IR 05000341/1987045
| ML20236V846 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 12/02/1987 |
| From: | Greenman E, Parker M, Patricia Pelke, Rogers W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236V841 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-87-45, NUDOCS 8712070129 | |
| Download: ML20236V846 (10) | |
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O.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
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Report No. 50-341/87045(DRP)
Docket No. 50-341 Operating O cense No. NPF-43 Licensee: Detroit Edison Company 2000 second Avenue
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Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name:
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>i Inspection At:
Fermi Site, Newport, Michigan j
Inspection Conducted:
October 6 through November 9, 1987
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Inspector:
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E. Parker Date 1, p,
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R. Pelke Date
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Approved By:
Edwa d reenmi71
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Inspectier. Summary Inspection on October 6 through November 9,1987 (Report No. 50-341/87045(DRP))
L Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspecitTon by resident inspectors of previous ir,spection findings, LERs, events, operations, maintenance,
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surveillance, startup tests, and report review.
Results:
No deviations or violatic,ns were identified.
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8712070129 071203 L"
PDR ADOCK 05000341 G
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted a.
Detroit Edison Company
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F. Abramson, Operations Engineer
- F. Agosti, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Services
- J. Bass, Production Quality Assurance, Senior Engineer l
- L. Bregni, Compliance Engineer S. Cashell, Licensing
- T. Dong, Plant Safety R. Eberhardt, Radiation Protection Engineer L. Esau, Maintenance Engineer
- L. Fron, Mechanical / Fluid System Nuclear Engineering
- D. Gibson, Plant Manager J. Green, Systems Engineering R. Kelm, Director, Nuclear Security J. Leman, Director, Plant Safety, Nuclear Production
- R. Lenart, General Director, Nuclear Engineering L. Lessor, Advisor to Plant Manager R. May, Superintendent, Maintenance and Modification G. Ohlemacher, Principal Engineer, Licensing
- W. Orser, Vice President, Nuclear Operations / Plant Manager J. Plona, Operations Support Engineer E. Preston, Assistant Director, Plant Safety
- T. Randazzo, Director, Regulatory Affairs B. Sheffel, Nuclear Production, Technical Engineering ISI
- F. Svetkovich, Technical Engineer, Nuclear Production B. R. Sylvia, Group Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- W. Tucker, Superintendent, Operations b.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- M. Parker, Resident Inspector P. Pelke, Region III
- W. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on November 13, 1987.
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Action On Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
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(C?osed) Open Item (341/86003-01(DRP)):
Overpressurization of the HPC1/RCIC Piping and Condensate Storage Tank Rupture.
This item concerned the February 14, 1986, overpressurization of a section of the high pressure coolant injection / reactor core isolation cooling (HPCI/RCIC) full flow test line, and the subsequent event on November 17, 1986, overpressurizing the same line, resul+4ng in a rupture of the condensate storage tank (CST).
The corrective action to the February 14, 1986, event is documented in Inspection Report No. 50-341/86054 and is considered adequate.
Concerning the November 17, 1986, overpressurization, the licensee took action to reduce the possibility of additional overpressurization events.
This action included:
Rerouting the control rod drive (CRD) minimum flow line downstream
of the spectacle flange.
Upgrading the 300 pound class piping from E41-F11 to the spectacle
flange with 600 pound class piping and extending the class boundary to the last isolation valves on the spectacle flange.
Providing overflow capability and detection on the CST and condensate
return tank (CRT).
Installing relief valves for overpressure protection on the
HPC1/RCIC test line.
Installing a vinyl liner on the diked area surrounding the CST /CRT.
- The inspector reviewed the following Engineering Design Packages (EDP).
- EDP 6731:
Upgrade Selected Piping Segments.
This consisted of replacement of 300 pound class carbon steel piping components in the combined HPCI/RCIC test return line to prevent piping overpressurization.
- EDP 6737:
Reroute the CR0 Minimum Flow Line.
This consisted of relocation of the one-i1ch CRD minimum flow line connector from upstream of valves E41F175 and E41F179 to an area downstream of valves E41F158 and E41F178, to prevent an inadvertent overpressurization of the piping upstream of E41F158 and E41F178.
- EDP 6687:
Install pressure relief protection on the HPCI/RCIC return line.
This consisted of the installation of three pressure relief valves in the combined HPCI/RCIC/CRD test return line to the CST to prevent overpressurization of the 150 pound class portion of the test return line.
The inspector verified that the EDPs had been implemented by review of the following PN-21s (work orders):
269499, 668568, 269500, 669302, and 986466.
The inspector also walked down the accessible portions of piping to verify the above action had been completed and the necessary procedures and drawings had been updated to reflect this modification.
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In addition, the inspector verified that the vinyl liner had been
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installed in the diked area and that overflow protection had been installed on the CST /CRT.
This item is closed.
3.
Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
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(Closed) LER 85079-01:
Auto-Start of Division II Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) and Emergency Equipment Service Water (EESW) Caused by Improper Adjustment of Valve Controller.
This LER was previously reviewed in Inspection Report No. 50-341/87012 and remained open pending implementation of Engineering Design Package (EDP) 1720.
EDP-1720 has been implemented by field completion of Work Requests (PN21) No.
007A0827, No. 018A0826, and No. 276738.
Post-maintenance surveillance tests were conducted prior to declaring EECW Divisions I and II operable.
The inspector verified that the reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) system is currently operated with the RBCCW Make-Up Tank (P4200A001) in service and both EECW Make-Up Tanks (P4400A001 and P4400A002)
isolated during normal RBCCW operations.
Procedure P0M 23.127,
" Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water / Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System," has been revised to incorporate the current system line-up.
During the review of P0M 23.127, Revision 17, the inspector noted that Valve P42-F113 was incorrectly listed on Page 6 as a RBCCW Return Header Vent Valve.
This error was subsequently corrected in P0M 23.127, Revision 18.
The licensee is currently performing sequence-of-event testing to verify proper system operation and actuation.
The inspectors will continue to observe system operation as a result of other LERs on premature system actuation, b.
(Closed) LER 85083-00:
Reactor Protection System (RPS) Divisional Power Failure Causing Emergency Safety Feature (ESF) Actuations.
During closeout of LER 85083, RPS Divisional Power Failure Causing ESF Actuations, the inspector reviewed the licensee's cause of failure.
The failed component was determined to be a failed circuit board in the electrical protection assemble (EPA) protection logic causing the protection logic to actuate resulting in the opening of the circuit breaker.
The licensee replaced the failed circuit board.
Review of previous failures at other plants indicated that some failures were attributable to the electrolytic capacitors on the circuit board.
Electrolytic capacitors typically have a specified deenergized shelf life, Review of the licensee's shelf life program determined that the EPA circuit board including the capacitors have an indefinite shelf life as specified by the manufacturer, General Electric.
Subsequent discussions with the manufacturer indicated that General Electric now recommends a seven year deenergized shelf life.
The licensee has now implemented the manufacturers shelf life
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recommendations into their shelf life program and indicated that the
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electrolytic capacitor shelf life would be reviewed further in view of the circuit board failures identified at other sites.
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(Closed) LER 86045-00:
Overpressurization and Rupture of CST Piping Caused by Inadequate Overpressure Protection and Operator Error.
This item concerned the overpressurization of HPCI/RCIC piping and rupture of the CST piping on November 17, 1987.- This LER was voluntarily submitted by the licensee to inform the NRC of the event and to describe corrective action taken to prevent recurrence.
This event is being tracked independently by the NRC under Open Item 341/86002-01 and 341/86003-01.
Open Item 341/86002-01 addresses the health physics and environmental aspects and 341/86003-01 addresses the licensee's corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
This LER is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Followup of Events (93702)
During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several events, some of which required prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72.
The inspectors pursued the events onsite with licensee and/or other NRC officials.
In each case, the inspectors verified that the notification was correct and timely, if appropriate, that the licensee was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were conducted within regulatory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent future recurrence.
The specific events are as follows:
October 17 Potential loss of primary containment integrity.
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October 20 Sodium hydroxide leaked to environment.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
5.
Startup Test Witnessing and Observation (72302)
The inspector reviewed portions of startup test procedures, reviewed procedure results completed to date, toured the areas containing system equipment, interviewed personnel, and observed test activities of those startup tests identified below.
During this review, the inspectors noted that the latest revision of the test procedure was available and in use by crew members, the minimum crew requirements were met, the test prerequisites were met, appropriate plant systems were in service, the special test equipment required by the procedure was calibrated and in service, the test was performed as required by approved procedures, temporary modifications such as jumpers were installed and tracked per established administrative controls.
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The inspector observed the performance of the following startup tests:
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STUT.03E.015 HPCI System - Hot Vessel Injection.
STUT.03F.015 HPCI System - Cold Vessel Injection.
STUT.03H 015 HPCI System - Cold. Vessel Injection (Second Run).
STUT.03G.015 -HPCI System - 1000 PSIG Cold CST Injection.
Startup Tests STUT.03E.015 HPCI System - Hot Vessel Injection and STUT.03F.015 HPCI System - Cold Vessel Injection were originally performed during Test Condition 2.
These tests sere reperformed on October 14 and-18, 1987, respectively, to demonstrate proper system operation after undergoing repair and modification to correct previous problems.
These tests were performed successfully with no major problems identified.
During the performance of STUT.03H.015 HPCI System - Cold Vessel Injection (Second Run), the HPCI system tripped on high reactor vessel water level after about 35 seconds of operation at rated flow.
This trip was not a l
result of improper operation of the HPCI system.
The HPCI functioned as i
designed and tripped on a Level 8 (high reactor vessel water) to protect the HPCI turbine from excessive moisture carryover.
The high level was a result of trying to control feedwater in manual while performing HPCI injections at low power /feedwater flow rates. As such, the licensee has determined that the startup test meets the acceptance standards required and reperformance of this test is not required.
During the tests, the inspector observed preparations, pre-job briefing, testing and restoration of system following startup testing activities.
Good communication and coordination was noted between the operating shift, startup personnel, and all support personnel.
The pre-job briefing included discussions on prerequisites, cautions, abnormal conditions, and radiological concerns.
The testing activities were noted to be well planned and executed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period from October 6 through November 9, 1987.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan, i
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The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
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inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the
' Division I and II reactor heat removal (RHR) system including the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) system to verify operability by comparing the system lineup with plant drawings, as-built configuration or present valve lineup lists; observing equipment for conditions that could degrade performance; and verified.that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning, and calibrated.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility.
operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
On October 25, 1987, the shift noted an increase in generator gross megawatts, while the plant was in steady state operation with reactor power at 40%.
Further investigation discovered that recirculation pump
"A" had begun a steady increase-in speed without any manipulations of the controls.
The control room operator placed the manual / automatic (M/A)
station for the
"A" pump in manual and attempted to lower recirculation pump speed.
When no response was noted, the operator manually locked the scoop tube in place.
The recirculation pump speed increased from 51% to 61% resulting in a peak increase in reactor power to 52%.
The shift then took steps to reduce the pump speed manually at the reactor recirculation motor generator set to balance out both pumps.
The "A" pump flow controller was then left in manual control with the speed at 51% until repairs were completed.
A previous event occurred on October 22, 1987, in which the reactor power increased to a maximum of 51% during the transient.
At that time, troubleshooting and repairs were taken which were believed to have corrected the situation.
The licensee has since performed additional troubleshooting and repairs to correct the recirculation pump runaway problem.
The inspector was in the control room during the October 26, 1987, event and observed operator action to control and reduce recirculation pump speed.
The operating shift demonstrated good control in identifying and resolving the event.
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On November 5,1987, licensed operators received an unanticipated reactor recirculation pump runback to 32% power due to reactor feedwater pump actions.
During the process of recovering from the runback and resetting the pump controls, one of the recirculation pumps increased to maximum flow.
The flow increase caused an instantaneous increase of power to 70%
then reduced to 50% and remained constant.
The licensee issued deficiency event report (DER)87-435 on the event.
The inspectors will review the licensee's corrective actions to the DER.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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,7.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to rett.rning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
Annual Preventative Maintenance on Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
No. 13 Switch Gear Room North Ventilation Fan.
Annual Preventative Maintenance on Electric Fire Pump.
- Following completion of maintenance on the EDG system, the inspectors verified that the system had been returned to service properly.
During the Division II core spray outage on October 22, 1987, the inspector observed the following activities:
Replacement of a leaking valve on E21N006B, located on Rack H21-P019
in accordance with PN-21 008A0409.
Recalibration of minimum flow differential pressure switch E21N006B
in accordance with P0 24931.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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8.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical
Specifications and verified that:
testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies
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identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by i
appropriate management personnel.
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.The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
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24.110.05 RPS Turbine Control Valve / Turbine Stop Valve Channel Functional Test.
24.307.15 Emergency Diesel Generator No.12 31-Day Start and Load Test.
The inspectors performed a record review of completed surveillance tests.
The review was to determine that the test was accomplished within the required Technical Specification time interval, procedural steps were
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properly initiated, the procedure acceptance criteria were met, independent verifications were accomplished by people other than those performing the test, and the tests were signed in and out of the control room surveillance log book.
The surveillance tests reviewed were:
24.425.01 Containment Integrity Verification for Valves Outside Containment.
No problems were identified.
On October 23, 1987, the inspector observed the performance of P0M 24.307.15,. Revision 12, Attachment 1, " Emergency Diesel Generator No. 12 31-Day Start and Load Test." Attachment 4 to P0M 24.307.15 is the 30-minute operating log.
The inspector noted that the recorded lube I
oil temperatures were approximately 182 F and the recorded jacket cooling water temperatures were approximately 158 F.
These values were outside the normal operating values cf 190 F to 205 F, and 165 F to 180 F, specified in Enclosure C of P0M 23.307, " Emergency Diesel Generator System." The values in P0M 23.307 were changed after licensee personnel confirmed that the values were obsolete.
This matter is considered resolved.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
9.
Report Review (90713)
During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Operating Report for September 1987 and the Emergency Diesel Generator Start Failure Reports dated October 5, 1987, and October 26, j
1987.
The inspector confirmed that the information provided in the Monthly Operating Report met the requirements of Technical
Specification 6.9.1.6 and Regulatory Guide 1.16 and that the information j
provided in the Emergency Diesel Generator Start Failure met the requirements of Technical Specifications 4.8.1.1.3 and Regulatory Guide 1.108.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
on November 13, 1987, and informally throughout the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspection.
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