IR 05000413/1987036
| ML20237A384 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1987 |
| From: | Lesser M, Peebles T, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237A370 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-3.A.1.2, TASK-TM 50-413-87-36, 50-414-87-36, NUDOCS 8712140439 | |
| Download: ML20237A384 (13) | |
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UNtTED STATES
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[pa. Moo NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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n REGION il o
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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I r ATLANTA, G EORGI A 30323
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I Report Nos.
50-413/87-36 and 50-414/87-36 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street l
Charlotte, N.C.
28242 Docket Nos..
50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52 Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: October 26, 1987 to November 25, 1987 i
Inspectori kA
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P..K.. Van Doorn Date Signed
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Inspecto :
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M. S. Lesser D4te/ Sighed '
Approved by:
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T. A. Pee 61es', Secritin~ Chief Date Signed Projects Branch 3A Division of Reactor Projects i
SUMMARY Scora-This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site inspecting in toe areas of review of plant operations; surveillance observation; maintenance observation; review of licensee nonroutine event reports; followup of previously identified items; refueling activities (Unit 1); and cold weather i
preparations.
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I Results: Of the seven (7) areas inspected, no apparent violations or devia-tions were identified.
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1 REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees-
- J. W. Hampton, Station Manager H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent W. F. Beaver, Performance Engineer
- W. H. Bradley, QA Surveillance S. Brown', Reactor Engineer B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent
- R. N. Casler, Operating Engineer R. H. Charest, Station Chemistry Supervisor M. A. Cote, Licensing Specialist J. W. Cox, Production Support / Training Manager T. E. Crawford, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent W. P. Deal, Health Physics Supervisor
- C. S. Gregory, I. & E. Support Engineer
- C.. L. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer-J. Knuti, Operating Engineer j
F. N. Mack, Project Services Engineer
- W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer
- G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent J. Stackley, I. & E. Engineer D. Tower, Shift Operating Engineer R. F. Wardell, Technical Services Superintendent J. W. Willis, Senior QA Engineer, Operations Ot'ar licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, nechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 25, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The following new items were identified:
Unresolved Item 413,414/87-36-01: Review of Environmental Qualification of Accident Monit'oring RTD Instrumentation (paragraph 5.e.).
Inspector Followup Item 413,414/87-36-02: Long Term Corrective Action for Post Modification and Post Maintenance Retests (paragraph 7.b).
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Licensee Identified Violation 413/87-36-03: Failure to Limit the Working Hours of Staff Who Perform Safety Related Functions (paragraph 7.c.).
Unresolved Item 414/87-36-03:
Review of NSW Maintenance W ek Documenta-
. tion (paragraph 7.d.).
Unresolved Item 413/87-36-04:
Inability of PORVs to Fail Safe Closed (paragraph 7.e.).
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
a.
(OPEN)
Violation 413, 414/87-30-02: Failure to Establish Adequate Measures to Periodically Calibrate All Safety Related Instruments.
The inspectors ' reviewed the licensee's response in correspondence dated November 13, 1987. Corrective action related to the 20 safety related instruments, which were not calibrated, was not addressed in the response.
The licensee agreed to submit an additional response.
The inspectors reviewed results of the 20 calibrations of the instruments that were missed and noted that 8 of the 20 were found inoperable or out of tolerance, some of which were in a non conserva-tive direction.
The inspectors asked the licensee for a system hi storical operability evaluation of the affected components.
All instruments found out of calibration were repaired.
b.
(CLOSED) Violation 413/87-20-03: Inadequate Investigation of Isolated Containment Pressure Channel.
The licensee responded to this item in correspondence dated August 28, 1987, which the NRC considered inadequate as stated in our letter of September 30, 1987.
The licensee re-responded on October 27, 1987.
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions described therein and held discussions with licensee personnel.
The licensee has stressed the importance of thorough investigations to appropriate personnel and has provided additional guidance relative to recurring events.
Additional corrective actions were described relative to isolation of instrument valves. Followup of these actions will be performed against Viola-tion 50-413/87-30-01.
c.
(OPEN) Violation 414/87-30-01:
Failure to Follow TS 2.2.1 in Determining Equation 2.2-1 was satisfied Following Non Conservative Reactor Trip Adjustment.
The licensee responded in Correspondence dated November 15, 1987 and admitted the violation. The licensee agrees that the existing values in the TS should have been used; however, they have yet to demon-strate whether or not the incident was within the safety analysis.
The licensee has agreed to provide a revised calculation which must include the correct value for Z and how they account for the 3%
calibration error.
The licensee has agreed to submit an additional resoonse addressing these concerns.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Unresolved Items *
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New unresolved items are identified in paragraphs 5.e., 7.d.,
and 7.e.
5.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 & 2) (71707 and 71710)
a.
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs, danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed. Shift turnover <
were. observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance wit'
approved procedures.
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, the measures taken to assure physical protection of the facility met current requirements.
Areas inspected included the security organization, the establishment and maintenances of gates, doors, and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and badging were-proper and procedures followed.
In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured. were observed for fi re prevention - and protection activities.
These included such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems and materials, and fire protection associated with mainte-nance activities.
The inspectors reviewed Problem Investigation Reports (PIRs) to determine if the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing appropriate corrective actions.
b.
The inspectors conducted a detailed walkdown of the Unit 1 safety injection system inside containment.
The following valves were -
identified to have packing leaks: INI-14, 1NI-16, 1NI-18, INI-127, and 1NI-155.
1NI-127 was not properly labeled. These discrepancies were forwarded to the licensee for followup action.
c.
Unit 2 Summary Unit 2 started the period at about 95's power, power having been reduced due to Feedwater Regulating Valve problems.
On November 3, TS 3.0.3 was entered when it was discovered that 2 of 4 Steam Generator level channels were inoperable.
Channel IV had been previously placed in the tripped condition due to a suspected reference leg leak inside containment.
Channel II then failed its daily channel check, reading high out of tolerance, later determined to be a leaking vent valve on its reference leg. While shutting down the unit, channel II spiked high completing the necessary logic for a l
- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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Steam Generator high high level feedwater isolation. The unit was immediately manually tripped from 60% power.
The trip response was adequate with the exception of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TOCA) pump which tripped on over speed immedia+ely upon startup.
Operators failed to note this and had it not bei for a thorough post trip review by the Performance Group the problem would have gone undetected.
Maintenance technicians discovered the turbine control valve to be out of adjustment however could not determine why.
Unit 2 entered Mode 4 on November 4 to repair the reference leg problems and started back up on November 7.
Unit 2 ended the period at 75% coasting down in preparation for the December refueling outage.
A Unit.1 summary is documented in paragraph 9.
d.
As documented in PIR 1-C87-0139, Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) was informed by Combustion Engineering of potential equipment qualifica-tion problems associated with Litton supplied cable connectors for cov a exit thermocouple systems.
Under LOCA conditions, the connec.-
would allow moisture to affect the thermocouple accurac.
A retrofit kit, supplied by Combustion Engineering to rectify the problem, had been installed on Unit 2 during construction but was not on Unit 1.
The retrofit kit has since been installed on Unit 1.
The inspectors reviewed work request 8256IAE to verify installation of the kit on Unit 1.
e.
On November 13, 1987, licensee site personnel were informed by licensee Design / Engineering (D/E) personnel that the Unit 2 Wide Range Hot and Cold Leg Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTDs)
(Accident Monitoring Instrumentation per TS 3.3.'3.6) were possibly inoperable due to junction boxes housing the RTD splices not being water tight.
Further review revealed that two Cold Leg RTD splices were acceptable meeting the TS minimum requirement.
However, all four Hot Leg RTDs were declared inoperabic at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> since environmental ~ qualification requirements were not met. D/E personnel determined that up to a minus 60 degrees F error could occur from these RTDs.
The licensee reviewed accident analyses and Emergency Procedures to determine if compensatory action could be taken.
It was determined that an event involving a high energy line break with loss of reactor coolant pumps would require oper:stor compensation for the error for evaluation of subcooling.
The licensee documented a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) based on their review and the known error, and provided training to operations personnel to describe the problem and the appropriate compensatory action.
The inspectors and NRC:RII management reviewed the JC0 and agreed that compensatory actions were acceptable until repairs could be affected f
during the upcoming outage, scheduled to begin on December 18, 1987.
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i Unit 1 splices were repaired while the Unit was in the refueling outage. Further NRC review of this item is necessary to determine if regulatory environmental qualification requirements have historically been met and the significance of the problem.
This is Unresolved Item 413,414/87-36-01: Review.of Environmental Monitoring RTD Instrumentation.
'l No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Observation (Units 1 & 2) (61726)
a.
During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations were in compliance with various TS requirements.
Typical of these requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems, safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventilation, and direct current electrical power sources.
The inspector verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance with the approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appro-priate removal and restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The 'following surveillance were either reviewed or witnessed wholly or in part:
PT/1/A/4250/06 1NS-43 Inservice Test PT/2/A/4250/06 AFW Pump Head and Valve Verification PT/2/A/4600/02 Mode 4 Periodic Surveillance Items OP/0/A/6100/06 Reactivity Balance Shutdown Margin Calculation PT/2/A/4600/02 Mode 1 Periodic Surveillance Items PT/0/A/4971/06R Diesel Generator IA Relay Testing PT/1/A/4450/09 Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation Train A Operability Verification b.
The inspector discussed the snubber inspection program being conducted per TS 4.7.8 with licensee personnel. The inspector could not determine whether TS 4.7.8.e. and g. were being met relative to test ~ failures versus the number of snubbers to be tested.
Appropriate NRC: NRR and RII personnel were contacted who in turn
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The licensee issued a TS interpretation based on these discussions.
Essentially, the licensee was allowed te group failures by failure mode group.
The licensee program has resulted in 100% testing of the size 1/4 and 1/2 mechanical snubbers which have exhibited a failure rate of approxi-mately 10%.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Maintenance Observations (Units 1 and 2) (62703)
a.
Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The inspector verified licensee conformance to the requirements in the following areas of inspection:
the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to f
returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified personnel; and materials used were properly certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may effect system performance.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following maintenance activities in progress:
Work Request 4347MNT Breakin Run and Overspeed Test of IB Diesel Generator Work Request 5880PRF Trouble Shooting Nuclear Service Water Pump 2B Upper Bearing Flow Problem Procedure Not Recorded Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Cleaning MP/0/A/7400/08 Diesel Generator 1A Main Bearings and I
Counterweight Removal and Inspection Work Request 255140PS Installation of NSW Blank Flange MP/0/A/7400/44 Diesel Generator Crank Shaft Alignment and Thrust Clearance Measurement The following post-maintenance retest documentation was reviewed:
PT/1/A/4350/02E Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Transfer Test for NSM CN-10054, CN-10057 I
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b.
NRC Report 413,414/87-23, Quality Effectiveness Inspection, discussed problems with post modification testing and referenced approxi-mately 10 modifications, identified by the Test Review Committee, where testing was inadequate or not performed.
The inspectors reviewed the Test Review Committee conclusions in a Intrastation Letter to R. F. Wardell from J. A. Kammer dated August 25, 1987 and associated work requests / documentation to determine the significance of the problems. Modifications CN-10203, CE-0392, CN-10435 involved work performed on valves where the post modification test was performed and documented under IWV testing shortly after the modification was completed. However, the test was not documented in the modification package. The Test Review Committee has recommended that test documentation be kept with modification documentation in
the future for easier traceability.
Modification CN-10608 was postponed until the third refueling outage for Unit 1.
Test documen-tation for Modification CN-10371 could not be located. Post modifi-cation tests were veri fied to have been performed using the engineer's unofficial records, however, the data was not recorded.
Modifications CN-10432 and CE-0480 involved maintenance where post modification tests were not performed, however, the valves were not required to be tested under the IWV program.
Modifications CN-10236 and CN-10099 involved reversing leads for computer point and/or remote valve position indication.
Past modification tests were inadequate and remote verification was not performed until the required two year tests. The valves were otherwise able to perform their function.
Problem Investigation Report (PIR) 0-C87-0197 identified that a test was never performed on the Unit 1 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel after installation of a modification to add a manuc1 reset function for an Auxiliary Feedwater auto start.
The inspectors reviewed an oper-
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ability statement which justified continued operation without the test. The justification evaluated the consequences if the modifica-tion had been installed incorrectly.
If the reset switch would not work, the auxiliary feed (CA) pumps and flow control valves would not be controllable by the operators af ter an auto start, until the low low steam generator level cleared.
Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves would, however, be controllable.
If the reset switch was wired backwards, the motor driven CA pumps would be unaffected but the turbine driven CA pump might trip. The operator would be able to restart the pump.
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This Auxiliary Shutdown Panel test was also a concern in Report 413,414/87-25. A test has since been performed.
The inspectors reviewed the results of the test performed on October 21 by PT/1/A/4350/02E, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Transfer Test For NSMs CN-10054 and CN-10057.
The test adequately demonstrated the operability of the panel after the modification.
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The Test Review Committee was formulated to review post modification testing as a result of recurring problems in that area.
The committee identified a variety oof weaknesses in the licensee's post modification retest program, inadequate documentation of retests, incorrect determination of retest requirements and missed retests on safety - related equipment have occurred.
Although the items of concern in Report 413,414/87-23 are considered resolved, problems continue to occur particularly in post maintenance testing (See LERs i
413/87-30 and 32). The Test Review Committee has made recommenda-tions for long term improvements in this area.
A retest manual is being developed and more effective use of the IAE Tech Spec Data Base is required. This is identified as Inspector Followup Item 413/414-87-36-02: Long Term Corrective Action for Post Modification and Post Maintenance Retests pending implementation by the licensee and review i
by NRC.
c.
PIR 0-C67-0314 documented review of four Nuclear Maintenance Specialists' work hours and identified that the maximum allowed time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> worked within a seven day period had been exceeded without proper approval. Discussion with the Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor indicated that this incident, along with one other under the same general work supervisor, was an isolated case that occurred due to the current Unit 1 outage. The program as outlined in Station Directive 3.0.8 appears adequate.
The job supervisors within the department have been counselled on their responsibilities for ensuring the requirements are met.
The inspectors add tionally requested that the licensee place appropriate emphasis in ensuring other station departments are properly controlling overtime.
Although this is a violation of TS 6.2.2.f., no Notice of Violation is proposed as permitted by Appendix C of 10CFR2 and this incident is classified as a Licensee Identified Violation 413/87-36-03: Failure to Limit the Working Hours of Staff Who Perform Safety Related Functions, d.
The inspector observed trouble shooting for the Nuclear Service Water (RN) pump 2B upper bearing coolant low flow inspection on October 30, 1987 per Work Request (WR) 5880PRF.
The inspector observed the use of shim stock to clean the shaf t area and setup for a special flush of the area.
Later review o' documentation did not show that this work was described in detail on the WR as required by procedure.
The licensee indicated that some work may be documented on another WR and a broad based preventive maintenance approach to RN pumphouse problems is being developed.
Pending further review, this is Unresolved Item 414/87-36-03:
Review of NSW Maintenance Work Documentation.
e.
On November 17 stroke testing was performed on the three Unit 1 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV) af ter the valves were repacked.
The valves are air actuated open and closed with spring assist. All three PORVs failed to shut with air pressure during I
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testing. The unit was in Mode 6 at the time.
Investigation revealed tape over a solonoid vent port and one air isolation valve shut which partially explained the failures. The PORVs were later able to cycle with air pressure, however, subsequent tests to demonstrate the ability of the PORVs to " fail safe" closed on spring force alone failed. Two of the three PORV's INC-32 and 1NC-34 are required to be operable when the reactor coolant system is pressurized in Modes 4 and 5 for Low Temperature over pressure protection. These two valves have a safety related backup supply of nitrogen.
The licensee declared these two valves operable per Station Directive 3.1.14,
" Operability Determination", based upon the fact that they would function (open) with air pressure and a backup source of pressure was available.
Troubleshooting continued on INC-36 which was not required to be operable. The vendor, Control Components Inc. (CCI),
was consulted and informed the licensee that they needed to perform a breakin lubrication procedure which required lubricating the stem and
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packing components.
This requirement had not been provided il the vendor manual. This item is identified as Unresolved Item 413/87-36-04: Inability of PORVs to Fail Safe Closed, pending final licensee solution and NRC evaluation of operability determination.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports (Units 1 and 2) (92700)
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.
The determination included: adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event. Additioral inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, wera conducted for those reports indicated by an (*).
The following LERs are closed:
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- 413/87-18 Rv.1 Containment Pressure Channel Inoperable Due To Failure To Return Transmitter To Service Following Calibration j
- 413/87-23 Missed Surveillance Of Fire Detection Zones Due To Lack Of Admin Controls Retiring Technical Specifica-tion Standing Work Request
- 413/87-27 Rv.1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperable Due To Instrumentation Unknowingly Isolated (Violation Issued)
413/87-30 Inadequate Retest Resulting In A Technical Specification Violation l
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414/87-26 Unit Shutdown Due To A Bearing Failure On The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 414/87-28 Wide Range Containment Pressure Channel Inoperable
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Due To Pressure Transmitter Isolation Valve Closed For Unknown Reasons
No violations or deviatiens were identified.
9.
Followup of Emergency Preparedness Action Items (92701)
a.
(CLOSED)
Appraisal Weakness 50-413/85-39-13, 414/85-36-13: Meteor-ological Data Processed Through the OAC was not. Validated. This item was inspected in March, 1987 and intended to be closed via Report No.
413,414/87-03. However, the item was listed as 85-39-01 in error and is therefore closed by this report for record purposes, b.
(CLOSED)
Appraisal _ Weakness 50-413/85-39-18, 414/85-36-18: Meteor-ological Data Generator Equal to 90% Recovery Efficiency. This item as described in the paragraph for items above was also previously inspected and listed in error as a different number (85-39-2).
Therefore, this report serves to close this item.
c.
(CLOSED)
Appraisal Weakness 50-413/85-39-23, 414/85-36-23:
Communicators use of Unapproved Procedures.
This item was also inspected 'previously and listed in Report No. 413,414/87-03 as 85-39-3.
Therefore this item is closed by this report.
d.
(CLOSED) Appraisal Weakness 50-413/85-39-12, 414/85-36-12: Revising Section 5.6 of Procedure HP/0/B/1009/15 to Provide Adequate Instruc-tions and Upgrading and Clarifying Containment Leak Rate Curves.
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The licensee has incorporated the required guidance into Procedure HP/0/B/1009/18 which has been reviewed and found to be satisfactory by NRC:RII (Cunningham).
Therefore, this item is closed.
e.
(CLOSED) Appraisal Weakness 50-413/85-39-15, 414/85-36-15: Revising Procedures which use Meteorological Data to Reflect Hierarchy for Data Substitution and Specifying and Assigned Data Averaging Period (15 min.) and Valid Time of Observation.
The required Guidance has also been incorporated into Procedure HP/0/B/1009/18 which has been reviewed and found to be satisfactory by NRC:Rll (Cunningham).
Therefore, this item is closed, f.
(CLOSED)
Appraisal Weakness 50-413/85-39-26, 414/85-36-26:
Developing a Permanent Method of Displaying Plant Mimics in the OSC.
The inspector verified that permanently mounted mimics have been
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placed in the OSC.
Therefore, this item is closed.
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_(CLOSED)
Appraisal Item 50-413/85-39-27, 414/85-36-27: Completion of Construction and Establishment of Operational Readiness of the Consolidated CMC.
The inspector observed CMC operations during a
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McGuire Station drill on September 11 and 12, 1987. The consolidated facility has been completed and it has been shown that it can be effectively operated.
Based on the previous inspection and NRC:RII input (Cunningham) this item is closed.
h.
(CLOSED) Appraisal Item 50-413/85-39-33, 414/85-36-33: Verifying the Completion of Construction of the Consolidated CMC.
Based on the inspections described in paragraph 9.g. above, this item is closed.
i.
(CLOSED) (Both Units) TMI Action Item III. A.1.2.1. A: TSC and EOF.
The TSC and EOF are now fully operable to the satisfaction of NRC based on previous inspections and final closeout inspections of open items. identified above.
Therefore, this item is closed.
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(CLOSED) (Both Units) TMI Action Item III. A.1.2.1.B: OSC. The OSC is now fully operable to the satisfaction of NRC based on previous inspections and final closecut in. pections of open items identified above.
Therefore, this item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
l 10.
Refueling Activities (Unit 1) (60710)
a.
The inspectors verified that TS applicable to Mode 6 were met, fuel i
handling equipment testing was performed, proper radiological controls, housekeeping and foreign material exclusion practices were met and water level control practices were followed. The inspectors witnessed fuel handling from the control room, spent fuel building and containment and verified that correct revisions of applicable procedures were in use.
b.
Unit I completed defueling and started the reporting period with all fuel removed from the reactor; no mode. On October 26, operators
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commenced draining down the reactor coolant system, however, failed to de-energize an underwater 1000W flood light which had been lowered into the reactor vessel.
The light burst into flames when it was uncovered due to the decreasing water level and remained burning for approximately seven minutes until operators could de-energize it.
Although no airborne contamination was detected, debris dropped into the vessel which required extensive inspections to locate and remove.
Unit 1 entered Mode 6 at 1250 on November 4 and completed refueling on November 8 ahead of schedule. The upper internals were replaced on November 10 and the unit entered mode 5 on November 17.
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On November 17, while installing a relay on 6900V bus ITD, a short caused the bus to de-energize and a blackout occurred on B train 4160V emergency bus, ETB. The B train Diesel Generator auto started and sequenced on, however two 600V Motor Control Centers failed to sequence on properly.
The load centers. powered numerous safety related valves. Operators were quick to manually energize the two
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load centers. Preliminary investigation determined that a time delay relay was out of calibration.
The operating Residual Heat Removal pump was reenergized 5 minutes later.
Reactor Coolant Temperature
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increased form 128 degrees F to 132 degrees F during this time.
Fill and Vent of the Reactor Coolant System was completed by November 21 and the unit ended the period performing the containment integrated leak rate test.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Cold Weather Preparations (71714)
The inspectors verified that the licensee was inspecting / repairing cold weather protection devices in preparation for the winter season. Work Request 3057 SWR for thermostats, heaters and instrumentation boxes had been implemented.
The inspector witnessed inspection of one instrument box and its associated thermostat and heater and discussed the inspections with the licensee.
A number of repairs were identified on the work request.
Further inspections will be conducted in this area.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
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