IR 05000341/1987044

Safety Insp Rept 50-341/87-44 on 870908-1023.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Surveillance Program Meeting Intent of Tech Spec Definitions 1.4, Channel Calibr, 1.6, Channel Functional Test & 1.33, Reactor Protection..

ML20236Y196
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	12/07/1987
From:	Darrin Butler, Phillips M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236Y185	List: IR 05000341/1987044 ML20236Y184 ML20236Y189
References
50-341-87-44, NUDOCS 8712110170
Download: ML20236Y196 (20)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION III

Report No. 50 141/87044(DRS)

Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43 Licensee: The Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48224 Facility Name: Fermi 2 Inspection At: Fermi 2 Site, Monroe, Michigan l Inspection Conducted: September 8, through October 23, 1987

[, otCb, Inspector: D. S. Butler /d!7 !87 b/%

Approved By: Mont P. Phillips, Chief /2/7gy Operational Programs Section Date Inspection Summary l Inspection on September 8 through October 23, 1987 (Report No. 50-341/87044(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Special announced safety inspection of the surveillance program and its meeting the intent of Technical Specification Definition 1.4,

" CHANNEL CALIBRATION;" 1.6, " CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST;" 1.11, " EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE TIME;" 1.19, " LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST;"

and 4 ,3, " REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME" in accordance with NRC Inspection Module 9270 Results: Of the five areas inspected, three violations of Technical Specifications (TS) were identified: (1) failure to perform an adequate logic functional test in accordance with TS 4.3.2.2 and 4.3.5.2 (Paragraph 2.c);

(2) failure to perform an adequate response time test in accordance with TS 4.3.3.3 (Paragraph 2.f(1)); and (3) failure to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the Remote Shutdown Panel control switches for the initiation of the RCIC system in accordance with TS 4.3.7.4.2 (Paragraph 2.g(2)).

8712110170 PDR ADOCK

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Detroit Edison Company

• D. Gipson, Plant Manager

• R. May, Superintendent, Maintenance and Modifications

• R. Matthews, I&C Supervisor

• L. Esau, I&C Engineer

• T. 0keefe, Surveillance Engineer l * Svetkovich, Technical Engineer

• Shukla, Licensing Engineer

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US NRC

• Parker, Resident Inspector

• The above persons attended the exit meeting on October 23, 1987.

The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspectio . Surveillance Program  ! Introduction At the time of this inspection, the licensee was in the process of improving their surveillance program. This included rewriting and changing the format of over 500 procedures. Technical Specifications were being reviewed (as the result of DER-87-286 and corrective actions as stated in LER 87-019) to ensure the following: each requirement was covered by an approved procedure; the performance interval was correctly stated in the procedures and in the Surveillance ,

Scheduling and Tracking (SST) program; plant operating conditions, as '

described in Technical Specifications, were correctly identified in the procedures and in the SST program; and the procedures contained steps which implemented the required Technical Specificatio ;

Surveillance procedures were being rewritten by personnel who had '

plant experience (e.g., senior Instrument and Control (IC) technicians).

Human factor elements were being included in the review to remove elements that were common knowledge and to use standard notation (e.g., light "0N"). Parallel efforts were also takirg place in the Nuclear Engineering Department to control and provide setpoint base The procedures were also including a section or attachment to perform independent verifications, planning and preparation prior to performing the procedure, and an impact statement to alert the operator to expected alarms and control actions.

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Completion of this effort should provide quality procedures and minimize personnel erro l b. Surveillance Testing The purpose of the inspection was to review selected logic functional / simulated autorvatic actuation, channel functional, channel calibration, and r. ponse time tests to ensun proper test overlap was maintainx and that the entire system from sensor to actuated equipment was teste The following Fermi 2 Technical Specification (TS) Definitions were used during the review:

• 1.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values )

of the parameter which the channel monitor The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TES The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrate * 1.6 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be: Analog channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify 0PERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions and channel failure q trip ,

I I Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip function The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL-TEST may be performed by any l series of sequential, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is teste {

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• 1.11 The EMERGENCY CORE C0OLING SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored <

parameter exceeds its ECCS actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ECCS equipment is capable of performing its safety function, i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures  ;

reach their required values, etc. Times shall include j diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays

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where applicable. The response time may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or total steps such that the entire response time is measure i l

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• 1.19 A LOGIC. SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be a test of all logic components, i.e., all relays and contacts, all trip units, solid state logic elements, etc., of a {

logic circuit, from sensor through and including the ;

actuated device, to verify 0PERABILIT The LOGIC l SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series !

of sequential, overlapping or total system steps such !

that the entire logic system is tested, j

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• 1.33 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be the time i interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its trip setpoint at the channel sensor until de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids. The response time may [

be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or !

total steps such that the entire response time is measure ,

The above definitions were not reviewed in their entirety for all the systems selected for review. The following 1s a breakdown e' ,

the systems, TS trip function, and definition reviewed: '

System Trip Function Definition

• RPS ALL 1.4, 1.6, 1.19 Steam Dome Pressure 1.33

• HPCI ALL 1.4, 1.6, 1.19 (actuation and isolation)

< Low water level (Level 2) 1.11 Drywell pressure 1.11

• RCIC ALL 1.4, 1.6, 1.19 (actuation and isolation)

• Feedwater/ Main ALL 1.4, 1.6, 1.19 Turbine Trip

• ATWS Recirculation ALL 1.4, 1.6, 1.19 Pump Trip Only one division of logic was reviewed in most cases. The other division should be its mirror image. Problems identified in this report should be applied to other channels in the same trip system j and in their counterpart division. All the other items, as detailed ;

in the system breakdown, were adequately meeting the intent of their ]

associated TS definition. A procedure list is provided in Section _

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c. Logic System Functional Tests

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The review was accomplished by reviewing the logic functional and l channel functional tests, and tracing (yellow-lining) out the ]

logic paths to ensure proper overlap. Where equipment was not i l actuated by the logic test, the Operations Department equinment l operability tests were verified to provide the proper overla The logic functional and operability testing iare also used to meet the additional surveillance requirement to perform a simulated automatic operation of all channel Inadequate logic testing overlap was identified in the following procedures:

(1) RCIC System Isolation

• Procedures 44.030.51 and 44.060.001 did not verify the continuity of the circuit in that overicp between contacts (5/6) on relay E11-K10A to permit closure of vacuum breakers E51-F062 and F084 were not teste * Procedure 44.060.001 did not verify the continuity of the circuit in that parallel contact to contact wiring overlap between E51-K58 and K59, and K60 and K61 contacts that provide reactor low pressure signal to permit closure of vacuum breakers E51-F062 and F084 were not checke * Procedure 44.060.001 did not verify the continuity of the circuit in that wiring overlap through equipment room steam leak detection test switches SSA and B to the relay cnntacts of E51-K3A and B was not checke (2) HPCI System Isolation

• Procedure 44.030.151 did not verify the continuity of the circuit in that parallel contact to contact wiring overlap between E51-X15 and K80, and K48 and K81 contacts that provide low steam pressure signal to permit closure of vacuum breakers E41-F079 and E41-F075 was not checke * Procedure 44.030.151 did not verify the continuity of the circuit in that wiring overlap through equipment room temperature leak detection test switches $6A and B to the relay contacts of E41-K4A and B was not checke (3) RCIC System Actuation

• Procedure 44.060.001 did not verify the continuity of the I circuit in that parallel contact to contact wiring overlap between E51-K62 and K3 contacts that start E51-C004 was not checke l

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The licensee, prior to October 23, 1987, had not performed an adeguate logic functional surveillance for the above. TS ,

Definition 1.19 is applicable throughout Technical Specifications to ensure logic tests are providing adequate test overlap. These tests are required to be performed by TS 4.3.2.2 for Items (1) and (2), and TS 4.3.5.2 for Item (3), and in accordance with TS Definition 1.19. This is considered a violation of Technical Specification (341/87044-01). '

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d. Channel Functional Tests The channel functional test procedures listed in Paragraph 5 were reviewed for the following: 1 initiate protective actions we(1) to ensure re tested all the contacts that forcontactoverlap),

(2)verificationofallpertinentannunc(ators,and(3)thatthe i

trip unit setpoint reflected the correct TS valu ;

The HPCI steam line flow high TS isolation input was provided by E41-N657A (trip setpoint 395 INWC). In parallel with the N657A contacts are the N660A reverse steam line flow contacts (trip setpoint -395 INWC). Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-2, ,

4.a, lists the trip set)oint as < 395.0 inches H 20/536,625 lbm aer hou It appears tlat the T5 requirement does not apply to 1660 Currently,N660AistestedinconjunctionwithN657Ain Procedure 44.020,20 Point to point wiring overlap from N660A to )

N657A contacts were not verified. Since the N660A contacts could cause a HPCI isolation, the inspector recommended the licensee  ;

change Procedure 44.020.201 to provide overlap in testin l e. Channel Calibration The channel calibration test procedures listed in Paragraph 5 were reviewedtoensuretheyincorporatedthecorrectTStrip(valueand that the calibration included a channel functional test CFT).

(1) None of the calibration 3rocedures satisfied the CFT requiremen The licensee indicated tlat when a calibration was scheculed to be performed, a CFT would also be performe Discussions with the surveillance scheduler and IC foreman indicated they understood a TS calibration required the performance of a CF The IC foreman stated that if a calibration was received without a CFT, the foreman would request the issuance of a l CF The inspector reviewed Plant Order EFT-3011, " Surveillance Performance Coordinator Work Instruction." Section 8 of the

)lant order did provide instructions that a Channel runctional/ Channel Calibration should be 3erformed in set There was no reference in EFT-3011 to TS Jefinition 1.4. The inspector recommends the licensee strengthen the language of Section 8 and provide a TS definition refererce as well as instruct key personnel on the TS definition requiremen . _ _ -

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(2) The ECCS reactor water level Procedures 44.030.255, 256, 257, and 258 contained an incorrect " required limit" value for trip unit B21-N691A, B, C, and D (Level 1). Attachment 1 listed a required limit of 4.68 ma, corresponding to a reactor level of 18 inches. The TS allowable value is > 24.8 inche The channel functional Procedures 44.030.251, 252, 253, and 254 did reflect an adequate required limit of > 27.58 inche The inspector reviewed the last calibration tests and found !

them to be acceptable. Changing the " required limit" valu'e in ]

Procedures 44.030.255, 256, 257, and 258 will be tacked as an i Open Item (341/87044-02). j l

f. Response Time j

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Response time tests were reviewed to ensure' adequate test l overlap was maintained from the sensor through to the actuated j device. The instrumentation channels were tested in segment The sensor, trip unit, and logic times were verified to be within the instrument channel response time. The instrument channel logic was overlapped by equipment actuation response time testing conducted l by the Operations Departmen The transmitters were tested inplace by a hydraulic (transient)

ramp generator and the trip unit was tested by its own trip / :

calibration system. The inspector verified, by review of the Rosemount 510 DU master trip unit schematic diagram, that the transient test' current produced by the 510 DU calibrator overlapped the transmitter signal wirin (1) During the review of ECCS Procedures 44.030.259, 261 (Level 2 HPCI) and 44.030.308, 309 (Drywell high HPCI), it was noted that.the HPCI slave actuation relays E41-K2, K3 (Level) and E41-K4, K5 (Drywell) were not tested as typically done in other response time procedure Procedure 24.202.04 actuated and response time tested HPCI by simulating a Level 2 signal through the E41-K2 and K3 relays. This was an adequate test of the K2 and K3 relays. However, the Drywell E41-K4 and K5 relays were not tested by IC or by Operation The licensee, prior to October 23, 1987, had not performed an adequate response time surveillance of relays E41-K4 and K TS Definition 1.11 is applicable throughout Technical Specifications to ensure response time tests are providing adequate test overlap. This test is required to be performed by TS 4.3.3.3 and in accordance with TS Definition 1.1 This is considered a violation of Technical Specification 1 (341/87044-03).

(2) During the review of Procedure 44.030.309, a test resistor was to be connected at the wrong terminals in procedure Step 6. '

This appears to be a typographical error. Changing the resistor connections to AA-65 and AA-66 in Procedure 44.030.309 will be tracked as an Open Item (341/87044-04). ,

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l g. Other Surveillance Testing-(1) Procedure 44.010.201 was reviewed to ensure the CRD hydraulic accumulators were being tested in accordance with their TS requirements. Surveillance requirement 4.1.3.5b was being fulfilled by Procedure 44.010.201. One portion of the test (TS 4.1.3.5b(2)) required that over a period of at least ten minutes, the time that each individual accumulator check valve maintains the associated accumulator pressure above the alarm setpoint (> 940 psig) with no control rod drive pump operating

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be recorded. The alarm setpoint was maintained between 1010 to 1040 psig. This is well above the TS requirement. The licensee indicated the intent of the ten-minute time. period was for logging of all accumulators that did alarm and for ceasing the procurement of data on accumulators that did not alarm at ten-minutes. The TS bases supports the licensee's interpretation in that, "The surveillance requirement to measure and record the time that the accumulators maintain pressure above the alarm setpoint is intended to provide information rather than establish OPERABILITY of the accumulators. No action is required if the accumulator pressure does not remain above the alarm setpoint for at least a ten-minute period of time."

Discussion with the IC' technicians indicated that there was no formal program to determine when the accumulator check valve should be repaired, if the alarm was received well before the ten-minute interval had ended. The inspector was concerned that leaking check valves would not receive timely corrective maintenance. The licensee should develop acceptance criteria to establish at what point corrective maintenance will be performed, and that this information will be trended and compared to the other accumulator check valves. This is considered an Open Item (341/87044-05).

The accumulator pressure was verified weekly, as required by TS 4.1.3.5a, in Procedure 24.000.02. The pressure gauge, PI-131, was located on the same instrument line as the accumulator low pressure switch. They were last calibrated in May 1985, as per a work order. The pressure gauge has not been placed in a calibration program. This is considered an Open Item (341/87044-06) to calibrate PI-131 for each accumulator at an interval commensurate with other TS calibrations to ensure accurate measurement dat (2) In the RCIC logic test, 44.060.001, the remote shutdown panel RCIC transfer logic was verified by jumpering around the remote shutdown switch contacts. Operations Department personnel implement the remote shutdown system TS requirement 4.3.7. by demonstrating the operability of each control switch and control circuit in Procedure 24.630.01. However, 24.630.01 ,

states that overlap between the RCIC initiation switch l contacts, and valves E51-F045 and F059 switch contacts was

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I demonstrated in 44.060.00 Simulating the operation of a switch by placing a jumper in parallel with the switch contacts does not demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the switch. This is a violation of Technical Specification (341/87044-07) for failing to demonstrate the OPERABIi.ITY of the RCIC control switches for RCIC initiation and operation of valves E51-F045 and F05 (3) Item 2 above is the second example where testing' overlap was missed between interdepartmental procedures (see Paragraph 2.f(1)). The two examples have involved IC and Operations. These two departments have the most TS requirement overlaps. .The inspector is concerned that other departmental overlap requirements may also have been misse The licensee needs to review all overlapping surveillance procederes that are performed by different plant departments to-ensure proper overlap is maintained. The response to this item should be included in the response to violation 341/87044-07 abov Surveillance Observation The inspector observed the performance of Procedure 44.010.041 on scram discharge volume float switch C11-N013A. The float switch was  ;

located in a nearly inaccessible location. The IC technician had to climb on top of safety-related panels, conduit, and the Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) scram valve seismic mount to gain access to the float  ;

switc The inspector recommended that the licensee develop a safer way in which to perform the float switch calibration While observing the performance of 44.010.041, the inspector noted i that the Health Physics Department provided continuous coverag The technician was using an AC powered portable air sampler. The inspector observed its placement near the safety-related panels and next to the ARI scram valve. The inspector was concerned about the potential for scramming the plant due to motor brush arcing. These panels were annotated to inform personnel not to operate two-way radios within six feet of the panels. The technician moved the 4 sampler to another location that allowed adequate sampling of ai l The inspector recommended that the licensee inform personnel about  !

setting up electrical equipment that may produce arcing within the vicinity of instrumented safety-related equipmen The surveillance test was performed adequatel The IC technician !

had to connect clear tubing (used as a sight glass) to the l calibration port of the float switc Water was introduced into the tubing. A surveyed, permanently-marked calibration point l (center line of the float switch) was mounted on the wall. A ruler  !

was used to measure between the point of float switch actuation and I the mar Following calibration, the test equipment was removed I and the float switch was restored to operation. The independent verification of the restoration was performed by a qualified individual who did not participate in the tes t L _ __ __ _ _ __

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The inspector determined the IC technicians were qualified to perform the tes Approximately 84 surveillance procedures were reviewe Overall, the inspection demonstrated that the licensee was attempting to satisfy applicable Technical Specifications and the respective associated TS definitions. However, the licensee should review their surveillance

. program outside of this sample of procedures and ensure that other areas do not exhibit the same finding No additional violations or deviations were identifie Fcur recommendations were discussed in Paragraph 2.d, 2.e(1) and 2.h.' Engineering The following items were generated as a result of the surveillance program review: DECO Setpoint Methodology The licensee was developing a setpoint methodology similar to that described in the Instrument Society of America (ISA) Standard S67.04-1982, "Setpoints For Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation Used in Neclear Power Plants," and General Electric Company Setpoint Methodology NEDC 31336. The ISA standard permits the upper setpoint limit to exceed the Technical Specification (TS) trip setpoint within the nominal trip unit accuracy without resetting the trip valu The channel functional and calibration procedures, as a result of this, could permit the "As Left" trip unit value to be left exceeding the TS trip setpoint. Throughout the TS, it was stated that instrumentation channels shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of TSs. The NRC has stated its position in RG 1.105, " Instrument Setpoints For Safety-Related Systems,"

Revision 2. The upper setpoint limit (Standard) was the same ,

as the trip setpoint in the Standard Technical Specification )

However, RG 1.105, Revision 2, does not apply to the Fermi 2 plant J due to the docketing of that operating license on July 15, 198 The surveillance procedures "As left" value that could exceed the TS trip setpoint were well below the TS allowable value. Using a worst case, direct summation of loop inaccuracy, assumed drift of 0.2%, and measuring and test equipment inaccuracy, the probable range of the trip setpoint would not have exceeded the TS allowable value over the expected calibration interval. The approval of the i licensee's setpoint methodology program is beyond the scope of this inspection. This is considered an Unresolved Item (341/87044-08) to determine if the licensee's setpoint methodology is setting the trip setpoints consistent with values shown in TS No action by the licensee is required at this tim __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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I The scram valve pilot air header can be depressurized by several means to ensure the insertion of the control rods. Backup. scram solenoid valves and the ARI system provide this diversification. In i parallel with backup scram valve C11-F110A, and ARI valves C11-F1608 l and C11-F160A are check valves C11-F111, C11-F1618, and C11-F161A.

l The licensee indicated that the check valves were not being functionally tested. The check valves were provided, assuming a i -failure of a solenoid valve, to permit depressurization of the air

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header past the failed valve. The inspector is concerned that the

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check valves should be tested to ensure they can perform this function. This is considered an Unresolved Item (341/87044-09) to determine if the check valves need to be functionally tested to

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ensure the backup scram and ARI system can perform their intended

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function. No action by the licensee is required at this tim During the review of Procedure 44.010.001 (RPS steam dome pressure),

the inspector noted that the " required limit" value for the trip unit would permit the allowable TS value to be exceede The values equated to the following:

TS 1088 psig '15.605 ma procedure 1088.44 psig 15.61 ma This item appears to be a " rounding up" problem in the design calculations. In.this case, the calculation should have been

" rounded down" to ensure conservatism. The licensee needs to revise RPS Design' Calculation 4522, change all applicable procedures, develop guidelines on how to "round off" calculations to ensure conservatism, and review other design calculations and procedures to ensure this concern does not exist in those procedures. This is considered an Open Item (341/87044-10).

d. The RCIC (E51-F022) and HPCI (E41-F008) test line throttling valves require their manual close button to be held, or a sustained auto-close signal to be present to ensure valve closure. The throttling valves'were used to adjust the flow and pressure during operability testing of RCIC and HPCI. These valves have auto-close logic (system actuation) that were from non-sealed-in contact There were other contacts in parallel with the auto-close contacts that would ensure the valves would continue closing. This is an unusual arrangement, since most valves that are required to close on a system auto-actuation are closed by sealed-in contact The RCIC system can be actuated from the remote shutdown pane The initiation switch momentarily simulates a reactor low level signa The E51-F022 valve (if E51-F013 was closed) was noted to start to close and stop unless the initiation switch was held. There appeared to be a five-second delay before other parallel contacts would re-initiate and continue the valve closin The HPCI valve does not appear to have a similar delay in closin _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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The licensee needs to evaluate whether these valves should be auto-closed on sealed-in contacts and if the five second delay in closing E51-F022 has any safety significance. This will be tracked as an Open Item (341/87044-11). The HPCI auxiliary oil pump (E41-C005) must operate for the HPCI system to star The oil pump provides the initial system bearing and hydraulic oil pressure until the shaft driven oil pump can provide the pressure. The pump run circuitry includes a pressur switch'(PS-E41-NA01) in series with both the manual and auto-start circuitr The inspector is concerned that the PS may in fact prevent the starting of the HPCI auxiliary oil pump, thus preventing HPCI initiation. The inspector must ascertain the exact nature of the PS failure mechanism, and whether its failure could prevent the ,

HPCI system from operating. This item will be tracked as an Open 1 Item (341/87044-12). ) The following drawings require correcting due to their failure to conform with the plant as built:  ;

(1) 2235-3 needs turbine trip light changed from D215 to DS1 (2) 2235-1 needs E51-F095 added te the valve lis (3) 2235-1 needs E51-K62 2/8 con'. acts changed from E51-F004 l to E51-C00 (4) There is a discrepancy on 2235-2, E51-F045 (LS15), that LS15 contacts open when the valve is fully closed and on !

2231-7 which indicates that LS15 opens at < five percent

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closure. Engineering needs to evaluate and ensure the correct configuration exists on both drawing These items will be tracked as Open Item 341/87044-1 No violations or deviations were identifie . Preventive Maintenance (PM)

The inspector reviewed the PM program for incorporation of non-TS equipment protection alarms for the RCIC and HPCI syste RCIC Calibration Event Device Description Interval E833 E51-N006 Pump Suction Pressure-Low 18M ES36 E51-N009A Turbine Exhaust Pressure-High 18M E837 E51-N0098 Turbine Exhaust Pressure-High 18M E842 E51-N202 Governor End Bearing 18M E843 E51-N203 Coupling End Bearing 18M E844 E51-N204 Filter ^P 18M

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l Calibration j Event Device Description Interval "

E847 E51-N207 Barometric Condenser 18M E848 E51-N208 Barometric Condenser 18M I

All of the above devices were functionally tested in Procedure 44.060.001.

HPCI Calibration Event Device Description Interval E023 E41-C005 Lubricate Motor 10 years l E097 E41-C005 Space heater check, annually j Insulation check, l continuity check j E643 PS-E41NA01 Auxiliary Oil Pump 18M E649 E41-N010 Pump Suction-Low 18M E653 E41-N017A Turbine Exhaust Pressure-High 18M l E654 E41-N0178 Turbine Exhaust Pressure-High 18M l E659 E41-N201 Bearing Oil Tank Level 18M l

E660 E41-N202 Bearing Oil 18M E661 E41-N203 011 Cooler 18M E662 E41-N204 Oil Filter 18M E667 E41-N216 Barometric Condenser Level 18M )

E668 E41-N217 Barometric Condenser Level 18M E41-C005-(Auxiliary Oil Pump) was functionally tested quarterly in 24.202.0 All of the other devices were functionally tested in Procedure 44.030.15 The licensee was considering additional performance testing of HPCI. The testing will be performed, as event AB48, when the procedure has been fully developed. In addition, the auxiliary oil pump motor control center will be inspected and tested, and ite DC ammeter loop calibrated. This was scheduled for implementation by 1

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November 30, 198 The licensee has adequately addressed and scheduled the maintenance on the above protective devices. No violations or deviations were identifie . Procedures List Logic Functional / Simulated Automatic Actuation / Operability

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24.000.02 Shiftly, Daily, Weekly and Situation Required

Revision 23 Surveillance.

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24.202.01 NPCI Pump Operability and Flow Test at 1000 PSI and Revision 22 Valve Operabilit .202.04 HPCI System Automatic Actuation / Suction Valve Auto Revision 16 Transfe .630.01 Remote Shutdown Panel Control Circuit and Switch Revision 1 Tes .206.01 RCIC System Pump Operability and Valve Tes Revision 9 24.206.06 RCIC System Automatic Actuation / Suction Valve Auto Revision 5 Transfe .010.061 RPS - Logic Functional Tes Revision 3 44.030.51 ECCS - RHR.(LPCI Mode), Division I, Logic Functional Revision 4 Test. (Section 6.4 only)

l 44.030.151 ECCS - HPCI Logic Functional Tes Revision 4 44.040.009 ATWS - Division I Logic Functional Tes Revision 6 44.040.010 ATWS - Division II Logic Functional-Tes Revision 6 44.060.001 RCIC System Logic Functional Tes ,

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44.190.001 Feedwater/ Main Turbine Trip System Logic Revision 6 Functional Tes b. Channel Functional 24.110.05 RPS - Turbine Control Valve / Turbine Stop Valve Revision 6 Channel Functional Tes .137.01 Main Steam Line Isolation Channel Functional Revision 4 Tes .610.01 RPS - Manual Scram Functional Tes Revision 6

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24.610.02 RPS - Mode Switch in Shutdown Functional Tes Revision 3 .

24.610.u5 RPS - Backup Manual Scram Functional Tes Revision 2 TCN 5416 14 I

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44.010.001 RPS - Reactor Steam Dome Pressure, Division I, Revision 20 Functional Tes .010.013 RPS and NSSSS - Reactor Vessel Low Water Level Revision 3 (Level 3), Division I, Channel A1/A, Functional; B21-N680 .010.025 RPS and NSSSS - Main Steam Line Radiation, Revision 8 Division I, Channel A1/A, Functional Tes .010.033 RPS and NSSSS - Drywell Pressure, Division I, Revision 6 Channel A1/A, Functional Test; C71 N650, C71-N651 and C71-N65 .010.041 RPS - Scram Discharge Volume High Water Level, 4 Revision 6 Division I, Channel A1, Float Switch Functional Test / Calibration; C11-N013 .010.72 RPS - Scram Discharge High Water Level, Division II, 4 Revision 6 Channel B1, Functional Test; C11-N601 .010.108 Division I IRM Functional Test; IRM A, IRM C, IRM E, Revision 7 and IRM .010.124 RPS - APRM A Channel Functional Tes Revision 14 l 44.020.201 NSSSS - HPCI Steam Line Flow, Division I, Revision 9 Functional Test; E41-N657A and E41-N660 .020.207 NSSSS - HPCI Steam Line Pressure, Division I, Revision 4 Channel A, Functional Test; E41-N658 .020.209 NSSSS - HPCI Steam Line Pressure, Division I, i Revision 4 Channel C, Functional Test; E41-N658 .020.219 NSSSS - HPCI Turbine Exhcust Diaphragm Pressure, Revision 4 Division I, Channel A Functional Test; E41-N655 .020.221 NSSSS - HPCI Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure, Revision 3 Division I, Channel C Functional Test; E41-N655 .020.227 NSSSS - HPCI and RCIC Room Area Temperature, Revision 9 Channel A Functional Test; E41-N602A and E51-N602 .020.231 NSSSS - RCIC Steam Line Flow, Division I, I Revision 5 Functional Test; E51-N657A and E51-N660 ]

44.020.235 NSSSS - RCIC Steam Line Pressure, Division I, Revision 4 Channel A Functional Test; E51-N658 .020.237 NSSSS - RCIC Steam Line Pressure, Division I, I Revision 3 Channel C Functional Test; E51-N658 _ _ _ _ _ _ - ___-__-_______a

-_ _. - _ _ _

.

.

.

44.020.243 NSSSS - RCIC Turbine High Exhaust Diaphragm l

Revision 3 Pressure, Division I, Channel A Functional Test; E51-N655 .020.245 NSSSS - RCIC. Turbine High Exhaust Diaphragm Revision 3 Pressure, Division I, Channel C Functional Test; E51-N655 .030.153 ECCS - HPCI Condensate Storage Tank Level Revision 7 Functional lest; E41-N6618 and E41-N661 .030.155 ECCS - HPCI Suppression Pool Level Functional Test; Revision 2 E41-N6628 and E41-N6620 44.030.251 ECCS - Reactor Vessel Water Level (Levels 1, 2, Revision 10 and 8), Division I, Channel A Functional Test; B21-N691A, B21-N692A and B21-N693 .030.252 ECCS - Reactor Vessel Water Level (Levels 1, 2 Revision 12 and 8), Division II, Channel B Functional Test; ,

B21-N691B, B21-N6928 and B21-N693 .030.253 ECCS - Reactor Vessel Water Level (Levels 1, 2 Revision 9 and 8), bivision I, Channel C Functional Test; B21-N691C, 821-N692C end S21-N693 .030.254 ECCS - Reactor Vessel Water Level (Levels 1, 2 Revision 12 and 8), Division II, Channel D Functional Test; B21-N6910, B21-N6920 and 821-N693 .030.299 ECCS - Drywell Pressure-RHR, CCS and HPCI Actuation, Revision 3 Division I, Channel A Functional Test; B21-N694 .030.300 ECCS - Drywell Pressure-RHR, CCS and HPCI Actuation, Revision 4 Division II, Channel B Functional Test; B21-N694 .030.301 ECCS - Drywell Pressure-RHR, CCS and HPCI Actuation, Revision 3 Division I, Channel C Functional Test; B21-N694 .030.302 ECCS - Drywell Pressure-RHR, CCS and HPCI Actuation, Revision 3 Division II, Channel D Functional Test; B21-N694 .040.001 ATWS/SRV Lew Low Set - Reactor Vessel Pressure, Revision 7 Division I, Channel A Functional Test; B21-N611A, '

B21-N708A and 821-N709 .040.002 ATWS/SRV Low Low Set - Reactor Vessel Pressure, Revision 6 Division II, Channel B Functional Test; B21-N6118, B21-N708B and B21-N709 .040.003 ATWS/SRV Low Low Set - Reactor Vessel Pressure, Revision 5 Division I, Channel C Functional Test; B21-N6110, ;

B21-N708C and 821-N709 I

l

- ___-

_ - ___

.

.

.

44.040.004 ATWS/SRV Low Low Set - Reactor Vessel Pressure,

.

Revision 7 Division II, Channel D Functional Test; B21-N611D, B21-N7080 and 821-N709 !

44.190.005 Feedwater/ Main Turbine Trip System - Reactor Revision 9 Vessel level (Level 8), Channel C Functional Test; B21-N695 .190.006 Feedwater/ Main Turbine Trip System - Reactor Revision 9 Vessel Level (Level 8), Channel D Functional Test; B21-N695 c. Channel-Calibration 44.010.005 RPS - Reactor Steam Dome Pressure, Division I, Revision 5 Division I, Channel Al Calibration; B21-N678A and B21-N078 .i 44.010.017 RPS and NSSSS - Reactor Vessel Low Water Level Revision 5 (Level 3), Division I, Channel A1/A, Calibration; B21-N680A and 821-N080 .010.037 RPS and NSSSS - Drywell Pressure, Division I, Revision 4 Channel A1/A Calibration; C71-N650A, C71-N651, C71-N653 and C71-N050 .010.064 RPS - Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Closure Revision 20 Calibratio .010.076 RPS Scram Discharge Volume High Water Level, Revision 6 Division II, Channel B1 Calibration; C11-N601B and C11-N016 .010.116 IRM A Channel Calibration; C51-K601A and C51-R607 Revision 6 )

(Section 6.11 only)

44.010.130 RPS - APRM A Channel Calibratio Revision 9 (Section 6.10 only)

44.010.201 CRD Hydraulic Unit Calibration and Functional Tes Revision 6 44.020.203 NSSSS - HPCI Steam Line Flow, Division I, i Calibration; E41-N657A, E41-N660A and

'

Revision 6 E41-N057 .030.255 ECCS - Reactor Vessel Water Level (Levels 1, Revision 7 2 and 8), Division I, Channel A Calibration; I B21-N691A, B21-N692A, B21-N693A, B21-N091A and B21-R604 l

17 l

!

L - - - _ - - - - - _ - - - _ - - _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ - - _

- - - - -

g- , , , -

s A )

'. < # i

-

). . + 1 r7 j, j'!, 4,f'Y * h

,, p 7

.

.

t b f .s 9\ (% $

$ if '

44.030.256 i vh T5 '- Raactor Vessel Water Level (Leveh 1, t

Revision 8 Dy ~ and 8), Division II, Channel B Calibration;

,.j %?1-N6918, B23-N6928, B21-N693B, MJ;AT n

"

N' tand O'21-R623 , .,

%.z )

44.030.257 >

ECCS-ReactorVesselWaterLey,(Le,vds,( M Revision 7 2 and1), Div/sion I, Channel C Calibration; i

' A B21^r'i91C, 87t-N592C_, B21-N693C, B21-N091C, t

' 4 a21,ty3C and C35-R00 o

, ff (

rh 44.030.258 \LCC5,ReactorVesselWaterLevel(Levels 1, #

Revision 8 2 anM 3),! Division II, Channel 4 alibration; B214Wlo, B21-N692D, B21-N693L\ 1.-N091D and'P21-R&34 s IJ '

q 44.030.303 ECCS - Drywell Pressure - RHR, CCS and HPCI

'

Revision 5 Actuation, Division I, Channel A Calibration; y B21-N694E and 821-N094 g ,, y'

) k n 44.030.304 Revision 5 ECCS - Dryvell Pressure - RHR, CCS ada HPCI Actuation, Division II, Channel B Calibration; ( G'( *

_

'

{

B21-N694F and 821-N094F. ! 3 44.030.305 ECCS - Drywell Pressure - RHR, CCS and HPCI \ Q Revision 5 Actuation, Division I, Ch%nel C Calibration; B21-N694G and B21-N094G.'? .

44.030.306 ECCS - Drywell Pressure - RHR, CCS and HPCI Revision 5 Actuation, Division II, Channel D Calibration; B21-N694H and 821-N094 ' i

%

r, 44.040.005 ATWS/SRV Low Low Set - Reactor Vessel Pressure, ' A i

'

Revision 6 Division I, Chernel A Calibraticc, B21-N611A, , {

B21-N708A, B21-i(05A and D1-N121 .

{

e i 44.040.006 ATWS/SRVLowLowSet-ReactccVesselPressuig, Revision 6 Division II, Channel,B Calibration; B21-N611Ba '

B21-N708B, B21-N7098'and B21-N111 I l

44.040.007 ATWS/SRV Low Low Set - Reactor Vessel Pressure, Rev sion 7 Division I, Channel C Q 11bratiop. B21-N611C,  % l B21-N708C and B21-N111C Y i

44.040.008 ATWS/SRV Low Low Set - Reactor Vessel Pressure, Revision 6 Division II, Channel D Calibration; B21-N6110,3  ;

t B21-N708DandB21-N1.p ,

j A t 44.190.009 Feedwater/ Main Turbine Trip System - Reactor yv i Revision 6 Vessel Level (Level 8), Cha'nnel C Calibration; s l B21-N695C and 821-N095C. ' '

/

l

'

l I ,

i

< .

6  ?

l 18 ,

i

-

. ;3 l I i <  !

- - - - = - - - - - - - - - - - -

7, g3 3 ,1

. ),

Y, , f '!

di p Response Time

[; d.

F c;r(

I' N 44.010.009 RPS - Reactor Vessel Steam Dome High Pressure,

'l ' b' Revision 4 Division I, Channel A Response Time Test;

,;

B21-N678A, B21-N078 .010.011 RPS - Reactor Vessel Steam Dome High Pressure,

.)YI -'

Revision 4 Division I, Channel A2 Response Time Test; B21-N678C, B21-N078 ,

i)

m

, 44.020.011 NSSSS - Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Levels 1 t

V

'

" Revision 4 and 2), Division I, Channel A Response Time Test; ci B21-N681A, B21-N684A and 821-N081 .020.013 NSSSS - Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Levels 1 Revision 4 and 2), Division I, Channel C Response Time Test; B21-N681C, B21-N684C and B21-N0810.

__

44.030.259 ECCS - Reactor Vessel Water Level (Levels 1 Revision 4 and 2), Division I, Channel A Response Time A Test; B21-N691A, B21-N692A and 821-N091 .030.26 ECCS - Reactor Vessel Water Level (Levels 1 Revision 5 and 2), Division I, Channel C Response Time Test; B21-N691C, 821-N692C and 821-N091 .030.308 ECCS - Drywell Pressure-RHR, CCS and HPCI Actuation, Revision 3 Division II, Channel B Response Time Test; B21-N694F and 821-N094F.

t, t

-

44.030.309 ECCS - Drywell Pressure-RHR, CCS and HPCI Actuation, Revision 5 Division I, Channel C Response Time Test; B21-N694G and B21-N094 )

54.000.03 Control Rod Scram Insert Time Tes Revision 13 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. Unresolved items identified during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3.a and . Open Items Open items are matters which have_been discussed with the licensee which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2.e(2), 2.f(2), 2.g(1),

3.c, 3.d, 3.e, and 3.f.

)

. _ _ - _ _ _ .

.

-

.

8. Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

on October 23, 1987. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection, The licensee acknowledged the statements made by the inspector with respect to the violations. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to

'

documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar !

i l

- _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ .