IR 05000341/1987012

Insp Rept 50-341/87-12 on 870303-30.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on inspector-identified Items,Startup Test Phase Results, Regional Request,Operational Safety & Maint

ML20212Q822
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	04/19/1987
From:	Greenman E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212Q770	List: IR 05000341/1987012 ML20212Q766
References
50-341-87-12, NUDOCS 8704240071
Download: ML20212Q822 (18)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-341/87012(DRP)

Docket No. 50-341 Operating License No. NPF-43 Licensee: Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name: Fermi 2 Inspection At: Fermi Site, Newport, Michigan Inspection Conducted: March 3-30, 1987 Inspectors: W. G. Rogers

M. E. Parker D. S. Butler S. G. DuPont P. R. Pelke f /f'

Date

[cdm Approved By: E. G. Greenman, Deputy Director DivisionofReactorProjects I//// 87 Dat'e Inspection Summary Inspection on March 3-30,1987,(ReportNo. 50-341/87012(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine una licenseeactiononviolations,nnouncedinspectionbyresidentinspectorsoflicensee actio startuptestphaseresults,startuptestwitnessingandobservation, regional Licensee Event requests, operational safety, maintenance, surveillance,ia and plant tr Reports, Results: report review, or No violations followup of events, deviations were identified. T1ree open items were identified (Paragraphs 4.n., 5.c., and 8).

8704240071 870420 PDR 0 ADOCK 05000341 PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Detroit Edison Company F. Abramson, Operations Engineer F. Agosti, Vice President, Nuclear Operations L. Bregni, Compliance Engineer

+ G. Debner, Startup Engineer, Test Phase 0. Earle, Technical Engineer, Nuclear Production

+ G. Ford, Startup Test Phase J. Flynn, Corporate Attorney S. Frost, Licensing J. Green Systems Engineering Supervisor, Nuclear Engineering

• R. Kelm,, Director, Nuclear Security

• J. Korte, Nuclear Security Supervisor, Plans and Programs

• R. Lenart, Plant Manager, Nuclear Production L. Lessor, Consultant to the Plant Manager, Nuclear Production

• R. May, Su)erintendent, Maintenance and Modifications G. Ohlemac1er, Assistant Maintenance Engineer

• W. Orser, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering J. Plona, Operations Support Engineer E. Preston, Director, Plant Safety

• T. Randazo, Director, Regulatory Affairs W. Ripley, Director, Startup

• L. Simpkin, Director Nuclear Engineering

+*F. Sondgeroth, Licens,ing Engineer, Licensing

• B. R. Sylvia, Group Vice President, Nuclear Operations

+ P. Thurman, Licensing G. Trahey, Director, Quality Assurance

• W. Tucker, Superintendent, Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

D. Butler, Region III

+ S. DuPont, Region III M. Farber, Region III

• E. Greenman, Region III

• Parker, Resident Inspector P. Pelke, Region III

• W. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector

+ Denotes those who attended the exit meeting on March 30 198 ,

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• Denotes those who attended the exit meeting on April 3, 1987.

The inspectors also interviewed others of the licensee's staff during this inspection.

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2. Followup on Violations (92702)

(0 pen) Violation (341/86032-02(DRP)): ' Inadequate corrective actions to repetitive ECCS/ESF actuations. The licensee has generated )otential design change PDC 6682 Revision A and PDC 6740 based on the luman factors study. Also, the licensee has installed permanent protective barriers around the high traffic instrument racks. The violation remains open pending implementation of all corrective action . Followup on Inspector-Identified Items (92701) (0 pen) Open Item (341/86032-02(DRP)): Corrective Actions to MPU-3 failur The licensee changed the transfer switch and upgraded the bus source fuse to 60 AMPS under EDP 6539 during this outage. A sample load failure analysis list has been generated for MPU-3 distribution panel 1. The licensee has submitted a request for bid to perform a load failure analysis on most of the plant's electrical system. The licensee completed revised MPU calculations taking into account the potential increased inductive loading caused by the

"Solarton" transforme , (0 pen) Unresolved Item (341/87009-02(DRP)): The licensee has modified the surveillance procedures to test the " deactivate" mode in both divisions. The new tests shall be performed prior to startup from the current outage. The licensee is in progress of performing an analysis of diluting the drywel (0 pen) Unresolved Item (341/86039-05(DRP)): Instrument tolerances on ECCS flow rates. The licensee has adopted an interim position to take instrument tolerances into account on ECCS and RCIC flowrate A long-term position will be taken based on BWR owner group interaction with the NRC. The plant manager indicated that prompt dialogue with the NRC may need to be started based on the flow orifice restrictions on the residual heat removal system causing an unusual valve lineup to achieve the necessary flowrates. The inspector informed the licensee that this dialogue should be initiated with NR . Startup Test Phase Results Review and Evaluation (72510,72514,72516, 72517, 72518, 72532)

TheinspectorreviewedthefollowingStartupTestPhase(STUT) test resultsanddatatoascertainthatthetestobjectivesandrequirements of the FSAR, Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.68 were me The results were found to be adequate for completing the testing requirements for Test Condition 2:

• STUT.02H.014,RCICSystem1000psigColdCSTInjectio * STVT.020.031, Loss of Turbine / Generator and Offsite Powe * STUT.02A.027,TurbineStopValveTripandGeneratorLoadRejection, LoadRejectWithBypas * STVT.028.002, RadiationMeasurements,CompleteSurvey(45%).

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• STUT.020.022, Pressure Regulato * STUT.02A.030, Recirculation System Performanc * STUT.020.026, Relief Valve * STUT.028.012, Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Calibration

• STUT.028.019, Process Computer Determination of Core Performanc * STUT.02C.019, Process Computer Dynamic System Test Cas * STUT.02A.029, Recirculation Flow Control System Step Change Testin * STVT.028.033, Piping System Vibration Dynamic Response Testin * STUT.02A.033, Piping System Vibration Steady State Dat * STUT.02B.023, Feedwater System Level Setpoint Change Listed below are the test objectives, acceptance criteria (Level 1 and 2)

and plant or equipment related problems (if any) and the resolutions taken by the licensee: STUT.02H.014: Theobjectiveofthetestwastoobtainbaselinecold quickstartdataofthereactorcoreisolationcooling(RCIC) system while the reactor is operating at normal operating pressure (1000 psig)withpumpsuctionfromthecondensatestoragetank(CST).

Theacceptancecriteriaofthetestwastoverifythat;(1)the average pump discharge flow is equal to or greater than the 100 percent rated value (600 gpm) within 50 seconds after an automatic initiation with pump discharge pressure between 250 and 100 psig above rated pressure; (2) the RCIC turbine shall not tri) or isolateduringautomaticormanualstarts;(3)thepeak1CIC turbine speeds shall not exceed 5 percent of the rated speed to provide an adequate margin between the transient speed overshoot and theoverspeedtripand1 solation;and(4)theturbineglandseal condenser system shall be capable of preventing steam leakage to the atmospher Theinspectorreviewedthecollectedtestdataandindependently)

verified that: (1) the RCIC turbine reached rated flow (615 gpm within 50 seconds (29 seconds) with at

- p(no p discharge pressure greater time after the than100psigaboveratedpressure$)

initiation did the turbine trip; ( e maximum transient start speed peak (2000 rpm) and the maximum subsequent overshoot were greater than 5% below the rated speed of 4725 rpm- the (4)(4500 rpm)

collecteddataverifiedthatanadequatevacuumwasmalntained throughout the test on the vacuum tank and leakoff lines demonstrating that the gland seal condenser system prevented steam leakage to the atmosphere. The inspector concluded through review of the data and independent calculations that all of the acceptance criteria were met, STUT.020.031: The purpose of the test is to demonstrate that the plant will respond per the design for concurrent loss of the turbine generator and all offsite power without operator assistance, as to laws. (1)Thereactorprotectionsystem(RPS)willautomatically sc am the reacto (2) The emergency diesel generators (EDG)

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automatically start and properly load the emerge cy busses. (3)The turbine / generator protection-system automaticall initiates a trip and fast closure of the main turbine steam admis ion valves. (4)

The ability to maintain control of reactor vessel water level and pressure during transient conditions. (5) Required equipment and support systems operate satisfactorily without dependence on offsite power for the test duration of 30 minute (1) The inspector reviewed the data related to the test and observed the video recording of the test and concluded that all of the acceptance criteria were met as follows:

(a) Level 1: The reactor was scrammed by the RPS, all EDGs started and loaded automatically within the Technical Specification required time and the reactor vessel water level and pressure were controlled without any operator assistance throughout the 30 minute test duratio (b) Level 2: The open and close actions of the safety relief valves (SRV)ints.occurredwithin20 pounds (psi)oftheir design setpo (c) Level 2: After the initial opening of the SRVs only one (SRV"A")reo)enedduringthefivesubsequentblowdownsas required by t1e design bases for the loss of offsite power accident analysi (2) The following problems were noted by the licensee during the performance and restoration of the test:

(a) Power was lost to the RPS Bus "A" eight seconds after the initiation of the loss of offsite power. The inspector verified the RPS power was lost by reviewing the sequence-of-events recorder (50ER) printout however; the objectiveofthetest(toscramtheplantwithoutoperator assistance) was achieve The licensee performed further testing of the RPS Hotor-Generator and tripping circuits to determine the cause of'the equipment malfunction. The results of this testing indicated that the system is o)crational and that the discrepancy was analyzed as a plenomenon to be monitored throughout the startup test phas outboard (b) Mainsteamisolationvalve(MSIV)B21-F028B, isolation valve stroke time to closure was second The extrapolatio,n of the data to the time of full closure was 5.1 seconds which exceeded the 5.0 seconds requirement oftheTechnicalSpecifications. The licensee declared the HSIV inoperable and made appropriate repairs prior to starting up for TC 3 after the maintenance outag (c) The main steam bypass valves both opened and closed within one-half second of test initiation as the main turbine

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steam admission valves close The apparent cause was due to loss of electrical power to the transmitter instrumentation loops. The licensee determined that this response did not agree with the design intent and conducted an investigation into the power supply scheme for the governor control system and determined that a future design modification is require (d) During the interval of the EDG start and load six primary containmentmonitoringsysteminstrumentsensIngline isolation valves for the torus and drywell closed and reopened when the busses were reenergized by the EDG Engineering evaluated these valve closures for design adequacy and determined that a future design modification will be pending. In addition, for the interim, precautions will be added to the operating procedures to alert the operators to this condition.

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(e) Several valve position limit switches did not indicate

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properly duringand vacuum breakers thethe test, RC IC governor valve.Work including the torus-to-requestshadbeenissuedtoadjustthevalveposition limit switches prior to entering TC (f) The Division II post-accident level / pressure recorder failed to automatically shift to fast speed until several minutes into the transient. A work request had been issued to troubleshoot the problem. See paragraph for further discussion on this instrumen (g) During the RCIC o)eration in the test mode after the test, a high level on t1e torus actuated an automatic transfer of the HPCI pump suction from the CST to the torus. This resulted in the closure of the combined HPCI/RCIC outboard testisolationvalve(E41-F011)asperthedesignto prevent a torua flow path to the CST. With E41-F011

, indicating fully closed, the operator observed that the RCIC flow indicated about 500 gpm indicating that

> E41-F011 was in fact still partially open. The operator manually (from the control room) closed the valve, and the

! valve then completely closed as indicated by zero RCIC

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flow. The valve was cycled after the test and appeared to function correctly, this discrepancy is considered to be resolved. Additionally the combined HPCI/RCIC valve will

also receive additional, testing during TC The inspector reviewed these problems to ascertain the

impact upon both the acceptance of the loss of offsite

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power test and continued ascension of power through Test j Condition 3 (75% core )ower and 100% core flow). The i inspector concluded, t1ough these problems are in some a cases failures of equipment or components, the acceptance of the loss of offsite power test and power accession to i Test Condition 3 were not affecte _ _ ____ _ __ ___- ___ _ __

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r STUT.02A.027: The purpose of this test was to demonstrate that a reactor scram will not occur at low reactor power as a result of a main generator trip and that there will be a smooth transfer from the turbine control valves to the bypass valves. The inspector's review of the obtained data verified that no reactor scram occurred during the test and as such, met the acceptance criteria of the tes The inspector noted that following the turbine trip, a pressure and level transient of about 7 psi and 11 inches peak-to peak was observe This transient was completely dampened by the system within 5 second The licensee did document one test exception or problem, as required for supplemental test data anal to a point corresponding to 80%ysis,of their the bypasswithin capacity valves didsecond not open This is not a requirement for acceptance of this test, but is a level 1 acceptance criteria for the TC 6 generator load reject test and as such was performed as a su of any possible problems. p31emental test to obtain an early indication Review of the data verified that the west bypass valve was greater than 90% open and the east by] ass valve was only 12% open at 0.3 seconds. As a result of this pro)lem the bypass valve was declared inoperable and was repaired prior to going into TC The inspector found the licensee's actions to be acceptable and the acceptance of the test was not affected by the east bypass valve failure to respond within 0.3 second STUT.028.002: The purpose of this test was to determine the radiation levels in the plant exce operation at about 50% core po,wer.The pt the drywell, survey during power demonstrated that the radiation doses were consistent with the guidelines contained in 10CFR20, " Standard for Protection Against Radiation." The inspector reviewed the data obtained during the survey and found it to be satisfactor STUT.020.022: The purpose of the test was to verify the optimum settings for the pressure control loop by analysis of the system response to step changes in pressure demands. In addition, the takeover capability of the backup pressure regulator upon failure of the controlling regulator and proper pressure regulator response with both the turbine control valves and the bypass valves controlling pressure was demonstrated. The inspector verified that all of the acceptance criteria were met and that the system response was as per design, STUT.02A.030: The purpose of this test was to obtain baseline recirculation system approximately 55% core performance flow. Thedata during TC 2 flow conditions, data collected during TC 2 will be compared to the data collected during Test Conditions 3, 5, and 6 for analysis of the overall performance of the recirculation syste The data collected during this test included jet pump flow, loop flow, recirculation drive flow, recirculation pump motor q,enerator electrical parameters, pump suction temperature, core dif ferential pressureandjetpumpdifferentialpressur __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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Since the test was for baseline data collection only, there were no acceptance criteria.

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The licensee did, however, identified three problems discovered during testing as follows: (1) the wattmeters for the recirculation ,

pump motor generators indicated downscal A work request was issued to repair the wattmeters and additional verification of their

operation will be done during baseline data collection during TC (2) The calibrated jet pump numbers (5, 10, 15, 20) did not match

' the instrumentation identification labels attached to the instrument ,

drawer. This discrepancy will be corrected prior to completing the l prerequisites for the TC 3 data collection test. (3 The "B" loop recirculationflowindicatordidnotagreewiththe]A" loop i indicator. This discrepancy will also be corrected prior to .

i completing the prerequisites of the TC 3 tes '

i 3 The inspector reviewed all of these discrepancies and determined

that they are minor in nature and that adequate corrective actions i

! are being taken. In addition all of the parameters that were I

affectedwillberecordeddur}ngtheproceedingtestconditionsand i should not affect the overall ability to evaluate the performance of the recirculation syste l i STUT.020.026: The purpose of the test was to verify that the SRVs function properly, including reseating and that the suppression pool t

temperature indicates less than a 45 F differential temperature when

SRVs are open with torus cooling in operation. The verification of j suppression pool temperature is to satisfy licensing commitment 2.c(5).

! All of the acceptance criteria were met, except for Level 2

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criterion 4.2.2, "The temperature measured by thermocou)1es on the i discharge side of the valves shall return to within 10 F of the temperature recorded before the valve was opened." SRVs B21-F013J i and B21-F013M tailpipe temperatures failed to return to within the i 10*F criteria during the test. However both valves' tail)ipe temperaturesdidmeetthecriteriawith}n11hoursaftertie completion of the test. The licensee evaluated this discrepancy

, and determined as documented in their March 20, 1987, letter to j W.M. Tucker,SuperintendentofOperations,fromG.J.Debner, i that through valve weepage was Startup Engineer observed for and for SRVs "J" Test"M".

Phase,The letter also contributed the i  ;

weepage to two conditions. SRV "J" was required to be cycled 11

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timesduringTC2,whichmayhavecontributedtothefailureto

! meet the 10 F criteri SRV "M" weepage was apparently pressure

! dependent as the tailpipe temperatures had been decreasing until

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reactor vessel pressure was raised to su) port another startup test.

1 The letter recommended that both valves )e monitored during future t

plant operations and that they be included in the list of SRVs that i must be set pressure tested at least once per 18 months per 1 Technical Specifications.

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The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee and found them to be satisfactory. In addition the inspector found that the discrepancyshouldnotaffectproceedIngtoTC3,sinceallLevel1 criteria were met. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the data

. collected to satisfy the licensing commitment and found it to be

adequate, h. STUT.028.012

Theobjectiveofthetestwastoverifyandadjust, asnecessary(calibrate),thesixAPRMchannelstoensure conformance with the reactor heat balance. The test found that all six channels agreed with the heat balance and as such, met all of theacceptancecriteriaanddidnotneedanyadjustments, i. STUT.02B.019: The purpose of the test was to verify that core thermal power core flow and the thermal limits are within their allowablelimitspertheTechnicalSpecifications. The test results demonstrated that all criteria were me j. STUT.02C.019: Theobjectiveofthetestwastoverifythatthe processcomputerNSS(NuclearSteamSupply)programsanddata classes were correct and function properly under plant operating conditions. All of the criteria associated with the thermal limits;

MCPR (Minimum Critical Power Ratio), Maximum LHGR (Linear Heat .

Generation Rate), and MAPLHGR (Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate) were met. However, 15 exceptions were identified

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during the tes All of these exceptions had bean resolved by the licensee,manyofthembysubstitutinginputvalueswhentheinput parameter was outside of the computer s calibrated range or by using other programs and data classes to satisfy the test objectives. The

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ins)ector reviewed the exceptions and the resolutions and found them .

to 3e adequat I

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k. STUT.02A.029: Theobjectiveofthistestwastodemonstratethat the plant would have stable responses to changes in recirculation

flow. All of the test acceptance criteria were met except for one Level 2. The criteria required that the decay ratio of the speed

! loop response to be less than or equal to .25 at any speed. The "B" i

recirculation motor / generator set exhibited a limit cycle of about i

2.5% speed peak-to peak when operating at 38% spee General l Electric evaluated the M/G set response and determined that the limit cycle is not associated with the flow loop and that at 38%,

the M/G is near the the lower limit of the speed loop, and not an expected operating point. The proposed resolution is that the limit t

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cycle does not prevent further operation into TC 3 and that extended operation at 38% should be minimized. Additionally, the evaluation demonstrated that the limit cycle did not impose any significant

instabilities; however, a similar limit cycle under TC 3 conditions j (normal operating region of the power to flow map) would not be 1 acceptabl The inspector reviewed the evaluation and agreed with

! the conclusions for TC 2 and that similar limit cycles during TC 3

) will probably not be acceptable. The system response will be

! monitored and evaluated during TC 3 by the performance of j STUT 03A.02 .

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' STUT.028.033: Theobjectiveofthetestwastodeterminetheflow induced transient vibration response of the main steam and safety relief valve piping during planned SRV operation and during the turbine trip and generator load reject within bypass capacity. All of the vibration data was within the test acceptance criteri STUT 02A.033: Theobjectiveofthetestwastodeterminetheflow l

Induced vibration responses of selected piping main steam, l recirculation system feedwater system SRV pi ing, RCIC HPCI and

! residualheatremovalsystem sleadystteconditIonsaf

! eed 25 steam flow and at 50% core during%

I minimum flow. During recirculation the test four pump sp, disc,repancies exceeded the acceptance criteria, dllofthesewereevaluatedtobesensornoise

induced and that the related plaing vibration was acce) table.

l However, the licensee will reta(e the data with hand 1 eld sensors I at25%steamflowduringtheapproachtoTU3 conditions (75% core,

! powerand100%coreflow). Pending the results of the retest the licensee will declare the piping either operable or inoperable,, STVT.028.023: Theobjectiveofthetestwastoverifytheoperability ofthefeedwatercontrolsystem(FWCS)atlowcorepower. Not all of theobjectiveswereaccomplishedbecauseofequipmentproblemswith the dynamic compensator lead / lag network computation modul The module was removed for maintenance prior to starting the test. With the module removed, the three element control function could not be verified. Thisisanopenitem(341/87012-01/0RS))untilperformance of the three element control function is completed. The licensee I

currently has scheduled testing of the three element controller during the first week of the approach to TC 3.

l The inspector concluded, based upon the review of the above startup i tests, that the required acceptance criteria had been met for Test l Condition 2 and that there are no test related restraints for entering ,

Test Condition No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Startup Test Witnessina and Observation (72302)

l The inspectors reviewed portions of startup test procedures reviewed l procedureresultscompletedtodate,touredtheareascontaIningsystem l equipment, interviewed personnel, and observed test activities of those l startup tests identified below.

I During this review, the inspectors noted that the latest revision of the test procedure was available and in use by crew members, the minimum crew

, requirements were mot, the test prerequisites were met, appropriate plant l systems were in service, the special test equipment required by the procedure was calibrated and in service, thu test was performed as

requiredbyapprovedprocedures,temporarymodificationssuchasjumpers I

and I were installed test results for and tracked the tests por established observed administrative by the inspectors controls,t indicated tha acceptance criteria were met.

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a. TurbineStopValveTripandGeneratorloadRejection The inspector observed the performance of STUT.02A.027, Revision 3,

"TurbineStopValveTripandGeneratorLoadRejection-LoadReject Within Bypass." On March 16, 1987, the licensee reduced power to 22% to perform a turbine stop valve trip and subsequent generator load relection. The test was performed to verify a smooth transit on from the control valves to the bypass valves and demonstrate the capability to avoid a reactor scra The test commenced with opening the main generator output breakers and observing fast closure of the control valves and opening of the bypass valves. The test was performed with no problems identified and a smooth transition to the bypass valves. The reactor responded as expected with no trip as reactor power was below the control valve fast closure setpoin b. Loss of Turbine-Generator and Offsite Power The inspectors observed the performance of STU Revision 4 " Loss of Turbine-Generator and Offsite Power." 020.031, 1$87 with the reactor at 27% power, the licensee performed the hoss 16, l On Marc

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ofOffsitePowertesttodeterminethereactortransientperformance during the loss of the main generator and all offsite powe The test was also performed to demonstrate acceptable performance of the station electrical supply. The test commenced by isolating Fermi 2 from the grid. The loss of power to the reactor protection system caused an expected reactor scram and actuation of all primary and secondary containment isolation functions. The emergency diesel generators automatically started and were loaded by the digital load sequence All emergency safety features (ESF) busses were loaded to supply power as necessary. The transient was extended for thirty minutes in order to demonstrate proper operation of equipment and support systems. The 30-minute extension was required to demonstrateproperfunctionofhighpressurecoolantinjection systems,if (HPCI)andreactorcoreisolationcooling(RCIC)ICwerenotre without operator assistance. HPCI/RC necessaryInlevelcontrolandwere,therefore,notinitiate to mainta quired The test was performed with all major equipment operating as expecte Some minor detail in Paragraphb.4. problems were noted and are explained in The inspectors noted that the test was well executed and was performedwithnomajorproblemsidentified. The inspectors believe this is partially attributable to the licensee dedicating a specific team and shift crew to preplan and execute the test. The licensee ,

also took interest to review and discuss with other plants, problems and concerns identified during the performance of their tes ;

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. . Division II Post-accident Level / Pressure Recorder The Division II post-accident level / pressure recorder failed during the loss of offsite power testing. This instrument has had a history of failures when called upon to function. The licensee has not been able to identify a root cause for this last failur As such, the licensee has embarked upon an escalated testing program on the recorder. The inspector considers the testing results, and futurecorrectiveactionsasanopenitem(341/87012-02(DRP)).

No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Regional Requests General September Electric Service 10, 1986 Information entitled Letter

"IRM Blown (SIL-445}

Fuse Event, dated discusses the Monticelloeventin,whichallpositiveandnegativeIRM3/4 amp fuses (F1 and F2) connected to the 24 Vdc bus B were blown because of a power surge. Afterthepositive3/4ampfuses(F1)were replaced, all inoperative IRM channels appeared to be operating normally, flowever, because of continued loss of the negative power su) ply, of which there was no indication on the control panels, the IRi channels were ino SIL-445 recommends; (perable and 1) procedure unable to (2)

re-evaluation, process flux signal replacing 3/4 amp IRM chassis fuses with 1.5 amp fuses, and (3) adding voltage sensing relays which would monitor each IRM chassis to )rovide an RPS IN0P trip in response to loss of negative power. T1e inspector reviewed the licensee's actions for the three GE recommendations as follows:

(1) Procedures The licensee determined that existing procedures are adequate to detect an inoperable IRM caused by the failure of a -24 Vdc fuse. First, I&C Surveillance Procedures 44.010.108 and 44.010.109 provide for Division I and II IRM functional tests weekly in Conditions 2, 3, 4, or 5 and within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to startup, if not performed within the previous 7 days. These procedures would detect an inoperable IRM. Second, if the failure occurred after the performance of the functional and then a reactor startu) (shutdown) was commenced the failure

?rocedure 24.603.02, Attachment 1 would (Attachment be detected 2),SRM by/IRM Overlap Verificatio Last, should the failure occur during reactor operation in the IRM range it would be detected by either of the following: (1)therequired shiftlysurveillance(24.000.02) IRMchannelcheck,or(2)by the applicable startu and shutdown procedures, for example, Procedure 22.000.03, p'StartupfromColdShutdowntoRated Power " which requires maintainin0 IRM indication on scal The in,spector notes that the hardware changes discussed under (3)belowprovideadditionalassurancefordetectionofablown f2 fus _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _

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(2) Fuse Replacement l

The licensee determined that 1.5 amp replacement fuses were not i necessary due to the hardware changes which are discussed under l (3)belo (3) Hardware Changes Upon receipt of GE RICSIL-007 and NRC PNO-III-86-57, the licensee issued DER 86-015 on July 25, 1986, to track the fuse issu EDP-5903 was prepared on July 26, 1986, to add -24 Vdc lower monitoring relays to the eight IRM channel INOP circuit )N 21 Nos. 648314 and 648315 implemented the E0P-5903 hardware changes and the installations were accepted for service on July 31 1986. The inspector reviewed the current revisions of the 6d21-2145 series electrical drawings for the IRM channels and verified that the EDP-5903 design changes were incorporated, On March 24, 1987, the inspectors received a request from IE Headquarters to determine the lubricant used on the Fermi 2 main steam isolation valve o-ring seals. The information was acquired from the licensee and relayed to NRC on March 25, 1982. The licensee utilizes Dow Corning 55M and 44M lubrican t No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (71707)  ;

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period from March 3 thru March 30, 1987. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations,and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors by observation and direct interview verifled that the physicalsecurltyplanwasbeingimplementedinacco,rdancewiththe station security pla The inspectors observed plant housekeepin0/ cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. Durin0 the '

inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the residual heat removal system to verify operability by comparing system lineup with plant drawings, as built configuration, or present valve '

l lineup lists; observin0 equipment conditions that could degrade performance; and verified that instrumentation was properly valved,

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j functionin0, and calibrate l

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These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guidos and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel parts and materials used were properly certified; radiologicalcontroiswereimplemented;andfirepreventioncontrolswere implemente Workrequestswerereviewedtodeterminethestatusofoutstandingjobs ,

and to assure that priority is assigned to safet maintenance which may affcct system performance.y-related equipment The following maintenance activities were observed:

• Emergency Olesel Generator (EDG) No. 13 Thrust Bearing Inspectio '

• ReactorHeatRemoval(RilR)PumpBChangeou * Calibration of the RCIC Flow Transmitter, following completion of maintenance on the RilR pump motor and emer(ency diesel generator (EDG), the inspectors verified that the system hat been returned to service properly. The inspector reviewed the procedures for calibrating the RCIC flow transmitter. The licensco was reading the transmitter output calibration voltage across a 1 ohm resistor supplied with the transmitter. The resistor accuracy had been verified for RCIC flow transmitter E51-N003 on January 27, 198 There was no 3rogram in affect to W rify the resistor accuracy prior to calibrating t1e transmitte The inspectors were concerned that the environment may affect the resistor accuracy and it should be verlfled prior to use. The licensee has responded with a memo (87 009, dated February 10,1987) to IC personnel to no longer use the 1 ohm resistor for calibration purpose Maintenance instruction HI-IC-0203, "GEMAC Model 50-555 DP Electronic Transmitter Calibration," procedure stop 7.1.2 details a digital multimetermaybeconnectedinpara1101totestjacks(acrossthe1 ohm resistor) and set to read the millivolt output calibration voltage, in addition, the specification sheet for E51 N003 detailed the transmitter i

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output is read across a 1 ohm resistor. Changing the above procedure step and the RCIC flow transmitter specification sheet to reflect the memowillbetrackedasanopenitem(341/87012-03(0RP)).

The licensee should review any other procedures and specification sheets for GEMAC differential transmitters in use for similar change No violations or deviations were identified in this are . MonthlySurveillanceObservation(61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications and verified that: testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test and any deficienciesidentifiedduringthetestingwereproperlyreviewedand resolved by appropriate management personne The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

• 24.139.02 erabilit * - Division II LPCI and Suppression Pool Cooling 24.204.06-StandbyLiguldControlPumpandCheckValv andValveOperabilityTest(PartialforRHRPurrpBonl * 24.307.16 - Emergency Diesel Generator No. 13 Start and Load Tes * 49.307.31T - Operation of EDG No.13 Af ter Spec,ial Upper Crankshaf t Thrust Bearing Inspection, Special Tes Duringtheperformanceofthestandbyliquidcontrol(SLC)pumpandvalve operability test, the inspector noted the SLC Tank Hl/Lo level annunciator alarmed in the control room. The inspector questioned the control room nuclear supervising operator as to why the annunciator was alarmed. It was subsequently determined that this was due to a valving error by the operator at the storage tank when restoring the system lineup after completion of the test. During the restoration, the operator failed to close the test tank discharge valve prior to opening the storage tank discharge valve thereby providing a dra;a path to the test tank and overflowing the test tan Approximately 120 gallons of 13.2% sodium pontobarbitate water was drained from the SLC tank prior to restoring the lineup. The licensee subsequently restored the storage tank level and sodium pontobarbitate concentration to within Technical Specification limits and returned the system to service. Adeviationreport(DER)wasinitiatedonthesituation and adequate corrective action taken under the DER corrective action No violations or deviations were identified in this are _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-

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j 10. LicenseeEventReportsFollowup(92700)

l Throughdirectobservationsdiscussionswithlicensee$ersonnel,and review of records, the following event reports were rev ewed to determine i that reportability requirements were fulfilled immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action,to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification ;

(Closed)LER85005,InadvertentRPSActuationOuetoInstrumentValvin !

(Closed)LER85014, Leg. Inadvertent RPS Actuation While Valving in Refere (Closed)LER85015, Leg. Inadvertent RPS Actuation While Valving in Refere (Closed)LER85017,EmergencyEquipmentCoolingWaterSystemAuto-Star !

(Closed)LER85018,MissedTechnicalSpecificationChemistrySurveillance for EDG Fuel 01 ,

(Closed)LER85021,RPSActuationWhileReturningInstrumenttoServic l (Closed)LER85022,RPSActuation l (Closed)LER85026,EmergencyEquipmentCoollnyWolerAutoInitiatio (Closed)LER85030, Testing. level 3 Scram, Valve Opened During Suiveilla r (Closed)LER 85030-01, Level 3 Scram, f (Closed)LER85045,ReactorBuildingHVACTriponFreezestatFailur (Closed)LER85049,EmergencyOleselGeneratorAutoStar (Closed)LER85067,ReactorTrip,ReturningInstrumenttoServic (Closed)LER85075,OlgitalLoadSequencerNotResetbyOperatorCauses Division ! EECW/EESW to Auto Start on Start of EDG,

(Closed)LER85077,SurveillanceTestProcedureErrorResultsin inadvertent Auto Start of Olvision !! EDG, l (Closed)LER85079,AutoStartofDivisionl'EECW/EESWCausedby I ImproperAdjustmentofValveControlle (0 pen) LER 85079 01, Auto Start of Olvision !! EECW/EESW Caused by  :

ImproperAdjustmentofValveControlle LER's and 85079 01 85017, inspector8579,d an all action is complete with the-were reviewe

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i DesignPackage(EDP)1720thatwillalleviatethe l problems of level and pressure control when the l makeu) tank is connected to the system. This EDP will )e implemented during the first refueling

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outag LERs 85017 and 85079 are considered closed and .ER 85079-01 will remain open until implementation of the EDP and verification by the NR (Closed) LER 86031, High Pressure Condition Caused by Personnel Error Results in Automatic Reactor Tri (Closed) LER 86032, failure to Post an Hourly Fire Watc The preceding LERs have been reviewed against the criteria of 10 CFR 2 Appendix C, and when the incidents described meet all of the following, requirements, no Notice of Violation is normally issued for that ite , The event was identified by the licensee; The event was an incident that according to the current enforcementpolicy,metthecrIteriaforSeverityLevelsIV or V violations; The event was appropriately reported; The event was or will be corrected (including measures to preventrecurrencewithinareasonableamountoftime);and, The event was not a violation that could have been prevented by the Ilcensee's corrective actions for a previous violatio { No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Rfport Review (90713) i During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Annual Operating Report for the period of January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1986, and the Monthly Operating Report for February 198 The inspector confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.A.3 and Regulatory Guide 1.1 No violations or deviations were identified in this are . FollowupofEvents(93702)

l During the inspection period, the Ilconsee experienced several events someofwhichrequiredpromptnotificationoftheNRCpursuantto10dFR 50.72, the inspectors pursued the events onsite with Itcensee and/or other NRC officials. In each case, the inspectors verified that the notification was correct and timely, if appropriate, that the Ifcensee

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was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were conducted within regulatory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent future recurrence. The specific events are as follows:

• March 6, 1987 - Sewage discharge to the lak * March 16, 1987 - Loss of Offsite Power Tes * March 17, 1987 - Reactor Scram due to low level while placing RHR system into shutdown coolin * March 25, 1987 - Shutdown cooling isolatio * March 30, 1987 - Sewage discharge to the lak No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Plant Trips (93702)

Following the plant trip on March 16, 1987, the inspectors ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control I room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant

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parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistr The inspectors verified the establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.

l All systems responded as expected.

l This was a p eplanned startup test simulating loss of offsito power and l was the culmination of Test Condition 2. The licensee entered into a three week outage immediately following the loss of offsite power test.

l No violations or deviations were identified, i

14. Open Items I

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 4.n., b.c., and . ExitInterview(30703)

Theinspectorsmetwithlicenseerepresentatives(denotedinparagraph1)

on March 30 and April 3, 1987, and informally throughout the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The !nspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes

, revlowed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not l identify any such documents /procc a as pro The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspection.prietar _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ _ _ _____ _ _