Fan 11 A Motor (62707. 37551) ,
On October 19, the licensee identified that the Unit 1 Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Booster Fan 11 A motor was grounded and required replacement. The fan was declared i inoperable, and a 7 day action statement was entered in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.8. The licensee requested enforcement discretion to be allowed l sufficient time to breach the ductwork and install temporary blind flanges to permit replacement of the fan motor while the remainder of the system was restored. By letter
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dated October 22, the NRC exercised discretion in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy, Section Vll.C, from enforcing Technical Specification 3.0.3 as it related to 3. l and 3.3.2. This letter allowed the fuel handling building exhaust system to be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> while installing the temporary modification and up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> while removing it. Appropriate compensatory measures proposed by the licensee were l approved. The NRC letter noted that while enforcement discretion was not normally granted for repeat problems, licensee corrective actions for a similar problem in April 1998, were appropriate and timely, but the approved system modification was not yet installed and the requested Technical Specification change request was under review by the NRC staff. The exercise of enforcement discretion was warranted to l avoid an unnecessary plant transient for which no compensatory benefit to public health '
and safety existe The licensee implemented the temporary modification and replaced the fan motor on October 21-22. The inspectors observed that maintenance personnel were thoroughly briefed and that equipment was staged for the expected work and planned contingencies. The time that the entire system was inoperable was effectively minimized through planning and rehearsing. The licensee documented the event in Licensee Event Report 50-498/980-10, which is discussed in Section M M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92700,92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-498/98-010: Inoperable fuel handling building exhaust ventilation system. As discussed in Secticn M2.4 above, Exhaust Booster Fan 11 A developed a grounded motor. Repairs to correct the condition required opening the system duct work, rendering the system inoperable. Enforcement discretion was granted to allow sufficient time to perform the work. A similar event occurred in April 1998. Corrective actions from the earlier event, including a Technical Specification change and a system modification, were not yet completed. The Technicat Specification was submitted to the NRC and was in the review process, while the modification was developed and approved, but was scheduled for implementation during
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the next outage in each unit. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions and determined that they were appropriate and were planned to be completed within a reasonable time perio The event was caused by the system design not permitting the fan motor removal with the system operable. The root cause of the fans developing grounds was a deficiency in the method used to coat the motor windings. The licensee was in the process of L
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evaluating the reasons for the problem. Upcn conclusion of this evaluation, the licensee planned to evaluate the failures for 10 CFR Part 21 reporting applicability. The inspector concluded that no violation occurred associated with the root cause of this i event. This item is closed.
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M8.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-498/98-007: Failure to perform quarterly surveillance test on turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. On September 15,1998, the system engineer identified that the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump quarterly inservice test had not been performed on July 9,1998, as scheduled. The l l previous inservice test had been performed on April 14,1998, and the allowed grace )
l period expired on August 9,1998. The pump was successfully tested on August 15, )
l 1998. Technical Specification 4.0.5 requires inservice testing of this pump in j accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as required I by 10 CFR 50.55a(g). This item was identified as a violation of Technical l Specification 4.0.5. The inspectors verified that the corrective action had been taken in l accordance with the licensee's corrective action program. This nonrepetitive,
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licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-498/98010-01).
M8.3 . (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-499/98-002: Automatic reactor trip due to low-low i
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level in Steam Generator 2A. This event was discussed in detail in NRC Inspection Report 50-498;499/98-09, and a violation was issued. No new issues were revealed by the licensee event repor !
l M8.4 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-498/98-008: Inoperable rod control demand step !
- counters. On September 9,1998, the control rod step counters for Bank D were !
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inadvertently rendered inoperable for approximately 34 minutes during troubleshooting i activities, instrumentation and controls technicians intended to place a driver card from the circuit onto an card extender that allowed access to test points on the card for j troubleshooting. This action would render the step counters inoperable for a few seconds. Once the driver card was reinstalled in the extender, the control room i operators were asked to step the Bank D control rods in. While stepping the rods in, the control room operators noticed that the digital rod position indication circuit changed but
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the step counters did not change. Rod motion was promptly stopped, the circuit was restored to original condition and the counters were verified operable. The licensee's 1
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investigation determined that the card extender had three open circuited pins that caused the rod step counters to lose power. Technical Specification 3.1.3.2.b allows j only one step counter per bank to be inoperable in Mode 1. This licensee-identified and corrected event constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement actio :
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.-13-111. Enaineerina E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92700,92993)
E (Closed) Unresolved item 50-498/9724-04: Updated Final Safety Analysis Report inaccuracies; inaccurate usable auxiliary feedwater storage tank and purge volum The NRC discovered the following two errors in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report :
The response to Question 440.30N stated that the auxiliary feedwater storage tank had a usable volume of 485,000 gallons, which was equivalent to the tank's capacit However, the tank had some unusable volume, which was properly accounted for in the safety analysis, but not accurately reflected in the answer to the questio Section 7A.ll.E.1.1 did not provide an accurate time period for the auxiliary feedwater pumps to purge the dry portions of the system up to the steam generators after pump start. However, these purge times were not an input into the safety analysis. Therefore, this error did not represent a safety concern. The licensee revised both portions of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to provide accurate information. The inspectors considered the errors to be isolated oversights and recognized that neither error involved an actual safety concer E8.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-498/97-003: Potential over pressurization of piping due to thermal expansion. During evaluation of Generic Letter 96-06," Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions," the licensee discovered that a segment of the 3-inch liquid waste processing line within containment could become over pressurized due to thermal expansion of trapped fluid during a design basis accident. The licensee drained this portion of the line as an immediate corrective action. For long-term corrective actions, the licensee installed insulation on the lines. With the insulation in place, the licensee calculated that the pipe would not become over stressed during a design basis acciden The licensee later determined that, although the piping would have exceeded code allowable stresses, the conditions would not have resulted in a loss of containment integrit The inspectors reviewed operator logs detailing the initial discovery and immediate corrective actions and the subsequent procedures used to install the insulation. The inspectors considered the discovery of this condition by the licensee to have been consistent with the intent of the generic lette E8.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-498/ 97-013: Failure to meet the Technical Specification leak rate requirements for a supplementary containment purge supply isolation valve. An evaluation identified that the methodology used to calibrate the flow measuring devices used in local leak rate testing was nonconservative because it was not density compensated. After applying conservative calibration correction factors, it was found that integrated containment leak rate test results met Technical Specification requirements. However, on November 11,1997, the licensee identified that
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Containment Penetration M-43, a Unit 1 supplementary containment purge supply isolation valve, exceeded the allowed Technical Specification leak rate on September 22,1997, as a result of applying the correction factor. This condition existed without taking the required Technical Specification 3.6.1.7 action for an inoperable isolation valve until October 30,1997, when the penetration was retested and found within Technical Specification leak rate allowances. This failure constitutes a violation of l minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement actio l IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Unit 2 Forced Outaae Radiation Protection Activities Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors observed radiation protection activities during the Unit 2 forced outage on November 21-22,1998. The inspectors also reviewed surveys and observed prejob safety briefings. Discussions were held with radiation protection department personnel and managers, Observations and Findinas The inspectors noted that dedicated radiation protection staff was provided to support forced outage activities beyond the normal shitt compliment. Thorough radiation and contamination surveys were performed, including airborne contamination survey Neutron dosimetry required by the radiation work permit was used appropriatel The inspectors observed that the prejob safety brief was thorough and detaile Radiation workers actively discussed ways to minimize radiation exposure and industrial hazards for the instrument lin.e repair work. During the conduct of the work, workers removed material from the high dose work area and worked on it outside the containment building as much as practical. This saved personnel dose and was a good demonstration of as low as reasonably achievable practices by radiation workers, Conclusions Good radiation protection support was provided during the Unit 2 forced outage which included thorough radiation surveys and very good prejob safety briefs. Radiation workers were inquisitive during the radiation safety briefs and demonstrated effective as low as reasonably achievable practices by conducting as much of the reactor coolant system instrument line repair outside containment as practical.
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A ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATIO_ N PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee
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G. Childers, Manager, instrumentation and Controls, Unit 2 T. Cloninger, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering W. Dowdy, Manager, Plant Operations Unit 2 J. Groth, Vice President, Nuclear Generation S. Head, Supervisor Nuclear Assurance and Licensing M. Lashley, Manager, Reliability Engineering D. Leazar, Director, Nuclear Fuel and Analysis F. Mangan, Vice President, Plant Services R. Masse, Plant Manager, Unit 2 G. Parkey, Plant Manager, Unit 1 J. Phelps, Manager, Plant Operations Unit 1 G. Powell, Manager, Radiation Protection J. Winters, Maintenance Rule Coordinator INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observation IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support IP. 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities
- IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance IP 92903: Followup - Engineering s
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 50-498/98010-01 NCV Missed turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater purnp quarterly surveillance test (Section M8.2)
Closed 50-498/98010-01 NCV Missed turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump quarterly surveillance test (Section M8.2)
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50-498/98 010 LER Inoperable fuel handling building exhaust ventilation system (Section M8.1)
50-498/98-007 LER Failure to perform quarterly surveillance test on turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (Section M8.2)
50-499/98-002 LER Automatic reactor trip due to low-low level in Steam i Generator 2A (Section M8.3)
l 50-498/98-000 LER inoperable rod control demand step counters
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(Section M8.4)
50-498/9724-04 URI Updated Final Safety Analysis Report inaccuracies -
(Section E8.1)
i 50-498/97-003 LER Potential overpressurization of piping due to thermal expansion (Section E8.2)
50-498/97-013 LER Failure to meet the Technical Specification leak rate requirements for a supplemental containment purge supply isolation valve (Section E8.3) j l
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