IR 05000413/1993030

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Insp Repts 50-413/93-30 & 50-414/93-30 on 931116-19.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Isi - Observation of Work Activiities & Review of Recorded Data Associated W/First ten-year Insp Interval Ultrasonic Exams
ML20059B426
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/03/1993
From: Blake J, Coley J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059B411 List:
References
50-413-93-30, 50-414-93-30, NUDOCS 9401040130
Download: ML20059B426 (8)


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UNITED STATES b

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101 MARTETTA STREET. N.W., SUITE.'900 7. g j

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199 f.

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i Report Nos.:

50-413/93-30 and 50-414/93-30 l

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Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52 Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: November 16-19, 1993 J. LM. M.

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Inspector:

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Date Signed Approved by:

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J. J B 4kE, Chief Date Signed Ma ri

's and Processes Section En in ering Branch Division of Reactor Safety

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SUMMARY l

Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of inservice inspection (ISI) - observation of work activities and review of recorded data associated with the first ten-year inspection interval ultrasonic examinations

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of the Unit I reactor vessel. Examination activities related to the Unit 1 in-vessel remote visual examinations were also reviewed.

Results:

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t In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.

Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) Nuclear services, the vendor contracted by the

licensee to conducted the first ten-year inspection interval ultrasonic

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examinations of the Unit I reactor vessel, had prepared well for the examina-tions.

Equipment certifications were well documented and personnel certifica-tions revealed a high level of professional and technical experience. The automated reactor inspection system (ARIS II) functioned well and data

reviewed by the inspector revealed that the vessel welds examined to date did

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not have any serious discontinuities. Two concerns however, were identified by the inspector during the inspection. The first concern dealt with the failure of visual examiners to interpret whether recorded discontinuitier are

Code relevant or non-relevant and to describe the deficient condition with

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sufficient detail that the Level III Examiner can make the proper disposition (paragraph 4). The inspector's second concern identified that inadequate communications had occurred in that, although the licensees technical services manager and level III examiner were aware of a recent reported through-wall crack event (September 16,1993) in the pressurizer PORV line at the Palisades facility, the site responsible ISI Coordinator for the Catawba facility had not been informed (paragraph 3). Obtaining information concerning the lessons learned from the Palisades event could prove to be very helpful to the licensee when performing their examination this outage.

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REPORT DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • D. Cabe, ARIS Project Manager
  • J. Coleman, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance Quality Control
  • S. Coy, Manager, Radiation Protection
  • W. Deal, Manager, Customer Support
  • J. Forbes, Manager, Engineering
  • R. Giles, ISI Coordinator
  • S. Lefler, Mechanical / Nuclear Engineering
  • J. Lowery. Regulatory Compliance Specialist
  • W. Mc Collum Jr., Station Manager
  • D. Rehn, Vice President

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  • G. Robinson, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance Quality Assurance

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  • Z. Taylor, Manager, Compliance

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Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, technicians, and administrative personnel.

Other Organizations

  • A. Richmond, Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Technologies NRC Resident Inspector
  • R. Freudeneberger, Senior Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview

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Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the i

last paragraph.

2.

Inservice Inspection - Observation of Examination Activities for the First Ten-Year Interval Reactor Vessel Automated Ultrasonic Examinations Unit 1 (73052, 73753, and 73755)

i Background Catawba Unit 1 is presently in refueling outage No. 7, which is the second outage in the third period of the first ten-year inspection interval. Unit I started comercial operation on June 29, 1985 and the first inspection interval will be concluded on June 29, 1995. Although the licensee has one more refueling outage prior to the conclusion of the first ten-year interval, the ten-year automated ultrasonic examinations

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of the reactor vessel are being performed this outage.

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The applicable code.for the ISI examinations of the reactor vessel welds i

and associated. piping welds.for Unit 1 is the ASME B&PV Code, Sections V

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and XI, 1980 Edition through the Winter-1981 Addenda.

However the outlet nozzle to. safe end welds, outlet nozzle safe end to pipe welds,. and

outlet nozzle to vessel welds will be performed using the 1992 Edition, j

with the exception of Appendix VIII and Appendix.III, III-2120(c) and-i III-2200(b) requirements.' The licensee has contracted B&W Nuclear-

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Services to perform the first ten year interval automated ultrasonic -

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examination for the reactor vessel. B&W was using their Automated i

Reactor Inspection System (ARIS II) to scan the welds and data was

collected and analyzed with their ACCUSONEX data acquisition and imaging system.

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Observation of In-Vessel Ultrasonic Examination Activities The inspector reviewed data and observed the inspection activities

delineated below to determine whether the examination of the Unit I reactor vessel was conducted in accordance with the Technical

Specifications, the applicable ASME Code, and augmented. requirements

imposed by NRC/ industry initiatives.

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The following transducer scan coverage drawings were reviewed by the-inspector to determine whether each weld would obtain. proper exami -

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nation coverage based on the ARIS scanning fixture configuration:

Drawino Not Weld No.

Weld Confiouration 1227621-D, Rev.1 W-1 Circumferential Seam 1227620-D, Rev.1 W-2 Meridional. Seams i

1227619-D, Rev.1 W-3 Circumferential Seam-

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1227618-D, Rev.1 W-4 & W-5 Circumferential Seam 1227617-D, Rev.1 W-6 Circumferential Seam i

1227616-D, Rev.1 W-7 Circumferential Seam

1227622-D, Rev.1 W-Inlet Inlet-Nozzle Weld.

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1227623-D, Rev.1 W-Outlet Outlet Nozzle Weld -

Examiner qualification-and certification records for the. following B&W personnel were reviewed by the inspector:

Examiner Certification level

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S.R.B.

Level II

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G.A.C.

Level II Limited M.G.H.

Level III j

S.M.H.

Level II-

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C.E.M.

Level II

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D.S.M.

Level I Limited

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Level II

B.E.R.

Level II

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A.R.

Level II R.L.R.

Level II i

H.W.S.

Level III i

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Examiner Certification Review Cont'd Examiner Certification Level J.T.

Level II The inspector observed B&W's examiners and equipment operators

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acquire data with the ACCUSONEX data acquisition and imaging system for the Nozzle welds listed below:

Weld No.

Weld Description IRPV-W13 Inlet Nozzle Forging To Shell At 247 Degrees From Vessel ID 1RPV-W13 Inlet Nozzle Forging To Shell At 247 Degrees From Nozzle ID

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IRPV-W14 Inlet Nozzle Forging To Shell At 293 Degrees From Vessel ID 1RPV-W14 Inlet Nozzle Forging To Shell At 293 Degrees From Nozzle ID 1RPV-W15 Outlet Nozzle Forging To Shell I

At 22 Degrees From Vessel ID 1RPV-W15

.0utlet Nozzle Forging To Shell

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At 22 Degrees From Nozzle 10 The inspector also observed B&W's 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> In-vessel calibration verification activities after the completion of Weld No. IRPV-W13.

l The following system channels, transducer angles, and transducers were verified:

System Channel No. Transducer Anale Transducer Serial No.

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Channel No.1 60 Degree Shear S/N 5604-93002 Channel No. 2 70 Degree Longitudinal S/N 9731-93004

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Channel No. 3 45 Degree Shear S/N 5508-93005

Channel No. 4 45 Degree Longitudinal S/N 5121-93004 Channel No. 5 0 Degree Longitudinal S/N 5008-93001 Channel No. 6 70 Degree Longitudinal S/N 9731-93005

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Channel No. 7 60 Degree Shear S/N 5604-93004 l

Channel No. 8 45 Degree Longitudinal S/N 5121-93005 Channel No. 9 45 Degree Shear S/N 5508-93006 Each of the above areas were examined by the inspector to determine whether the following criteria was met:

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  • Approved procedures were being followed

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  • Specified equipment is being used
  • Personnel are knowledgeable cf examination method and operation of test equipment
  • Examination personnel with proper level of qualification and certification are performing the various examination activities

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  • Proper weld coverage was obtained
  • Ultrasonic sound penetration of the clad forged rings and vessel welds was obtained b.

Review of Recorded Ultrasonic Data Ultrasonic data acquired on the Unit I reactor vessel with the ACCUSONEX system was transmitted to B&W's Lynchburg, Virginia facility by telephone for final analysis and evaluation.

B&W's Level III at the Catawba facility however, had the capability to review this preliminary data to insure that the ACCUSONEX system was functioning correctly and acquiring the data properly. Analysis of the data acquired during system calibrations and calibration verifi-cation checks was also conducted by B&W's Level III examiner at the Catawba facility.

The inspector audited the B&W Level III examiner's review of the data listed below to determine whether_the examination process was performed satisfactorily and whether any significant indications had been recorded:

Weld No.

Weld Confiouration Scan Position

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1RPV-W05 Circumferential Weld 70*

-63* To +66*

1RPV-WO5 Circumferential Weld 60*

-4* To 60*

1RPV-WO5 Circumferential Weld 45'

0* To 60*

1RPV-W05 Circumferential Weld O'

0* To 60*

IRPV-WO5 Circumferential Weld 60*

-4* To 60*

1RPV-WO5 Circumferential Weld 60*

218' To 240*

1RPV-WO5 Circumferential Weld 45'

218' To 240*

1RPV-WOS Circumferential Weld 60*

218' To 240*

1RPV-WO5 Circumferential Weld 70*

218' To 240*

1RPV-W15 Outlet Nozzle 70*

0* To 360*

1RPV-W15 Outlet Nozzle 45'

0* To 360 1RPV-W15 Outlet Nozzle O'

0* To 360*

1RPV-W16 Outlet Nozzle 60*

0* To 90*

1RPV-W16 Outlet Nozzle 45'

0* To 90*

1RPV-W16 Outlet Nozzle 60*

90* To 180*

1RPV-W16 Outlet Nozzle 45'

90* To 180*

1RPV-W16 Outlet Nozzle O'

90* To 180*

Within the areas examined, no violation or deviation was identified.

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Review of ISI Outage Plan - Unit 1 (73753)

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The inspector's review of the licensees ISI outage plan and subsequent discussions held with the ISI Coordinator revealed that inadequate commu -

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nications had occurred between the licensees inspection services depart-ment and the site ISI coordinator. This communication failure consisted

~ f the inspection services manager and level III examiner being aware of i

o a recent reported through-wall crack event (September 16, 1993) at the

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Palisades facility, however the site responsible ISI Coordinator for the'.

Catawba facility had not been informed. The event involved the failure

of two separate inspection agencies to identifyLa significant primary

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water stress corrosion crack during ultrasonic examinations on a dis-similar metal weld for the 4 ' inch non-isolable pressurizer power operated relief valve line. The ISI outage plan for the Catawba facility-identi-

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fied that the licensee intended to examine the same weld on the Unit 1.

pressurizer this outage.

Information concerning lessons learned from the

Palisades event could prove to be very helpful to the licensee when l

performing this examination.

l Within the areas examined, no violation or deviation was identified.

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4.

Observation of In-Vessel Visual Examinations - Unit 1 (73753)

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The inspector observed the in-vessel visual examinations listed below to determine whether the licensee was performing the ISI of these components in accordance'with ASME,Section XI, 1980 Edition-with Addenda through

Winter 1981 and Duke Power Company's (DPC) Visual Examination Procedure

No. QAL-14 Rev. 13. The examination of the following components were j

observed by the inspector.

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Upper Support Plate

Guide Tube Welds

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Weld Joints on Accessible Support Columns I

Accessible Support Columns and Upper Core Plate j

r The inspector also reviewed the above examinations to determine whether

the examination personnel are knowledgeable of the_ examination method, qualified with the proper level of certification for the. examination

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activities, and that the examination results and evaluation of the l

results are recorded as specified in the visual. examination procedure.

The inspector's.eview of data taken by the level II visual examiners-revealed that the examiners were recording all observed discontinuities

whether the indications were Code relevant or non-relevant.

Failure of'

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the examiners to interpret, properly describe, and evaluate the observed-

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condition required a subsequent review of all the reported data.

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Discussions were held with cognizant DPC management personnel to address this concern and immediate corrective action was taken. This corrective action consisted of reviewing the tapes, determining which indications

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were recordable, and properly describing the condition (with dimensions

where needed) so that the level III examiner has enough information to properly disposition the condition as discussed in DPC's Procedure No.

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QA-516, " Evaluation of ISI Indications".

Within the areas examined, no violation or deviation was identified.

4.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized in November 19, 1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.

The inspector described the

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areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.

Propri-i etary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments

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were not received from the licensee.

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5.

Acronyms and Initialisms ASME

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American Society Of Mechanical Engineers ARIS

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Automated Reactor Inspection System

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B&PV

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Boiler and Pressure Vessel B&W

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Babcock and Wilcox DPC

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Duke Power Company

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ID

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Inside Diameter ISI

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Inservice Inspection Rev.

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Revision No.

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Number Nos.

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Numbers

RPV

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Reactor Pressure Vessel

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