IR 05000413/1990001

Insp Repts 50-413/90-01 & 50-414/90-01 on 900108-11. Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Followup to Operational Safety Team Insp

ML20011E993
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	02/05/1990
From:	Breslau B, Kellogg P, Mellen L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20011E986	List: IR 05000413/1990001
References
50-413-90-01, 50-413-90-1, 50-414-90-01, 50-414-90-1, NUDOCS 9002230376
Download: ML20011E993 (11)

Text

.

'

UNITE'S STATES

[p M:

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON o

,

~, ^

,,

1. '

• ,

REGION ll

f I

101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

I

ATLANT A, GEORGI A 30323

%,...../

Report Nos.:

50-413/90-01 and 50-414/90-01 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.:' 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52 Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted-January 8-11, 1990 Inspector :

to B. Breslau, Reactor Engineer Da'te ' Signed

's.W)A.

2/ rho

-. Mellen, ac or ngineer Date Signed Approved by:

u

/ We f

E fd c

P.'KelT $ f cnieT/

Da te' 51gned i

Operatio6al' Prog (ams Section

!

Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:

This announced inspection was conducted as a follow-up to the Operational Safety Team Inspection (OSTI) conducted April 10-May 5,1989, Inspection Report Nos. 50-413,414/89-09.

The scope cf this inspection-included review of one violation and 12 inspector follow-up items (IFI).

Items concerning E0Ps were not reviewed, they will be the subject of a future inspection.

.Results:

The review of the previous inspection findings indicated adequate corrective action had been completed for nine of the 13 items.

Items discussed in paragraphs 2.h.,j.,k., are incomplete and will be reviewed in a future inspection.

Items discussed in paragraphs 2.a,b.2), g..j...

were not completed within the-l time frame specified by the licensee, these are considered as exemples of a Deviation from an NRC commitment, hence, reflect adversely towards management's responsiveness to NRC issues.

,

One violation was identified, failure to request relief, as required by TS,

from meeting ASME specifications in the IST program, paragraph 2.g.

'

9002230376 900208 PDR ADOCK 05000413

.O PDC

i

,

.

E

.,

+

.

,,

REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee employees

• W. Beaver, III, Manager, Performance Engineering R. Bryant, NPD Planning

,'

G. Cornwell, NPD Maintenance Engineering Services

• T. Crowford Superintendent. Integrated Scheduling

• J. Forbes Superintendent Technical Services

• R. Glover, Manager, Compliance C. Hartzell, Manager, Compliance

• V. King, CNS compliance M. Kirksey, Performance Engineering

• T. Owen, Station Manager

• W. McCollum Superintendent Maintenance G. Rogers, Project Engineer

• Z. Taylor, Performance Engineering Other Licensee employees contacted included instructors, engineers, technicians, operators, and office personnel.

NRC Representatives

• M. Lesser, Resident Inspector

• Attended entrance interview Acronyms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.

2.

Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)

a.

(Closed)VIO 413/89-09-01, Failure to follow procedures, Unit 1 was operating at approximately 100 percent power; valve 1-KC-9 was not i

locked in position as procedurally required.

Also, a Unit 1 operator failed to frisk at the first available frisker after exiting contaminated areas in auxiliary building.

The inspectors reviewed completed work requests which were written as a result of the licensee's subsequent review.

The licensee's review determined the valve handwheel had come off the valve stem due to local vibrations. The completed work requests indicated that a bolt and washer were installed on each of the Component Cooling Water System pump suction and discharge valve stems. This appears to be an adequate corrective measure to avoid further occurrences.

The inspector's review of SD 3.8.3 (TS), Contamination Prevention, Control and Decontamination Responsibilities, Revision 25, indicated when a series of continuous entries / exits of contaminated areas are to occur over a two (2) hour period, the whole body frisk may be delayed until all exits on a single elevation are completed.

_

l'

.

,

.

.

.

'

,,

g

!

Also, if interruptions of these continuous entries / exits occurs, the worker shall perform the required frisking and proceed immediately to complete a whole body frisk. The inspector's interviews with the licensee has determined that this practice appears to be well understood by those interviewed. The licensee's corrective actions are considered adequate.

,

The licensee's response to this violation, dated August 10, 1989, committed to having corrective actions completed by September 1, 1989.

Review of the eight work requests indicates the work requests were written August 31, 1989, but work did not consnence until December 30, 1989.

Actual completion was accomplished on

!

January 2.1990.

The licensee failed to complete the corrective actions as committed to in their response and failed to request an extension when it became obvious that they would not meet the commitment date. This is identified as deviation 50-413/90-01-01.

i b.

(Closed)IFI 413,414/89-09-03, Controls on the thermal power computer and its inputs were weak.

This computer was used for normal determination of plant power level and for adjusting the gain on the

,

_'

nuclear instruments.

The licensee made two specific commitments, which were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-413,414/89-09, to strengthen the

<

controls on the thermal power computer and its inputs. The specific commitments and licensee actions are as follows:

1)

The procedure used to perform a check of the computer inputs to the thermal power calculation, PT/1/A/4150/03B, Revision 13. Thermal Outputs Inputs Reliability Check, will be added to the CPT tracking program.

The inspector reviewed the December 21, 1989, Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1. CPT Program, and verified that PT/1/A/4150/03B had been included in the program. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the most recent revision of the procedure from document control and confirmed the appropriate procedure had been included in the CPT.

2)

The Maintenance Management Procedure concerning control of the Standing Work Request program will be revised to ensure that the cognizant System Experts receive notification of any instrument calibration that will exceed its normal calibration frequency.

The inspector reviewed the draft changes for Attachment 2 of the Maintenance Management Procedure 3.5.

The

}

licensee did not meet their commitment date of December 1, 1989; this is an example of the deviation noted in paragraph 2.a.

However, the draft that was reviewed contained pertinent programmatic changes, a

.

-

-.

-

.

'

.,

-

c.

(Closed) IFI 413,414/89-09-04, One 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was weak concerning a modification to the nuclear service water pit strainer instrumentation.

Annunciators described in the FSAR were disabled for about 30 days with no written consideration of compensatory

,

action.

[

The licensee reexamined their 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation process as it pertains to compensatory measures and determined that an

evaluation of compensatory measures will not normally be included in the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.

'

d.

(Closed) IFI 413,414/89-09-05, Many of the site's safety related pump rooms are contaminated, which inhibits operator and management surveillance.

The inspector's tour of the plant revealed that the licensee's decontamination program following the OSTI review achieved a condition where all pump rooms are accessible for surveillance without the need for donning protective clothing.

Additionally,

,

the licensee has revised the monthly report documenting contamination status and decontamination efforts / plans to indicate under " Priority Items" a permanent category of " Contaminated Safety Related Pump

,

Rooms".

The licensee's efforts in this area are considered to be

'

adequate in alleviating a potential deterrent to operator and management surveillance of the contaminated pump rooms, e.

(Closed) IFI 413.414/89-09-06, Control of doors was weak, as indicated by the three open fire or security doors found by the NRC inspection team.

The NRC inspection Team identified three s)ecific doors that were not properly secured.

The licensee took tie following actions on these specific cases:

i

'

1)

The automatic closure device and the weather stripping on the door to the emergency diesel generator room (AX302) were replaced.

The inspector verified that this door closed properly.

2)

The floor tiles were replaced and a high spot on the concretc subfloor was ground down to permit unimpeded operation of Unit l

one control room door (S-400).

The inspector reviewed the l

completed maintenance work request 001593MES which was written to correct the identified deficiencies with the door.

The inspector discussed the work performed with the maintenance l

planner. There were no identified deficiencies.

L 3)

The door at the entrance to the IAE office area is a non-committed fire door (the door is in a non-vital area, but

!

designated as a fire door to prevent property damage).

The safety section at Catavaa has received permission from the

'

insurance carrier to allow the doors in this area to remain open when personnel are in tne area.

l

-

- - -

- - - -

-

-

-

-

-

'

.

.

'

• .

,,

.

i All Radiation Protection personnel were required to read the NRC Inspection Report section that addressed the fire doors.

The inspector reviewed the required reading and attendance sheets. All Radiation Protection employees were informed of the potential problems with fire doors.

A preventive maintenance program was established to inspect and maintain all doors in the auxiliary building and diesel generator i

rooms. The inspector reviewed a copy of the preventive maintenance schedule.

All NPD maintenance personnel and construction and maintenance i

personnel associated with the installation of flooring materials were cautioned to ensure door operation was not impaired by the

,

installation of flooring materials.

The inspector reviewed the training attendance sheet for this activity.

All non-committed fire doors will be marked with a permanent sign.

Any door that is not required to be maintained in the closed position will be marked to avoid confusion. These actions will be completed by March 1, 1990, f.

(Closed)IFI 413.414/89-09-07, In the IV and Safety Tag procedures, three items for potential improvement were identified.

These concerned the practice of both operators simultaneously verifying

,

valve positions; procedures allowed both operators to use the same remote indication to verify valve position, and procedures for restoration of a system during removal of a tag out did not

,

address alignment or independent verification of valves inside the tagout boundary.

The inspectors noted that the licensee's response to the weakness to IV and safety tag procedures stated no corrective action would be taken to require both operators to travel independently and that both operators could use the same remote indication to verify valve

'

position.

As noted in NRC response of November 6,1989, there is no regulatory requirement for independent travel.

However, optimum results have been achieved by others when both operators travel independently and at least one operator physically inspects the valve if possible.

The resident inspectors will continue to monitor this activity to assess the adequacy of this practice.

Additionally, the licensee's revised Operations Management Procedure 2-18, Tagout Removal and Restoration (R&R) Procedure, Revision 22, has been adequately revised to reflect the requirement to include, on the R&R tagout sheet, the valve /s on which maintenance is being performed.

This action provides adequate assurance that proper position restoration will be addressed upon work completio.

e p

I-

..

t

..

'

L

!

g.

(Closed)IFI 413,414/89-09-08, Several deficiencies were noted during observation of a performance test on one of the containment spray

'

pumps.

The NRC inspection identified a number of deficient areas during i:

observation of INS-1B performance test PT/1/A/4200/04C, changes 0 to 27 _ incorporated dated 4/30/86.

The specific deficiencies and

'-

the associated licensee corrective actions are as follows:

'

1)

No reference drawing is given for the KF system in section 2.0, References.

Valve 1KF 101B is referred to in enclosure 13.5.

This item will be resolved by the elimination of all references to the KF valves in the Containment Spray performance test procedures.

See notes 1, 2, 3 and 4.

2)

Performance test PT/1/A/4200/04C allowed pump operation with inadequate flow for a brief period of time.

This item will be resolved by noting throttle valve position for the NS pump after flow has been established. See notes 1, 2, 3, and 4.

3)

There is a significant digit mismatch between acceptance criteria and available data.

The required values in the procedure have many times the accuracy indicated in their significant figures than can be obtained through the measurement instrumentation available. The licensee does not intend to change the procedure to reflect a more realistic flow value.

Their position is the flow can be measured within the error band of the desired reading. While this is not an example of customary engineering practice, it is within the bounds of the IWP requirements.

4)

Communications between the remote location of the throttle valve and the meter that reads the flow was difficult during performance of the PT. The licensee's Performance Engineering group evaluated the communications during the PT and determined that the resolution of item 2 should correct the problem.

Item 2 has not been corrected in the existing procedures. See item 2 and notes 1, 2, 3, and 4.

5)

This item contained two separate parts as follows:

a)

Instrument INSTH5010 was broken with an incorrect (

laminate tag.

The item was resolved with the completion of work request 0512030PS, dated

'

August 7, 1989.

b)

NS pump 1B motor covers were either loose or missing.

The removal and reinstallation on these covers has been incorporated into procedure PT/1/A/4200/048.

The revision is included in issued change 10 for PT/2/A/4200/04B and change 9 for PT/2/A/4200/04C.

See note >

' '

..

'

7 note 1 The current revision of performance test PT/1/A/4200/04C changes 0 to 39, dated October 26, 1989, did not contain this revision.

The revision will be included i

in the as yet unissued change 40, note 2 The current revision of performance test PT/1/A/4200/04B, changes 0 to 35, dated December 13, 1989, did not contain this revision. The revision will be included in the as yet unissued change 36.

note 3 The current revision of performance test PT/2/A/4200/048,

changes 0 to 12, dated November 7, 1989, did not contain

this revision.

The revision will be included in the as

yet unissued change 13.

,

note 4 The current revision of performance test PT/1/A/4200/04C, changes 0 to ll, dated November 8,1989, did not contain this revision.

The revision will be included in the as yet unissued change 12.

The licensee did not meet the commitment completion date for updating the procedures, this is an additional example of the deviation noted in paragraph 2.a.

The inspector discussed the containment spray Performance Test procedures and the last performance of each procedure with staff members of the performance engineering group. The inspector noted that the four procedures, one for each of the core spray pumps, were

<

different although they accomplish the same task.

The majority of the differences were pen and ink type changes, some of which date

>

back to early 1986.

An example is PT/2/A/4200/04B which has 12 change requests that have approximately 60 steps or criteria that have been revised with pen and ink changes but have not been incorporated into the original issue of the procedure. The inspector was informed that all four of the procedures would be revised to include all previous revisions by March 31, 1990.

The inspector noted a number of minor procedural discrepancies that were discussed with the licensee.

These minor discrepancies will be included in the update that is scheduled to be completed by March 31, 1990.

An additional discrepancy was noted in enclosure 13.1, Test Equipment Information, for all four Containment Spray Pumps.

The accuracy listed for both the vibration meter and the vibration probe exceeded the values listed in ASME Section IX, Article IWP-4000,

'

Paragraph IWP-4110, Table IWP-4110-1.

In Technical Specification Section 4.0.5 the licensee committed to follow Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR Part 50 Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, Section50.55a(g)(6)(1).

}

'

'

.

' '

.

.

,

i The licensee further clarified their commitment in the Inservice Testing Program for Pumps and Valves by stating that this program f

is based upon the ASMC Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI,

,

Subsections IWP and IWV, 1983 Edition including addenda through the summer 1983 Addenda.

r P

The licensee's written request for relief from the Pump and Valve p

Inservice Testing Program was answered by NRC in a Safety Evaluation L

Report dated January 8, 1987.

In Section 2.1.2.1 the NRC denied the

'

L licensee's request to permit the use of portable instrumentation to measure vibration amplitude with an accuracy of plus or minus 11 percent full scale.

The NRC staff determined that the measure-ment accuracies identified in Table IWP-4110-1 (Vibration Amplitude of plus or minus 5 percent) should be achieved for these pumps in

order to provide reasonable assurance of their continuing operational readiness.

The NRC granted interim relief for the balance of the fuel cycle for both units (Unit 1 - October 2,1987, I

and Unit 2 - December 24,1987).

PT/1/A/4200/04C - the instrument accuracy requirements were not changed as required by the SER and remained at 11 percent without requesting additional relief from IST requirements until October 13, 1989, when the vibration meter accuracy requirements were changed without obtaining / submitting IST relief request to plus or minus 6

,

percent and the vibration probe accuracy requirements were changed to plus or minus 7.3 percent.

PT/1/A/4200/04B - the instrument accuracy requirements were not changed as required by the SER and remained at 11 percent without requesting additional relief from IST requirements until July 27, 1989, when it was changed to 5 percent.

The licensee determined that they could not meet the 5 percent accuracy required by the SER and on October 11, 1989, without obtaining / submitting IST relief request, the vibration meter accuracy requirements were changed to plus or minus 6 percent and the vibration probe

-

accuracy requirements were changed to plus or minus 7.3 percent.

PT/2/A/4200/040 - the instrument accuracy requirements were not changed as required by the SER and remained at 11 percent without requesting additional relief from IST requirements until August 8, 1989, when it was changed to 5 percent.

The licensee determined that they could not meet the 5 percent accuracy required by the p

SER and on September 13, 1989, without obtaining / submitting IST relief request, the vibration meter accuracy requirements were changed to plus or minus 6 percent and the vibration probe accuracy requirements were changed to plus or minus 7.3 percent.

,

PT/2/A/4200/04B - the instrument accuracy requirements were not changed as required by the SER and remained at 11 percent without requesting additional relief from IST requirements until July 25, 1989, when it was changed to 5 percent.

e

.

-

..,

-

The licensee determined that they could not meet the 5 percent accuracy required by the SER and on September 13, 1989, without obtaining / submitting IST relief request, the vibration meter accuracy requirements were changed to plus or minus 6 percent and the vibration probe accuracy requirements were changed to plus or minus 7.3 percent.

.'

The failure of the licensee to comply with the TS and SER when the interim relief from vibrational instrumentation accuracies had expired and the failure to seek subsequent relief as required by the TS and IWP when they became aware of the inaccuracy of the vibration equipment to measure plus or minus 5 percent is identified as violation 413,414/90-01-02.

h.

(0 pen)IFI 413,414/89-09-09, Scaffolding procedures did not address seismic considerations and resultant inoperability of safety equipment.

The licensee is developing generic scaffolding procedure guidelines to address concerns based on seismic considerations. A site specific procedure is to be generated by July 1,1990, to include information from the above guidelines to address seismic considerations in the erection of scaffolds..The revised procedure for this item will be reviewed in a future inspection.

1.

(Closed)IFI 413,414/89-09-10, IAE maintenance did not use portable equipment to facilitate timely locating of dc ground faults.

The licensee determined that the old test equipment, Electrom Co.

Model 201002 DC ground fault detector was too sensitive to surrounding noise, they have obtained an additional piece of test equipment which allows them to test for and locate DC ground faults more efficiently.

The licensee indicated that they will continue to explore all avenues to ensure the most efficient method is obtained to locate ground faults.

J.

(0 pen)IFI 413,414/89-09-16, Noise level in the control room during auto-start of both ventilation trains during S/I response was excessive and requires shouting for audible communications between personnel.

The licensee has completed a design study on control room ventilation auto-start during ECCS actuation.

Design Engineering proposed recommendations to management and concluded that installation of sound attenuation material in the return and discharge ducts associated with the Control Room air handling units with the procedural changes recommended will be sufficient to minimize the noise impact from the VC syste m f

!

-

'"

-

-

.

i The licensee committed to have a proposal for corrective action by

December 31, 1989. The licensee has not prepared a corrective action

'

proposal or implemented any further actions since this study. This is an example of the deviation noted in paragraph 2.a.

This item will remain open until the licensee has acted upor Design Engineering's recommendations.

A future inspection will review L

actions taken.

k.

(0 pen) IFI 413,414/89-09-18 The ETQS program was experiencing a

'

>

state of flux and communications feedback were noted as being weak.

The licensee is still developing the new program. Comunication of the new requirements will be conducted when the program is finalized.

The communication to personnel is reheduled to be completed by March 1, 1990.

The results of this program communication will be reviewed in a future inspection.

1.

(Closed) IFI 413,414/89-09-19 The high number (131) of TSMs and the duration of time some were open was considered a weakness.

The inspector reviewed documentation of the licensee's TSM review.

!

All TSMs have clearance dates and responsible departments assigned for clearing.

The licensee identified approximately 50 percent of the installed TSMs to be cleared in the 1990 outages.

The remaining TSMs which are not tied to an outage have been assigned an estimated clearing date.

The total number of TSMs (98) are trending down towards a goal of no more than 60 for both Units.

This area is considered to be receiving adequate attention, m.

(Closed)IFl 413,414/89-09-20, The separate reporting authority and duplication of support functions for the transmission group was considered as a weakness.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's' response to this issue, dated October 10, 1989. The clarification related to the functions of the transmission group provided sufficient information to consider this area as adequate.

3.

Exit Interview An exit interview was conducted on January 11, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above.

The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results noted below.

Proprietary information is not contained in this report.

Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

Item Number Status Description / Reference Paragraph 50-413/90-01-01 OPEN DEV - The licensee failed to complete the corrective actions as committed to in their response to Vio 413/89-09-01 and faikt te request an extension of the commitment date, paragraph 2.a,b.2),g.j.

.

-..

.

.

+'

,

,

~

'

-

..

50-413.414/90-01-02 OPEN VIO - The licensee failed to seek relief from IST requirements prior to changing testing criteria, paragraph 2.g 4.

Acronyms ASME American Society Mechanical Engineers

.. I AE Instrumentation and Electrical CNS Catawba Nuclear Station CPT Catawba Periodic Test DEV Deviation ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System E0P Emergency Operating Procedure ETQS Employee Training and Qualification System FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report IFI Inspector Follow-up Item IST Inservice Test IV Independent Verification NPD Nuclear Production Department NRC Nuclear Regulatory Connission OSTI Operational Safety Team Inspection R&R Removal & Restoration SD Station Directive SER Sd aty Evaluation Report S/I Safety Injection TS Technical Specification TSM

. Temporary Station Mortifications VC Ventilation Control VIO Violation I