IR 05000498/1998003

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Insp Repts 50-498/98-03 & 50-499/98-03 on 980104-0214. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint, Engineering & Plant Support Re Emergency Facilities
ML20217B579
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 03/24/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20217B534 List:
References
50-498-98-03, 50-498-98-3, 50-499-98-03, 50-499-98-3, NUDOCS 9803260104
Download: ML20217B579 (19)


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ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket Nos.: 50-498-

-50-499

, License Nos.: NPF-76 ~

~ NPF-80

. Report Nos.: 50-498/98-03 50-499/98-03:

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' Licensee: STP N'uclear Operating Company -

' Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station,' Units 1 and 2 4

Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth

.Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Dates: January 4 thou9h February _14,1998 inspectors: D. P. Loveless, Senior Resident inspector .

W. C. Sifre, Resident inspector R.' A. Kopriva, Senior Project Engineer, Branch A

, . Approved By: 'J.1. Tapia, Chief, Project Branch A, ,

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Division of Reactor Projects I

' Attachment: 'SupplementalInformation

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l, . EXECUTIVE SUMMARY y

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 L NRC inspection Report 50-498/98-03; 50-499/98-03 l-~

Operations

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Licensed operat6r performance in both units was very goodf Continuous awareness of

. plant conditions resulted from superior attention to control panel indications. Annunciator response was performed in accordance with in-hand response procedures. Radio

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communications with plant operators were good (Section 01.1).

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. A fire protection header in the Unit 1 containment building was isolated for 2 month l l

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This resulted from an inadequate release of an equipment clearance order. Although the l closed isolation valve provided an alarm in the fire protection computer system, '

- operators were not required to verify historical alarms in fire protection system.~ This is a

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u Violation 498/98003-01 (Section 01.2).

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Online implementation of the Unit 1 control room modification was good. Coordination of -l

work activities was excellent and the application of lessons learned from the Unit 2 l

E modification reduced the impact to unit operations. Compensatory measures for intenm i states were verified to be correctly implemented (Section O2.2). l l

l Maintenance

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Maintenance and surveillance activities observed were very good and supported _ I

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E continued plant operations. Technician performance during corrective and preventive !

maintenance activities was very good. Work instructions correctly incorporated vendor j supplied information (Section M1.1 and M1.2). i

. :: A generic review of the licensee's preventive maintenance program was performed and the ;

inspectors concluded that the program was very good. A review of completed preventive !

" maintenance packages encompassing activities associated with the program requirements ;

was performed. Scope / intent, work instruction, vendor requirements and recommendations, and post PM reviews were good (Section M1.3).

a- A work order discrepancy was not documented in a condition report until 6 months after i o identification. The issue was the subject of severalinternal documents'and discussions !

L before a condition report was written to address the issue. The condition report program I

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- requires a condition report be written upon identification of discrepancies. This is a noncited i

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violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Poliev; 498/98003-02 L (Section M3.1).

The Nuclear Safety and Quality Concerns Program was effectively addressing employee ;

concerns. The licensee addressed a weakness identified through an investigation  !

concerning the need to track proposed actions to resolve issues (Section M8.1).  ;

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2-Engineenng

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Engineering evaluations which were reviewed _were thorough' and provided an appropriate level of detail. A recommendation to test the Terry turbine governor valve .

stems for sticking was conservative (Section E1.1).

Plant Suoport

Emergency facilities and supplies were maintained in a good state of readiness f(Section P2.1).

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Table of Contents '

Rehort D'et ails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ~

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I01L Coriduct of . Operations . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ' '

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01.1f Control Room Observations ..................................1 a ,

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n 01.2 . Equipment Clearance Order Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 2-'

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02, Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 O2.1 Plant Tours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

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p - O2.2 , Unit 1 Control Room Modification ............................4:

n M1 . Conduct of M aintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

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M1.1 General Comments on Field Maintenance Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 '

id1.2 General Comments ori Surveillance. Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

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M1.3 : Preventive Maintenance Program Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 i

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. M3" Maintenance Procedures'and Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 -

M3.1 - . Circuit Breaker Maintenance Package Paview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 .

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!M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues ...... .........................8

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M8.1. ' Review of the Nuclear Safe, and Quality Concerns Program . . . . . . . . . 8 b 'E1 Conduct qf Engineering i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4 . E1.1 -- Engineering Evaluation Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 E8- Miscellaneous' Engineering issues . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 E8.1 --(Closed) Unresolved item 498;499/97006-07: Failure to inspect

' Standby Diesel Generator Heat Exchangers for Biofouling in

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Accordance with Commitments . . .. . . . . . . . . < . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . 10

[ ' R 1' Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 .

' R1.1 . Tours'of Radiological Controlled Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. 11

/P2 Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

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P2.1 ' inspection of Emergency Response Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

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S1 -- Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

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  • S1.1 ' Daily Physical Security- Activity Observations . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 11

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- X 1' . . ' Exit Meeting Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

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Report Details Summary of Plant Status -

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- Units 1 and 2 operated at essentially 100 percent power throughout this inspection perio . Operations .

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01- Conduct of Operations 1 ,

n ' 01.1 . ' Control Room Observations (Units 1 and 2) ~

- Inspection Scope (71707)

Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors routinely observed the conduct of -

operations in both the Unit 1 and 2 control rooms. Frequent reviews of control board L status, routine attendance at shift turnover meetings, observations of operatorc

. performance, and reviews of control room logs' and documentation were performed The

' inspectors observed portions of the following evolutions in addition to full power .

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' operations:

L-e Unit 1 Control Room Modification ei Unit 1 Extended Allowed Outage of Safety Equipment

b; Observations and Findings

. During routine observations, the inspectors noted that reactor operators remained at the -

control panels and intently observed plant parameter indications. Based on these

' observations and on interviews, the inspectors determined that control room operators were continually aware of existing plant conditions. Operator response to annunciato alarms was prompt, in'accordance with' approved procedures, and appropriately'. ;

dispositioned the alarm status. The control room supervisors remained cognizant of - -

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ongoing activities'.

- The_ inspectors routinely attended shift tumover meetings where'in shift operator j provided clear and concise information to the oncoming operators. Oncoming operators routinely reviewed the control room logs, discussed current plant conditions, and verified l major equipment status. ' Plant managers and operations department managers were

< often observed in attendance during shift tumover. The inspectors also attended end of

, shift status meetings wherein equipment status and emergent issues were discusse Plant operators exhibited good system knowledge and awareness of plant condition Identified material de5ciencies were reported and documented in condition report ' The inspectors monitored the status of safety related equipment during the successive extended allowed outages of the Unit 1 A, B, and C train engineered safety features ;

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-2-equipment. The equipment outages were very well coordinated site wide efforts. The inspectors verified that compensatory actions required by the Technical Specifications

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. were in plac Conclusions

~ Licensed operator performance was very good. -Turnover activities ~were thorough Plant operators exhibited good system knowledge and awareness of plant conditions. The Unit'1 train engineered safety features equipment outages were very well coordinated

. site wide effort .2 Equipment Clearance Order Reviews

, Insoection Scone (71707) .

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions data base for condition reports documenting equipment clearance order issues as a followup to Violation 97005-03, documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-498;499/97-005. The inspectors reviewed 23 condition reports addressing equipment clearance orders from the past 6-month Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that 22 of the condition reports reviewed were written to a'ddress minor documentation errors or wrong component errors identified while establishing clearance t.oundaries.- One of the condition reports was written to address an inadequate equipment order release Condition Report 97-14190 was written to address a failure to properly restore a fire I

. protection system upon releasing Equipment Clearance Order 1-97-71621. As a result, fire protection hoses for the reactor containment building were out of service for an extended

, period of time with no corrective action taken. The licensee addressed the failure of two senior reactor operators to properly restore Valve FP-0949, leaving it in the closed positio The valve serves as a sectional isolation for five fire cabinets installed inside the Unit 1 l reactor containment building.- Equipment Clearance Order 1-97-71621 had been written to -!

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isolate the valve during modifications.- During the implementation of the equipment

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clearance order, appropriate compensatory actions had been taken.'. On July 31,1997, the clearance was released and the compensatory actions were removed, however, the valve

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was not reopened. The valve remained closed without compensatory actions until

. identification of the problem on September 13,1997. The root cause was determined to be

human error of two senior reactor operator ;

i During a review of this occurrence, the inspectors determined that the Valve FP-0949 position was annunciated on the fire protection computer in the main control room. A

. computer data history review indicated that the valve had remained in alarm the entire !

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p f -3-time that it was closed. Operators were not expected to determine or verify the status of the fire protection computer alarms and fire protection personnel no longer verifed alarm statu Valve FP-0949 being closed for an extended period of time without compensatory

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' actions was in noncompliance with Plant General Procedure OPGP03-ZF-0018, Revision 7, " Fire Protection' System Operability Requirements," Section 4.6. Section 4.6 stated:

"The FIRE HOSE STATIONS listed in Addendum 3 SHALL be operable whenever equipment in the area to be protected is required to be operable by the Technical Specifications."

The fire hose stations affected were listed in Addendum 3 and equipment in the reactor s

containment building was required to be operable from July 31 through September 14,1997; therefore, this was in violation of License Condition 2.E. " Fire Protection" (498/98003-01).

The availability of an alarm indicating the improper position of the valve constituted prior .

opportunity to identify the condition. Additionally, the failure to identify that the fire protection computer annunciation was not being utilized constituted inadequate corrective actio Although this violation was licensee identified, it does not meet the requirements for a noncited violatio Conclusions The inspectors concluded that, although equipment clearance order implementation problems were being addressed by the licensee, further improvement was necessar The faillire to retum Valve FP-0949 to the open position was a violation of License Condition 2.E, " Fire Protection."

02- - Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Plant Tours (Unit 1 and 2) Inspections Scope (71707)-

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The inspectors routinely toured the accessible portions 'of plant areas in Units 1 and Areas of special attention during this inspection period included:

  • . Units 1 and 2 electrical and mechanical auxiliary buildings
  • Standby Diesel Generators 11,12,13, and 21

'e isolation Valve Cubicles 1 A,2B, and 2D .

. I e- Units 1 and 2 auxiliary feedwater pump room ]

k * Units 1 and 2 fuel handling buildings

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The inspectors observed that systems and components _were maintained in good

- material' condition in both units. Several minor discrepancies'were identificci in both units- '

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' correctio t Conclusions

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The inspectors concluded that the material condition of systems and components was good and only minor deficiencies were note x -  : O2.2 Unit 1 Control Room Modification - Inspechon Scope (71707)

From January 12-24, craftsmen installed the major portions of the human interface modification in the Unit 1 control room. The modification was identical to the modification previously performed in Unit 2 and discussed in NRC inspection Report 50-498;499/97007. The inspectors routinely monitored the implementation of the

' modification and its impact on plant operation ,

' Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the modification scope and d' etermined that several interim

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states had been incorporated into the schedule to ensure equipment availability. The inspectors verified that compensatory measures were in place for radiation monitoring

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and for risk and dose assessment while these normal control room functions were -

impaired, The inspectors noted that the application of lessons leamed from the Unit 2 !

,s modification further reduced the impact to plant operation. The work was performed ]

Jduring periods when the risk associated with online maintenance was low. ' On one l occasion . modification work was stopped to allow for the performance of a surveillance

' test of moderate ris Conclusions The implementation of the Unit 1 control room modification was well coordinated with

_ plant control room operators and was well controlled. Contingency plans and ,

[ " compensatory actions were well developed and implemented. Shift supervisors i

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maintained excellent awareness and control of modification activities and of any conflicts !

M 'with control room operation !

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L 5-11. Maintenance i

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M1: -. Conduct of Maintenance -

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M1.1 . General Comments on Field Maintenance Activities :

.a; Inspection Scope (62707)-

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The inspectors observed portions of the following ongoing maintenance activities

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Repair-l -

e 375583 Steam Generator 2B Power Operated Relief Valve Nitrogen Leak

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n b;' Observations and Findinos Overall performance of observed preventive and corrective maintenance activities was i

very good; Technicians and mechanics demonstrated strong knowledge and familiarity-j with equipment and assigned work. Work was performed with appropriate supervisio l

> Work packages and instructions provided adequate detail. Vendor information was

properly incorporated into work instructions. System engineers provided good support for postmaintenance testing.

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Technician performance during observed corrective and preventive maintenance

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activities observed was very good. Work packages and instructions provided adequate detail, and vendor hformation was properly incorporated L ' M1.2'~ General Comments on Surveillance Testing <

i I Insoection Scone (61726)

The inspectors observed portions of the following surveillance activities: l

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-e Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP03-AF-0007, Revision 10, " Auxiliary

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.o- - Plant Surveillance Procedure OPSP03-MS-0003, Revision 11, " Main Turbine Steam inlet Valve Operability Test" L

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' The observed surveillance tests were'well performed and utilized approved procedure The tests properly implemented Technical Specification surveillance requirements. Plant o

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- operators were observed performing detailed.walkdowns of equipment during testing activities. System engineers provided good support in the collection of data for

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equipment performance trending.' Communication between control room operators and

' plant operators in the field was good.L The Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 14 inservice test

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included govemor valve stem measurements for thermal binding. The measurements were performed in response to an engineering evaluation discussed in Section E2.1 of ,

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Surveillance testing observed was well conducted in accordance with approved '

. procedures. The testing also properly implemented the Technical Specification -

surveillance requirement ~ M1.3. : Preventive Maintenance Program Review s.' Inspection Scope (62707)~

The' inspectors performed a generic review of the licensee's preventive maintenanc !

(PM) program.' Discussions with responsible individuals and a review of program d procedures were utilized to obtain a thorough understanding of the program's purpose, j scope, format, and requirements. The review consisted of assessing the preventive ;

. maintenance identification guide, the scheduler's and work control screening group !

guide, the planners' guide. and preventive maintenance items in the corrective action' .

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program. In addition, maintenance program work package and instruction development was discussed.'

b.- Observations and Findings

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s The overall performance of the preventive maintenance' program was very goo .

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A Personnel responsible for the program demonstrated a strong knowledge and familiarity with the program structure and requirement !

The inspector selected a representative sample of plant systems for which preventive '!

maintenance is performed The qualified display processing system, the 125 vde Class l1E batteries, the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system, and the liquid waste

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processing system were then selected for a more focused review. Within these four

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systems,2g preventive maintenance tasks were selected at random and evaluated for L

levels of complexity and diversity. For each of the preventive maintenance tasks D selected, the information form and preventive maintenance work instructions were ,

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. reviewed for compliance with the requirements of the preventive maintenance progra l f : Equipment descriptioniidentification, functions, preventive maintenance scope / intent, h,

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+ vendor recommendations, and failures were clearly defined and documente Additionally, the work instructions reviewed described the maintenance activity in 1 sufficient detail to properly perform and accomplish the intent of the preventive maintenanc : This evaluation was further refined and 12 preventive maintenance activities were

selected, which were representative of the total preventive maintenance population. The r completed preventive maintenance work packages included the instruction form, the preventive maintenance work instruction, the equipment history, the work order, the work -

instructions, and a summary of work performed, including all applicable data. ' A sampling of applicable references was reviewed to verify that appropriate requirements and

- information had been incorporated into the preventive maintenance task and work

' instruction c.: Conclusions

, The inspectors concluded that the preventive maintenance program and the -

implementation of that program were very good. The program was thorough in the selection of components and identification of the scope / intent of the work. . The work activities were properly scheduled and planned. The instructions reviewed were very thorough, and vendor recommendations were property incorporated into the work instructions. Work experience feedback was properly reviewed utilizing the corrective

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action program. Successful performance of the preventive maintenance instructions was supported by a good progra . M3 '. Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1- Circuit Breaker Maintenance Package Review

= Insoection Scone (62707)

The inspectors reviewed documents associated with a design change package and work order developed as a contingency action for a circuit breaker maintenance activit . bl Observations and Findinas Work Order 333920 was implemented on February 24,1997, to change the setpoints on

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a Class 1E circuit breaker. If the circuit breaker could not be properly calibrated to the new settings, a design change package would be required to replace the circuit breake The design enange package would be required because the existing breaker model was obsolete and a newer replacement circuit breaker would require modification of the load center. Design Change Package 95-2849-2 and Work Order 348150 were attached to

. Work Order 333920 as a contingency action. Design Change Package 95-2849-2 and Work Order 348150 had been developed in September 1996, as contingency packages for a previous circuit breaker maintenance activity. Work Order 348150 had not been implemented during the previous maintenance activity, but remained open and available

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'at the Work Package Control Center. However, Design Change Package 95-2849-2 was 1 removed from the open design change package list after the previous maintenance

' activit Upon further review, the inspectors ascertained that on March 21,1997, licensee personnel had identified that open Work Order 348150 implemented a design change package that was not considered open. This condition was the subject of discussion and evaluation

among the maintenance, work control,' and engineering organizations until the decision was finally made to write a condition reportc However, the condition was not documented in a condition report until September 24,1997 when Condition Report 97-15173 was written to address this issu ~The inspectors reviewed Plant General Procedure OPGP03-ZX-0002, Revision 15l
  • Condition Reporting Process." Procedure OPGP03-ZX-0002 requires documentation of a condition report for conditions needing attention and requiring documentation. The !!
failure to write a condition report to address an open work order that could have j inappropriately implemented a design change with unclear status was in

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noncompliance with Procedure OPGP03-ZX-0002 and with Technical Specification 6. _ _

This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcernent Poliev 498/9803-02.' ,

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.cc Conclusions

The failure to document a condition on a condition report was of minor safety significance because the design change package in question was for a specific circuit breaker in a specific load center and the likelihood of inadvertent implementation of the work order

'was considered low. The failure to write a condition report to address an open work .-

order that could have inappropriately implemented a design change was in . I noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.8.1, however, this was a violation of minor !

significance and is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section IV of the 1l NRC Enforcement Poliev.~

M81 ' Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 Review of the Nuclear Safety and Quality Concems Program a .~ Inspection Scone (62707)

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issues that had been raised were adequately addressed.-  ;

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-- Findinas and Observations With one exception, the concerns reviewed were properly addressed and documented, ,

and appropriate corrective action recommendations were made. The inspectors  !

determined that the licensee's response to one concem had not been adequately l 3  ;

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. documented and tracked after initial contact with the' reporting employee. The employee had contacted a Nuclear Safety and Quality Concems Program representative on two occasions regarding a technical issue. - Both occasions resulted in the representative discussing the issue with line management and requesting further review.. The

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representative believed that the technical issue would be addressed through the L employee's issuance of a condition report.- For this reason and because the employee g did not specifically indicate that he wanted to file a concem, a Nuclear Safety and Quality Concems Program file was not opened.- The employee again contacted the program -

. representative and during a 'senes of subsequent discussions, stated that he felt that he -

had not been taken seriously during his' prior contacts. ' At this point, the licensee initiated '

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a separate investigation to address this concem. This investigation determined that, although the technical issue had been properly addressed, the Nuclear Safety and Quality _Concems Program should be enhanced by initiating a mechanism to track

' proposed actions that are relied upon to resolve issues.; The licensee has instituted this tracking mechanism to ensure that explicit actions + hat are relied upon to resolve issues are accomplishe .' Conclusions The Nuclear Safety and Quality Concems Program was effectively addressing employee l concems. The licensee addressed a weakness identified through an investigation conceming the need to track proposed actions to resolve issue Ill. Engineering ;

E1- Conduct of Engineering -- i

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E1.1 . Engineering Evaluation Reviews i Inspection Scope (37551) j i

Using inspection Procedure 37551, the inspectors penodically reviewed engineering -

issues and plant incidents to assess the adequacy of their identified root cause Engineering products were evaluated to determine the effectiveness of the licensee's

. controls for identifying, resolving, and preventing problems. The following specific i

. engineering evaluations were selected for review: l e- Evaluation of Recent Events involving inconel Govemor Valve Stem Sticking on Terry Turbines as Documented in Condition Report 98-58 !

i e- Risk Evaluation of a Condensate Pump Failure with One Pump Out of Service as . !

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I> Observations and Findings

Condition Report 98-586 was developed to determine the actions necessary to address

'a condition documented in INPO Operating Experience Report OE87-23. The operatin '

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experience report documented three events at boiling water reactor facilities where Inconel governor valve stems on reactor containment core isolation cooling Terry

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J turbines became stuck and resulted in either turbine overspeeds or loss of speed contro The report identified inadequate diametrical tolerances combined with thermal expansion of the valve stem as a root caus . The licensee's engineers determined that there was .no record of govemor valve sticking caused by inadequate stem to spacer clearances .on turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 14 and 24 since the installation of inconel stems. However, the engineers .

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recommended testing the pumps during the next scheduled inservice test to demonstrate adequate clearance. The inspectors ascertained that the tests involved measurement of

. the stem diameter before and after running the pumps for one hour to establish thermal equilibrium. The tests also included close monitoring of valve stem movement after

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l l turbine shutdown to verify free movement. The tests were satisfactorily performed for

. Units 1 and 2 on January 20 and 26, respectivel ;The inspectors also reviewed 'a limited evaluation of the likelihood that a condensate pump would fail with one other pump out of service.L This evaluation was performed to ;

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facilitate' the removal of the Condensate Pump 21 motor for repair. The pump motor was I scheduled to be out of service for approximately 3 months. The inspectors found the

~ evaluation to have a sound basis and to provide the appropriate level of detai Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the reviewed engineering evaluations were thorough and provided the appropriate level of detail. ' The recommendation for testing of Terry turbine

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governor valve stems for sticking was conservativ '

- E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues

? E8.1. (Closed) Unresolved item' 498:499/97006-07: Failure to inspect standby diesel generator

- heat exchangers for biofouling in accordance with commitment This item addressed the failure of the licensee to meet commitments made in response !

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' to Generic Letter 89-13. Specifically,' the licensee had committed to perform tests to'

assess functionality or to inspect and clean all heat exchangers in the Unit i essential cooling water system. However, the heat exchangers associated with the standby diesel

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w generator had only been inspected once in 1993, and never cleane i e 1 l/;  ;

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! On January 30, the inspector independently inspected the condition of the jacket water and lubricating oil heat exchangers for Standby Diesel Generator 11; On February 2, the L inspector observed the ditassembly and inspection of the Jacket water and lubricating oil heat exchangers as well as the intercooler associated with Standby Diesel Generator 12.-

All five heat exchangers were in good condition. No evidence of biofouling was1 observed. The Standby Diesel Generator 11 Jacket water heat exchangers tubes :

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contained approximately.10 mil of scaling. This worst case fouling condition was well within the~ manufacturer's recommendations._ All heat exchangers were cleaned and

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returned to service. On February 10, maintenance and engineering personnelinspected -

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the Standby Diesel Generator 13 heat exchangers and reported similar result The condition of the heat exchangers indicated that the failure to inspect the tubes every

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18 months was not significant. Therefore, no violation had occurred. The issue l

- continued to be tracked by the licensee's corrective action program as documented in 'l Condition Report 97-1466 IV. Plant Support 3

l - R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls i p

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- R'1.1- Tours of Radioloaical Controlled Areas (71750) -1 l

( ~ Routine tours of the radiological controlled areas were conducted throughout the l

. inspection period. Doors and gates required to be locked in accordance with Technica j L

Specifications or the licensee's radiation protection program were verifiexf to be properly H

- secured. Work observed in these areas was performed in accordance with approved radiation work permit P2L Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources I

!- P Insoection~of Emeroency Resoonse Facilities (71750)

g During routine plant tours, the inspectors observed that the technical support centers and

. operations support centers in both units and the emergency offsite facility were readily

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available and properly maintained for emergency operation.

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- 81 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities  !

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, S1.1:. Daily Physical Security Activity Observations (71750)  ;

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' On a daily basis, the inspectors observed the security force personnel practices and the !

condition of security equipment. Protected area barriers were in good conditio Personnel access measures and equipment searches for contraband were properly conducted. Security officers were alert and fully aware of the responsibilities of their respective post ,

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-12-V. Manaaement Meetinas l

X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 6,1998. Management personnel i- acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked if any materials examined during the inspection period should be considered proprietary. No proprietary

'information was identifie .

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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee

.W. Cottle, President and Chief Executive Officer  !

- J. Groth, Vice President, Nuclear Generation l B. Masse, Plant Manager, Unit 2 G. Parkey, Plant Manager, Unit 1 F. Timmons, Manager, Nuclear Plant Protection T. Waddell, Manager, Maintenance, Unit 1 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED I IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations

!P 62707: Maintenance Observation j

. IP '/1707: - Plant Operations l IP 71750: Plant Support

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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED  ;

Ooened 498/9803-01 VIO A fire protection header in Unit 1 containment was isolated for 2 months (Section 01.2).

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498/9803-02 NCV A condition report was not written to address an identified work order discrepancy until 6 months after identification (Section M3.1).

= ClQS /9803-02 NCV A condition report was not written to address an identified work order discrepancy until 6 months after identification

.(Section M3.1).

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498/9706-07 URI Failure to inspect standby diesel generator heat

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exchangers for biofouling in accordance with commitments (Section E8.1).

Discussed 498;499/9705-03 VIO Two examples of inadequate equipment clearance order boundries (Section 01.2).

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