Text

Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2023001
	ML23109A197
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	06/28/2023
From:	Billy Dickson; NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2
To:	Peter Dietrich; DTE Electric Company
References
	IR 2023001
	Download: ML23109A197 (22)
	v • d • e

SUBJECT:

FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2023001

Dear Peter Dietrich:

On March 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2. On April 6, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with E. Olsen, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2.

June 28, 2023

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Karla Stoedter, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000341 License No. NPF-43

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000341

License Number:

NPF-43

Report Number:

05000341/2023001

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2023-001-0059

Licensee:

DTE Electric Company

Facility:

Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2

Location:

Newport, MI

Inspection Dates:

January 01, 2023 to March 31, 2023

Inspectors:

J. Gewargis, Resident Inspector

R. Ng, Senior Project Engineer

T. Taylor, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved By:

Karla Stoedter, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

High Energy Line Break Barrier not Properly Secured Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000341/2023001-01 Open/Closed

[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," when door RB-5, a high energy line break (HELB) barrier, was found open while touring the plant. A nuclear operator entered a room to perform rounds and left the door open while performing rounds in the area.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

The plant started the assessment period at or near 100 percent power. On January 27, 2023, the plant commenced a planned power reduction to approximately 70 percent power for routine maintenance and testing. The plant returned to 100 percent power on January 28, 2023, and remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the assessment period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending high winds on February 15, 2023. Walkdown of 345 kV, 120kV, general service water (GSW), residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) roof, and site overall was completed.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Division 1 diesel generator service water (DGSW) during division 2 diesel generator system test the week ending January 20, 2023

(2) Division 1 non-interruptible air supply (NIAS) during division 2 safety system outage the week ending February 4, 2023

(3) Division 1 emergency equipment service water (EESW)/(RHRSW) reservoir during the mechanical draft cooling tower (MDCT) 'D' fan brake troubleshooting

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Fire protection walkdown of reactor building 4 reactor recirculation motor generator sets zone during the week ending January 6, 2023

(2) Fire protection walkdown of division 1 and 2 RHRSW building service water pump rooms during the week ending January 20, 2023

(3) Fire protection walkdown of emergency diesel generator (EDG) 11 engine room, fuel oil room, and review of fire brigade implementation during the week ending March 15, 2023

(4) Zone 19, turbine building first floor, south reactor feed pump room, completed the week ending March 31, 2023

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced drill of the first floor of radwaste chemistry lab storage room during the week ending February 18, 2023.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a planned down power to 70 percent power on January 27, 2023.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a training scenario in the control room simulator performed by a crew of licensed operators on March 8, 2023.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample 1 Partial)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Potential for grease hardening in breakers with extended refurbishment intervals, completed the week of March 25, 2023 (2)

(Partial)

Non-interruptible air system (NIAS)

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) EDG 12 lube oil work and low-pressure coolant injection test during the week ending January 21, 2023

(2) Emergent work to replace reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) barometric condensate pump switch during the week ending February 4, 2023

(3) Startup level control valve interrogation and hypothetical scram response during the week ending February 25, 2023

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Division 2 NIAS and operability questions on the reactor building/torus vacuum breakers during the week ending February 11, 2023

(2) Control complex heating ventilation and air conditioning (CCHVAC) hot deck and compressor noises during the week ending February 11, 2023

(3) EDG 13 DGSW pump 'B' down power trending down during the week ending February 25, 2023

(4) Review of anomalous indications during certain surveillances of the reactor protection system, completed the week ending March 25, 2023

(5) Review of troubleshooting and restoration of mechanical draft cooling tower fan brake electrical circuits, completed the week of March 25, 2023

(6) High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system high energy line break door left open during operator rounds, completed the week ending March 31, 2023

(7) Inservice testing program and other surveillance/preventive maintenance scheduling problems during the week ending March 18, 2023

(8) Operability of all EDGs upon discovery of a vulnerability for spurious trips of the crankcase overpressure circuit during design basis tornados, completed the week ending March 31, 2023

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Containment high range radiation monitor replacements (permanent), completed the week ending March 11, 2023

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

(1) Division 1 emergency equipment cooling water EECW heat exchanger swap from 'C' to 'A' during the week ending January 6, 2023

(2) RCIC EG-R work and safety system outage during the week ending February 4, 2023

(3) NIAS emergent issues/troubleshooting during the week ending March 18, 2023

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

(1) Reactor pressure vessel loop 'A' and 'B' jet pumps 1-10 and 11-20 total flow calibration

(2) Core spray pump and valve operability surveillance during the week ending March 18, 2023

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) HPCI pump and valve surveillance during the week ending February 18, 2023

Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Step changes in leakage starting in 2023 during the week ending March 25, 2023

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed a multi-facility drill from the simulator control room, technical support center, and emergency operations facility on March 14,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===

Main article: IP 71151

(1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (1 Sample 1 Partial)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) The inspectors reviewed a series of corrective action documents related to corroded bolting on several pump columns in the ultimate heat sink reservoir. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several condition assessment resolution documents (CARDs)associated with declining inservice testing trends on the same pumps.

(2)

(Partial)

Review of licensee document control, records, surveillance and performance test control, and performance scheduling and tracking

INSPECTION RESULTS

High Energy Line Break Barrier not Properly Secured Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000341/2023001-01 Open/Closed

[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," when door RB-5, a high energy line break (HELB) barrier, was found open while touring the plant. A nuclear operator entered a room to perform rounds and left the door open while performing rounds in the area.

Description:

During a routine plant tour, the inspectors discovered door RB-5 open. RB-5 is the HELB door between the HPCI/CRD pump area and the "T-room," or pipe tunnel room, in the auxiliary building. The door is described as a HELB barrier in various licensee design documents, and the licensee has indicated it as such in the plant's barrier procedure, 35.000.242. In the event of a postulated break in the HPCI pump steam supply line, the door acts as a barrier to protect adjacent areas from the high energy that would be released. A sign posted next to the door also identifies the credited functions of the door along with directions on how to operate the door (namely, to shut it after passing through and to keep it open only for normal ingress/egress). The inspectors assessed the condition, took photos of the door and sign, and called out twice to see if anyone was in the T-room. The inspectors did not go into the room nor shut the door because of a high radiation area (HRA) boundary in front of the door. The inspector was not briefed for entry into an HRA nor on an appropriate radiological work permit. After about a minute, a nuclear operator exited the T-room and discussed the issue with the inspector. The operator indicated they were performing rounds and left the door open while taking readings in the room. The inspector discussed the matter with licensee management.

Corrective Actions: The door was shut, and the licensee performed an investigation.

Corrective Action References: 23-21718

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee did not follow procedure 35.000.242, "Barrier Identification/Classification," when an HELB door was left open during operator rounds. The procedure required HELB door RB-5 to be shut after passing through. If the door was going to be open for other than normal ingress/egress, an assessment was required.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, plant design documents and procedures assume HELB barriers will only be open during normal ingress and egress. Leaving the door open challenged assumptions within the plant's design basis regarding the impacts of a high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) steam line break.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Specifically, the inspectors answered 'no' to all of the questions in Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions." After reviewing design documents and the licensee's past operability evaluation, the inspectors concluded there were no operability impacts to other equipment.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, despite the requirements posted on a sign at the door and knowledge of a previous NRC NCV on HELB doors, a door was left open on operator rounds.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires, in part, activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Contrary to the above, on March 1, 2023, door RB-5, an HELB boundary, was not operated in accordance with procedure 35.000.242, "Barrier Identification and Classification," Revision 64. Specifically, procedure 35.000.242 required that such a door only be open for normal ingress/egress unless an assessment was performed in accordance with the procedure. A nuclear operator entered a room to perform rounds and left the door open while performing rounds in the area. There was no assessment performed for leaving the door open. Manipulating HELB barriers is an activity affecting quality as their functions are assumed in certain postulated accidents.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation: NRC Review of EDG Operability Upon Discovery of Vulnerability for Spurious Trips of the Crankcase Pressure Circuitry during a Design Basis Tornado 71111.15 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and a non-cited violation (NCV) of NRC requirements as part of our review of this issue. Rather than being included in this inspection report, the finding and NCV are included in re-issued NRC Inspection Report 05000341/2022010 which documents the results of the 2022 Design Basis Assurance Inspection since this inspection team first identified the EDG vulnerability.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On April 6, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to E. Olsen, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.01

Procedures

MOP01-200

Severe Weather Guidelines

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

23-21283

NRC Identified - FME Caps Missing on Hanson Fittings

Rack H21P501A

2/15/2023

6M271-5706-3

RHR Service Water Make Up Decant and Overflow Systems

Functional Operating Sketch

03/15/2022

Drawings

6M721-5706-3

RHR Service Water Makeup Decant and Overflow Systems

Functional Operating Sketch

AI

23.208,

2G

EDG-11 DGSW Electrical Lineup

23.129

Station and Control Air System

25

23.208

1A

Division 1 RHRSW Valve Lineup

01/24/2022

23.208

1C

Division 1 RHR Reservoir Valve Lineup

09/20/2018

23.208

1E

Division 1 EESW Valve Lineup

10/14/2019

23.208

3C

Division 1 RHR Reservoir Instrument Line Up

08/07/2016

23.208,

1G

DGSW Valve Lineup

23.208,

2C

Division 1 RHR Reservoir Electrical Lineup

71111.04

Procedures

MOP 23

Plant Storage

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

23-21912

Follow-up to CARD 23-21886 Oil Missing from RFPT Test

Panel (NRC Concern)

03/08/2023

FP-RB-4-17b

Reactor Building Recirculation System Motor Generator

Area, Zone 17, EL. 659'6"

71111.05

Fire Plans

FP-RDWST

Radwaste Building Zones 22, 23, 24, and 25

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

FP-RHR-1-11-

EDG

RHR Complex, EDG 11 Room, EL. 590' 0"

FP-RHR-1-11-OS

RHR Complex, EDG 11 Oil Storage Room, EL. 590' 0"

FP-RHR-1-50

RHR Complex, Division 1 Pump Room, Zone 50, EL. 590' 0"

FP-RHR-1-51

RHR Complex, Division 2 Pump Room Zone 51, EL. 590'0"

FP-TB

Turbine Building

LP-FP-940-0631

1st Floor Radwaste Chem. Lab Storage Room, Zone 24 Fire

Brigade Drill Evaluation Form

Miscellaneous

Temp Change

13158

Power Operations 25% to 100% to 25%

05/18/2022

29.100.01 SH 1

RPV Control

29.100.01 SH2

Primary Containment Control

29.100.01 SH5

Secondary Containment and Rad Release

29.ESP.01

Supplemental Information

MOP 01

Conduct of Operations

71111.11Q

Procedures

ODE-3

Communications

09-26638

Circuit Breaker User Group Feedback Breaker Lubricants

08/27/2009

20-25147

Revisions Request for Breaker Refurbishment Procedures

04/24/2020

23-20640

PM Evaluation Request for PMs Q339 and Q320 and

Associated Technical Requirements

01/24/2023

23-21156

Recommend Revision to 35.622.003

2/10/2023

23-21158

As-Found Conditions on Division 2 NIAS Control Air

Compressor

2/10/2023

23-21228

Breaker Position 65E-E6 Greased with Anderol are Past

Industry Life of Anderol and Need to be Prioritized for

Refurbishment

2/14/2023

Corrective Action

Documents

23-21232

Breaker Position 72F-3A Greased with Anderol are Passed

Industry Life of Anderol and Need to be Prioritized for

Refurbishment

2/14/2023

Information Notice 96-43

Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers

08/02/1996

NRC Information Notice 95-22

Hardened or Contaminated Lubricants Cause Metal-Clad

Circuit Breaker Failures

04/21/1995

71111.12

Miscellaneous

Technical Report

Guidance on Overhaul of ABB K-Line Circuit Breakers

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

MMA-02

Maintenance Program

MQA11-100

Operability Determination Process

Procedures

ODe-11

CARD Documentation Expectations

Work Orders

67495146

License Renewal Replace suction and Discharge Valves

with New or Refurbished Valves

2/21/2023

Work Week Schedule, Week Ending January 21, 2023

01/21/2023

Miscellaneous

Risk Management

Plan

RCIC Barometric Condensate Pump MCC Contacts Not

Closing in - WO 67595874

2/03/2023

Procedures

MWC 15

Elevated Risk Management

71111.13

Work Orders

67595874

RCIC Barometric Condensate Pump MCC Contacts Not

Closing in

2/02/2023

17-28945

EDG 13 DGSW Pump 'B' (R3100-C007) Differential

Pressure in Alert Range Low

11/03/2017

19-20729

17D27 Hot Deck High Temp

2/01/2019

2-28738

22 NRC DBAI Inspection: MES27 Evaluation does Not

Support the Immediate Operability Determination

Assumptions in CARD 22-28864

08/15/2022

23-20481

EDG 13 DGSW Pump "B" D/P Trending Down and at

Bottom of "Acceptable Range"

01/18/2023

23-20582

A71BK10D Contacts Not Operating as Expected

01/23/2023

23-20785

3D90 Received Unexpectedly During 24.110.05

01/28/2023

23-20832

Unable to Perform 44.010.142

01/31/2023

23-20907

Conflicts in the Implementation of Inservice Testing (1.1) and

Surveillance Frequency control (5.5.15) Programs at Fermi 2

2/01/2023

23-20910

PM Events Identified in CARD 23-20074

2/01/2023

23-21296

Abnormal Noise Division 2 CCHVAC Chiller

2/16/2023

23-21297

Div 2 CCHVAC Chiller Making an Abnormal Noise When

Started

2/16/2023

23-21315

T41-L452 Temperature Element Appears to be Missing

CREF Boundary Plug Seal

2/16/2023

23-21638

Multiple Recent Issues and Concerns Related to the

Surveillance/Performance Package Control (MWC03)

Process

2/28/2023

71111.15

Corrective Action

Documents

23-21690

RPS Test Box Light Did Not Turn Off as Expected During

03/01/2023

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Surveillance C71A-K5C

23-21922

Cognitive Trent: Auxiliary Relay Contact Performance

03/09/2023

23-22040

RHR, Division 1 Pump Room

03/13/2023

23-22116

Troubleshooting Revealed Potentially Dirty Contacts on HFA

Relays C71A-K12G/K12C

03/15/2023

23-22132

Work Not Performed Due to Issue with RPS Relays

03/16/2023

23-22188

Partial Completion of WO 60062468 "Calibrate Overspeed

Protection System Cooling Tower Fan 'D' Loop"

03/17/2023

2-32060

Received 17D27 Division 2 Control Room A/C Trouble due

to Hot Deck Temp

2/22/2022

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

23-21718

NRC Concern-Door T2200Y008 "RB/AB SUPSTRC CRD

PUMP RM DOOR 3'0" x 7'0" " Found Open

03/01/2023

6I721-2095-15

Schematic Diagram Nuclear Steam Supply Shut Off System

Trip System 'B'

U

6I721-2155-06

Schematic Diagram Reactor Protection System Trip System

'A' System Relays

W

6I721-2155-06

Schematic Diagram Reactor Protection System Trip System

'A' Scram Trip Logic

M

6I721-2155-08A

Schematic Diagram RPS Trip System 'A2' Scram Trip Logic

C

6I721-2679-01

Primary Containment Monitoring System Diagram

BP

6M721-2015

Station and Control Air Diagram

CU

6M721-3445-1

Diagram Nitrogen Inerting and Supply System

S

6M721-4615

Interruptible and Non-Interruptible Control Air

AI

Drawings

M-N-2057

Diesel Generator Ventilation RHR Complex Division 1

S

Engineering

Evaluations

TSR-38364

Revise PBOC-High and Moderate Energy Line Break

Evaluation DC-5426 Vol 1

DI-MAG/Digital Magnetic Sensors08-025

ISI/NDT-IST-Program Evaluation Sheet: New Reference

Values and Acceptance Criteria for R3001C007

05/22/2008

10-006

ISI/NDE-IST Program Evaluation Sheet: IST Third Interval

Pump Reference and Criteria Tables

07/28/2010

17-042

ISI/NDE-IST Program Evaluation Sheet: IST Re-Baseline

R3001C007

11/29/2017

Miscellaneous

Field Change

Change Load Resistor on Speed Switch E11K100A, B, C,

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Request - 80072-

and D from a 2.2k ohm Resistor to a Variable ohm

Potentiometer

Troubleshooting

Plan

MDCT 'D' Speed Controller Malfunctioning 8.4 Volts Peak to

Peak and >2.6 kHz

TSC 89-011

Non-Interruptible Control Air System Operability and

Compliance of Limiting Condition for Operation

35.000.242

Barrier Identification/Classification

44.010.001

RPS - Reactor Steam Dome Pressure, Division 1, Functional

Test

44.010.142

Division 1 RPS - Two out of Four Logic Modules Channel

Functional Test

Procedures

44.020.068

NSSSS - Turbine Building Area Temperature, Trip System

'B', Channel Functional Test

47117267