IR 05000341/1987028
| ML20236B271 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1987 |
| From: | Jablonski F, Maclean P, Reynolds S, Walker H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236B232 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-87-28, NUDOCS 8710260040 | |
| Download: ML20236B271 (12) | |
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i U.S.1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'.
j REGION ^III ReportNo..50-341'87028(DRS)
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Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43 l
' Licensee: Detroit Edison Company
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6400 North Dixie' Highway j
l Newport,'MI 48166 j
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Facility Name:
Enrico Fermi-Nuclear. Power' Plant, Unit 2 i
Inspection At:
Enrico Fermi 2 Site,LNewport,' Michigan i
Inspection Conducted: July 13 through August 7 and 13, 1987
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Inspectorsi
'S. A. Rey olds
/0-/Y-17 Date
$'. A. &
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H alker
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f P. J. Waclean
/d - /V - 8 7 Date
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Accompanied By: Tomy Le, NRR l
/O-/bd7 Approv'ed By:
onski, hief
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Quality Assurance Programs Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on July 13 through August 7 and 13,1987 (Report No. -50-341/87028(DRS))
j Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection cf. licensee's Nuclear QA Audit Program and follow-up on items related to the maintenance s'urvey conducted b'y the NRC staff in April 1987.
This. inspection was conducted utilizing' portions of Inspection Procedures.25578, 62700, and 62702.
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Results:
Four violations were identified:. failure to perform Technical L
Specification required preventive maintenance, Paragraph 3.b.(1); failure to provide the necessary control for work on safety-related and Technical
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Specification'related components, Paragraph 3.b.(5); failure to verify compliance with all aspects of the QA Program, to determine the effectiveness of the QA Program, and to identify a significant condition adverse to quality, 4.b.(1); and failure to perform Technical Specification required. audits within'
.l the specified frequency, Paragraphs 4.b.(3) and 4.b.(4).
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DETAILS r
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Persons Contacted
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Detroit Edison Company ( QCoj
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- B. Sylvia,'GroupdicMPrekidhnt'
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- F. fAgosti, Vice Presidehti Nuclear Engineering.
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- St Cashell, Licensing ErAjineer l'
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' *S.' Catola, Chairman,. NSRG LQ. Duong, Supervisor,' Materials' Engineering Group
'*P.KFessler,,, Supervisor,' Plant Scheduling-T
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+*S. Frost,'ticensing: Engineer:
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+*R. May,)l,7Vice President,' Nuclear 0perationsSuperintendent,'Maqitena' ac
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+*W. Orser
'*G. Traheyf Director,: Nuclearf Quhlity Assurance
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- W. Tuckerk Superintendent,L Operations'.X".
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+J. Wald, ?upervis'or,. 0perational[Qulity Assurance.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission g
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- A. Davis, Regional Administrator.
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- H. Miller, Director, Division ot Reactor Safety a"
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- Indicates those attending thelAug'ust'7, 1987, exit meeting. itelephone%
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+ Indicates those participating'in the August-13, 1987,-
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exit meeting.
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Other individuals were 'c'ontacted as a-matter, of course during the inspection, a
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Licensee Action on Preh us Inspe ion Findings M
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-(Closed) Unresolved'It'em (241/85026-02.):
There was.a low completion"
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rate of Priority lliiET Priority 2 preventive maintenance tasks and.
the ' licensee had.not conducted 'an. objective evaluation ~ of the.
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b impact.
The situation stil1 existed.
This item will be upgraded
'y to a violation described in Section 3.b.
This. item is closed.
,7 (Closeb)UnresolvedItem(341/85026-03):The PM program, as.
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l descriEiRTTn3D 12.000.17, permitted lower priority tasks to be
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L completed with resources that could-have been applied to'either-f 1-overdue, higher priority tasks cr overdue. tasks of:the same priority.
The situation still existed. This item was; upgraded.to a violation 1-described in Section 3.b.>'-This item is-closed."
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(Closed) Open I Om (341/86011-04):
There has no documented?pncy d'
for the time frame:in whicn to complete 100% audit coverage of
. Technical Specifichtons (TS) line items.
QAPR 18, Audits,1was.
revised :to require all line items of TS Sections 3.0 andi4.ffcto be audited at least once every five years. The inspectors W viewed the current audit schedule and noted that.this requirement had.been
' included. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Open Item (341/86011-0_6_)_:
The shelf. life had expired.on.
several drums of EPICOR. Bead Resin, EP-11, and. review and evaluation
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An adeq' ate engineering evaluation' was had not been completed.
u performed to extend the shelf life.
Records indicated that no bead resin was use( that had an expired shelf' life. This item is closed.
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(Closed) 0' pen Ithm (341/86011-08):'. Safety-related items were not segregated from ncasafety-related items in Warehouse B; most of the j
safety-related items were marked, but. the nonsafety-related items'
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were'not marked; there was. generally no storage leve1~ requirement
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marked on the items; there was a lack.of strict access; control,
which exposed.the items in' storage to visiting personnel, wind,
dirt, dust,. humidity, and the weather. The inspector observed the storage of safety-related items in Warehouse A and B and determined
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that safety-related items were adequately segregated from non '
' safety-related even though there was.no' distinct storage area-
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for safety-related items.
The inspector also' observed several-N L
safety-related items and verified that markings were adequate.
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L The required storage level was not marked on items, but it appeared j
that the items were properly stored at the required storage level
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and access control was adequate to protect items from visiting personnel and the elements. This item is closed.
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Maintenance Pr,ogram The purpose of this portion of the inspection was to follow up on concerns identified during the NRC Maintenance Survey conducted at Fermi 2 on April 20-24, 1987, and to review overall licensee performance, including management involvement to assure quality, in' the areas of preventive l
maintenance (PM) and corrective maintenance (CM).
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a.
Reference Documents
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(1) P0M 12.000.019, " Work Requests," Revision 26
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(2) P0M 12.000.017, " Preventive Maintenance Program," Revision 5 b.
Inspection Results
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s The inspectors review d the overall state of maintenance activities p
with emphasis on maintenance backlogs and the effect on components,
systems, and plant performance.
i, (1) Based on licensee records and discussions with licensee personnel, the inspectors determined that more than 5000 PM items had never
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been performed. This number represents more than one third of the total PM scope. Additionally,-a substantial quantity of PM l
items were past due. Significant numbers of PM items due each l
month were routinely deferred, rescheduled or cancelled without
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adequate technical evaluation.
Consequently, the licensee did
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not evaluate the impact on component, system, and plant perfor-
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mance. Licensee personnel informed the inspectors that possibly
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as many as 25% of the delinquent items were safety-related.
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In further discussions with nr'fous licensee personnel qnncernin;;, _ g
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the potential safety signif
,4 was established that the v(jcaf4e of the inspectors' finAngs it ta tr'acking systems used by Vid.
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I licensee were insufficient?land incolzplete to monitor FM
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performance status and og'
The licensee
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was ahe.ble.to determine Ah(itain PM history files.
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e overall status of' the TS reyuired
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PM items.
Consequent 13 s the safety significance of the
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delinquent, never perfore d or past due, PM items could not be f,, ' !
readily determined. That is, the licensee was not knowledgeable of the Mjfddts tFv6alins Snt PM items had on functionality,
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i reliability,'and,6perab@itfofsafety-t91atc4Ssystemsand
"4 components, and on the performance.of ba'ance of plant equipment, (
j whichcould/)allenggddety'relatedequipmentiffailurewere thanthree-brthsofthePMitemsnasAE.e@tedstatusofmore
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to occur. Thesafety-related/nonsefeter
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established and the j
licenseecou%not'readily.establishthe' status. 4 a result b'
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of this issue the licensee committed to review and ' evaluate
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the ef fect the ' delinquent PM items have on the reifability an
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operability of bompingnts, systems, and the plant, reassess
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,3 a program for reducing the backlog to acceptable levels.
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j Below Y,e examples of delinquent PM items thaMaither had i,'
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never been performed or were past due.
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(a) PIS No. E1150F006B, resiadal heat removal (RHR) rprvice (
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water outlet isolation motor operated valve:
PMNo.f19d4 required that the motoc be lubricaM W6 tested, ano that theassociatedmotorcontrolcentar(MCC)fe@rlpostior.",
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'6e tested every 18 months. Testing of the feeder position i
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was the result of an environmental qualification (EQ)
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commitment.
This PM Was more than one year overdue.
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I lbh PIS No. E1150F047B, RHR A and B inlet isolation valvd)
l JPM No. MM 8844 is as stated in example (a).
Testing'o
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of the feeder position, an EQ commitment, was more than j
one year overdue.
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PISNo.E1150F0488,RHRAandBbypassNlve: ri PM No. MM 8844 is as stated in example (a).
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of the feeder position, an EQ commitment, was more j
than one year overdue.
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PIS No. E1150F0688, RPR /t and 8 service water outlet isolation valve: PM No. MM 8844 is as ritated in
example (a). Testing of the feeder position, an l
EQ commitment, was more than one year overdue.
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(e) PIS No. E41K602, high pressure core injection (HPCI)
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j power supply: PM No. TG 4002 requires recalibration
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of the unit every 18 months. The calibration interval was established based on the failure of the HPCI system at another plant.
Calibration of this unit was more than one year overdue.
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-(f) PISNo.iS150F007,reactorcoreisolationcooling-(RCIC)
turbine steam inboard containment isolation valve:
PM No.'MM'8844 is as. stated in example (a). Testing of the feeder position, an.EQ commitment, had never been
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performed.
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(g) PIS No. N30N060A, turbine. vibration m'onitor: PM No. TG4003
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required a' loop calibration every 18 months.
Failure of V
this non-safety related component resulted in a turbine trip and a subsequent reactor scram on July 20, 1987 t
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This PM had never been performed.
It could.not be-I determined what effect, if any, the failure to perform the PM item had on'the monitor failure..
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(h) PIS No. P44R401A, emergency core cooling water-(ECCW)
l makeup tank level indicator:
PM No. TG4000 requires
calibration every 18 months.
This PM had never been performed.
(i) PIS No. P44R406A, ECCW make up tank pressure. indicator':
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PM No. TG4000 requires calibration eve'y 18 months.-
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(j) PIS No. P4400F602A, ECCW essential equipment return
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isolation valve: PM No. MM 8844 is stated as in i
example (a). ' Testing of the feeder position, an j
EQ commitment, had not been performed since
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April 16, 1984.
1 (k) PIS No. P4400FG14, ECCW supply to drywell penetration i
cooler isolation valve: PM No. MM 8844 is stated-as
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in example (a). Testing of the feeder position..an EQ commitment, had not been performed since November 21, 1984.
(1) PIS No. R33005001C, diese1 generator MCC: ~PM No'. MM1040
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required cleaning.and inspection of the unit once per year.
The PM never was performed'and should have been performed twice since the plant was licensed.
Fermi 2 Technical Specification (TS), Section 6.8.1, requires that procedures for PM which can affect the performance of safety-related equipment be established, implemented, and maintained. Additionally, Fermi 2 Technical Specification, Section 6.8.4, requires that programs, including PM, be established, implemented, and maintained to. reduce leakage from those portions of' systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident.~-
The systems include the HPCI, CS,' RHR, RCIC systems' and several ~
other systems. As described above, a significant number of PM.
items were either never performed or past due.
Fa11ure to.
perform PM items is a violation of Fermi.2 Technical Specification Sections 6.8.1 and 6.8.4 (341/87028-01).
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(2)
During the review of several delinquent PM items, 'the inspectors noted that some of the PM items were established to meet environmental qualification-(EQ) requirements for the component.
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Some examples of those delinquent PM items were shown above in examples (a), (b), (c), (f), (j),-and (k). Review of the effects those delinquent PM items had on EQ is' unresolved and will be reviewed in a future inspection.(341/87028-02).
(3) The overall maintenanc'e work request backlog-(work that had a
been scheduled) included approximately.2450 open work requests.
j About 480 of those work requests had. work completed and. equipment i
declared operable, but had not been final' reviewed by maintenance, engineering, QA, and other groups. Twenty-one of the. items were still open over one year beyond the date that work was completed.
Licensee Operational.QA staff reviewed those: items for significance and determined that there was no impact'on safety.
Additionally, the maintenance superintendent was directly.
involved with expediting the closure of the items. - About 430-of the open work requests were non-field complete CM work requests. This number appeared to be slightly high, but not excessive. The remaining 545 work requests were non-field complete PM items that represented a backlog of about two months work but the PM backlog appeared to be increasing,by approximately 70 items per month-due to the inability of:the maintenance staff to complete all scheduled items.-
The inspectors do not have concerns at this time with the.CM..
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work request backlog nor with the work request backlog that,had the work completed, but not the review; however, the inspectors
have major concerns with the PM backlog, which is noted in the I
above violation.
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The inspectors reviewed the methods'used to establish'and update
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the overall scope of the PM system in relation to vendor manual'
i changes, generic industry issues, and adequacy of the initial j
scope.
The licensee indicated that there were no methods in
place for the review and updating of PM coverage.
Fer.ni 2 TS Section 6.8.1 requires the periodic exercising of.normally idle equipment that must' operate when required. The inspectors were
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unable to determine that the TS requireme't had been implemented.-
Consequently, the adequacy of the overall scope of the PM ' program is unresolved and will be reviewed in a future inspection (341/87028-03).
(5) The inspectors reviewed 14' completed PM and CM work requests.
I CM Work Request (WR) No. 648693, for EDG 13 fuel oil day tank l
' level indicators, was not identified.as safety-related or TS related. Work instructions were prepared and reviewed, work was performed, and the work request closed out as if the components were non safety-related, non TS related, and without adequate controls,' inspections, or reviews. After discussions with the licensee, the licensee evaluated'the situation and determined that the component was a TS requirement (Section 3/4.8.1) and safety-related.
Procedure P0M 12.000.015,
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" Work Request," Revision 26, required that if a component was j
safety-related the work request be identified as safety-related,
and that if the component was.TS related the. work request be j
identified-as such and the.TS paragraph number be entered.-
The inspectors were concerned beyond just the fact that the licensee failed to follow the procedure; the inspectors were
concerned that the licensee failed to recognize the components as safety-related and TS related, thus the licensee. failed to provide the required controls consistent with safety-related
and TS related components.
l Failure to identify the EDG 13 fuel oil day tank level-indicators as safety-related'and TS related on WR No. 648693,
which resulted.in work instructions being prepared.. work' being -
performed, and closed out as if the components were non j
safety-related and non TS related,'and failure to provide i
adequate controls consistent with the components importance-
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with safety is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion Il
(341/87028-04),
j (6) The inspectors noted that' scope changes to CM WR No. 639499 for repairs to the condensate water storage-system appeared to have been inadequately reviewed'by QC.. The licensee determined that this work package was safety-related after completion of 14
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initial steps; however, there was no objective evidence that'QC reviewed the completed work as a result of the status changes.
Also, there was no objective evidence that work steps added
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to the work request during performance of the work had been reviewed by QC prior to work performance.
It could not be easily determined by the inspector which items were work instructions and which were descriptions of work performed.
Several steps were not signed by the worker indicating work
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completion. Licensee personnel indicated that proof of step completion was provided by other documentation within the package; however, those documents did not readily indicate s o.- Work instructions also appeared to be confusing and i
incomplete. General adequacy of work instructions and documentation of work performed is unresolved and will be reviewed during a future-inspection (341/87028-05).
(7) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's trending of maintenance items.
Periodic summary reports of trends were provided to management but did not address repetitive failures nor requests for corrective action. This item-is unresolved and will be reviewed during a future inspection (341/87028-06).
(8) The inspectors reviewed the Engineering' Design Package (EDP)/
l Production Design Change (PDC) backlog and determined that:
approximately 400 PDCs had not been reviewed and dispositioned; 480 EDPs with approved dispositions were in the process-of being developed into design packages, 97 design' packages were awaiting
. work scheduling; and 131 design packages; were in. progress of being worked. The licensee stated that the approved EDPv,
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s 708 in total, were being ' reviewed weekly to establish. priorities.
The inspectors do not have any concerns in this area.
1 (9) During.the review of maintenance, a list.of calibration procedures was obtained from the calibration shop supervisor.
The inspector noted that several' procedures for. calibration of individual pieces of equipment had not been periodically. reviewed as required by the licensee's procedures.
It also appeared
that several procedures drafted in 1984, 1985, and 1986 had
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not been approved. Test equipment calibrated utilizing these-
unapproved procedures should be reviewed by the licensee
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for acceptability. This item is unresolved pending.further i
review during a subsequent ~ inspection (341/87028-07),
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(10) The inspector reviewed material control and spare parts control-
practices, particularly related to concerns identified during the NRC Maintenance Survey, about the potential for declaring
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equipment operable with parts that had not been approved by l
engineering. The inspector determined that there were controls I
which included several independent measures to assure the parts received engineering review prior to use. The inspector did not have any further concerns in this area.
i (11) The inspector reviewed the two computerized spare parts systems i
used at Fermi including Spare Parts Reference System.(SPRS) and j
Materials Management Systems-(MMS). A concern of the NRC j
Maintenance Survey team m s that the SPRS did not reflect the correct quantity sf spare parts in stock. The inspector verified that SPqS did not always reflect the correct quantity of spare puts in stock; however, the MMS did reflect the cormt quantity for the parts the inspector selected-to check.
The inspector determined that the failure of SPRS to correctly reflect the quantity of spare parts in stock did not pose a
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significant safety issue; only that a delay could result in obtaining a part.
The inspector did not have any further concerns in this area at this time.
Overall, the inspectors concluded that the state of maintenance activities
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was weak and needed significant improvement. The inspectors were extremely concerned that the licensee failed to perform a large number of PM items and concurrently failed to evaluate the effect and safety significance the delinquent PM items had on the reliability and operability of components, systems, and the overall plant. Additionally,- the inspectors were concerned that the licensee had difficulty in determining the safety-related status of items.
The inspectors concluded that licensee management involvement and control
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to assure quality in the area of maintenance needs to significantly improve especially in the areas of completing past due PM items and evaluating the impact on overall operability of the plant from delinquent PM' items.
The inspectors concluded that if additional licensee management attention had been placed on previously identified NRC concerns back in 1985 (Items No. 341/85026-02 and No. 341/85026-03) it would have prevented the PM program problem.
It should be noted, as described in Section 4, that'
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t licensee QA audits in the area'~of PM were not effective in identifying
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those problems identified by the NRC inspectors.
Two violations and five unresolved items were identified.
4.
QA Program l
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The purpose of this portion of the. inspection was to review the licensee's l
. Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit Program for implementation and effectiveness.
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in.the. identification, solution, and prevention of conditions adverse to quality. This-inspection was made.to evaluate. licensee management involvement and_ control-in assuring quality.and to detennine the effectiveness'of staffing, training, and qualifications of QA personnel..
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Reference Documents
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(1) Nuclear Quality Assurance A'udits:
A-QS-P/TS-86-22 Maintenance Program A-QS-P/TS-86-25 Surveillance Testing A-QS-P-86-26 Maintenance and Modifications QA A-QS-P/TS-86-35-Corrective Action
A-QS-P-86-37 Plant Maintenance
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l A-QS-P/TS-87-02 Corrective Action i
A-QS-P/TS-87-03 Nuclear Training j
i A-QS-P-87-12 Receipt Inspection, Material Control,
.1 and Warehousing
A-QS-P/TS-87-15 Technical Specification Testing Program-
.i A-QS-P/TS-87-16 Corrective Maintenance (2) Nuclear Quality Assurance Procedure 1801, " Audits,"
Revision 7.
(3) Quality Assurance Program Requirement 18, " Audits,"
Revisions 4 and 5.
b.
Inspection Results
(1) The inspectors reviewed those audits listed.above. The audits appeared to be more concerned with process and procedure than technical aspects of the activities.
For example:
(a) The auditors who conducted the plant maintenance' audit, A-QS-P-86-37, did not review the large PM backlog, nor identify that several thousand PM. tasks had not been performed. The portion of the audit on PM appeared to just verify that the work process was
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followed in a proper manner;- (b) The auditors who conducted the receipt inspection, material control and warehousing audit, A-QS-P-87-12, did not address a main purpose of the audit.-
Effectively, the audit only determi.ned that protection areas
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existed. The more significant question of material being stored in the proper protection area was included on the audit checklist, but was not answered.
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I Additionally, almost all: audits that the inspectors reviewed had significant portions of preapproved checklists incomplete.
Examples of this practice were identified in Audits A-QS-P/TS-85-46,
A-QS-P/TS-86-22, A-QS-P/TS-86-31, and A-QS-P-87-12.
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justification was provided for' not' completing those portions of
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the checklists; and there was no objective evidence that the checklists were reviewed.
The inspectors noted'that Procedure
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NQAP 1801 required justification for checklist items that were not completed and that the audit' team leader review the checklists.
Those audits lead the inspectors to question whether the l
QA audit program provided the kind of detailed. technical i
assessments that were most useful to management in assuring j
that safety significant deficiencies were identified.
Failure of the auditors and audits to identify the PM' problem and to complete the checklists, including the checklist item
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on material storage protection level, resulted in failure to verify compliance with all aspects of the QA Program, failure j
to be able to adequately determine the effectiveness of the QA Program in.those areas, and failure to identify a significant condition adverse to quality; therefore, this is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,' Criterion XVIII (341/87028-08).
(2) As noted above, audit checklist items were-incomplete with
'l no justification and there was no objective evidence that the audit team leader had reviewed the checklists, which were in conflict with the requirements of NQAP 1801.
Additionally, Procedure NQAP 1801 defined " finding".as a-nonconformance or Quality Assurance Program deficiency, and defined " conditions adverse to quality" as any nonconformance with prescribed requirements, including procedural violations or inadequacies.
The inspectors noted that in several instances, problems were identified as observations instead of as findings',
that the problem needed to be corrected (an observation did not require corrective action or followup), and that no justification or reasoning was provided as to why the problem was not identified as a finding (a finding required corrective action and followup).
It appeared to the inspectors that either auditors and audit
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team leaders were not aware of the requirements in Procedure
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NQAP 1801, or that the ' requirements were overlooked.
(3) The inspectors reviewed a listing of previo'usly performed audits and identified some audits that were not performed within the-period required by TS Section 6.5.2.8.
Audits of operations and fire protection (required at least one every 12 months),
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and corrective action bequired at least once every six months),
were not always performed within the required period _ After discussion with licensee'QA personnel about this subject,'it was noted that 14 of 94 audits conducted since January:1985
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were not performed within the required time period.
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Failure to perform audits as required by TS Section 6.5.2.8 is a violation (341/87028-09A).
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(4)
.A contributing cause of.the' violation in (3) was j
Procedure QAPR.18.
The. inspectors reviewed Procedure QAPR 18, " Audits," Revision 4,-wherein; Step 6.6.1 stated:
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The audits to be performed and their frequency i
are identified in the Technical Specifications '
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Section 6.5.2.8, or in other licensing commitments.
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The period of an audit may be exceeded by +25%,
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but subsequent audits shall restore the audit to its normal period.
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TS Section 6.5.2.8 does not allow the.specified audit periods i
to be' exceeded by +25%; however, Procedure QAPR 18.did.. After discussions with licensee QA personnel, QAPR 18 was revised to l
delete the +25% extension. Since the procedure was: revised and is now in compliance, the violation was considered to be closed (341/87028-09B).
l (5) The inspectors reviewed qualification files for several audit team leaders who appeared to be adequately qualified and j
certified per ANSI N45.2.23, " Qualification of QA Program Audit
Personnel for. Nuclear Power Plants," and Detroit Edison' Company
'j Nuclear Quality Assurance Procedure 0203, " Qualification and l
Certification of Audit Personnel," Revision 2.
Training to j
certify as audit team leaders appeared to be adequate; however, i
there was no objective evidence that any training or guidance
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was provided for the preparation, completion, and review of audit checklists.
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The inspectors were concerned that the Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit Program did not provide the necessary confidence to ensure the quality at Enrico Fermi 2.
The inspectors concluded that licensee management involvement and control in verifying quality should improve; audits were not always timely or
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complete and procedures were occasionally violated. The number of auditors appeared to be adequate based on inspector experience.
The training and qualification appeared to be adequate to meet requirements of. applicable
codes, standards, and commitments; however, the training appeared to.be j
weak in the areas of preparation, completion, and review of audi_t I
checklists, and lacking in performance of technically oriented audits.
l Two violations were identified.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations.
Unresolved items disclosed'during this inspection are included in Paragraphs 3.b.(2), 3.b.(4), 3.b.(6), 3.b.(7), and 3.b.(9).
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Exit Interview.
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The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on August 7, 1987, at the Fermi 2 plant and by telephone on August 13, 1987, and summarized the purpose, scope and findings of the inspection.
The inspectors discussed the-likely informational content of.the inspection
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report with' regard to documents or processes reviewed'oy the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify-any such documents
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or processes as proprietary.
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