IR 05000341/1997012

Insp Rept 50-341/97-12 on 970804-06.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Exam Procedures & Representative Records,Observations of Activities & Interviews W/Staff & Conduct of Security & Safeguards Activities

ML20211G069
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	09/25/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211G067	List: IR 05000341/1997012 ML20211G063
References
50-341-97-12, NUDOCS 9710010450
Download: ML20211G069 (8)

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIONlil Docket No: 50-341 License No: NPF-43 Report No: 50 341/97012(DRS)

Licensee: Detroit Edison Company (DECO)

Facility: Enrico Ferml, Unit 2 Location: 6400 N. Dixie Hw Newport, MI 48166 Dates: August 4-6,1997 Inspector: G. Pirtle, Physical Security inspector Approved by: James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety 9710010450 970925 PDR ADOCK 05000341 0 PDR .

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Enrico Fermi, Unit 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-341/97012 This announced inspection included a review of the Vehicle Barrier System. Temporary Instru;; an 2515/132 * Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants" was used for inspection guidanc The features and structures that form the Vehicle Barrier System (VBS) met the design characteristics established by the NRC. The vehicle barrier components, or acceptable other barriers, and the location of the barriers were as described in the summary description of the VBS submitted by the licensee to the NRC, or as described in the current security plan. One unresolved item and one inspection followup item were noted as described below:

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No violations or deviations were noted. The provisions for land vehicle control measures met regulatory requirements and licensee commitment .

An unresolved item was noted pertaining to compensatory measures for failed tamper alarms (Section S1.1.b.3(a))

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An inspection followup item was noted pertaining to some vehicle barrier system-related procedure deficiencier. (Section S1.1.b.3.(b)).

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t IV. Plant Support Report Details S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S Temocrary Instruction 2515/132. " Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants" lDsoection Scone (Tl 2515/132)

Areas examined included provisions for land vehicle control measures to protect against the malevolent use of a land vehicle and to determine compilance with regulatory requirements and licensee commitment Obser/ations and Findinas (1) Vehicle Banier System The inspector found that the features and structures that form the Vehicle Barrier Systern (VBS) met the design characteristics established by the NRC. The vehicle barrier components and the location of the barrier were as described in the summary description of the VBS submitted to the NRC or as described in the security pla A visual walkdown performed by the inspector confirmed that the general type of vehicle barrier described in the VBS summary description or an acceptable altemate type of barrier had been installed and that the barrier was continuou No significant signs of barrier damage was noted during the walkdown of the VBS. The inspector also confirmed that the active barriers (gates) had manufacturer's certifications that the barriers would meet or exceed the maximum parameters of the design basis vehicle threat, r (2) Bomb Blast Analysis Inspector field observations of standoff distances were consistent with those documented in the summary description. The licensee confirmed that calculation of minimum standoff distance was based on NUREGiCR-6190 or an independent engineering analysi (3) Procedural Controls The licensee appropriately defined criteria for maintenance, surveillance, and compensatory measures for the VBS in appropriate procedures. The procedures were generally well written and detailed except as noted in (b) belo Discussions with the Superintendent, Security (a licensed reactor operator)

confirmed that procedures necessary to safely shutdown the units after a bomb blast were reviewed and found to be adequate. A specific procedure for equipment damaged by a bomb blast was not prepared, but the existing

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l l abnormal operation and emergency operating procedures were considered adequate to cope with loss of equipmen (a) An unresolved item was noted pertaining to tamper alarms for active elements of the VBS Compensatory measures for inoperative tamper alarms for the VBS passive barriers did not appear to meet specific standards for monitoring. Resolution of the issue ofintermittent or continuous compensatory measures will be addressed by separate correspondence (50-431/97012-01).

(b) During review of security procedures, the following weaknesses were noted. Correction of the weaknesses will be monitored as an Inspection Followup Item (50-341/97012-02).

(1) Revision 27 of the security plan addressed the VBS. NRC Region lll review of Revision 27 to the security plan was completed and the licensee was advised of the review results. The letter contained several review comments that require a respons (ii) The procedure for tamper alarm testing for active barriers was deficient. The procedure does not identify adequate pass / fail criteria for such testing. The testing criteria could allow the barrier to be ineffective (raise above the anchoring pin) and still be considered to be acceptable under the testing criteri (iii) The procedure for vehicle access to the protected area did not address operation of the VBS for emergency vehicle entr (iv) The procedure for annualinspection of the VBS designated a position (General Supervisor Security Operations) not trained or qualified to evaluate the impact of degraded barriers. Guidance for the annualinspection of the VBS was also lacking in regards to allowed spacing between barriers and other aspects pertaining to barrier inspection (v) The procedure for VBS compensatory measures did not require an analysis or evaluation to assure the measures can fulfill the VBS function (i.e. assuring temporary vehicles are of sufficient mass and size to be an effective barrier). Conclusions The provisions for land vehicle control measures met regulatory requirements and licensee commitments. The VBS program was consistent with the summary description submitted to the NRC m the security plan; installed components were identified in NUREG/CR-6' or the licensee's engineering analyses; and appropriate procedures had been dricioped and implemented. An unresolved item was noted pertaining to

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compensatory measures for failed tamper alarms. An inspection followup item was noted for weaknesses with some VBS related procedure Miscellaneous Security and Safeguard losues S (Closed) Insoection Followuo item (Recort 50 341/96008-03): Annual evaluation of security training instructors. The required evaluations of security training instructors had been complete S8.2 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item (Recort 50-341/96008-04): Revision required for the Security Section of the Updated Final Safety Arlysis Report (UFSAR). The revision (number 8) to the Security Section of the UFSAR (Section 13.7) has been complete X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the Inspection results to members of the licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on August 6,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined or inspection findings discussed during the exit meeting should be considered as proprietary or safeguards information. No other proprietary or safeguards information was identifie _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee A. Antrasslan, Compliance Engineer R. Cook, Acting Compliance Supervisor J. Davis, Director, Nuclear Training T. Dungy, Security Shif t Supervisor K. Hotz, Security Specialist K. Howard, D! rector, J. Korte, Director, Nuclear Security ,

A. Kowalczuk, Manager, Plant Support S. Neal, Security Speclatist K. Tyger, Quality Assurance NRC G. Harris, Senior Resident inspector, Fermi 2 C. O'Keefe, Resident inspector, Ferml 2 -

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED Tl 2515/132 Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants" issued January 18,1996 iP 92904 Followup - Plant Support ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

.Onened 50-341i97012-01 URI Compensatory Measures For Failed Tamper Alarms 50-341/97012-02 IFl Vehicle Barrier System Procedure Weaknesses Closed 50 341/96008-03 IFl Annual evaluation of security training instructor /96008-04 IFl Revision required for the Security Section of the Updated Final Safety Analysis repor '

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED VBS Vehicle Barrier System IFl inspection Followup Item UFSAR Undated Final Safety Analysis Report URI Unresolved item t

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L PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Summary Description For Proposed Vehicle Control Measures and Results of the Vehicle Bomb Comparicon For Protection Against Malevolent Uso of Vehicles at Fermi 2, dated February 1, 1995 Revised Summary Description For Proposed Vehicle Control Measures and Results of the Vehicle Bomb Comparison For Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Fermi 2, dated February 15,1996 Deviation Event Report No.1007," Failure to Conduct Quarterly Vehicle Barrier System Gate Arm inspection", dated August 20,1996 Deviation Event Report No. 96-1710 " Vehicle Barrier System Does Not Comply With Physical Security Plan", dated November 21,1996 Deviation Event Report No. 961817 " Degraded Vehicle Barrier System Gate Arm', dated December 1,1996 Deviation Event Report No.0088, " Vehicle Barrier Gate Damaged", dated January 23,1997 Procedure SEP-SE1-08," Protected and Vital Area Patrols", Revision 2, Approved February 28, 1996 Procedure SEP SE1-06," Reporting Physical Security Events", Revision 7, Approved August 1, 1997 Procedure SEP-SE-01," Testing and Maintenance", Revision 9, Approved May 15,1997 Section 6 of Procedure MGA 09," Access Control", Revision 5, Approved July 15,1997

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