IR 05000341/1987029
| ML20235H458 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/1987 |
| From: | Foster J, Hironori Peterson, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235H438 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-87-29, NUDOCS 8710010059 | |
| Download: ML20235H458 (22) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGU'ATORY COMMISSION L
REGION III
' Report No; 50-341/87029(DRSS)
Docket'No. 50-341 License No.'NPF-43
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L'censee:
The Detroit Edison Company i
_6400 North Dixie Highway
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Newport, MI 48166 Facility Name:
Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 Inspection At:
Fermi 2 Site, Newport, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
August 17-20, 1987 h
of[f8 77
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Inspectors:
H. Peterson Team Leader Date
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J. Foster
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Approved By:
W. Snel e
j I/87 Emergency Preparedness Section Dats
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Inspection Summary Inspection on August 17-20, 1987 (Report No. 50-341/87029(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the annual Fermi Unit 2 Emergency Preparedness Exercise involving observations by four NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
However, exercise. weaknesses which require corrective actions are identified in this report and in the Appendix to the report's transmittal letter.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
NRC Observers and Areas Observed H. Peterson, Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC)
Operational Support Center (OSC), Post-Accident Sampling
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System (PASS) In-Plant Teams J. Foster, CR, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
G. Bryan, CR, TSC R. Hogan, OSC, Medical Drill b.
Detroit Edison Company F. Agosti, Vice President, Nuclear Services W. Orser, Vice President, Nuclear Operations J. Mulvehill, Senior Emergency Response Planner M. Hoffman, Emergency Response Planner M. Cooley, Emergency Response Planner R. Kelm, Director Nuclear Security B. Heffner, Director, Public Information S. Frost, Licensing J. Cwiklinski, Plant System Engineer D. Nick, Plant System J. Drotar, Plant System Engineer S. Latone, Director, Nuclear Training R. Mcleod, Supervisor, Nuclear Training
C. Sexauer, General Supervisor, Nuclear Services j
J. Nolloth, Supervisor, Nuclear Services D. Ball, Nuclear Security M. Lico, Dose Assessor S. Bump, Radiological Engineer (
R. Eberhardt, Radiation Protection Engineer R. Anderson, Supervisor Radiological Engineer J. Bobba, General Supervisor, Health Physics M. Prystupa, General Supervisor, Chemistry
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K. Shields, Chemist D. Farrar, GE Chemist J. Louweis, Nuclear Security J. Shafer, Maintenance Administrator S. Washburn, Supervisor, Document Control and Records Management A. Waite, Registered Nurse G. Kenney, Nuclear Training K. Lindsey, Nuclear Training D. Johnson, Nuclear Training, Acting Supervisor J. Buf kin, RET Coordinator
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J. Sahli, OSC Controller B. Lewis, RET Coordinator M. Karmol, Worklead and TSC Dose Assessor a
B. Holka, Simulator Worklead
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- T.
Schehr, Nuclear Shift Supervisor-
- W.-Ostrom, Nuclear Assistant Shift Supervisor
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Parker, Data Clerk
- J.
Dewes, STA
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Pterman, NSO
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Davis, NSO
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Snyder, NSC
- S.
Taylor, Shift Operations Advisor
- W. Tucker, Emergency Director
- E. Preston, Emergency' Director
- J. Plona, Tech.. Engineer
- E. Madsen, Licensing.
c.
Others R. Martin, Mercy Memorial Hospital, Assistant Director, Emergency Services M.'Syed, Medical Director
- Indicates those licensee personnel who did not attend the August 20 -1987 exit meeting.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Open Items a.
(0 pen) Open Iteu 341/85018-03:
Correction to the orientation of the meteorological tower measurement booms. -The work order to reorient two of the met tower booms into the prevailing wind was reissued in October 1986.
The package for the work to be performed was sent to Stone and Webster in May 1987.
This package identified other work to'be accomplished, such as replacement of cracked conduit, and is scheduled to be completed and ready for maintenance in October 1987.
This item remains open.
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b.
(0 pen) Open Item 341/85041-04:
Suggested revision of dose assessment computer code to accommodate ATWS conditions.
The licensee presently has the capability to address ATWS conditions in dose calculations
performed on the IBM PC-based ERIS (RADOSE) system.
Licensee j
personnel indicated that this option will be incorporated into the mainframe ERIS code in the future.
This item remains open.
3.
General A daytime exercise of the licensee's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness (RERP) Plan was conducted at the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant on August 18, 1987.
The exercise tested the licensee's capabilities to respond to a hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a major radioactive release.
This was a utility only exercise.
Attachment 1 describes the scope and objectives of the exercise.
Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenario.
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14.
General Observations.
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-a.
Procedures'
The exercise.was conducted"in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E
. requirements using the Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness
'(RERP) Plan and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).
b.
Coordination The licensee's response was generally coordinated, orderly, and timely.
If the events had been real, the. actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient'to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safety.
c.
' Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with four NRC observers.
d.
Exercise Critiques The. licensee held facility and controller critiques at the Emergency Operations Facility after the exercise on August 18, 1987..
The NRC discussed the observed strengths and weaknesses during the exit interview held on August 20, 1987.
Personnel who attended the NRC exit interview are listed in Section 1.
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5.
Specific Observations a.
Control Room (CR)
Control Room (CR) personnel reacted promptly and properly to simulated accident conditions presented to them via the simulator.
They were adequately familiar with procedures (Emergency Operating Procedures, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, Technical Specifications) and
' referred to them as necessary.
Emergency conditions were properly and rapidly classified per Procedure EP-101.
Operators demonstrated good CR practice by maintaining low noise levels, and by repeating instructions and instrument readings.
CR personnel maintained adequate logs to allow reconstruction of significant actions taken during the simulated emergency.
Public address announcements were made following event classifications, alerting plant personnel to the current emergency classification and
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I the current plant status.
Notification procedures were followed, including use of a checkoff list designed to ensure that all required notifications were made.
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J The communicator inLthe Control Room was severely overburdened, having responsibility for offsite notifications following the Unusual Event
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and Alert classifications plus having to respond to various requests for information.
Partially as a' result of the above, on a few occasions vital information flow from the CR was untimely.
The communicator did not notify Canada of the Alert classification until 50 minutes'after the Alert had been declared.
This untimely notification was approximately 20 minutes after the: Site Area Emergency declaration.
The licensee's plan does not set a time limit for initially. notifying Canada of' an emergency declaration.
Some of the communicator's problems.were due to an exercise artificiality.
The'three-way telephone system in the actual Control Room, which allows simultaneous notification of the state'and counties,~was not available in the Control Room Simulator.
Based on the'above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.
However, the following items should be considered for improvement:
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The licensee should consider adding an additional CR communicator.
- The licensee should establish a reasonable internal time limit.for. initially notifying Canadian officials of emergency declarations, i
b.
Technical Support' Center (TSC)
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The Technical Support Center (TSC) was quickly activated.
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Procedures, logs, and checklists were properly utilized.
Noise levels were adequately controlled.
Plant parameter status boards were well maintained during.the entire exercise.
TSC personnel made adequate recommendations and explored different'
solutions to the problems at hand.
Communications and coordination between the TSC, CR, and OSC were generally adequate.
The internal TSC briefings, held by the Emergency Director (ED), were timely and beneficial to the TSC staff.
In general, the TSC staff worked well together and were knowledgeable of their procedures and duties.
Although overall communications were adequate, on occasions E-information flow to the TSC from the CR was untimely.
For example,
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the TSC was informed of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)
system initiation and subsequent fuel failure approximately one hour after the fact; the TSC was not aware that one of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) steam isolation valves indicated an intermediate valve position until approximately two hours after the condition existed.
The inadequate flow of significant information-from the CR to the TSC is an Exercise Weakness (No. 341/87029-01).
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TSC habitability was, in. general, adequately estab1'ished and maintained.- Habitability could'have'been degraded due to the
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location of the security radio antenna cable.
This cable ran from inside the TSC to outside the building, preventing proper
' sealing of the doors and reducing the effectiveness of the TSC's Heating,. Ventilation,'and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system in the recirculation mode.
Also, there were no Direct Reading Dosimeter-(DRD) chargers initially available at the dosimeter issue desk.
The DRDs were then. issued at the security desk.
However, once the chargers were made available, the guards did not know how to zero the DRDs.
Many of the personnel reporting to the'TSC did not appear to know how to zero their dosimeters or to properly frisk themselves.
This.is an Open Item (No. 341/87029-02).
Based on the above findings, one Exercise Weakness and one Open
' Item were identified.
c.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
The Operational Support Center.(OSC) is located in a two story building adjacent to the CR and is the access way to the CR entrance.
The OSC is a controlled clean area-requiring a full body frisk, utilizing a portal monitor, for admittance.
The OSC control area was on the first floor of the building, and was divided into a control center and waiting area.
During the majority-of the exercise, the OSC was cramped and noisy.
This caused some delays in obtaining information from inplant teams and providing information to OSC personnel.
During Assembly and Accountability, the OSC is also utilized as an assembly area.
This contributed to the crowded conditions and initially hampered both OSC and accountability activities.
The OSC was staffed and operational in a timely manner.
Key personnel in the OSC displayed knowledge of plant maintenance and troubleshooting activities.
In general, the OSC staff demonstrated technical expertise in their functional areas.
OSC habitability was quickly determined and monitored frequently.
The OSC Coordinator was quick to establish the organization and provided periodic plant status updates to OSC personnel.
Assembly and Accountability initially proceeded in an orderly manner.
However, as more people arrived in the OSC and reported their badge numbers to security, other people left the area prior to the completion of accountability.
Assembly and Accountability was declared completed within 30 minutes, but over 70 people had not been properly accounted for.
Furthermore, no adequate actions were initiated or simulated to find those who were missing before Assembly and Accountability activities were terminated due to outage considerations.
This unsatisfactory demonstration of onsite Assembly I'
and Accountability is an Exercise Weakness (No. 341/87029-03).
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The operation of'the OSC was, at times, disorganized and-inefficient.
-Records of OSC activities were incomplete.
Status boards were not utilized to their ful.lest.
Data and events were not always updated effectively.
No one person was assigned responsibility to maintain the status boards.
At times, the OSC. Coordinator had to update the status boards.in addition to. fulfilling his other duties.
Many records, including survey data and ARM readings, were written on scraps of. paper.
There were no formal data forms available for use,
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and records'of team activities'were not' maintained.
OSC procedures did not contain sufficient instructions for each key position'and did not adequately address records retention.
The lack of adequate records retention in the OSC and insufficient procedural guidance on key staff duties is an Open Item (No. 341/87029-04).
Tracking of'inplant teams was not well organized. There was no established method to accomplish team tracking, such as a checklist addressing the teams' briefing, progress on assigned tasks, and debriefing.
For example, on one occasion, the OSC Coordinator was asked what was the status of the PASS team.
The OSC Coordinator did not know the status of the team.
He had to ask the Radiological Emergency Team (RET) Leader for the team's status.
The RET Leader informed him that the team was in the process of PASS sampling.
In actuality, the PASS team was delayed and had not started its sample collection task.
The inability of OSC supervisory personnel to maintain an adequate awareness of the inplant teams' progress on assigned tasks is an Open Item (No. 341/87029-05).
Inplant survey results were not effectively utilized for inplant team briefings.
Recent survey data along with ARM readings were inadequately updated on plant layout maps.
There was no method to use recent survey results to help select optimum inplant routes to and from the job sites in order to reduce exposure to inplant teams.
This is an Open Item (No. 341/87029-06).
Based on the above findings, one Exercise Weakness and three Open Items were identified.
d.
Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS)
The PASS team consisted of two RAD / CHEM Technicians.
One technician both read the procedure and performed the actual mechanics of drawing a RCS sample, while the other technician monitored radiation levels.
Only one person was reading, logging, and performing the mechanics of sampling.
At times, it was apparent that this was too much activity
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for one person to handle effectively.
For instance, when the operator j
tried to manipulate sampling valves while also reading the procedures (on loose sheets of paper), he would occasionally drop pages on the floor.
The team adequately demonstrated the mechanics of drawing an RCS liquid sample while wearing full anti-contamination clothing and SCBAs.
The team demonstrated adequate HP concerns in surveying, and in monitoring their radiation dose.
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Communications between the two technicians were demonstrated through their SCBAs by the use of throat microphones.
This equipment was initially effective, but at times there was too much static to make communications effectively understood.
Also, the PASS team did not have a radio to maintain communications with the OSC, which contributed to lack of awareness of sampling progress in the OSC and the TSC.
Although the team demonstrated sampling procedures adequately, there was too.long of a delay from the time the request to sample was made to the time the sample was drawn.
At approximately 1045, the request was received and the team was dispatched, but it was not until 1200 that the team began entry preparations.
However, at approximately 1250 the team had collected a RCS liquid sample.
Sample analysis results were available by 1341.
The PASS team delay was partially due to the lack of readily available dosimetry (finger ring dosimeters).
The inplant Radiological / Chemistry lab had insufficient finger ring supplies, which then had to be obtained from the General Training and Orientation Center (GTOC)
outside the protected area.
During the one hour delay, the team could have reviewed their procedures, checked their equipment, and donned their anti-contamination clothing, but these actions were not taken.
Although the team performed the sampling and used procedures adequately, it was noted that Attachment 2 to the sampling procedure (78.000,14, Revision 5) was utilized.
The attachment had unapproved temporary changes penned in by the operators.
Enquiring further into the inserted changes, it was determined that some important steps were missing.
The following were the unapproved, temporary changes noted in Attachment 2:
(1) Step 3.10; statement was added, "1 gal".
(2) After Step 3.11; statement was added, " Turn S-5 to 0FF".
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(3) Step 3.12; statement; " position 1 or 4", was changed to, j
" position 1 or 5".
(4) After Step 3.20; statement was added, " Turn switch S-3 to position 3 (FLUSH) to MAXFLUSH".
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(5) Ltep 3.24 was deleted.
(6) Step 3.25; statement was added, " Turn all switches up and 0FF l
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secure N and de-energize panel".
Further review of the PASS procedures by the licensee, to approve any appropriate penned in changes, is required.
The practice of utilizing informally revised procedures without prior formal review and approval is an Exercise Weakness (No. 314/87029-07).
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Licensee personnelLindicated they could not demonstrate the capabilities of the PASS to obtain gas samples due to a damaged limit switch on the containment air. sampling system. 1The operability
'of;the gas sampling system of the PASS will be tracked as an Open
. Item (No. 341/87029-08).
Based on the above findings, one Open Item and one Exercise Weakness were identified.
The following items.should also be considered for
.. improvement:
The organization and composition of the' PASS team should
be reviewed for adequacy.and efficiency, and modified as necessary.
Appropriate personal-dosimetry should be readily.available
E in the.inplant Radiological Chemistry Lab.
The PASS team should be equipped with a radio to provide
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communications capability between the team and the OSC.
e.
Medical Drill One of the exercise objectives was to demonstrate the capability to evacuate a contaminated injured worker from the site to an offsite hospital for decontamination and treatment.
The licensee was slow to provide onsite medical attention to the f-victim.
Over 20 minutes elapsed between the time the injury was reported to.the CR until a rescue team with a stretcher arrived at the scene.
The rescue team was not properly dressed for entering a contaminated area.
They were not wearing sufficient anti-contamination clothing or self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs). The inplant team that included the victim was fully dressed in anti-contamination clothing, including SCBAs.
.A total of 40 minutes elapsed from the time the injury was reported until the time the contaminated injured man was transported out of the affected area.
It was over an hour after the injury occurred that the ambulance left the plant site.
Once at the hospital, the ambulance delivered the patient to the wrong door, which was not prepared to receive a contaminated patient.
The ambulance and ambulance attendants did not demonstrate proper contamination control measures, and were not sufficiently corrected by the HP technicians.
The floor of the ambulance was not covered with herculite, and the attendants did not use gloves.
In addition, the HP technician stationed outside the treatment room failed to control the spread of contamination by the ambulance attendants.
The HP technician inside the treatment room failed to provide adequate guidance to the medical staff on methods to minimize contamination, decontaminate the patient, and dispose of contaminated items.
HP technicians had earlier failed to note and correct the fact that two nurses at the onsite dress-out station had failed to frisk upon leaving a contaminated area, and that one nurse failed to remove contaminated gloves upon leaving the area.
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The slow response to'the accident scene by licensee personnel, and the inadequate Health Physics support provided by licensee
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personnel to' ambulance and medical staffs is'an Exercise Weakness (No. 341/87029-09).
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' During the Medical drill, when the contaminated injured man was being, processed out through the dress out area, the contaminated area-had to be expanded due to the spread of contamination into a clean area.
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The step off pad, which had been contaminated, was moved and a new location established.
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The hospital portion of the Medical Crill took more time than i'
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At this point, the Medical l
Controller turned the evaluated drill into a training session, questioned'the players on their actions, and provided answers where players were uncertain.
Based on the above findings, one Exercise Weakness was identified.
f.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was staffed and activated promptly at approximately 1028 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91154e-4 months <br />.
Status boards were excellent l
and were well maintained throughout the exercise.
Good use was made of a status board for trending plant variables of interest.
Noise
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levels were low, and adequate logs were maintained to enable reconstruction of significant actions taken during the simulated accident.
EOF personnel were properly prohibited from smoking or eating prior to the performance of radiological habitability checks.
The Heating Ventilating and Air Conditioning system was put into the recirculation mode, with no problems noted.
A Continuous Air Monitor was in operation, and personnel were requested to read their dosimeters at approximately 15 minute intervals.
A frisker station was located outside of the entrance to the EOF, and personnel were relied upon to survey themselves for potential contamination.
Licensee personnel indicated that the location and operation of this frisker station is i
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under review, and a portal monitor is planned for this location in the future.
l EOF personnel adequately tracked the plume and projected offsite L
radiation doses.
Protective Action Recommendations were adequate and timely.
Effective communication with the State of Michigan via voice line and telefax was noted.
State of Michigan representatives reported good agreement between their dose projections and those performed by the licensee.
In general, the EOF staff communicated adequately with other emergency response facilities, the State of Michigan, and other offsite agencies.
The EOF maintained overall awareness of plant conditions and the status of the injured / contaminated man.
EOF staff received periodic
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.i and effective briefings on plant status.and offsite actions.
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exercise progressed, relief shift personnel received thorough turnover
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briefings prior to assuming their tasks.
There was a scenario / controller error in providing the location of an onsite radiation reading, which led to the conclusion that offsite doses were 30-40 times those projected using plant monitor data and computer models.
EOF oersonnel then assumed that an unmonitored release pathway must.also exist, and they properly pursued locating such a release pathway.
When it was found that this was a Controller error and was distracting from the exercise scenario and timeline, a Controller was allowed to correct the false information.
While EOF personnel properly pursued finding an unmonitored release path, recognition is needed of the fact that a single anomalous data point should be discarded if no other data support that reading.
One offsite message form, in the section " additional information" had erroneous information that the State of Michigan had decided to j
evacuate all sectors out to a five mile radius.
This information was
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identified as being in error and corrected (the other' sections of the form' correctly identified ongoing protective actions as sheltering).
Finally, contrary to the requirements of EPIP (EP-290) and orders from the Emergency Officer in the EOF, the initial notification form used to notify State and local authorities of the General Emergency was deficient.
The transmitted form had omitted required data in Sections 2, 3 and 7.
It also failed to correctly include the extra affected sector "N" in the Protective Action Recommendation.
The State was aware of the correct information via verbal communications.
The failure to correctly document two initial notification messages sent from the EOF is'an Open Item (Item No. 341/87029-10).
Based on the above findings, one Open Item was identified.
6.
Exercise Scenario and Control The' licensee's exercise scenario was challenging, and included a contaminated / injured man, meteorological changes and assembly /
accountability.
Exercisa control was adequate with the exceptions noted in Paragraph 5.f and the simulated overexposure of an inplant team.
Due to simulation artificiality and controller problems in adequately presenting radiation data, the two man team deployed to the RCIC room received a simulated exposure of 10 rem per man dose, thus exceeding 10 CFR 20 limits without prior authorization.
The' exercise utilized the CR simulator to good effect.
The simulator did fail early in the exercise, but it was restarted without causing any undue delays in the performance of the exercise.
There was a backup system of exercise information sheets available to provide plant parameter data to the-CR operators in case of total simulator failure.
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Licensee Critiques The licensee held three levels'of exercise critiques, one at each individual facility immediately following the exercise, a critique for controllers / observers following the facility critiques, and a presentation at the Exit Interview.
NRC personnel attended these critiques and determined that significant exercise problems had been identified by licensee personnel.
8.
Exit Interview The NRC exit interview was held on August 20, 1987, with the licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 in attendance.
The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and preliminary findings of the inspection.
The licensee was also asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary.
The licensee responded that none of the information was proprietary.
Attachments:
1.
Scope of Participation and Exercise Objectives 2.
Scenario Events Summary
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FERMEX 87
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August 18, 1987
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SECTION 3 - SCOPE, OBJECTIVES, AND SIMULATIONS FOR FERMEI 87
31 DETROIT EDISON 3 1.1 SCOPE FERMEX 87 is scheduled as a " Licensee-Only" exercise to be evaluated by the NRC. However, the Counties of Monroe, Wayne and Brownstown Township may participate. Since it is not a scheduled year for local participation, the local Emergency Response Organizations will not be evaluated by FEMA. As a result, the State of Michigan will participate on a limited basis to pass through the information needed by the Counties to exercise their response organizations. The EXERCISE is designed to test Edison's response to various plant emergencies; to establish the communications and coordination between, Edison and offsite governmental Emergency Response Organizations and Facilities; and address the specific responsibilities, capabilities, and interfaces of each organized element of the Fermi 2 RERP Plan and Implementing Procedures.
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A simulated abnormal radiological incident at Fermi 2 will escalate from an UNUSUAL EVENT to a GENERAL EMERGENCY.
As the capabilities of Edison and the various offsite governmental response organizations are brought into play, the effectiveness and efficiency of Fermi 2's response will be independently evaluated by the NRC.
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FERMEX'87
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August 18, 1987
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OBJECTIVES The specific objectives of FERMEX 87 will demonstrate:
1.
The adequacy cf the RERP Plan and its Implementing Procedures and test the proficiency of the Emergency Response Organization to select and use the appropriate procedures for response to the emergency.
2.
The capability of the Control Room operators to respond to a radiological incident at Fermi 2, by manipulating the simulator controls, with a minimum of exercise messages and exercise Controller interface and to use
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the Simulator Control Room communications to conduct an exercise.
(The Simulator is not being evaluated).
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The integrated capability of the Emerger.cy Response Organization to respond to a simulated emergency event.
4.
The effectiveness of the interfaces among the Simulator Control Room and the permanent Emergency Response facilities, (Operational Support Center, Technical Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility).
The adequacy and effectiveness of the permanent TSC emergency communications network between Fermi 2, the State of Michigan, Monroe County, Wayne County and Canada.
6.
Proficiency in recognizing, understanding, and applying the Emergency Action Levels in classifying emergency events.
The capability of the Simulator Control Room to properly use the procedures and forms provided for notification of the State and local
' governmental agencies within 15 minutes of classification of the emergency event and provide followup reports on a periodic basis.
8.
The capability of the Control Room to notify the NRC within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of declaration of the emergency event.
The capability of the Control Room to recognize when a release limit from an effluent stack is exceeded.
10.
The capability of the TSC and EOF (when functional) to properly notify State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes of classification of the event, and provide followup reports on a periodic basis.
11.
The capatility to perform timely and effective offsite dose assessment based on plant conditions, potential / actual radiological releases, and meteorological conditions through the use of computer software.
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FERMEX'87 i
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August 18, 1987
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The capability to recommend to the responsible State officials protective i
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actions for the general public in the 10-afle EPZ based on plant l
conditions, potential and/or actual radio *aogical releases and j
meteorological data on a timely basis 'within 15 minutes of declaring a GENERAL EMERGENCY).
The capability to recommend to the responsible State officials protective actions for the general public in the 10-mile EPZ based on meteorological forecasts.
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14.
The capability of the Offsite RETs to locate and track the plume, to obtain air samples (if requested) and collect environmental samples and deliver them to the EOF Laboratory.
15.
The use of personnel dosimetry by the Emergency Response Organization in the Control Room, OSC, TSC and EOF.
,
16.
The capability of Health Physics personnel to establish control points at the TSC and EOF and perform routine radiological surveys in the facilities.
m p
The capability of Health Physics personnel to perform inplant surveys with
/
the proper procedures and instrumentation.
18.
The capability to authorize exceeding 10 CFR 20 exposure limits within the plant when requested.
,
The capability to use inplant iodine monitoring.
20.
The capability to obtain iodine grab samples, analyze, and properly use the results in offsite dose assessment.
'
21.
The capability to obtain and analyze PASS samples as may be requested.
22.
The capability to evacuate an injured / contaminated worker from the site to a hospital offsite for decontamination and treatment.
The capability of the Offsite RETs to observe ALARA monitoring practices while performing offsite monitoring.
24.
To perform Assembly and Accountability within 30 minutes.
The capability to conduct a shift change of the Emergency Response personnel within the TSC and EOF.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
__ _
,
"
FERMEX'87
'
Augu:t 18, 1987
'
P ga 12
~
^
3 1 3 SIMULhfED CONDITIONS 1.
Simulator For purposes of FERMEX 87, the simulated power level history and other aspects such as nonoperational equipment are defined in the scenario summary by the initial Simulator conditions.
There are conditions the Simulator is not programmed to provide as described below:
a.
The area radiation monitor (ARM) channels will respond and indicate offscale. The ARM readings are simulated within the plant according to the location of the release and the area of Concern.
b.
Stack effluent radiation monitors for SGTS, Turbine, Radwaste, and Reactor Building stacks are not available from the Simulator. Releases to the environment are simulated according to accident conditions.
2.
Other a.
The capability to take chemistry samples for analysis will be demonstrated. The analytical results are simulated according to accident conditions.
b.
Participation by DECO onsite personnel directly involved in responding to an emergency shall be carried out to the fullest extent possible - including the deployment of Fire Brigade, Radiological Monitoring Teams, Damage Control and Rescue Teams, and other emergency workers.
-
c.
All actions are to be played out, as much as possible, in accordance with emergency plan and procedures as if it were a real emergency. Actions that cannot be played out should be ioentified to the CONTROLLER stating the reason why the action cannot be continued or must be simulated.
OFFSITE RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS 3 2.1 STATE OBJECTIVES The State of Michigan will have only limited participation and will not be establishing objectives.
3 2.2 WAYNE COUNTY OBJECTIVES Wayne County will have only limited participation at the Joint Public Information Center and will not be establishing objectives.
_ _ _ _ - _.
'
'
FERMEX'87 August 18, 1987
-
P2ga 13 I
~
3 2 3 BROWNSTOWN TOWNSHIP OBJECTIVES Brownstown Township will have only limited participation at the Joint Public Information Center and will not be establishing objactives.
3 2.4 MONROE COUNTY OBJECTIVES Monroe County will have only limited participation at the Joint Public Information Center and will not be establishing objectives.
'!
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'
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