IR 05000413/1987032

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Insp Repts 50-413/87-32 & 50-414/87-32 on 870921-25.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review & Evaluation of Selected Areas of Licensee Emergency Preparedness Program
ML20235V626
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/07/1987
From: Decker T, Kreh J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235V620 List:
References
50-413-87-32, 50-414-87-32, NUDOCS 8710150244
Download: ML20235V626 (6)


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AkQEoQ UNITED STATES - '

N n o; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .

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I 3j!, 101 MARIETTA STREET, f e , ATLA *lTA, GEORGIA 30323

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, LRdort:Non:;.50-4'13/87-32and50-414/87-32

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Licenseeir < Duke Power Company-

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s 422. 91th Church Street

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Charldtte, NC 28242

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6 0 ,'v Facility Name: , Catawba Nuclear' Station

Docket Nos.
'.50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-48 e

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s Inspection conducted: September 21-25, 1987 Inspector: NN 4.> /d - T-8 7

.J. L. Kreh' Date Signed

~ Approved by: /0 - 7'87-g .T. .R. Decker, Section Chief .

Date Signed V Division of Radiation. Safety and Safeguards W

SUMMARY

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Scope: .. This routine, unannounced inspection involved . review and evaluation of

. selected areas of the licensee's-emergency preparedness progra ~

.Results: No violations or deviations'were identifie ;

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i REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • H B. Barron, . Superintendent of Operations
  • L. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer
  • S. Gregory, I&E Support Engineer
  • P. Simpson, Station Emergency Planner
  • A. Cote, Compliance Specialist
  • A. Ruhe,' Associate Health Physicist
  • L. Mitchell, 0perations Specialist T. B. Smith, Jr., Emergency Planning Assistant J. W. Cox, Manager, Production Training Services W. H. Barron, Director, Operator Training G. G. Barrett, Training Supervisor G. F. Winkel, Instructor, Operations Training C. L. Courtney, Health Physics Support Supervisor D. S. Lee, Staff Health Physicist H. T. Baumgardner, Shift Supervisor S. L. Bradshaw, Shift Supervisor V. D. King, Associate Engineer, Compliance NRC Resident Inspectors
  • P. K. VanDoorn M. S. Lesser
  • Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 25, 1987, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 abov The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings. The i licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio . Emergency Detection and Classification (82201)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Sections I and IV.C; and Section D of the licensee's Emergency Plan, this program area was inspected to determine whether the licensee used and understood a standard emergency classification and action level schem )

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l TheLinspector reviewed the licensee's classification procedure The event classifications in the prccedures were consistent with those required by regulation and the Emergency. Pla The classification

' procedures did not appear to contain impediments or errors which could lead to incorrect or untimely classificatio Selected emergency action levels (EALs) specified in the classification

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procedures were reviewed. The reviewed EALs appeared to be consistent with the initiating events specified in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654 and the Emergency Plan. The inspector noted that most of the EALs ware based on parameters obtainable from Control Foom instrumentatio g The inspector verified that the licensee's Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) included criteria for initiation of offsite notifications and for development of protective action recommendation The notification procedures required that offsite notifications be made promptly after declaration of an emergenc The inspector discussed with licensee representatives the coordination of l EALs with State and local official Documentation showed that the licensee had requested review of the EALs by State and local officials, and that these officials had ieviewed and concurred in the EALs during June and July 198 Interviews were hold with 2 Shift Supervisors to verify that they understood the relationship between fore status and such core damage indicators as containment high-range radiation monitor, high-range effluent monitor, containment hydrogen monitor, and postaccident primary coolant analysis. Both interviewees appeared knowledgeable of the various core damage indications and their relationship to core statu The responsibility and authority for classification of emergency events and ir,itiation of emergency action were prescribed in the Emergency Plan and EPIP Interviews with selected key members of the licensee's emergency organization revealed that these personnel understood their ;

responsibilities and authorities in relation to accident classificatio l notification, and protective action recommendation Walk-through evaluations involving accident classification problems were I conducted with 2 Shift Supervisors. Both personnel interviewed promptly and properly classified the hypothetical accident situations presented to them, and appeared to be familiar with appropriate classification procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Protective Action Decision-Making (82202)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) and (10); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3; and Section J of the licensee's Emergency Plan, this area was inspected to determine whether the licensee had ?4-hour-per-day i

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capability to assess and analyze emergency conditions and make recommendations to protect the public and onsite worker The inspector discussed responsibility and authority for protective action decision-making with licensee representatives and reviewed pertinent portions of the Emergency Plan and EPIP The plan and procedures clearly assigned responsibility and authority for accident assessment and protective action decision-makin Interviews with members of the licensee's emergency organization showed that these personnel understood-their authorities and' responsibilities with respect to accident assessment l and protective action decision-makin !

j Walk-through evaluations involving protective action decision-making were l conducted with 2 Shift Supervisors, both of whom appeared to be cognizant of appropriate onsite protective measures and aware of the range of protective action recommendations appropriate to offsite protectio Personnel interviewed were aware of the need for timeliness in making initial protective action reconnendations to offsite official Interviewees demonstrated adequate understanding of the requirement that protective action recommendations be based on core condition and ,

containment status even if no release is in progress. Licensee procedures made provisions for contacting responsible offsite authorities on 'a 24-hour basis. Backup communications links with offsite authorities were .

availabl !

No violations or deviations were identifie . Knowledge and Performance of Duties (Training) (82206)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F. this area was inspected to determine whether emergency response personnel understood their emergency response roles and could perform their assigned function The inspector reviewed the description (in the Emergency Plan) of the l training program, training procedures, and selected lesson plans, and interviewed members of the instructional staff. Based on these reviews and interviews, the inspector determined that the licensee had established ,

a formal emergency training progra {

Records of training for key members of the emergency organization for the /

period June 1986 to August 1987, were reviewed. The training records revealed that personnel designated as alternates or given interim respon- i sibilities in the emergency organization were provided with appropriate I training. According to the records, the type, amount, and frequency of  !

training were consistent with approved procedure ;

I The inspector conducted walk-through evaluations with selected key members  !

of the emergency organization. During these walk-throughs, individuals

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were given various hypothetical sets of emergency conditions and data and asked to talk through the response they would make if such an emergency ,

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actua_lly existed. The individuals demonstrated familiarity with emergency procedures and equipment, and no problems were observed in the areas of emergency ' detect 1on and classification, doso calculation, and protective action decision-makin No violations or deviations were identified, i

' DoseCalculationandAssessment(82207)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), this area was inspected to determine whether there was an adequate method for assessing the consequences of an actual or potential radiological releas The inspector reviewed Procedure HP/0/81009/18, "Offsite Dose Projections." The procedure conservatively assumed any releases to be at ground level, and was designed to project dose commitments to the public from noble gas and/or iodine releases through containment, the unit vent,

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or the steam relief valve Releases from unmonitored pathways would be detected and monitored by field team The inspector discussed the dose projection models used by the licensee and the States of North Carolina and South Carolina. The models used by the States and licensee produced different dose projection These differences were to be a subject of discussion between licensee and State representatives in the near futur The inspector was informed that extensive revision of the dose assessment program of the State of South )

Carolina was in progres Licensee procedures made provision for timely incorporation of dose j assessment results into the offsite protective action recommendation proces However, during irterviews with key licensee emergency response personnel, they appeared to recognize the uncertainties associated with i dose projections and the importance of making protective action recommendations based on plant condition ;

l An inspection and operability check were made of selected equipment and l support items used for dose assessment at the Control Room and Technical 'j Support Center (TSC). No 3 0hlems were observe The inspector requested and observed a dose assessment walk-through by an individual designated as an alternate for dose projection during an ,

eme rgency. The individual demonstrated ability to make such calculations using both manual and computerized method !

The inspector discussed the backshift availability of personnel qualified to make dose calculations. Prior to activation of the TSC, dose assessment would be accomplished through use of the " Nuclear-23" program on the Operational Aid Computer (OAC) in the Control Room, or manually through use of Procedure RP/0/A/5000/11, " Protective Action Recommendations Without the OAC." All licensed operators were trained in these method _ _ _ _ . _ J

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No violations ~or deviations were identifie .: NRC Bulletins (92703): l The. inspector reviewed the licensee's implementation 'of,the requirements of Bu11etin No. '.79-18, " Audibility Problems Encountered on- Evacuation of ,i

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Personnel from'High-Noise Areas." The. inspector was informed by, licensee m personnel :that -a Nuclear Station Modification. (NSM-00001) addressing th requirements of this Bulletin .was ' virtually : complete. .NSM-00001, >

initiated on November 1, ^1983, entailed the . installation of 'approximately; l 250 small, hard-wired' sirens throughout the station for. use in alerting 1 personnel in the event a site accountability / evacuation is' ordere j 1 InspeetorFollow-upl(92701) i

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(Closed). Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 413, 414/87-18-01: Training ~all- j

. persons on the Compliance Duty List' to serve . in the role 'of Compliance i Engineer as described' in. the Emergency Plan and EPIP Licensee j documentation showed that all members of the Compliance staff received i training on June 2,1987, regarding duties and responsibilities of the Compliance Engineer under Station Directive 3. j, u

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