IR 05000341/1997015
| ML20198Q117 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 11/04/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198Q105 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-97-15, NUDOCS 9711120115 | |
| Download: ML20198Q117 (15) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lli Docket No: 50-341 License No: NPF-43 Report No: 50-341/97015(DRS)
Licensee: Detroit Edison Company (DECO)
Facility: Enrico Ferml, Unit 2 Location: 6400 N. Dixie Hw Newport, MI 48166 Dates: October 8 10,1997 Inspectors: R. Glinski, Radiation Specialist G. West, Radiation Specialist Approved by: Gary L. Shear, Chief, Plant Support Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety i
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Enrico Fermi, Unit 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-341/97015
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This announced inspection included aspects of the licensee's plant support performance regarding mid-cycle outage chemistry, ALARA planning and implementation, and radiation
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worker practices. Overall, the areas examined were wellimplemented and the radiation protection support for the outage was successful. However, instances of inappropriate radiation i worker practice were identified.
i e ALARA planning for the 97-02 Mid Cycle Outage was based on historical data j and actualjob doses coincided well with the dose estimates, in addition, the outage ALARA planning demonstrated contingency planning and use of dose
] reduction techniques to minimize radworker occupational dose (Section R1.1).
- Radiological posting and labeling, housekeeping, and solid radwaste control measures were effective'v implemented. Contamination controi oractices la the plant were thorouDh and included radiation surveys to detect alpha
contamination; no alpha contamination was detected (Section R1.2).
- The fuel s!pping and recctor head activities were efficiently performed. The jobs
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were well planned e nd implemented with appropriate ALARA consideration These evolutions incorporated extensive research and evaluations, attention to
- lessons learned, and affective preventative maintenance (Section R1.3).
- * The reactor water cleanup (RWCU) pre job briefings informed radworkers of the radiological conditions, dosimetry requirements, and ALARA measures. Both the RWCU repair woik and radiation protection Job oversight were effective. The
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RWCU materiel condition continued to challenge the sts'f and the di'ficulties with pump disassembly will be reviewed further by Region lli (Section R1.4).
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- The chemistry staff successfully implemented a process to expedite floodup and improve water quality / clarity, and plant personnel effectively monitored fuel
integrity issues throughout the fuel cycle. The Depleted Zinc Oxide injection continued to minimize cobalt deposition on plant piping (Section R2.1).
- The licensee's records incident to decommisioning were well-maintained and were in compliance with 10 CFR 50.75(g) and other NRC guldance (Section R3.1).
- The radiation protection support and radworker practices were generally goo However, the inspectors observed one instance of inappropriate contamination control and one Non-Cited Violation was identified regarding the issuance o-alarming dosimetry with an incorrect dose alarm setpoint (Section R4.1).
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IV. Plant Sunnort Report D.91alla R1 Status of Radiation Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 Mid-Cvele. Outage Job and ALARA Planning insoection Scoce (IP 83750. IP 83729)
The inspectors reviewed the job and ALARA planning for the mid-cycle outage, specifically concentrating on dose goals and estimates, dose reduction techniques, and contingency development on the part of the Radiation Protection (RP) staff. This review included relevant ALARA briefing packages, radiation work permits (RWPs), and work orders, Observatiens and Findings Job planning and dose estimation for this mid-cycle outage were initiatec. by the plant staff several month? before the outage, and were modified frequently prior to the start of the outage. The total outage dose goal was 12 person-rem, with doce estimates for each job based on previous outage activities (specifically RF05 and Forced Outage 97-01). Appropriate moc:ifications were made in light of the differences in work scape. The insoectors noted that pre-job briefing requirements, RP job coverage requirements, and ALARA planning were based on the estimated job dose, the complexity and location of the evolution, and previous plant experience with the evolution. These planning activities were well-coordinate The major outage activitics, in terms of estimated occupational radworker dose, were:
Decontamination of the reactor cavity Replacement of the Safety Relief Valve pilot assemblies in the drywell Fuel sipping activities and associated core alterations Reactor vessel disassembly / reassembly and replacement of the O-rings
- Replacement of the "A" recirculation pump seal
- Replacement of the "A" Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) pump impeller The inspectors reviewed the ongoing status of these jobs in terms of person-rem expended and person-hours worked, and noted that the actual expended doses (tracked by RWP) and their corresponding dose estimates were within good agreemen The inspectors reviewed the ALARA planning packages for several of the above jobs, as well as their associated RWF , and work orders. Dose reduction techniques and
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contingency development were appropriate for the jobs reviewed. The RP staff emphasized the use of engineering controls in job areas (i.e., high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) ventilation, temporary shielding, RP Job monitoring, etc.] to supplement personnel protective clothing and/or respirator use in the performance of Jcbs. The
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implementation of these ALARA measures was especially apparent during observation of the "A" RWCU pump impeller replacement job (See Section R1.4). Conclusions The ALARArjob planning for the 97-02 Mid-Cycle Outage was based on h8storical data, with appropriate corrections made for the differences in work scope. Actual job doses coincided well with the dose estimates, and no jobs were expending significantly more dose than anticipated. In addition, ALARA planning for outage jobs demonstrated extensive contingency phnning and use of applicable dose reduction techniques to minimize radworker occupational dos R1.2 General Plant Walkdowns and Assessment of Plant Radioloalca! Conditions Insoection Scone (IP 8375D)
The inspectors performed numerous walkdowns 0f the reactor building, turbine building, auxiliary building, and the drywell. During these walkdowns, the inspectors reviewed plant radiological posting and labeling, contamination control and air sampling practices, radiation worker practices, radiation surveys, and plant housekeepin Observations and Findinas The radiological posting and labeling throughout the facility effectively informed plant workers of radiological conditions. Radiation surveys anducted by the inspectors verified that the postings were appropriato. Overall, contamination control practices were effective and housekeeping remained excellent, as materials and debris were kept to a minimum throughout the plant. Work tools were bagged and organized for different jobs, which made housekeeping activities more efficient. Prior to this outage, radwaste staff initiated the use of three separate types of containers for trash within the plant; one for potentially contaminated material, another for clean material, and a third for sharp objects. The inspectors noted that plant staff genera 9y used these various containers correctly and radwaste staff continued to challenge plant personnel to reduce radwaste by minimizing the materials taken into the Radiologically Restricted Area (RRA).
The inspectors reviewed radiation survey and air sampling data and noted that these surveys were conducted at the appropriate locations and frequencies. The RP staff had collected numerous grab air samples throughout the outage and only a small fraction showed airbome levels above 0.3 derived air concentration (DAC). In addition, continuous air monitors were located throughout the reactor and auxiliary buildings, and these monitors showed that there were no airt:orne concems. There were two
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occasions associated with the RWCU work in the inner Kelly building of the hot machine shop in which airbome radioactivity resulted in radworker intakes. The inspector reviewed the air sample data, the whole body count data, and the dose assessments with radiological health staff and determined that the methodology was appropriate. The radworker internal doses were not significan .
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l Due to the fuelleaks, the RP staff analyzed an appropriate percentage of the air samples and smears for alpha radiation, wh!ch would indicate the presence of bn%ranic radionuclides. Reactor coolant samples collected prior to the outage had
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shown that the levels of neptunium-239 (Np-239) were greater than 1E-3 microcurie per milliliter (uCl/cc). The ..ispectors reviewed air sample and smear data collected throughout the plant, with an emphasis on the RWCU work. Two air samples collected within the inner Kelly building showed Np 239 at levels that were less than 1% of the DAC, which was undetected by the whole body count. Smear surveys did not detect alpha activit Conclusions Radiological posting and labeling, housekeeping, and solid radwaste control measures were effectively imptomonted. Contamination control practices in the plant were generally well conducted and radiation surveys did not detect alpha contamination. Air monitoring results indicated no airbome transuranics greater than 1% of the DAC, and radworker internal dose assessments were appropriat R1.3 Dose Control for General Refuel Floor and Fuel Sionina Activities Insoection Scoce (IP 83750. IP 83729)
The inspectors reviewed the ALARA package, work order, and RWP for the fuel sipping evolution, and observed the in-core fuel sipping operations on the refuel floor, in addition, the inspectors interviewed personnel involved in the ALARA/ job planning for the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head venting, reactor head disassembly, O-ring replacement, and various refuel floor activities, Observations and FindinSS The in-core fuel sipping, which was des'gned to detect and locate leaks within the fuel bundles, was conducted by plant and contract personnel stationed on the refuel floo Four individuals were located on the refueling bridge to perform fuel sipping equipment movement and operations. In addition, several workers were located in a designated clean area on the floor, and they were responsible for the tracking and analysis of results, direction of equipment operations, and verification (by video camera and the use of fuel bundle serial numbers) of the proper location of the sipping rig. This job was performed efficiently and expeditiously, and two leaking fuel bundles were identifie Personnel conducting the fuel sipping were attentive and knowledgeable of their specific functions, and this work proceeded ahead of schedul The inspectors reviewed the ALARA planning for this evolution and noted that plant staff had taken the following steps in ALARA planning and job planning:
called another nuclear facility to discuss their experiences with fuel sipping,
'went to a contract facility to observe actual in-core fuel sipping operations,
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! ' researched fuel failures at other nuclear facilities, and
' reviewed the lessons teamed from a similai 1994 evolution at Fermi These research and preparation activities, as well as incorporation of lessons learned from these activities, resulted in effective job planning and ALARA planning for this evolution. One example of a lessons learned incorporation was the inclusion of a licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) on the refudng bridge during these operations. Analysis of the 1994 evolution by plant staff had found problems with communications between the refuel floor and the control room personnel during fuel moves. The inclusion of an SRO on the refuel bridge ensured that any information important to plant operators during performance of the juo wouia De recognizeo and relayed to the control room. The inspectors also noted the extensive development of contingency plans for this job, as well as the detailed assignment of RP Job coverage for *
all aspects of the activity. The inspectors determined that the extensive job planning was appropriate for this important and infrequently-performed evolutio For past outages, the RPV head was vented through a HEPA unit onto the refue;'loor, but this action resulted in xenon-133/133m levels that necessitated a 1-hour stand-cwm for refuel floor work. Due to the uncertainties posed by the fuel leaks and the hydrogen water chemistry, the RP staff evaluated altemate pathways to vent the RPV head. An RP evaluation determined that the RPV head should be vented from the head spray line flange through the standby gas treatment system to the atmosphere. The inspectors
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determined that the successfulimplementation of this plan was an appropriate ALARA and critical path decisio Contamination and airborne controls during the removal of the RPV head 0-ring included decontamination of the RPV to less than 4000 disintegrations per minute (dpm)
for smearable activity prior to the work, as well as a continual venting from the head spray line flange to a HEPA/ charcoal filter during the evolut:on. The O-ring removal crew also wore appropriate facial protection. The O-ring removal work was conduded with effective engineering ALARA control The expended dose for the refuel floor activities was well managed. Changes in operation procedures, preventative maintenance on the refuel bridge and stud detensioners (which improved operability), and elimination of the drywell flange removal / installation work significantly decreased the man-hours from previous outage The dose savings achieved in these refuel floor initiatives was primarily responsible for the outage dose of 10.4 person-rem, which was 15% below the outage estimat Conclusions The fuel sipping and RPV head activities were efficiently and expeditiously nerforme In addition, job and ALARA planning and implementation for these evolutions incorporated extensive research and evaluations, attention to lessons learned, and effective preventative maintenanc I
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R1.4 Dose Control for the Reactor Water Cleanuo Unit (RWCU) Reoair Work Insoection Scoce (IP 83750. IP 83729)
The inspectors observed the briefing and repair activities for the south RWCU. A historical assessment of dose expended for RWCU activities and current outage data were reviewed, and the inspectors discussed the historical materiel condition and radiation protection problems associated with the RWC Observations and Findings The inspectors attended the pre-job briefing for the stud removal / replacement phase of the south RWCU work. The radiation protection technician (RPT) discussed the j radiological conditions, the required dosimetry, and the ALARA measures for this jo General area dose rates in the south RWCU room ranged from F0 milliroentgen per hour (mR/h) to 2 roentgen per hour (R/h) close to the pump boc, and were 10 R/h on contact with the RWCU bowl. The maintenance crew discussed various aspects of the work which would impact the RP issues. This job was performed in a locked high radiation and highly contaminated area. In addition to the stud work, the crew was instructed to take measurements of various clearances for subsequent engineering analyse The inspectors observed the RWCU work remotely by means of a camera mounted in the room and noted that a HEPA filter unit and spray bottles were used effectively to control airborne activity. Air sample data showed that there were no airbome concerns in this room. In addition, the inspectors noted he use of respiratory protection, double layers of protective clothing which were taped to further prevent contamination, and continuous RPT coverage of the job. The RPT covering this job was very knowledge-able of the RP issues associated with this work. The inspectors verified that the members of this work crew were qualified for respirators and that the dosimetry was appropriate for the radiological conditions. The radworker practices were good, but the job was stopped when the crew encountered a problem removiag the last stu During interviews, plant personnel stated that the disassembly of the RWCU pump /
impeller assembly required that plant staff use a sledgehammer to pound in metal wedges to separate the impeller casing from the transition plate. The inspectors expressed concem regarding the need to use a sledgehammer to accomplish work in a locked high radiation / highly contaminated area. A recent RP self-assessment indicated that since 1989, RWCU work has expended nearly 50 person-rem, which constitutes 3.7% of the total dose at Fermi 2. The licensee has implemented the following improvements to minimize the dose expended for RWCU work:
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permanent shielding was installed to reduce dose rates from the pump suction and discharge piping, and the suction "/" strainers were removed, a
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jib cranes were installed to facilitate the removal of pumps and motors,
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motor / pump couplings were redesigned to reduce the man-hours required for coupling removal /re-installation, e
a work table with a ventilation hood and drain was installed in the hot machine shop and a beadblaster was used for decontamination prior to pump to-assembly,
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cameras were installed to permit remote monitoring, e
the mechanical seals were redesigned to improve performance and ease of removal, and e
an impeller puller was fabricated to allow removal of the impeller with minimal extremity dose.
'] Until recently, the plant replaced the mechanical seals approximately every 6 month The inspectors noted that the new mechanical seals functioned for an extended time over the past design, but discussed with RP staff whether this extended run-time contributed to the increased difficulty in RWCU disassembly. The RP management indicated that discussions with engineering staff had been conducted, and that RP and
_E engineering would cooperate to address the ongoing RWCU concerns, initial RP discussions with engineering indicated that the use of larger Jacking bolts and a slower
{= jacking process may improve the RWCU disassembly. The licensee actions to address the continuing RWCU concems, and their potential radiological impact, will be reviewed as an Inspection Followup Item (IFl 50-341/97015-01).
The inspectors noted that the impeller was removed from the pump assembly in the inner Kelly building located in the hot machine shop. A work table with a ventilation hood and drain was installed in the Inner Kelly to control airbome and smearable contamination and to facilitate decontamination with a beadblaster. As an ALARA measure, the licensee replaced the impeller rather than attempting to decontaminate and re-use this component, which had a dose rate of 45 R/h on contac The original dose estimate for the RWCU seal replacement was approximately person-rem. However, plant personnel encountered various materiel condition problems and after two job progress reviews the dose estimate was revised to 3.3 person-re Dosimetry data indicated that the whole body dose for the RWCU work was 3.13 person-rem and the extremity dose was 5.05 person-rem, which appeared reasonable for the work accomplishe Conclusions The inspectors determined that the pre-job briefings were sufficient to inform radworkers of the radiological conditions, dosimetry requirements, and ALARA measures. Job coverage by the RPT and performance of the RWCU repairs was effective. However, ,
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~R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment R2.1 Chemistry Maintenance of Outage Water Quality and Monitoring of Failed Fuel Parameters a. Insoection Scoce (IP 83750)
The inspectors reviewed radiation monitor data, laboratory results, and trend charts of radiological analyses udilzed to monitor fuel integrity parameters in reactor water and offgas. The inspectors also interviewed RP&C staff regarding the water quality in support of various outage activitie b. Qbservations and Findings The inspectors noted that water quality in support of outage activities was excellen The chemistry staff stated that prior to RFOS, the floodup water was supplied by the standby feedwater pur,ip taking suction from the condensate storage tank (CST).
However, the flow rate was only 3000 gallons per minute (gpm) and the floodup time was approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, as the floodup volumc is approximately 500,000 galion This process also presented water clarity problems, as the combined operation of the RWCU and fuel pool cleanup unit (FPCU), which employ filter demineralizers, have a cleanup capacity of only 1500 gp The current process utilizes the condensate pumps to take suction from the CST and pump the water through the condensate filter demineralizars, then through the main feedwater lines into the reactor cavity for floodup. The condensate pump flow rates are 7000 gpm each and the condensate filter demineralizers effectively remove radiological and chemical impurities prior to floodup. As a result, the current floodup with high quality water was accomplished in approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The RWCU and FPCU were used to maintain water quality during the outage, inspector observations and interviews with plant personnel working on the refuel floor demonstrated that the water clarity was excellen Soon after the May 1997 restart, plant personnelidentified a fuelleak. Throughout the cycle, RP&C staff effectively monitored offgas and reactor coolant for the characteristic radionuclides indicative of fuel integrity problems. Radiation monitors located on the offgas system were also closely monitored, in late September 1997, a spike of offgas activity and radiation monitors indicated the possibility of a second fuelleak. As stated above, the vacuum fuel sipping operations identified the defective fuel bundle The inspectors noted that RP&C staff monitored the offgas for the six xenon and krypton
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isotopes that are generally used for the " sum of six release" fuel integrity analyses. In addition, RP&C staff monitored the reactor coolant for dose equivalent iodine (DEI), as well as the activation and fission particulates Np-239 and strontium-91/92, respectivel Although the various radionuclide levels continued to increase throughout the cycle, the DEI peak was only 3% of the Technical Specification limi l
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The inspectors also reviewed the BWR Radiation Assessment and Control (BRAC) point radiation survey data. The BRAC point surveys are normally conducted 5 weeks after plant shutdown to allow short-lived nuclides to decay. However, due to the brevity of this mid-cycle outage, these surveys were performed 1 week after shutdown. Although
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the data was mixed, the average radiation levels at the four points remained constani at l approximately 125 mR/h. In addition, the radiation levels on the N2 recirculation risers decreased 10-30%. These survey results are noteworthy, as the plant operated under hydrogen water chemictry, which has been shown to increase dose rates on piping due
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to increased cobalt-60 deposition. Plant personnelindicated the depleted zinc oxide (DZO) inject!on continued to effectively displace cobalt on the oxide films located on the internal piping surfaces. The inspectors determined that RP&C assessment used appropriate methodolog c. Conclusions The inspectors determined that the chemistry staff successfully implemented a process to expedite floodup and improve water quality / clarity, in addition, RP&C personnel effectively monitored fuel integrity issues throughout the fuel cycle by tracking several key paramaters. The DZO injection continued to effectively minimize cobalt deposition on plant pipin R3 RP&C Documentation and Procedures Insoection Scoce (IP 84750)
The inspectors reviewed the Special Decommissioning Records which are maintained to comply with 10 CFR 50.75(g) requirements. The inspectors also interviewed RP staff regarding the 1988 NRC approval to retain slightly contaminated soil onsite, Observations and Findinos in November 1985,50,000 gallons of water overflowed from the CST and in November 1986, a pipe break drained 275,000 gallons of water from the CST to the diked basi As a result of these events, the surrounding soil became slightly contaminated, in 1988,
- Fermi received NRC approval to retain the soil onshe in accordance with 10 CFR 20.302(a). The soil was stored in seavans until 1992, at which time the soil was re-analyzed. Three soil samples from each seavan were counted to the environmental lower limits of detection (LLDs) and all of the results were below the LLDs. This soil was then used as non-radioactive fill at the residual heat removal complex onsite. Plant personnel stated that no soil from Fermi has boon released offsit The inspectors noted that the Special Decommissioning records were extensive, especially in relation to the low levels of contamination discovered in the sediment of the Fermi 1 Cooling Water Channel. These records contain maps, drawings, laboratory analyses, assessments, and a variety of plant condition reports dating to 1985. The inspectors determined that these records were well maintained in accordance with procedural and regulatory requirement i A _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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. Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee records incident to decommisioning were well maintained and were in compliance with 10 CFR 50.75(g) and NRC Information Notice 96-4 R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in RP&C R4.1 Radworker and Radiation Protection Technician (RPT) Outaae Performance Insoection Scoce (IP 83750)
The inspectors observed various outage work in progress and conducted several walkdowns of the facility. The inspectors also reviewed procedures and RWPs, and interviewed RP staff regarding radworker prectices, Observations and Findinas Overall, the inspectors observed that radworker, decontamination worker, and RPT work ,
practices were in accordance with station procedures and RP management expectations. The inspectors did not identify any problems with the wearing of personal contamination clothing and dosimetry, and radworkers generally respected radiological boundaries. The inspectors observed that RPTs challenged plant personnel, and in one instance noted that a radworker was questioned about having a purple hard hat outside a contaminated are Contamination control practices were effective, although the inspectors observed that one contract radwaste technician in a clean area was assisting in the decontamination of a reactor feed pump strainer basket (located in a contaminated area) by use of a iong-handled sponge mop. The movement of this tool across a contaminated area boundary was not considered a good contamination control practice by either RP management or the inspectors. Plant RP management investigated this occurence, determined that the two contract radwaste technicians involved were aware of station expectations for contamination control, and took prompt corrective action. No other problems were observed with radworker RP practices during other outage wor Overall, the RP support of outage tasks was effective. However, the licensee identified an instance in which radworkers were issued alarming dosimetry (PD-1) with an incorrect alarm setting. Five maintenance workers, who were replacing the impeller in the RWCU pump assembly within the hot machine shop inner Kelly buiMing, were issued alarming dosimetry prior to the work. The hot machine shop was posted as a high radiation area and the dose rates in the inner Kelly were 1R/h on contact with the pump assembly, and Kelly building dose rates ranged from 5-200 mR/h. After the work, one maintenance worker notified RP that his PD-1 did not alarm at 75 mrem, as the dosimetry reading was 88 mrem. The direct reading dosimeter reading was 105 mre i l
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An RP supervisor (RPS) checked the PD-1 dose alarm set point and found that the alarm was set at 75 rem rather than 75 mrem, Another alarming dosimeter used on that job was found with the same incorrect alarm set point. The doses for the other maintenance workers ranged from 1-35 mrem. The RPS verified that the dosimetry system was functioning properly and initiated a Condition Assessment Resolution Document (CARD). The inspectors expressed concern that the degree of incorrect setpoint for work in a high radiation area could have resulted in a significant worker dose without the benefit of the alar The RP department completed the following corrective actions: this RPT's qualification for issuing alarming dosimeters was retracted and the individual was disciplined in accordance with procedure, the error was discussed with RPS and RPT staff at various briefings, and the dosimetry vendor was contacted about pcssible changes to the software code. There are two requirements regarding alarm setpoint verification in the dosimetry system operation procedure (NPOP Procedure No. 65.000.245); Step 6.3. requires that staff, " Ensure correct parameters and setpoints have been input."; and ster 6.3.6 requires that staff " Verify correct alarm levels are displayed.". The failure of the RPT to perform these required steps was a procedural violation. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is be'ag treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-341/97015-02). Conclusions The inspectors observed that RP support and radworker practices were generally effective. However, the inspectors observed one instance of inappropriate contamination control and one Non-Cited Violation was identified regarding the issuance of alarming dosimetry with an incorrect dose alarm setpoin R8 Miscellaneous RP&C lasues R {Qiscussed) Insoection Followuo item 50-341/96006-10: inability to obtain a PASS sample. During a July 1996 emergency exercise, the PASS team was unable to obtain a reactor water sample due to a communication error regarding a valve manipulatio Since that time, other PASS problems have rendered the system unreliable in 1997, staff have repaired the 402B target rock valve and the 401 A and B target rock valves are scheduled for replacement during the 1998 refueling outage. The licensee has assembled a PASS Evaluation Team, which includes a vendor with significant PASS experience. Interviews with plant personnel Indicated that another PASS vendor has develuped a proposal to significantly upgrade the system. Therefore, due to the history of problems and the pending PASS upgrade, this item remains ope X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to licensee representatives during an exit meeting on October 10,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings and did not indicate that any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietar l
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L PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Liccnsee
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S. Bartman, Chemistry Supervisor L. Crissman, General Superintendent - Radwaste P. Duffy, Radiological Engineer S. Dyer, RP Supervisor - Refuel Floor P. Fessler, Plant Manager R. Gilmore, Radiological Health Supervisor D. Harmon, RP Supervisor / Operations ALARA P. Keenan, Radiological Engineer E. Kokosky, Superintendent and Radiation P,otection Manager W. Lipton, Principal Radiological Engineer G. Macadam, General Supervisor, Radiation Protection Operations R. Nearboof, Chemical Engineer D. Williams, Assistant Radiation Protection Manager NBC G. Harris, Senior Resident inspector, Fermi 2 C. O'Keefe, Resident inspector, Fermi 2 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 83750," Occupational Radiation Exposure" IP 83729, " Occupational Exposure during Extended Outages" ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50-341/97015-01 IFl RWCU materiel condition affecting pump disassembly and radworker radiation dose 50-341/97015-02 NCV issuance of alarming dosimetry with an incorrect dose alarm setpoin ,
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50-341/96006-10 IFl Inability to obtain a PASS sample Closed 50-341/97015-02 NCV issuance of alarming dosimetry with an incorrect dose alarm setpoin *
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA As Low As is Reasonably Achievable BRAC BWR Radiation Assessment and Control CARD Condition Assessment Resolution Document CST Condensate Storage Tank DAC Derived Air Concentration
- DEI Dose Equivalent lodinc y DZO Depleted Zinc Oxide '
FPCU Fuel Pool Clean Up-gpm gallons per minute HEPA
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High Efficiency Particulate Air i
IFl inspection Followup Item NCV ' Non-Cited Violation PASS Post-Accident Sampling System -
RP Radiation Protection
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RP&C Radiation Protection & Chemistry RPS Radiation Protection Supervisor RPT Radiation Protection Technician RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel RRA Radiological!y Restricted Area-RWCU Reactor Water Cleanup Unit RWP Radiation Work Permit SRO Senior Reactor Operator
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PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED NPRC 97-0398,' Dose Expended for Maintenance of RWCU Pumps".
NPRC-92-0061," Disposition of Soit Removed from CST /CRT Diked Area".
NPRC-97-0395," Dose Rates on BRAC Points and N2 Recirculation Riser Nozzles".
NPRC-97-0254,"Self Assessment of the RadiologicalImpacts From Failed Fuel With Emphasis
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Nuclear Production Operating Procedure (NPOP) 65.000.245, Rev. 4, " Operation of the SAIC Dosimeter System".
NPRC-97-0364, "Mid-Cycle outage (97-02) Reactor Shutdown".
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NPRC-97-0340,"Self Assescment on Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Venting".
Enrico Fermi 2 Special Decommissioning Records CARD (Condition Assessment Resolution Document) No. 97-10058, " Radiation Protection Boundary Violation" CARD No. 97-13031," Alarming Dosimetry did not Alarm at Expected Setpoint".
NL Work Instruction No. 4000, Rev. O, "Special decommissioning Documents". )
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