IR 05000341/1988019

Insp Rept 50-341/88-19 on 880531-0715.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Events,Operational Safety, Maint,Surveillance,Ler Followup,Startup Test Observation, Generic Ltr Review,Rept Review & Mgt Meetings

ML20207G690
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	08/15/1988
From:	Cooper R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207G673	List: IR 05000341/1988019 ML20207G670
References
50-341-88-19, NUDOCS 8808240200
Download: ML20207G690 (10)

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U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION III

Report No. 50-341/88019(DRP)

Docket No. 50-341 Operating License N NPF-43 Licensee: Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name: Fermi 2 Inspection At: Fermi Site, Newport, Michigan Inspection Conducted: May 31 through July 15, 1988 Inspectors: W. G. Rogers T. Silko R. Stransky -

T. McKennon T. Vandel S. Stasek C. Vanderpict Approved By: R ief 8//S/8/'

Reactor Projects Section 38 Dare '

. Inspection Summary In,spection on May 31, 1988 through July 15, 1988 (Report No. 50-341/88019(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Followup of events; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; LER followup; startup test observa. ion; Generic Letter review; report review; and n.anagement meeting Results: No violations were identifie One unresolved item was identified

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(Paragraph 6) and one open item was identified (Paragraph 3).

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Detroit Edison Company

• P. Anthony, Licensing

1. • D. Gipson, Plant Manager

1. • L. Goodman, Licensing

• R. Lenart, General Director, Nuclear Engineering

1. • W. Orser, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

1. • R. Stafford, Director NQA & PS W. Terrasi, General Supervisor, Chemistry

• W. Tucker, Superintendent, Operations

1. G. Preston, Operations Engineer

• Gelletly, General Supervisor, Plant Nuclear Engineering

• T. Riley, Compliance Supervisor

1. B. Sylvia, Group Vice President

1. D. Odland, Superintendent, Maintenance

1. S. Catola, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Services

1. L. Lessor, Techn'ical Specification Improvement Program Team Leader

1. F. Svetkovici,, Technical Engineer

1. D. Ball, Seccrity

1. J. Pendergast, Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

1. M. Virgilio, L'eputy Directory, Division of Reactor Projects, RIII

1. R. Knop, Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 3, RIII

1. R. Cooper, Chief, Section 3B, Division of Reactor Projects, RIII

- # T. Quay, Project Manager, NRR

1. P. Pelke, Project Inspector, RIII

1. J. Clifford, RIII Coordinator, DEDRO

1. • W. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector

• T. Silko, Inspector

• Denotes those attei; ding the exit meeting on July 29, 1988.

1. Denotes those attending the June 1, 1988 management meetin The inspectors al:,o interviewed others of the licensee's staff during this inspectio . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observ0d control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, reviewed computer generated reactor core performance reports and conducted discucsions with control room operators during the period from May 28 through July 15, 1988. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,

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including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and

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verified implementation of radiation protection control During the

inspection, tha inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Standby Gas Treatment, Emergency Diesel Generator, High Pressure Coolant Injection and Standby Liquid Control systems to verify operability by comparing system lineup with plant drawings, as-built configuration or present valve lineup lists; observing equipment conditions that could degrade performance; and verifying that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning, and calibrate These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedure During these reviews the inspector:

Observed that a change was made to the weekly turbine valve testing procedure. The change allowed testing to be accomplished at 88%

versus 80% power. However, the prerequisite portion of the procedure had not been changed to allow testing at 88% power. The matter was brought to the attention of the assistant shift supervisor and the prerequisite was subsequently change * * Noted problems associated with implementation of the control room information system (CRIS). The CRIS procedure does provide clear direction on making written modification to log entrie Corrections to the log were made in red and black ink and in penci Corrections to the log were often not initialed by the individual making the chang *

Corrections were lined-out in several different manner This condition leads to confusion as to the reasons for corrections being made to the log. It also makes the identification of those making the correction difficult to determin Operations personnel were not always familiar with changes to the log and cleared log entries.

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• Two operators (CRNS0s) interviewed tuuld not identify reasons l

for some log entries.

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The CRIS summary log is required to be reviewed only on a daily basis and only by the SEI not the NSO, NASS, or the NSS according to the procedur *

Review of the CRIS is not included in the Shift Relief Checklists for the NSO, NASS, or the NS CRIS dots may be added to the main control board and cleared from the main control board by NSO delegate The color of the CRIS dot is not very striking and easily blenJs in with the colors of the control board itself. This allows the dots to be missed when the board is observed especially when viewed from the operators' desks. Brighter colored dots would increa';e the visibility of the dots and help to improve the operators' awareness of the Improvement of the CRIS will be reviewed with those corrective actions taken to violation 341/83012-1 No violations or deviat, ions were identified in this are . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systemt were

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removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed:

• steam line flow indication repair computer point troubleshooting l

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l Following completion of maintenance on the steam line flow indication, l

the inspectors verified that these systems had been returned to service l properly.

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During the computer point troubleshooting a watertight door between the I turbine building and the auxiliary building had to be opened for an extended period of time. The inspectors determined that the door existed to protect two of the corner rooms from external flooding. Since the facility was in the midst of a severe drought, the inspectors placed

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I no safety significance on the door being open. However, the inspectors i requested from the licensee an understanding of the programmatic controls I on the watertight doors during maintenance / modification activitie !

This . natter is considered an open item (341/88019-01(DRP)).  !

No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications and verified that: testing was perfortned in accordance with adequate procedures, tcst instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results conformed with .

Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed I by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies identified- during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne .

The inspectors witnessed portions of the following test activities:

24.404.02 SGTS Filter Monthly Operability Test

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44.010.125 RPS - APRM B Channel Functional Test 24.202.01 HPCI Pump Operability and Flow Test a*,1000 PSIG and Valve Operability

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No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification (Closed) LER 86034-02: Temperature switch malfunctions during surveillance actuates reactor water cleanup system isolation valv '

Revisions 00 and 01 of this LER were previously closed in Inspection Report 341/87020. This revision better specified that the RWCU isolation was due to a number of printed circuit board assemblies in Riley Tempmatic Model 86 temperature switches used for this application not l being upgraded in accordance with General Electric recommended design l improvements. The schedule for corrective action implementation /

completion was also modified by this revision to allow for procurement of the required part Subsequently, all applicable Model 86 temperature switches were either replaced or modified to the upgraded configuratio This LER is close .

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(Closed) LER 87002-00: Ground fault causes turbine trip and reactor scram. The licensee determined the cause of the Cround fault to be a strio of aluminum used to aid assembly work during plant constructio The cluminum had not been removed at the completion of construction and due to cyclic stresses imposed on it during plant operation, had eventually failed and contacted the iso phase bus, thereby creating the fault. The licensee subsequently conducted an inspection of the iso phase cooling ducts and verified no further cases existed which could result in failures of this typ ,

Following the scram, a relay in the Post Scram Feedwater Logic Sequencer failed and necessitated the Control Room Operator (CRNS0) to take manual control of reactor water level. The relay was subsequently replace The inspector reviewed the Deviation Event Report (No.87-077) associated with the LER as well as the Post Scram Data / Evaluation Report (No.87-002)

and the work request (No. 0234 022687) outlining required corrective actions and has no further concerns in this catter. This LER is close (Closed) LER 87006-00: Incorrect lubrication valve line c causes damage to HPCI.turbire. The licensee determined the root cause to be personnel

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error in that the governor bearing oil supply valve was found closed and the thrust bearing oil supply valve mispositioned. No definitive cause for the misalignments could be determined but the licensee postulated that maintenance workers working on the HPCI system inadvertently moved *

the velve handles. The subject valves are ball-type and require only 90 degree movement of the handle to fully cycle the valv To prevent recurrence, the valves were properly repositioned and valve handles removed. Also, HPCI surveillance procedures 24.202.01, "HPCI Pump Operability and Flow Test at 1000 psi and Valve Operability," and

- 24.202.02, "HPCI Flow Rate Test at 165 psig Ractor Steam Pressure" were revised to include checking of oil pressures durirg performance of HPCI testing. The inspector has no further questions relative to this LER, and it is considered close (Closed) LER 88005-00: HPCI & RCIC not placed in service before 150 psig exceede (Closed) LER 88017-00: CCHVAC unplanned shift to recirculation mod (Closed) LER 88019-00: Manual scram when Division 1 offsite power was los No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Followup of Events (93702)

Ouring the inspection period, the licensee experienced sevefal events, some of which required prompt notificrtion of the NRC pursuant to

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10 CFR 50.72. The inspectors pursued the events onsite with licensee and/or other NRC officials. In each case, the inspectors verified that the notification was correct and timely, if appropriate, that the licensee

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was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were ronducted within regulatory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent future recurrence. The specific events are as follows:

May 28, 1988 Manual ESF actuation during isolation of a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system instrument line ruptur *

June 5, 1988 Natification to FAA of a loss of a cooling tower ligh * June 6, 1988 Notification to the Michigan Department of Natural Resources due to a sulfuric acid spil * June 9, 1988 Employee suffered heat exhaustion while performing maintenance and was transported offsit Juna 10, 1988 Unusual Event due to inadequate testing of the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) loop select system with High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) out of servic ~

• June 13, 1988 Unplanned Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation of core spray pump and Division 2 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) during surveillance activitie July 5, 1988 Notification to the Michigan Department of Natural Resources due to over chlorine in the General Service Water (GSW) buildin July 5, 1988 Unplanned FSF actuation of HPCI isolation circuitr * * July 7, 1988 Notification in accordance with IEB 88-05 asst,ciated with flanges from Piping Supplias Inc., and West Jersey Manufacturing Compan RWCU in.trument line failure: On May 28, 1988 at 3:15 a.m., while returning tr.e Reactor Water Civ.nup System (RWCU) to service, a steam leak developad in the system and was subsequently observed above the RWCU pump room . To terminate the leak, operators isolated RWCU and depressurized the system via blowdown to the main condenser. At 3: 54 a.m. ,

RWCU was depressuiized and the leak terminated. Because of the location of the leak, a large portion of the Raattor Building became u,ntaminate An NRC Region III Health Physics Inspector subsequently traveled to the site to review the event and evaluate the licensee's corrective actions.

l (Reference Inspection Report No. 341/88020).

j The licensee's evaluation into the cause of the leak had indicated that l

a swagelok fitting hai failed on a RWCU instrument line allowing the j subject tubing pair to separate. The root cause was apparently improper

' installation of the fitting in that it was either not properly positioned l onto the instrument tubing when tightened or, although properly positioned, was not tightened sufficiently to ensure a positive grip. As l

a result, yo determine if this was an isolated case, an inspection of 314 l

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additional swagelok fittings was performed by plant personnel. The fittings inspected were in assorted applications within the Auxiliary, Reactor, Turbine and RHR t.uildings. Of the 314 fittings inspected, 206 (66%)

exhibited gaps between the butt and fitting body greater than the manufacturer's recommendation On July 14, 1988, an event occurred where a swagelck fitting failed in a similar manne The leak occurred while placing RWCU into servic A different compression fitting failed on the same line as the one that failed in the May 28 even Following the second leak, Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 88-20 was issued on July 15, 1988. The CAL documented the licensee's investigation and corrective actions to this situatio On May 28, 1988, during testing of EDG 11 a fire occurred. Fuel oil leaked onto et 'st lagging through the local emergency stop butto The fire was ex d guished by an operator in the crea. The EDG wss declared inopea se until a permanent repair to stop the leak could be facilitate ,

The vendor was contacted by DEC0 engineering personnel who recommended an 0-ring be installed between the push button and its housing. This approach was adopted and Potential Design Change (PDC) 8994 was initiate Subsequently, the 0-ring was installed and the EDG declared operabl The inspector performed a partial review of the review process for 0-ring suitability and had questions as to whether the 0-ring was upgraded to QA 1 statu This matter is considered unresolved (341/88019-02(DRP)) until a more in-depth review is performe No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Startup Test Observation (72302)

The inspector witnessed performance of startup test STUT 060.012, APRM calibratio The inspector verified that the test was satisfactorily accomplishe No violations or deviations were identifie . Generic Letter Followup (92701) (SIMS No. B-19)

(Closed) GL 86-02: Technical Resolution of Generic Issue B-19 Thermal Hydraulic Stability. The licensee has implemented the recommendations of General Electric SIL-380 to provide for detection and suppression of possible flux oscillations in operating regions of potential instabilit As referenced in the subject Generic Letter, this w e determined to be an acceptable means of demonstrating compliance witt, GDC 10 and GDC 1 '

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The inspector verified that all recommendations of SIL-380 were properly incorporated and appropriate procedures revised. This Generic Letter is, therefore, close No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Report Reviews Monthly Operating Report: During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Operating Report for May and June 1988. The inspector confirmed that the inf w ation provided ret the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6. and Regulatory Guide 1.1 Quality Assurance Program Annual Update: The annual update was reviewed with satisfactory results, Special Report pursuant to Technical Specification 3.3.7.5 - On May 27, 1988, the Division 2 standby gas treatment radiation exhaust accident range monitor failed. This situation was reported as required in a letter dated June 10, 1988, to the NR However, the status and corrective action identified in the letter was not correc The licensee identified tre discrepancy to the resident inspector and inforn.ad him that a revision to the letter shall be issue This commitment is being tracked by the licensee under their commitment tracking system (RACTS) No. 88-40 No violations or deviations were identified in this are Management Meetings (30702)

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On June 1, 1988, NRC Region III management met with Detroit Edison management at the Nuclear Operations Center. The licensee provided presentations on plant status, management changes, material condition of the plant, Technical Specification improvement program, NOIP on Quality Assurance awareness, e.ommitment tracking, material control reorganization and observations on an INPO maintenance assist visi . Unresolved Item Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph ... - . . . - - . .. . . _ _ - .. - ~ . . - . -- .

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1 ExitInterview(307031 The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

on July 29, 1988, and informally throughout the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspectior, activities. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the

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inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by l

the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identif" any such documents / processes as proprietar The licensee acknowl;dged the findings of the inspection,

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