IR 05000413/1987007

Insp Repts 50-413/87-07 & 50-414-/87-07 on 870217-24.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Evaluation of Annual Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20197D241
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	03/10/1987
From:	Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20197D239	List: IR 05000413/1987007 ML20197D233
References
50-413-87-07, 50-413-87-7, 50-414-87-07, 50-414-87-7, NUDOCS 8703230522
Download: ML20197D241 (23)

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Ce:g UNITE 3 STATES..'

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'

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REGION 11

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ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323

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19R 101987

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Report Nos.: 50-413/87-07 and 50-414/87-07

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L Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street s

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Charlotte, NC 28242

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Docket Nos.:

50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-48

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Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Conduc ed:

February 17-24, 1987

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Inspe.or:

, t44 b 3-/8-87 ( A. L unningham Date Signed Accompanying Personnel:

J. M. Will, Jr.

M. E. Stein

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E. M. Podolak l

P. K. VanDoor

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Approve [dby:

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vr T./If. Decker, Section chief Date Signed

EmWgency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch

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Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

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SUl#tARY Scope:

This routine announced inspection involved evaluation of the annual radiological emergency preparedness exercise.

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Results: No violations or deviations were identified, t

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• J. W. Harrpton, Station Manager

• H. B. Barron Superintendent of Operations

• F. Wardell, Superintendent of Technical Services

• B. F. Caldwell, Superintendent of Station Services

• D. S. Lee, Staff Health Physicist

• G. L. Courtney, Staff Health Physics Coordinator

• W. P. Deal, Station Health Physicist

• M. Bolch, Station Emergency Planner

• R. Harris, System Emergency Planner

• J. W. Cox, Station Training Manager

• L. Hartzog, Corbpliance Engineer

• D. P. Simpson, Licensing Specialist

• W. B. Carroll, Security Captain Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, nechanics, security office nenbers and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspector

• P. K. VanDoorn M. l. esser

• Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 20, 1987, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

The exercise weaknesses identified herein were discussed during the critique, and later on February 24, 1987.

No dissenting contrents were expressed by the licensee.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed during the inspection.

No previcus enforcement matters remain outstanding.

Exercise Scenario (82301)

The scenario for the errergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the tasic elerrents defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and

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i organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of

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NUREG-0654.

i The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and

discussed in detail with licensee representatives on several occasions.

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While no major scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies

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became apparent during the exercise. The inconsistencies, however, failed

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to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency l

organization.

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j The scenario developed for this exercise adequately exercised the onsite i

emergency organization, and provided information to the State, counties, i

local governments, and Federal agencies consistent with their participation in the exercise.

Evaluation of the exercise disclosed that the licensee failed to adequately demonstrate the exercise objective

regarding access control for the Operations Support Center (OSC).

Accordingly, no evidence of the subject control for the facility was observed throughout the exercise.

This finding was fully discussed with

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licensee representatives during the critique, and later via telephone on

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February 24, 1987. The licensee acknowledged the finding.

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Exercise Weakness 50-413/87-07-01, 50-414/87-07-01:

Failure to demonstrate access control measures for the OSC defined as an exercise

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objective.

This item will be reviewed during subsequent exercises.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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DrillScenarios(82301)

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Scenarios for the nedical emergency, fire, and offsite radiological

I wonitoring drills were reviewed to assure that provisions were made to

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test specific functions in the licensee's Emergency Plan pursuant to l

10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and

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specific guidance defined in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.

l Scenarios developed for the subject drills were detailed, and fully

exercised the licensee's emergency response organization and i

participating offsite support agencies. The scenarios provided sufficient

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information to the local support agencies consistent with the scope of l

their participation in the drills, i

The licensee and offsite support agencies demonstrated a significant l

consnitment to training and personnel by use of cognizant controllers,

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evaluators, and specialists participating in the nedical emergency, fire, and radiological nonitoring drills.

The controllers provided adequate

,l guidance throughout the drills.

The scope and objectives of each drill l

were fully implemented.

Significant improvements in radiological l

monitoring and surveillance were observed regarding location and

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I consistent tracking of the simulated radioactive plume.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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Assignnent of Responsibility (82301)

This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an crergency pursuant to 10CFR50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.

The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the energency response organization was not required.

Discussions with licensee representatives and detailed review of the site Radiological Energency Plan indicated that a sufficient number of trained technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed.

The inspector also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the Technical Support Center (TSC), and Operations Support Center (OSC).

At the response facilities cited, required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the licensee's Emergency Plan and approved Implementing Procedures.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.

OnsiteEmergencyOrganization(82301)

The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirenents were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:

(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organizational interactions.

The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined, and staff was available to fill key functional positions within the organization.

The Plant Manager was notified via telephone, and returned to the plant site within the allotted time to complete activation of the TSC.

Augnentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of available onshift personnel.

The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Plant Manager.

Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response

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organization and State and local support agencies were adequate and

consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)

This area was observed to assure that the following arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3); Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50[1)

and guidance promulgated in Section II.C of NUREG-0654, namely:

acconnodation of selected State emergency response representatives at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility; and (2) identification of organizations capable of augnenting the planned response.

The scope of the subject exercise was confined to the onsite emergency response organization.

Interaction with offsite support agencies was limited to initial notifications attending emergency classification declarations, and assistance involving the medical emergency and fire drills.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Energency Classification System (82301)

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This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee

.1 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,

specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended in IE Information Notice 83-28.

An Emergency Action Level (EAL) matrix was used to promptly identify and properly classify an emergency and escalate it to more severe emergency

classifications as the simulated accident sequence progressed.

Licensee actions in this area were timely and effective.

Inspection confirned that the Emergency Action Levels were consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and the regulatory requirements and guidance cited above.

No violations or deviations were identified..

10. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations were established.

This area was further observed to assure that neans to provide early notification to the populace within the plure exposure pathway were establishod pursuant to t

10CFR50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D cf Appendix E to 10 ffR 50, and

specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654

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The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available for use in providing information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization, if required.

Notification of the State of South Carolina and other designated offsite response organizations was completed within 15 minutes following declaration of the Alert and Site Area Emergency classifications.

Inspection disclosed that the licensee consistently demonstrated confusion regarding the specific time of declaration of the Alert and the Site Area Emergency.

In both instances, a corrected initial warning message was required to define real time for each of the above declarations.

The following related findings were also disclosed, namely:

(1) apparent failure of the Energency Coordinator to followup (or designate such followup) of the initial notification of the Site Area Emergency to assure that offsite agencies were informed of the plant emergency status; (2) the Coordinator was unaware that the NRC was not informed of the subject classification.

The notification, however, was later made.

These findings were discussed in detail with the licensee during the critique, and later via telephone on February 24, 1987.

The licensee acknowledged the findings.

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. Exercise Weakness 50-413/87-07-02, 50-414/87-07-02:

Training of site

' emergency response organization principals and assigned alternates regarding the timing of emergency classification declarations, and

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. required followup of initial notification of offsite agencies. This item will be reviewed during subsequent exercises.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Emergency Comunications (82301)

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This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt

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tgamunications among principal response organizations and energency

.,sparsdanel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 C W 50, and guidance promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-0654.

Tho' inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's

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Control: Room and energency response facilities (TSC and OSC), between the

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licens6a and offsite agencies, and between the offsite environmental H

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monitoring teams and the TSC.

The inspectors also observed information

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flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency t

organization.

It was observed by NRC and licensee evaluators that

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i, audibility of telephone speakers in the TSC and the plant public address system in the Control Poom, TSC and OSC was low. This item was documented

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by the licGnsee as an identified inprovement.

i No violations.or deviations were identified.

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12. Energency Facilities and Equipment (82301)

n This. area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to supply. an emergency " response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.~47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,

.and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-0654.-

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The inspector' observed activation, staffing, and-operation of the emergency response facilities, and observed the use of equipment therein.

Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the. Control Room (CR), Technical support Center, and Operations

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Support Center, Control Room - The inspSctor observed that following review and a.

analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergency.

Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and. factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises.

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Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational duties. Effective management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise leveh required for the

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orderly conduct of ~ operations under emergency conditions.

The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of their duties, responsibilities, and authorities.

These personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and declare the proper emergency classification.

It was observed by NRC inspectors, however, that selected areas required imp (rovements in management and control of the Control Room, namely:

1) the Shift Supervisor did not inform the staff that he was the Emergency Coordinator until formally relieved; (2) clear and concise i

announcements were not made by the Emergency Coordinator when changes to specific EALs were implemented in escalating to a higher emergency classification; (3) sufficient periodic updating of the plant staff by the Emergency Coordinator of degrading plant conditions was not l

made; (4) sufficient followup of initial notifications to assure that L

all offsite agencies were informed of plant emergency status were not i

implemented (see Paragraph 10, above).

The indicated improvements

were discussed with the licensee during the critique, and later via l

telephone on February 24, 1987.

These items were documented by the licensee for review and followup.

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Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed L

following notification by the Emergency Director of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the Site Area Emergency classification.

The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilities.

Required i

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operations at the facility proceeded in an orderly manner.

This facility was provided with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staff.

Access control for the facility was established and adequate security was posted at the facility entrance.

The independent ventilation system was operational during the exercise, and radiological habitability was frequently monitored.

Dedicated communicators were assigned to the TSC, and required followup notifications 6,ere inplemer:ed.

The status of facility comunications is discussed in Paragraph 11, above, c.

Operations Support Center - The OSC was promptly staffed following activation of the emergency plan by the Emergency Coordinator.

It was observed that teams were assembled and prepared for deployment.

During operation of this facility, radiological habitability was routinely monitored.

Inspection disclosed that effective command and control of the subject facility was not demonstrated.

The following items were observed, namely:

(1) the OSC Coordinator was clearly not in command of the staff; (2) activation of the facility was not declared, and the staff was not appraised of plant conditions following facility activation; (3) coordination of OSC operations was poor, e.g.,

several maintenance teams were dispatched in an untimely manner, several maintenance personnel were dispatched from the TSC; (4)

maintenance of a facility log was not observed; (5) briefing and debriefing of teams were conducted regarding health physics considerations, but no such briefings were observed for technical matters. The subject findings were fully discussed with the licensee during the critique, and later via telephone on February 24, 1987.

The licensee acknowledged the findings.

d.

Exercise Weakness 50-413/87-07-03, 50-414/87-07-03:

Failure to demonstrate command and control of response activities in the Control Room and OSC necessary to assure prompt initiation and completion of accident mitigation.

This item will be reviewed during subsequent exercises.

No violations or deviations were identified.

13. Accident Assessment (82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria in Section II.I of NUREG-0654.

The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.

During the exercise, the

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engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively, except as discussed in the preceding Section, in analyzing plant status to provide recommendations to the Emergency Coordinator concerning mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems and equipment, control of releases of radioactive neterials, and termination of the emergency condition.

Radiological assessment activities demonstrated during the radiological monitoring drill involved several groups.

An inplant group was effective in estimating the radiological impact within the plant based on inplant monitoring and onsite measurements. Offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume.

Radiological effluent data was received in the TSC.

Routine inventory and verification of the contents of monitoring kits issued to offsite radiation monitoring team personnel was conducted.

It was noted that required contents of each kit were provided and were consistent with assigned inventories.

No violations or deviations were identified.

14.

Protective Response (82301)

This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions, consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of non-essential personnel, were promptly implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific criteria promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.

The exercise scenario involved no offsite radioactive release; however, the radiological monitoring drill scenario and the objectives thereof, included demonstration of the ability to develop timely and appropriate protective action recomiendations based upon radiological conditions, and the criteria defined above.

Protective actions regarding sheltering and evacuation of area occupants, where indicated, were promptly determined.

Drill objectives were effectively implemented.

No violations or deviations were identified.

15.

Radiological Exposure Control (82301)

This area was observed to determine that methods for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented for emergency wcrkers, and that these methods included exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific criteria defined in Section II.K of NUREG-0654.

An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers and

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by conducting periodic radiological surveys in the emergency response facilities.

Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of emergency actions, and adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection was available for use as appropriate.

Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation area access appeared adequate.

Health physics briefing of OSC survey teams prior to their deployment was adequate.

Dosimetry was available and appropriately used.

High range dosimeters were also available in case they were needed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

16.

ExerciseCritique(82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise,.were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E, 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.

A formal critique was held on February 20, 1987, with exercise controllers and observers, licensee management, and NRC representatives.

Weaknesses identified during the exercise were discussed.

Licensee action on identified weaknesses will be reviewed during subsequent inspections. The licensee's critique was detailed, and addressed both substantive deficiencies and indicated improvement items.

The conduct and content of the critique was consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance cited above.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Inspector Followup Items (92701)

(Closed) IFI 50-413/86-08-01, 50-414/86-08-01:

Failure to classify a SAE per Emergency Flowchart Event 4.14 of Procedure RP/A/5000/01 - Exercise Weakness.

Inspection disclosed that the subject procedure was promptly and effectively used in determining emergency classification.

(Closed) IFI 50-413/86-08-02, 50-414/86-08-02:

Maintain a Control Room log during facility participation in exercises and drills.

Inspecticn disclosed that adequate logging was maintained throughout the subject exercise.

(Closed) IFI 50-413/86-08-03, 50-414/86-08-03:

Consistent failure of TSC field team coordinators to direct field teams to locate and define plume center line - Exercise Weakness.

Observation of the radiological monitoring drill disclosed that location and tracking of the simulated plume were readily implemente.

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(Closed) IFI 50-413/86-08-04, 50-414/86-08-04:

Failure to -identify and factor into accident assessment and mitigation of critical parameters contributing to accident and major effects resulting therefrom - Exercise Weakness.

Inspection disclosed that all accident parameters were factored into. required mitigating, repair, and investigative exercises.

(Closed) IFI 50-413/86-08-05, 50-414/86-08-05:

. Provide updated.and effectively ' illustrated maps of offsite radiological sampling and surveillance stations to field monitoring -teams.

Inspection disclosed that revised maps were issued to correct the subject finding.

Attachment:

Exercise Scope and Objectives

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CONFIDENTIAL Catawba Nuclear Station 1987 Exercise

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SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES A.

Scope The 1987 Catawba Nuclear Station exercise is designed to meet the exercise requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E Section IV.F.

The exercise will involve full participation by the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operational Support Center (OSC).

The Crisis Management Center will not participate.

Also, the States and the counties within the plume exposure EPZ will not participate except to receive initial notifications.

On February 19, 1987 an exercise involving a simulated reactor accident will be held to test the integrated capabilities and a major portion of the basic elements within the emergency plans and organizations.

This exercise will simulate emergency conditions which would require response by on-site personnel.

The exercise will begin between 6:00 p.m. and midnight and will not involve a radiological release.

Exercise objectives are provided in Section I. B.1.

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Also on February 19, 1987, a radiological monitoring drill will be held.

This drill will involve a simulated radiological release and will test the capabilities for radiological dose projections and off-site monitoring.

Drill objectives are provided in Section I.B.2.

On February 18-19, 1987, two additional drills will be held. A medical drill will be held to involve a contaminated, injured individual.

A fire drill will be held to involve response by the on-site fire brigade and the off-site fire department.

A formal critique involving Duke Power and NRC will be held on

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February 20, 1986 at 2:00 p.m.

This critique will be closed to the public and will be held in the Catawba Administration Building.

l B.

Exercise Objectives 1.

Reactor Accident Exercise i

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Demonstrate the ability to declare emergency classifica-tion in accordance with station procedures.

b.

Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staff the i

TSC and OSC facilities after declaring an Alert or Higher emergency class.

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Demonstrate assembly of station personnel within 30 minutes in a simulated emergency and identify anyone not present at

the assembly locations.

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Test communications equipment among on-site emergency facilities including plant extensions and intercons.

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Test off-site communications equipment to the counties and states and to NRC including the Selective Signaling System and the NRC Emergency Notification System.

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Test the adequacy and operability of emergency equipment /

supplies.

g.

Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Shift Supervisor in the Control Room to the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC.

h.

Demonstrate proper use of the message format and authentication methodology for messages transmitted to states and counties.

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Demonstrate the ability to notify the states and the counties within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency or after changing the emergency class.

j.

Demonstrate the ability to notify NRC immediately after notification of the states and counties and not later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after declaring one of the emergency classes, k.

Demonstrate access control measures for the control room, TSC, and OSC.

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Demonstrate the ability to transmit data using the Crisis Management Data Transmittal System in accordance with station procedures.

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Evaluate the adequacy of the following assessment tools:

(1) Drawings (2) Status Boards (3) Maps n.

Test the ability to provide adequate on-site radiological monitoring and personnel dose record control.

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Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and appropriate protective action recommendations in accordance with station procedures.

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Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and provide mitigation strategies in accordance with station procedures.

2.

Radiological Monitoring Drill a.

Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate recommendations regarding emergency classification based

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upon radiological conditions in accordance with station procedures.

b.

Demonstrate the ability to develop timely and appropriate protective action recommendations based upon radiological conditions in accordance with station procedures.

c.

Test the adequacy and operability of emergency equipment and supplies.

d.

Evaluate the adequacy of the following assessment tools:

(1) Drawings (2) Status Boards (3) Maps e.

Demonstrate the ability to determine the location and magnitude of a plume from an atmospheric, radiological release, f.

Demonstrate adequate radio communications with the off-site monitoring teams.

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Demonstrate the ability to develop off-site dose

. projections in accordance with station procedures, h.

Demonstrate the ability to collect soil, water, and vegetation samples in accordance with station procedures.

3.

Medical Drill a.

Demonstrate proper response in accordance with station procedures to a simulated medical injury involving a contaminated patient.

4.

Fire Drill a.

Demonstrate response in accordance with station procedures by the on-site fire brigade to a simulated fire.

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Demonstrate the ability to request and obtain fire-fighting support from the off-site department,

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CONFIDENTIAL

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

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February 19, 1987 Time (hours)

Event

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i 1900 Exercise begins with Unit 2 at 100% power.

They have an unidentified primary system leak of approximately 1 gym which occurred at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> (before the exercise).

This is an unusual event classification.

1910 Leak increases to approximately 80 gym.

This should cause,them to upgrade status to an alert condition.

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1930 Reactor is tripped by this time with operators reducing power.

2005 Leak increases to beyond the capacity of normal

charging system.

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2005:30 Safety injection signal is initiated by Low Primary system pressure.

The following actions take place e the ECCS pumps:

(a)

Train A centrifugal charging (NV) pump shuts down due to mechanical failure

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(b)

Train B NV pump starts normally

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(c)

Train A Safety Injection (NI)

pump is in maintenance

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(d)

Train B NI pump fails to receive SI signal

(e)

Both Residual Heat Removal (ND) pumps start j

normally..

This situation is classified as a Site Area Emergency due to LOCA greater than ECCS capacity.

i 2006 HI-Hi containment pressure signal is received.

Both Containment Spray (NS) pumps start normally.

l 2010 Subcooled Margin 0 0 F. Operators should turn NC pumps i

off per procedure.

l 2035 Both NI pumps are returned to service and begin to draw suction from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST).

2040 FWST Low Level indication of 37% received.

Switchover of the ECCS pumps to the sump should begin.

2047 FWST Low-Low level indication of 11%

received.

l Switchover of the NS pumps to the sump should begin.

2200 Drill ends.

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RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING DRILL

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' February 19, 1987 The following drill scenario was developed specifically to evalute the emergency preparedness of the Dose Assessment and Field Monitoring groups.

The drill scenario does not factor in actions of other groups (OPS, Maintenance, IEE, etc.),

which might mitigate the accident or factor in protective action recommendations that they might do.

All the data provided is all that is necessary to make it through the drill.

If the controller does not have specific data that is requested, it therefore, is not needed to satisfactorily progress through the drill.

The drill scenario is a core melt sequence with the release path through stuck Containment Air Release and Addition valves, then through the unit vent.

the discharge it filtered through charcoal filters; therefore, the plume is considered 99% noble gases.

Particulate and iodines are not considered for this drill.

Players will include:

Emergency Coordinator Station Health Physicist

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Dose Assessment Group Field Monitoring Group Offsite consnunicator Performance Engineer l

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O CATAETBANUCLEARSTATION ANNUAL FIRST RESPONDER / PIEDMONT MEDICAL CENTER EXERCISE FEBRUARY, 1987 PURPOSE-THE PURPOSE OF THE DRILL IS TO EVALUATE THE ABILITY OF STATION PERSONNEL TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE FIRST AID TREATMENT TO AN INJURED EMPLOYEE WHO IS CONTAMINATED. THE DRILL WILL ALSO EVALUATE THE ABILITY OF STATION PER-SONNEL TO MONITOR AND CONTROL RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION AND TO SUCCESS-FULLY DECONTAMINATE AN INJURED EMPLOYEE LTILIZING PROPER HEALTH PHYSICS

PRACTICES.

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OBJECTIVES

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UPON TERMINATI0h 0F THIS DRILL, EACH PARTICIPAhT SHALL BE ABLE TO:

I)

E.U LAIN THE STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN ACCESSING AND TREATING CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING BITT NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING:

a)

PERFORM A PRIMARY SURVEY FOR DETECTION AND CORRECTION OF ANY LIFE THREATENING INJURIES OR :ONDITIONS (AIRWAY, BREATHING, CIRCULAT!ON, ETC.)

b) TRIAGE (PRIORITIZE) PATIENTS IF MULTIPLE INJURIES ARE INVOLVED.

c) PERFORM SECONDARY SURVEY ON PATIENT (S) TO DETECT AND STABILIZE ANY NON-LIFE THREATENING INJURIES AND OBTAIN VITAL SICNS.

d)

REMOVE THE PATIENT TO AN AREA WHERE TREATMENT /DECONTA!!-

INATION CAN BE RENDERED (IF NECESSARY)

a)

CO.TfUNICATE WITH HEALTH PHYSICS ABOUT WHEN DEC0hT.UtINATION PROCEDURES MAY BE PERFORMED, DEPENDI:G ON THE PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE PATIENT.

L)

IT INJLl RIES ARE LIFE THREATENING. THE EMERGENCY CARE IS CIVEN TO STABILIZE THE INJLT.ED.

2)

HEALTl! PHYSICS SHALL DECONTAMINATE AFTER THE INJURED'S CONDITION IIAS BEEN STABILIZED OR WilENEVER INJURIES ARE NOT LIFE TIIREATENING.

(DECONTAMINATION SHALL NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE EMERGENCY CARE.

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g) COMPLETE THE NECESSARY PAPER WORK (FIRST RESPONDER TREATMENT FORM)

II)

BRIEFLY DESCRIBE COMMUNICATION AT T E CONTAMINATED INJL1Y SCENE:

a) THERE SHALL BE AMPLE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN FIRST RESPONDERS AND HEALTH PHYSICS ON CONTAMINATION CONTROL, PATIENTS CON-DITION, ETC.

IN ORDER POR BOTH GROUPS TO REEP INFORMED OF T E EMERGENCY SITUATION.

b) TE SECURITY SHIFT LIEITTENANT SHALL BE INPORMED OF:

1)

STATUS OF INJURED AND EXTENT OF INJLTIES 2) TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENIS TO TRANSPORT INJURED INDIVIDUAL TO PIEDMONT E DICAL CENTER.

3) PICK UP POINT III)

BRIEFLY DESCRIBE TE PRINCIPLE ROLES OF FIRST RESPONDERS SAFETY AND HEALTH PHYSICS IN DEALING WITH A C0ffrAMINATED INJURY AT THE SCENE.

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a) FIRST RESPONDERS SHALL START ASSESSMENT / TREATMENT OF INJURED INDIVIDUAL.

FIRST RESPONDERS SHALL COMMUNICATE INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE PATIENTS'S STATUS.

b) THE ROLE OF HEALTH PHYSICS IS TO MONITOR RADIATION AND CONTAMINATION LEVELS, IMPLEMENT THE NECESSARY CONTROLS TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF CONTAMINATIONS AND PROVIDE DECON-TAMINATION AS NECESSARY.

c) OPERATIONS SHALL IMPLEMENT NECESSARY PROCEDURES TO INSURE PROPER NOTIFICATION IN THE EVENT AN INJURED EMPLOYEE IS TRANSPORTED OFFSITE CONTAMINATED.

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION ANNUAL FIRE BRIGADE /BETML V.F.D. EXERCISE FEBRUARY 1987 PURPOSE THE PURPOSE OF TM DRILL IS TO EVALUATE THE ABILITY OF TH STATION PERSONNEL TO RESPOND AND PERFORM FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES. THE DRILL WILL ALSO EVALUATE THE ABILITY OF BETHL VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT TO RESPOND AND INTERFACE WITH THE CATAWRA NUCLEAR STATION FIRE BRIGADE.

CONTROLLER / EVALUATOR: MARE CARRICK. SAFETY ASSISTANT CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION EVALUATOR:

JOHNY TALLENT, SAFETY ASSOCIATE CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

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EVALUATOR:

TERRY KING, SAFETY SPECIALIST DUEE POWER COMPANY

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OBJECTIVES

ASSESS FIRE ALARM EFFECTIVENESS. THE TIME REQUIRED TO NOTIFY AND ASSEMBLE THE FIRE BRIGADE AND THE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, AND USE OF FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT AND PRE-FIRE STRATEGIES.

• ASSESS EACH BRIGADE MEMBER'S KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE STATION'S FIRE BRIGADE ORGANIZATION. ASSESS THE BRICADE MEMBER'S CONFORMANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PLANT FIRE FIGNIING PROCEDURES AND USE OF PLANI FIRE FIGifrING EQUIPMENT.

• ASSESS THE FIRE BRICADE CAPTAIN'S ABILITY TO DIRECT THE FIRE FIGHTING EFFORT.

• ASSESS THE ABILITY OF THE FIRE BRIGADE CAPTAIN TO REQUEST A RESPONSE FROM BETHEL VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT.

• ASSESS THE ABILITY OF THE BETHEL VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT TO APPROPRIATELY RESPOND WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE TIME PEiLIOD TO CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION.

• ASSESS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERFACING BETWEEN THE CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION FIRE BRIGADE AND BETHEL VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMEN..

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FIRE CONDITIONS

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i TM WORD FR0 CESSING / PERSONNEL AREA 0F TM ADMINISTRATION BUILDING.

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SEQUENCE OF EVEMS THE CONTROL ROOM IS NOTIFIED.THAT THERE IS LARGE AMOUNTS OF BLACK SMOKE COMING FROM THE WORD PROCESSING / PERSONNEL AREA 0F THE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING.

THE CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION FIRE BRICADE RESPONDS TO T M FIRE BRIGADE LOCKER LOCATED ON T M 594' ELEVATION OF TM UNIT 1 TURBINE BUILDING, DONS PROTECTIVE j

FIRE FIGHTING CLOTHING AND EQUIPMElff, AND RESPONDS TO THE FIRE SCENE UNDER i

THE DIRECTION OF THE FIRE BRIGADE CAPTAIN.

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THE FIRE BRIGADE WILL ESTABLISH AND BEGIN FIRE FIGNTING FUNCTIONS.

THE STATION FIRE BRIGADE IS UNABLE TO CONTROL THE FIRE AND ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE IS SUP90NED FROM THE MTHEL VOLUlfrEER FIRE DEPARTMENT.

l T M STATION FIRE BRIGADE CONTINUES TO FIGHT THE FIRE WHILE THE BACK-UP

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SUPPORT IS IN ROUIE.

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T M STATION SECURITY FORCE WILL MEET AND ESCORT THE VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT TO THE FIRE SCENE.

THE FIRE BRIGADE CAPTAIN DIRECTS JOINT FIRE FIGHTING ACTIVITIES INVOLVING THE

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STATION FIRE BRIGADE AND THE BETHEL VOLUNIEER FIRE DEPARTMENT.

THE FIRE IS EXTINGUISHED, SALVAGE AND OVERHAUL OPERATIONS BEGIN.

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SALVAGE AND OVERHAUL OPERATIONS ARE COMPLETED AND FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT IS SECURED.

THE DRILL IS TERMINATED.

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EXPECTED ACTIONS i

STATION PERSONNEL:

• THE SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR SMELLS SMOKE AND UPON INVLSTIGATION DISCOVERS BLACK SMOKE COMING OUT OF THE BACK OF THE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING AND NOTIFIES THE CONTROL ROON.

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CONTROL R00M7

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• NOTIFY THE FIRE BRIGADE CAPTAIN. THE FIRE BRIGADE AND THE TECHNICAL l

ASSISTAES.

• ANNOUNCE THE FIRE OVER THE STATION'S PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM.

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• RELAY INFORMATION FROM THE PRE-FIRE PLAN TO THE FIRE BRIGADE CAPTAIN.

I FIRE BRIGADE CAPTAIN:

• RESPOND TO THE FIRE SCENE TO ESTABLISH AND DIRECT THE FIRE BRIGADE'S l

l FIRE FIGHTING ACIIVITIES.

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• ASSESS THE FIRE SITUATION AND REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM BETHEL VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENI.

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• REQUEST SECURITY TO PROVIDE ESCORTS FOR BETHEL VOLUM EER FIRE DEPARTMENT AND TRAFFIC CO RROL.

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• THE FIRE CAPTAIN DIRECTS AND COORDINATED FIRE FIGHTING ACTIVITIES WITH THE STATION FIRE BRIGADE AND BETHEL VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT.

FIRE BRIGADE MEMBER:

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• RESPOND TO THE FIRE BRIGADE LOCKER AND DON PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT.

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• RESPOND TO THE SCENE WITH APPROPRIATE CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT.

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• TO SET UP ATTACH HOSES AND PERFORM FIRE FIGHTING ACTIVITIES AS DIRECTED BY THE FIRE BRIGADE CAPTAIN.

SECURITY PERSONNEL:

• WILL RESPOND AND PROVIDE ESCORTS FOR BETHEL VOLUE EER FIRE DEPARTMENI AND TRAFFIC CONTROL.

BETHEL VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT:

• RESPOND TO CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION AND REPORT TO THE FIRE BRIGADE CAPTAIN.

• ASSIST CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION'S FIRE BRIGADE IN FIRE FIGHTING ACTIVITIES.

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Catawba Nuclear Station Exercise Feb. 19, 1987 Dose Assessment and Field Monitoring 0800 Drill starts with Unit 2 at 100% power.

Containment Air Release and Addition (VQ) started to reduce containment pressure. Normal release through unit vent in progress.

A Notification of Unusual Event was declared at 0700 due to fuel failure as indicated by sample results.

0810 Reactor coolant monitor EMF 48 alarms at trip 1, indicating fuel failure.

0815 Operations tries to stop VQ, but valves VQ2A, VQ3B(4") and VQ10 are stuck open.

Alert declared based on loose parts monitor alarm on Reactor Coolant Pump 2 A.

TSC activation begins.

0830 EMF 48 alarms at trip 2.

0855 Reactor coolant pumps trip.

Containment monitor EMF 39L alarms at trip 1 and 2, indicating increased activity in containment. Containment Isolation activated.

Containment Evacuation alarms.

0900 Reactor trip on lov flow.

0910 containment area radiation monitor EMF 17 alarms.

0915 Partial core melt.

0920 Unit Vent radiation monitor EMF 36L alarms at trip.

0921 Unit Vent radiation monitor EMF 36L alarms at trip 2.

0930

.01% of core inventory goes into containment atmosphere (5.5El Ci/m)

noble, 1.3E-1 Ci/ml iodine).

These conditions indicate a Site Area Emergency.

0945

.04% of core inventory goes into containment atmosphere (2.5E2 Ci/ml noble, 5.6E-1 Ci/ml iodine).

These conditions indicate a General Emergency.

1000

.05% of core inventory goes into containment atmosphere (2.8E2 Ci/ml noble, 6.3E-1 Ci/ml iodine).

1015

.086% of core inventory goes into containment atmosphere (4.6E2 Ci/ml noble, 1.0 Ci/ml iodine).

Core stops melting and cools down.

1020 VQ valves are closed.

Release stop.

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1030 Plume is spreading throughout the area.

Dose consequencies

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-1200 decrease, but actual affected area increases.

1200 Drill stops.

\\reh\\ drill-2.019

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