IR 05000413/1987009
| ML20214W539 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1987 |
| From: | Kahle J, Stoddart P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214W520 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-87-09, 50-413-87-9, 50-414-87-09, 50-414-87-9, NUDOCS 8706160075 | |
| Download: ML20214W539 (13) | |
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S-p (Ecg UNITED STATES
Do NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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p g
q,, j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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MAY 0 81987 Report Nos.: 50-413/87-09 and 50-414/87-09 x
Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.:
NPF-35 and NPF-48:
Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Cond
Apry3-17,1987 Inspector:
P 7e O
M P. E. Stodda u Dite Signed
///jpM MA///f//
Approved b :
Me, ffd. B. Kahle, Section Chfef v
Date Signed Emergency Preparedness and Radiological
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Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of radwaste system startup (Unit 2), liquid and gaseous radwaste systems, liquid and gaseous process and effluent radiation monitoring and sampling systems, and NUREG-0737 items.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
8706160075 87
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- C, L. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer
- G. T.' Mode, Staff Health Physicist
- P. N. McNamara, Staff Health Physicist
- M. Cote', Compliance Engineer
- R. F. Wardell, Superintendent, Technical Services
- D. Tower, Acting Superintendent, Operations G. Smith, Superintendent, Maintenance P.' Deal, Station Health Physicist J. Stewart, Corporate Radwaste Engineer C. Wray, Health Physics Counting Room Supervisor B. McNeill, Staff Chemist
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G. Courtney, Health Physics Supervisor R. Painter, Chemist, Chemistry Group J. Stackley, Instrumentation and Electronics Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included health physics technicians, chemists, engineers, technicians, and office personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. K. VanDoorn, Senior Resident Inspector M. S. Lesser, Resident inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 17, 1987, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
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below.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
In a telephone conversation with licensee personnel on May 6, 1987, the inspector informed the licensee that two items would be classified as licensee-identified violations; these were concerned with LER 87-004, Unit 1, Errors in EMF-39L Setpoints, and failure to perform an adequate survey relative to use of tritiated water in Unit 2 at the time of fuel loading.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Violation 50-413/86-23-01, 50-414/86-25-01:
Failure to follow procedure-Gamma Spectrum Analysis.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's
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i response to the, violation. and discussed the matter with licensee.
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i representatives.
A 4600 ml gas Marinelli had been used successfully with
less than 10% deadtime until approximately February 21, 1986, when Unit.1-
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apparently : developed fuel pin leakage.
After. February.21, deadtime went.
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up to about 15% for Unit 1 gas samples.
The licensee had previously.
ordered a 1260 ml Marinelli for use under-such conditions but this was not available until June 4, 1986.
The only other counter geometry available p'
was a 100 ml unit which was too small for good results...The 4600 ml Marinelli was. used because it gave better results than the-100 ml unit
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even'with 15%.deadtime.
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Evaluations of the'effect of high deadtimes with the 4600 ml unit were j
performed September 9,1986. -A 4600 ml sample was. analyzed three times on
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i Detector No. 24-P-94VC with an average deadtime of 9.7%.
A Cs-137 point i
source of 89 uC1 was added in three increments, producing deadtimes of 16.6%, 24.4% and 34.3%. Ratios of average test activities were calculated
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against the average control Waste Gas Decay. Tank -(WGDT)-D activities, i
Xe-133 ratios were essentially 1.0,-indicating that 'deadtime corrections
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for Xe-133m and Xe-131m were.not-statistically significant.
" Worst case" sample analyses for Unit 1 "VG". samples taken on April 24-26, i
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1986, with deadtimes of 23%, 22.1%, and 24.4%, were reviewed to establish corrections for Xe-133, Xe-133m, and Xe-131m. Ratios from the test WGDT-D
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samples (24.4% deadtime) were applied, resulting in an average 1.13%
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increase in activity determinations for the April.24-26 samples.
It was-concluded that the impact of deadtime in excess of 10% did not
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significantly affect the results of gaseous waste releases during the t
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The licensee now has a calibrated 1260 ml Marinelli on hand and will use
appropriately-sized units to obtain optimum analytical results.
Licensee'.s actions and responses were considered adequate. This matter is j
considered closed.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more _information is required to
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determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. -One new unresolved item identified during this inspection is
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discussed in Paragraph 6.
This item concerned the continued inoperability-l of radiation monitor EMF-50, a Technical Specification process monitor -
l controlling waste gas decay tank releases.
In a telephone conversation with licensee representatives on April 22, 1987, the licensee committed to a resolution of the problem by July _ 31, 1987.
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5.
Semi-annual ' Radioactive Effluent Release Reports - Calendar Year.1986 (84723,84724)
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j The inspector reviewed the semi-annual effluent release reports for Catawba, Units 1 and 2, for the periods January 1,1986.through June 30,
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1986, and July 1, 1986, through December 31, 1986.
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R Liquid radioactive releases for the year totalled 0.382 Ci per unit, or 0.774 Ci for L the 2 units. combined, of mixed fission products and activation. products.
Tritium totalled 118 Ci per unit, or 236 Ci for the.
2 units combined.
Annual average concentrations at the point of release i
were 3.21 E-09 uC1/ml of mixed fission and activation products and 9.85 E-07 uCi/ml of tritium.
The volume of. liquid released was 5.74 E+08 liters, and dilution flow was 2.38 E+11 liters.
The inspector noted that the volume released was substantially higher than had.been reported for CY 1985. (for Catawba-1
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alone) and was higher.than releases from comparable two unit facilities.
Licensee representatives pointed out that a separate radwaste release point had been established, as provided in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and in the facility Technical. Specifications, to provide for-the discharge of very-slightly radioactive fluids from normally " clean" sumps and from secondary coolant system drains.~
Process radiation
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monitors on principal contributory drain lines were provided for the
automatic diversion to. controlled radwaste systems in the event radioactivity concentration levels in those - lines should exceed.
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1.0 E-06 uCi/ml.
Converted from liters to gallons, the combined liquid radwaste discharge i
from both plants totalled approximately 124 E+06 gallons with a dilution i
volume of 62,000 E+06 gallons. Plant records indicated that approximately-120 E+06 gallons of this total went to the " low-level" release point, and about 4 E+06 gallons were discharged to the processed radwaste release point.
The-latter value is consistent with processed radwaste releases for comparable facilities.
The curie quantity released in liquids, 0.382 curies per'~ unit of ' mixed
I fission and activation products, was 28% of the average of liquid releases from_21 operating PWRs in Region II in 1985. Tritium released,118 curies per year per unit, was also 28% of the average' tritiu'm in liquid releases
from 21 Region II PWRs in 1985.
No detectable alpha activity was reported
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in liquid releases from the Catawba facility in 1966.
Maximum calculated 40 CFR 190 radiation doses to offsite receptors for the
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Catawba facility in 1986 were 2.2 mrem (total body) and 3.3 mrem (maximum organ (adult-GI-LLI)).
Calculated quarterly and annual doses from liquid
and gaseous effluents were less than the limits set-forth in
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Gaseous Effluent Processing Systems (84521, 84724)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's operating experience with the
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radioactive gaseous waste effluent processing system.
EMF-50 is the licensee's designation for the process gas radiation monitor
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which was designed to function as a discharge isolation device to
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J terminate gaseous waste holdup tank releases in the event that tank effluent radioactivity concentration exceeded a predetermined value.
During a previous inspection (Inspector Followup Item 50-413/86-23-03, 414/86-25-03, June 2-5, 1986), the inspector noted a number of problems in the design of the waste gas holdup tank discharge apparatus which resulted in EMF-50 being inoperable and representative sampling of holdup tank contents being unavailable.
EMF-50 was declared inoperable from June 6,
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1986, to July 9, 1986, ostensibly to clean and decontaminate the detection chamber and to calibrate the unit.
On July 10, 1986, one day later, the monitor was again declared inoperable and the reason cited as design problems.
In the inspector's review during the current inspection, it was determined that several design problems.had affected the operability of the discharge system and prevented the EMF-50 monitor from performing its design function:
a.
The monitor's alarm-trip setpoint for alarm and termination of discharge was based on analyses of waste gas holdup tank samples.
By design, the holdup tanks were sampled by sampling the header or plenum common to all tanks.
When the licensee attempted to obtain
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representative tank samples by this method, leakage into the plenum from tanks other than the one intended to be sampled contaminated the sample.
Several attempts were made to obtain representative samples by sampling a tank known to contain only pure nitrogen but all
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samples were contaminated with fresh fission products.
Licensee representatives acknowledged that representative samplec could not be obtained by this method, b.
The valving on one tank was modified to permit taking a sample directly from one specific tank without involving the plenum.
Only one tank could be so modified.
This tank was used to collect gases from the cover gas system so that the tank contents could be sampled representatively and enable the licensee to meet the Technical
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Specification limit on tank curie contents.
By being able to l
determine the curie content of this tank, the contents could be transferred to another tank not having sampling capability without violating the Technical Specification regarding curie content of tanks.
c.
At the time of the inspection, all tanks were approaching volume and pressure capacity.
Licensee representatives estimated that at the present rate of gas accumulation, all tanks would be filled to capacity by about July 15, 1987, at which time it would be necessary to either (1) release radioactive gases or (2) shut both units down.
d.
The monitor's detection volume was subjected to pressure siirges to about 50 psig when the system discharge valve was opened; the valve was apparently not capable of being opened by small increments; this was another design problem.
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The. discharge line entered the main stack at a point in the stack below the loop seal to the. Auxiliary Building and was under water at all times; when the discharge line was:not pressurized, water backed
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up into the discharge line and into the monitor. At the time of the
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inspection, the licensee had a major remedial. effort under way and projected _ completion of proposed modifications by July 1, 1987. -This was = stated by licensee representatives to : involve repair or.
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replacement of leaking. valves, replacement of the discharge valve i
with a unit capable of greater flow control to prevent pressurizing the system excessively,. provision for direct representative sampling L
'of each holdup tank, moving the location of the discharge line into the main plant vent to a location not involved in the Auxiliary
- Building loop _ seal, and providing a separate liquid loop. seal in the l
discharge line to prevent back-flow.
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In.a telephone conference on April 22,.1987,. licensee representatives
comitted to completion of the proposal modifications (noted above)
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and restoration -of EMF-50 to full operability not -later than
July 31, 1987. This matter has been identified as an Unresolved Item
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j (URI)_pending fulfillment of the licensee commitment.
(0pened) URI 50-413,414/87-09-01, Review status of licensee comitment to complete modifications necessary to return EMF-50 to
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j, full operability status not later than' July 31,-1987.-
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(Closed) IFI 50-413/86-23-03,50-414/86-25-03:
Review of WGDT noble gas monitor (EMF-50) operability.
EMF-50 remained inoperable as of
.the completion of Inspection 50-413,414/87-09.
Licensee comitted to L
return EMF-50 to full operability not later than July 31. 1987. This
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comitment was identified as URI 50-413,414/87-09-01.
IFI 50-413/86-23-03, 50-414/86-25-03 is considered closed for
tracking purposes.
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No violations or deviations were identified
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7.
NUREG-0737 Items (NUREG-0737, 84723, 84724)
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The inspector reviewed licensee status of equipment provided in. response to the concerns identified in NUREG-0737,' Sections 'II.B.3 (Post Accident
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Sampling)andII.F.1, Attachments 1and2-(Noble-gaseffluentradiological monitor and sampling of radioactive iodines and particulates in plant effluents).
The inspector reviewed Post Accident Liquid Sampling (PALS). system tests
and operational experience with the PALS, both prior to exceeding 5% power-
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and at full power.
In discussion with operating persont.el, it was stated that operational experience had been good and - that the PALS was
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functioning as. designed.
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Several changes were -incorporated in the Catawba PALS design that did-not j.
appear in the original Oconee and McGuire PALS systems. - These included
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utilization of bottled nitrogen instead of using plant nitrogen, which was frequently a source of water contamination.
Undiluted sample volume was increased from a nominal 1 m1 to 5 m1 to provide greater accuracy of analyses.
The Catawba PALS sample panel was controlled by a programmable controller device, which enabled the remote programming of control relays in place of the previous PALS design which required physical rewiring at the sample panel.
Five plant personnel were qualified for PALS operation at the time of inspection.
A licensee representative stated that plans called for approximately twelve plant personnel to be qualified on the systems.
Training was conducted on a one-on-one basis, and required each operator to complete two hours of classroom training and six hours of PALS
" hands-on" training, which included both collection of a sample and analysis of the sample.
Licensee personnel, as of December 31, 1986, performed a number of correlations between routine reactor coolant sample analyses and PALS analyses.
For boron analyses, correlations indicated an average of i 3.5%, with a high accuracy value of 0.1% and a low of 8.6%.
These values were considered to be within the accuracy guidelines of 5% for boron at concentrations in excess of 1,000 ppm and 50 ppm below 1,000 ppm.
The licensee indicated that a projected re-routing of the PALS sample flush rater back to a containment sump was scheduled for the next refueling outages for both units.
The next refueling outages are scheduled in CY 1988 for both units.
The inspector noted that the final NRC evaluation of the PALS required the inspector to witness a PALS sample collection, a normal RCS sample collection, analyses of both, and correlation of results. This evaluation was tentatively scheduled for the period of June 1, through September 30, 1987; a finn date will be established at a later time.
(0pened) IFI 50-413,414/87-09-02:
Evaluate PALS systems for Units 1 and 2 at a time when both units are operating.
(0 pen) IFI 50-413, 414/86-01-01:
Review routing of PALS sample residues to containment sump.
This modification was delayed until the 1988 refueling outages for Units 1 and 2.
This matter remains open.
(Closed) IFI 50-414/86-19-01:
Review of tests of PALS and PAGs scheduled prior to exceeding 5% power.
Tests were reviewed and found adequate.
This matter is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation, Sampling, and Analysis (84723, 84724)
The inspector reviewed selected aspects of the gaseous and liquid effluent monitoring, sampling and analysis program.
The semi-annual radiological effluent release report for July-December 1986 listed several extended (over 30 days) outagas of radioactivity monitors servicing the liquid and gaseous effluent release paths.
In discussions with licensee personnel, it was noted that the licensee had identified problems with the plant's various radiation monitors as a pervasive condition and had formed a task force to resolve the existing problems and to minimize future problems.
In reviewing reports of the causes of outages, there appeared to be no one major or comon cause for the problems.
However, there appeared to be design-related problems in many cases.
For example, sample pumps on the turbine building sump were reported have failed regularly, probably as the result of entrapment of trash or " crud" in the pump mechanism.
Steam generator blowdown monitors had problems with field routed piping and defective flow switches.
EMF-50 problems were previously discussed in Paragraph 6.
EMF-41, a multiple point noble gas air monitor sampling sequentially from 12 zones in the Auxiliary Building, cycled at 90 second intervals to sample each zone every 18 minutes. While a zone was not being sampled, air was still being drawn through the sample transport tubing; air coming into the system was not filtered with the result that dust accumulations occasionally clogged the rotameter air flow meters.
EMF-45 monitors the tube side coolant water of the containment spray heat exchangers; since the cooling water was raw lake water, organisms and other biological matters were present.
During long run operating periods, the water in the tubes became stagnant.
Many of the difficulties experienced with the EMF system to date can be partially attributed to a tendency to design system components to accomodate ideal conditions rather than the adverse conditions which can be encountered in plant operations.
Licensee representatives suggested that a possible contributing cause could be a Technical Specification-driven maintenance program geared to accomodate instrumentation required to be operable by Technical Specifications and under which items with relatively minor L.C.0. penalties - or with no applicable Technical Specification -- could receive a relatively lower degree of attention to repair or preventive maintenance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Liquid and Gaseous Radiochemistry (84723, 84724).
The inspector discussed radiochemistry analysis with licensee representatives.
The use of computerized graphic trending for various radiochemical analyses, including gross and isotopic radioactivity analyses of primary coolant, was demonstrated to illustrate plant capabilities.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
10. Environmental Radioactivity Monitoring (80721).
The environmental monitoring program was discussed with licensee representatives.
Pursuant to Temporary Instruction 2500/22, Collection of TLD Measurement Results, environmental thermoluminescent dosimetry (TLD)
results for 1986 were obtained from the licensee.
(Closed) IFI 50-413,414/86-44-01:
Review licensee procedures for systematic review of environmental data and identification of anomalous measurements.
The inspector reviewed Environmental Radiological Laboratory Procedure ER/0/13/2400/01, " Preparation of Sample Analyses Reports and Unavailable Analysis Reports and the Review and Distribution of Analysis Data," Rev. 3, with changes as of November 18, 1986.
The changes to this procedure incorporated provisions for the systematic review of environmental analytical data and criteria for identification of anomalous data.
The changes appeared to be adequate to address the inspector's concerns. This matter is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Licensee-Identified Violations (92701)
a.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-414/86-REC-01:
Evaluation of tritium in Unit 2 containment air sample of March 2,1986. This matter was reviewed during this inspection and was determined to constitute a licensee-identified violation of 10 CFR Part 20.201(b),
Inadequate survey.
Beginning with samples collected on March 2, 1986, an airborne level of tritium above the minimum detectable activity (MDA) was identified in the Unit 2 containment air.
At that point in time, initial fuel load had just been completed and the reactor had not been critical.
On March 2, 1986, Health Physics identified tritium in the Unit 2 refueling canal water.
Prior to this time, licensee personnel had been in direct physical contact with this water during initial fuel load activities. Urinalysis of 15 exposed persons indicated none had absorbed tritium above the licensee's action level (
Maximum Permissible Occupational Body Burden-MP0BB) greater than 10%
Of the 15
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persons checked, all were less than 0.3% of MP08B.
The tritium was determined to have been present as tritiated water in the Unit I borated water used to fill the Unit 2 reactor system and refueling canal preparatory to fuel loading.
Purity requirements called for high purity water to be used for boric acid mixing. The l
licensee's procedure for mixing borated water called for input from the Unit 1 Makeup Water Storage Tank (MWST), which was considered the highest purity water in the plant; this water was part of the Unit I water inventory and was known to contain tritium.
The resultant presence of tritium in the water used in the Unit 2 refueling canal and reactor coolant system had been recognized by plant chemistry,
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and Health Physics had also been aware' of tritium in the water in
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Unit 1 systems available to Unit 2.
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On November 11, 1985, the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
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was filled with borated water, produced.by adding boric acid to the
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high purity water transferred from the Unit.1 MWST.~ On November 26,
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F 1985, samples from the Unit 2 RWST were analyzed by Chemistry, including a tritium analysis; however, the results of the tritium
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analyses were not specifically called-to the ' attention of Health
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Physics supervision.
I Between December 1,1985 and February 1,1986, Unit 2 primary-side systems and the refueling canal were filled with borated water from the Unit 2 RWST.
At this point in time, many members of the plant
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staff were aware of the tritium content of this water 'but,
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apparently, no significance was attached to the matter.- Unit 2 fuel load began on February 25, 1986.
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On February 27, 1986, trouble developed with the fuel transfer device. ' Also on February 27, 1986, Health Physics approved a
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procedure under which personnel entered the refueling canal'.in-
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waist-deep water, wearing waders to minimize the possible effect of.
dissolved boron on the skin; however. the procedure did not note the presence of tritium in the water and no special provisions were made relative to potential tritium exposures to personnel.
From February 27 through March 1,1986, personnel rotated in and out of the canal
to manipulate the latch of the loading device during loading
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Fuel load was completed at 10:10 p'.m. on March 1,1986.
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On March 2,1986, the air sample ' noted in 86-REC-01 detected the'
j presence of airborne tritium above minimum detectable activity (MDA).
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At this time, the presence.of tritium in the canal water and in
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reactor system components was generally ~ recognized for the first
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time.
The cause of the failure to recognize the presence of tritium and to take timely appropriate action was' attributed by the licensee review
i panel to personnel error on the part of-several persons and groups.
Ccmmunication of available information concerning the presence-of the tritium was not adequate and several personnel involved did not have prior experience in nuclear plants.
The licensee's investigation
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summary recommended several actions as a result of this occurrence.
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It was recommended that both Health Physics and -Chemistry provide a higher level of expertise on backshifts and that communication be
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improved.
Wider distribution of trending data-'and graphs was also i
suggested so that responsible personnel could be more aware -of changing conditions.
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i After reviewing records and reports concerning the matter-and i
reviewing licensee corrective actions, the inspector concluded that
the licensee, once the problem had been identified, reacted in an
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Short-term corrective actions were initiated
rapidly, the resident inspector was ' notified and _ a thorough
investigation and assessment were initiated.
The-matter would nomally be considered to; be a violation of -
10 CFR.20, Section 201(b), as an inadequate survey of radiation '
i-hazards.
However, the licensee's actions in taking-prompt remedial
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measures, notifying the resident inspector, making a full and-
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comprehensive evaluation and -~ report, and instituting long-term
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corrective measures to prevent a recurrence met the criteria of-the
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NRC Enforcement Policy delineated in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C (1986) for-
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i a licensee-identified violation and no enforcement action-or followup action was required.
The licensee's report: of final corrective
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i actions was reviewed during the inspection and was determined to be
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adequate. This matter is considered closed.
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(Closed) ~ LER 87-004:
Personnel errors in calculating setpoints.
This matter was reviewed at the request of the resident inspector and
was identified as a licensee-identified violation of a Technical
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Specification requirement.
I This. matter - concerned Licensee Event Report (LER)87-004, dated l
February 26, 1987, that on some ten occasions between December 1
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1986, and January 24, 1987, a Health Physics technician improperly preoared a total of ten Containment Air Release and Addition System
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gaseous waste release packages. The errors resulted in the setpoints
of EMF 39L (EMF-39 monitors noble gas activity inside containment)
being established higher. than allowed by the Technical i
Specifications.
Releases were made from ~ both units based on incorrect gaseous waste release packages.. Both units were in Mode 1
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(poweroperations).
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The licensee's LER 87-004, correctly identified this matter as -a l'
violation of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1, which specifies the i
limits for the setpoints of EMF 39L. _ This matter qualified as a
licensee-identified violation under the criteria of -the NRC
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Enforcement Policy outlined in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1986). The
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licensee notified the Resident Inspector promptly upon recognizing
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j the matter, prepared and issued LER 87-004, took prompt short tenn i
corrective actions, instituted long-term corrective measures, i
including procedural revision and training for all licensee personnel F
involved in setpoint calculation or supervisory review, and made e
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comprehensive review and report.
The inspector reviewed these items i
and examined training records and determined that the corrective
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measures appeared to be adequate to prevent a recurrence.
The inspector concluded that while the matter would normally constitute a
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violation of Technical Specifications, the licensee's actions met the
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appropriate criteria for classification as a licensee identified l
violation, and that no enforcement action'or followup was required.
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The licensee's corrective measures included - re-training -and
L re-qualification of.the individual, revision of Procedure HP/0/B/1004/05 and re-training of Lall personnel concerned.
The
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inspector reviewed the revised procedure and observed a training..
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session for technicians and supervisors on April 15, 1987. Both the procedure revision and training were considered adequate.
The
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inspector also reviewed licensee's Problem Investigation Report Serial #0-C87-0014 and Investigation Report C87-006-01.
This matter
is considered closed.
l Two. licensee-identified violations were identified;. no deviations
were identified.
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12.
FollowuponInspector-IdentifiedItems(92701)
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a.
(Closed) -IFI 50-413/86-11-42:
Information Notice -_ Improper.
Maintenance. of Radiation-Monitor Systems.
The inspector discussed j
this matter with licensee representatives responsible for radiation monitor system maintenance. The information notice had been received but the licensee considered the plant program to be adequate and no
,
changes or modifications were initiated.- The licensee had separately f
taken note of the inoperability record of units of the radiological monitoring system and a task force had been organized to resolve the'
i system problems.
At the time of the inspection, the task force had not been operating long enough to produce tangible results.
This
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j matter is considered closed.
b.
(0 pen) IFI 50-413, 414/86-01-02:
Sampling of radioiodine aerosols has been identified as being subject to substantial but unquantified
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loss in long sampling line - generic item applicable to all. power-reactors.
This matter was discussed with licensee representatives.
,
As noted in 50-413/86-22 and 50-414/86-19, May 16, 1986, a sampling
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and analysis program had been initiated in early April 1986 but had
I been interrupted by demands of the Unit 2 startup effort on available
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staff personnel.
The continued demands of. plant operation on
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availability of personnel prevented further progress on.this matter.
Special analytical material had been procured for iodine species
evaluation as part of the program but had not been utilized as of the; j
end date of this inspection. This matter remains open.
i c.
(0 pen) IFI 50-413/86-23-02 and 50-414/86-25-02:
Improved procedure
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detail regarding background and sensitivity limits of effluent
monitors.
The inspector reviewed Catawba Station Memo, File No.
CN-768.05, dated April 14, 1987. This document provided substantive t
detail on the methods used in calculating radiological effluent j -
monitor sensitivities.
Methods.were ' based on ANSI N42.18-1980,
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Section 5.4.3, and provided for the determination of sensitivities at
)
the 2 sigma or 95% confidence level as functions of background count
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rate and RC time constant..The document discussed factors affecting
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background determination and correlations for various nuclides of interest.
Special cases such as liquid effluent monitors were
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discussed.
As of the date of the inspection, the material in the memo had been incorporated in station. procedure HP/0/B/1004/04,
" Radioactive, Liquid Waste Releases", but had not been incorporated in the procedure for gaseous releases.
This matter will remain open
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until the procedure (s) for gaseous effluent monitors have been revised. This matter remains open.
Nc violations or deviations were identified.
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