IR 05000341/1990011

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Insp Rept 50-341/90-11 on 900625-0824,No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previous Insp Findings, Operational Safety,Maint,Surveillance,Followup of Events, LER Followup,Medical Drill Observation & Regional Requests
ML20059H245
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/07/1990
From: Defayette R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
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ML20059H244 List:
References
50-341-90-11, NUDOCS 9009170066
Download: ML20059H245 (24)


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, U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0fMISSION REGION III [ Report No.'50-341/90011(0RP) C y !

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Docket No. 50-341 OperatingbcenseNo.NPF-43 ! t

Licensee: Detroit Edison Company l K 2000 Second Avenue i

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l Detroit, MI 48226  ; i Facility Name: Fermi 2 j Inspection At: Fermi Site, Newport, MI

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Inspection Conducted: June 25 through August 24, 1990.' -

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Inspectors: W. G. Rogers S. Stasek M. Depas I B. Drouin  : O , ' Approved By:

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R.-W."DeFayette, C ef - i7(f . Reactor Projects Section 2B Date  !

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Inspection Summary  ! Inspection on June 25 to August 24, 1990 (Report No. 50-341/90011(DRP)) Areas Inspected: Action on previous inspection findings, operational safety, maintenance, surveillance, followup of events,'LER followup, medical drill - observation, zebra mussels, and regional request Results: Improvements were noted in the licensee's ability to execute forced outages however, weaknesses were still evident in the planning / scheduling of routine and system outage maintenance. Operator response to off-normal events was good with program Smplementation weaknesses only evident during routine ; evolutions such as equipment tagging and plant tours. Actions to deal with zebra mussels appear satisfactory. Improvements have been made in the ability of the licensee to stage and evaluate medical drill. performance but actual drill participant performance has deficiencies. One unresolved item was I identified (Paragraph 3.b) and 4 open items were identifie (Paragraphs 3.a, 4.e, 7.b(2) and 8).

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iDETAILS'

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e , Persons' Contacted , f

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    ' a .'  Detroit Edison Companyt,   ' -
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 'r,     !P. Anthon'y.sLicensing      <

      / 5. D '.ola, Vice President, Huclear'.LEngineering and Services
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      * G. transton,' General- Director Nuclear Engineering * -             .
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j , d * P. Fessler,, Superintendent; Technical, Engineering F -

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s * D;.Gipson, Assistant-Vice President, Nuclear' Production

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      * ' L. Goodman,. Director, of < Licensing s      * M.-Hall, Shift Supervisor-    .
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     '* A. Kowalczuk, Superintendent,, Maintenance;7              ,
    ,   R. May,' Director,. Nuclear Materials Management .             ;

7~ ' s y * R. McKeon, Plant: Manager

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1, * WL Miller, Quality Assurarice Manager i

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      * J.'Mulveh111,. Supervisor Radiological Emergency Preparedness           <

G. Ohlemacher, Principal Engineer, Licensing . *

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      * W. Orser,' Senior Vice. President
      , Pendergast, Compliance Engineer:
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   ;   * P. Piggott, Emergency Preparedness'     , ,    s
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      * J. Plona, Operations Engineer      M '
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      * G. Reece, Operations' Training'Supervisori         s   ,
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      * T. Riley, Compliance'Scperviso *    >
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      * R. Stafford,' Nuclear Assurance Director      y'bf.' V    1!
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      ,F. Svetkovich; Operations Support Er.gineer
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oWT Tucker, Assistant to the Vice President-

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1 o ' ' ' l *cA.,Waite, Nurse t . 1 .

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y' ' f, '* Ji,V.1ker, GeneraltSupervisor,< Plant Engineering '

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     ; * D. Wells, Plant Safety "           .c
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y '. ' ; ' ' 1 * W; Rogers; Senior' Resident Inspector > -

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    4  *. S. Stasek, Resident Inspector    ' '
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      " M. Dapas, Reactor' Inspector, Headquarters!            .

f L' B. Drouin,' Project Inspector b ' _-

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 ,   * Denotes those attending the exit meeting on August'24, 1990.'           . >
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e y i I ' ~ The. inspectors also interviewed others of,the licensee's staff during this inspectio ~ ! , ,

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  , ActiononPreviousInspectionFindingd(92701)           '   '
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 ' '(0 pen) Open Item (341/8803? l7(DRP))': . 8ack of availsbility of .

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required spare parts.- This open iter. involved three areas which '

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reduced the reliability and_ availfoility of[ systems during ,. c'  ; maintenance due to the lack of spare parts.+'The first area dealt- , 1 withworkpackages(WR)sent(into-thefieldafterverificationoff 1  : '

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4-spare parts availability through the spare parts reference system

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     (SPRS) even though the mater _ial;had not been-accepted by'QC and was,

,~, in QC hold e The second area' dealt with the lack of planning of material requirements resulting in delays of corrective maintenance and preventative maintenance tasks being accomplished within-their' respective, frequencies. The third'arca dealt with the lack of a

   *  s working program,to identify 'and replace equipment for which' spare L      parts were not commercially available.:     ' ' '
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In response to these observations the' licensee initiated DER 89-22 >

,_     The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions, under that DER, and         o
 ;    determined that the,first concern had been resolved by warehouse i         .,s L6  ,
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f personnel identifying safety-related items as_ acceptable for use

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l ' r ""only af ter QC acceptanc ,

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lThe. second area: of parts pisnnibg was partially-addressed in-

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memorandum MM-MG-89-0076 of March,23,c198 In that memorandum,, it p,rovided for'8 correctf K actions, at follows: - ,

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a . . o (1) Thereviewofsystems(for'criticalcomponentstobe'tockedfor' s ,

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l operability, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCOs) ,

3 and operational functions. Thiswastobecompletedbythel,_

t technical group system engineers by the fall of 199 . f% y

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    /   Subsequently, this action was designated to begin on Januarp 1,
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f 1990 in step 5.3.1'of FIP-PM1-05, " Spare Parts Planning." ' ' : s > ; y,k

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       . (2) Prepare a listeidentified by vendors under which a purchased ;/  '
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f technical review for parts would be performed including part i i j, , 4 >

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identification, quality levels, QC requirements, . . 3 NRC requirements,_ obsolete parts resolution,; testing /i requirements and stockingilevel/ lead times.~ This was tospecting" bes t .y ,[ .,, %

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     (3)' The 4eview of each preventative maintenance event to identify? -

J+t '5 s* parts required to perform the event'.L This was to be complet _ s . by. January 31, 199 . 3 . V.t J > i

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        [NP-MA-90-0035 ' dated February 19 b90
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l maintenance documented completion of.the review for mechanical, ,y

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O' (4) To revie'w'the surveillance procedures for known parts problems ,

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and identify those paits to be accomplished by the technical- '

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_ group; by ' January '31,.- 199 Subsequently, th_is action was desigrdted for technical! group to .

   ;'   begin on ~ January 1,1990 in step 5.3.2 of- FIP-PM1-05, " Spare *

Parts Pl.anning." However,.the_ instrument control (I&C) maintenana department (is:to perform theI&C 44 series review .

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     (5) To compare parts requirements to' stocking' levels and realign as         ]

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    (6) Review a.. change to the design approval process'to allow-for-
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o s i s ' E .-upfront complete. reviews-of material equivalent exchanges by

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i "(7) To conduct spare. parts; problem.resolutionsiin a more ' W 4' expeditious and comprehensive manner by reviewing all'

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   ,-   corrective maintenance parts necessary for' material management!y' '

expedition and determine proper stocking l levels' to prevent- '. f

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     ,stockout recurrences.' This,was to be an ongoing activity  a 2-
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beginning in May1of 198 * c

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                  >c i    '(8), aTo establish'a hbt link'for maintenance      kert and foremen to;     'I
  . communicate-directly with~ materials management from the management / technical group to identify.a perceived parts proble This was to-be' initiated by May 1, 1989.^ -         .. ;
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    , In addition, parts planning was; required priorL to' scheduling non-E        ~'
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and priority I work requests, andispare' parts planning procedure FIP - PM1-05, " Spare Parts Planning," was issued 11n July 198 ,

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An obsolete equipment task Lforce,was ~establ.ished to address the

    ' third area but the inspector did'not' review'any1information of the 'E         ,

task force's current 4 status.' V , ji;;' i .

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xn The last two. areas of concern will continue to be' reviewed in future

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        < . . ., L (Closed) Open Item (341/86026-02(DRP)):; As-buiitswalkhown of plant against the safety related fuse' specifications.- During Refuelin ~

Outage 01 the licensee completed the' fuse walkdowns. and submittedi the completed work requests to.the-inspector for reviei The. 3 m . inspector reviewed the documentation and noted:D '

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l l . . . ; .. p l (1) That revision F of Specification EJ, Class IE and IE-BOPi 4 - l' Isolation Fuse List,,had been used'in!the walkdowns instead of ! the current revision ~ ~ The licensee compared the~ differences and deter' mined that all-l discrepancies were identified in..the'walkdowns.'

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    -(2) 'There were 10 other Items noted -inf the-initial review hat were,        ,

promptly resolved by the licensee-

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p .. - (0 pen) Violation (341/90005-06(DRP));' NIAS; valve out of' position.L

During:the inspection period the~1icensee completed investigations.

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    , into all the potential mispositioning; events. 'The. licensee

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    * concluded that no intentional; tampering occurred; The' inspector l

o * concurred with this conclusion. . However,v the

    >;possible' weaknesses in_non licensed operator performance. That4 i

reporteidentified s y N *i . Q .' i 7,

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j' . a report, coupled with inspector, observationsi :(see paragraph 3.f.) > j4' -

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Eled the inspector to conclude that the out of position valves were a 4 f e isymptomofthis'broaderproblem., To addre'ss'the broader-problem, the ; v > . mb y

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C i :]j j% fjh'hlMenseeissuedanon-lica edoheratoreva10ation' plan,dted

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f s , _~ V Aug'ust 7,199 This additional corrective action appears sufficient! - Nl v Te  : _1

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' 'to address the notice of violation. Closure of the violation is, - .s R Ni f; 6 , , , a : contingent upon licenseelimplementation of the'nor.-licensed operator 4 p;- />y evaluation plan resulting,in improved performance if the iq o

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non-licensed operators; a e*

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  ' (0 pen) Open Item (341/89008-10(DRP)):. Evaluation of Barton pressure      '(

dJ- switch performance. After the HPCI switch failure in 1989 ('~ l'li and the poor _ calibration history of the Barton pressure switches 1

the licensee
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   - (1) Increasedthefrequencyfof~calibrationchecks.onE41N006to       ;

every six months.- " '

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conducted every 12' months. ? f3 2, . The inspector met with the I&C' supervisor to determine the [ recort Barton' calibration history. Thre are 31 control: loop >

   ' Sixteen have; been completed'with thirteen failing the ' calibration -      l check Also,'E41N006 continued to fail the 6 month calibration    ,
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   , checks. The I&C supervisor stated that by the'end of.0ctober an e      o evaluation as to whether these'are the appropriate        !

instruments / instrument tolerances for.their-application would , _! be completed. The inspector will pursuetthe corrective actions . taken on the repetitive calibration failu'res under_the preventative ( maintenance post job review.in the next' inspection perio .> (0 pen) Open Item (341/89018-01(DRP)): Drawing control improvement

   - initiatives. On July 18,<1990 the' licensee provided the inspector:      ;
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with a demonstration of the: licensee. automated drawing syste The licensee indicated that this system should be instrumental in

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improving as-bui.it drawing. turn around. " .,

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m .. . 1 (Closed) Violation'(341/88012-02(DRP)): Drywell high pressure  : instrument rack valve found partially closed. The licensee in response to the violation, committed'in a letter. dated "

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August 24, 1988, to develop more specific instrument lineup. sheets' ,

. prior to unit restart from the_ first refueling outage. - These: lineup'      3 sheets were to be used to. perform instrument' lineups prior to_.any
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startup from outages over 30 days long. The inspector reviewed A procedure NPP-46.000.016,'"I&C' Instrument Valve Lineup," and -

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t' verified the lineup sheets'had been completed (including -

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incorporation of second verification requirements). . In addition,; f n ,

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   ' system operating procedure' NPP-23.137, " Nuclear Boiler System,"' was i g     s' .;

4, revised to includeLthe' specific four valves associated with Drywe11 N : 9 -

/ / l ,/ , j ( 'a t h,igh   pressure instrumentation, and training was-provided toi    1,4$;'?  i 4A f      ~

f,i j , maintenance personnel 1on. management expectations of' equipment ~ __ . Fi ,

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12~ , return-to-service' activities. The inspector has no-further concerns A .a, l1 6 At > '~on this matter and this violation is, therefore, considered closed. m ? ^

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fy[i, 4, (Closed) Violation (341/87026-02(DRP)):- Failwe; to follow

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administrative procedures. To prevent recurrence, the licensee ha taken the following corrective actions; ,

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t (1) The individuals involved in each of the subject events were counselled on their error . a (2) I&C shop policy No. 87-011 was" issued specifying-f. , requirements for independent' verification and all I&C personnel

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j (3) Deviation' Event Report (DER) 87-0249 was initiated to document and ensure correction of the wiring diagram s" y' N

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e [ discrepancies and As-Built Notice (ABN) 7423-1 was issued tog a " (

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J document correction of the vendor manual associated with thet J _

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    .i The,inspectorreviewedtheassociateddocumentationandverifiedIh 'c .' 1 "above actions had been complete No'further questions bemain on   , , . ,

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7 ,this matter and this. violation' therefore,_is closed,.

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I h".1 (0 pen) Unresolved item (341/88035-01(DRP)):, Oeficiencies'. identifiedi(*U,*i

    ; with temporary modifications (TM)F :The inspector reviewed .-    '; l' r s
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administrative procedure FJP-0PI-02, " Temporary Modifications" . 6

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The following temporary modificationsiwere then reviewed to verify 'r .'j

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proper implementation under FIp-0P1-02. . - 1 , TM 86-0185 Data. Inputs.to GETAR i 4 1 l '1

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    . TM 90-0002 Temporary Caustic' Suction Lin i '
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y . TM 90-0006 Mechanical Block:on Valve N2100F00 *

    . TM 90-0007 Replace Manual Valve N2100F096.With Plu . TM-90-0014 Support For SN FW Heater Vent Line.=
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    . TM 90-0015 Install Guide on East MSR Drain Lin .,

i All TMs reviewed appeared to"be properly implem' e nted'wIth al F , required approvals included, tags: properly hung, and associated documents such as procedures revised and critical: drawings redlined '

, . as needed. This item will continue to remain open per. ding completion of licensee actions relative to the TM reduction program as committed to in Deco letter dated May 29, 1990. In addition, use-of temporary modifications will continue to be closely evaluated as
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part of the routine inspectioniprogra s , o e e . 3; ,

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c (0 pen) Violation (341/89025-01(0RP)): Equipment r turn-to; service-performed without all requirements.of the LCO verified complete.. In .

. , y    response,.the licerssee prepared a. critique ^cf the event which-was issued to Operations, Maintenance,/andl Technical Engineering.,

personnel astrequired readingt The reading was specifically to' m reemphasize the importance of complying'with administrative ,

    ; procedures.11n addition, further operator training is currently being implemented on how to' process LCOs in accordance'with   *
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administrative procedure NPP-0P1-11, " System and Equipment Status."r This item will remain open pendingfinspecto ~" evaluation of the  ; effectiveness of that trainin ;  ;

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j.3 -(0 pen) Violation'(341/88012-08(DRP)): ' Inadequate control'of control-

     ' room administrative processes. In responsef the operations
. department instituted a system of' periodic audits to verify proper implementation of administrative requirements.3: These audits      .
    , included reviews of temporary modifications,' tagging, CRIS, LCO      '
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sheets, operator-aids, slogs, keys, completed rounds and routines, , annunciators, etc. Currently,'new training on implementation of the .

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control room. administrative controls is being conducted. The first , i area being presented to the operators deals with the processing o :

< ', , , LCOs. : This item will continue to remain open pending inspector     ,  ,
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f* evaluation of the effectiveness;of.the'new training;

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    , (Close'd)' Violation (341/88006-02(DRP)):' Failure of I&C
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 ' 7 s  4 . properly adhere to administrative procedure 12.000.080;   p' Conduct 'of C ,ers D 4 x .4     Electrical Field Activities," in that an interim alteration-     i.*'

i f" # # r checklist was not.used~as required.11n response, thellicensee'

             '
             ,
             '
               %g U O  i   counselled the. individuals; involved concerning independent b,.     *

g2 wi verification (IV) requirements and included a training module on:IV4 t:1

    '
-
  .

g 4, 1

    ",s into the continuing training progra O H ' *,ifp[         Use of the LinterimLalterationw 4'c s
             .. !+I
,
 ;

i W

    ..
     ' checklist "was
    # 'NPP-mal-03,  Interim subsequent  1y' relocated to Tht; Alteration of Electrical'Circuitryt"-

inspector reviewed the associate'd training material as well asE T ,-?,i administ'rative f

 ',lj*,
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.
-

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   %(* NPP-mal-03, and has no further concerns on' this matter. " Thi'slitenth close '

n, /. he f-m b6g .

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 .V; ,(Open) Open Item (341/89008-15(ORP)):: ReactorWaterCleanup-(RWCUP
             %p, t'

enhancements. 'In inspection report' 341/90005, an updateLof two ,of' l four potential. design changes to RWCU wassprovided. The other two, '

 ,;9    EDP-9659 and PDC-7289,'are provided below.-    -

,
             ] ]_ ml i '
              '
 (   " (1) EDP-9659,' Installation of a minimum' flow bdass iline around      !

t suction valve G33F119, was cancelled on1 August 315,-1990 af ter '

     ' an engineering evaluation of changes)inlthe operatiE.al=      3
     '

practices used to place RWCU-in service determined that the  ! changes were successful in reducing thermal transients and

        '

unplanned RWCU isolation , , ->

     (2) PDC-7289, Replacement of Riley Tempe'ratSre Mon'itors  t with HUMAC .~   ;

l 1eak'detectionF was cancelled due to"an engineering evaluation of RWCU temperature monitoring system performance after . ' implementing GE recommended circuit changes.(SILL 443) to the ,

               ,
         '

present system under, PDC-646 i l y .

          .. . #    '

L' , Therefore,the.onlydesignMangepre.sently scheduled fo , f l

   '
     ~implementationLis EDP-4885., This ~open item willL close with 'iu - ~
           '

implementation during Refueling Outage 0 '

          ,
           ,
               ;

E (Closed)'Open Item-(341/90003-04(DRSS)):. Medical dri11' problem .

               !

E - - The specif" weaknesses c.oted in the medical dril.1 from FERMEX 90-S > were cddressed but,-other weaknesses were notedlL A more complete , discussion in this matter is' provided in paragraph I'. *

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Operational Safety Verification l(71707)7 -

             ,
        >    .
            ~

The ihspect' ors observed control room operationf reviewed applicable logs : and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period from June 25 through August 24. . The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout, records and verified * ' . ' proper return to service of affected components.'. Tours of the reactor building and. turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment: conditions, including potential, fire' hazards,' fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to' verify that' maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc >

                <
                '
   ,
        ,
            .

The inspectors, by observation'and direct interview, verified that the a

   - physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla *
                ,
 ,

The. inspectors observed plantThousekeeping/ cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation' protection controls. 'During the m inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the

   .following systems,to verify operability by comparing system lineups with-
'

plant drawings, as-built configuration or present valve lineup lists; '

 ,

observing equipment conditions that could_ degrade performance; and

 <

verified that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning, and calibrate .

       . ,  c
         ,
.
   . Standby Gas Treatment System - Divisions I and II
   . Emergency Diesel Generator No. 12-       ,
   .

High Pressure Coolant Injection System' 4

   .. Control Air Compressors - Divisions'I and II     ,   ,
    , Reactor Recirculation System Motor-Generator Set B -
            ,
   ,
   .
   ,
    ' Primary Containment, Atmosphere Radiation Monitoring System
 ?,   TheTinspectors also. wit'nessed portions of the radioactive waste system         k
 ' '

controls associated-with radwaste shipments and. barrelin n

              <1   i t - ,
              .   ,
   ,These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility? N,        O
  . >' operations wererin conformance with the requirements . established unde'r       t*

technical specifications,-10 CFR;' and administrative procedure ;

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   .The followingtobservations were'made during the inspection period: s        >  '
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           , 3 ,. z,
               '
                ,+
   - During' routine to scofthere$ctorbuilding.the'inspectcrsnoted       <
, ,    the' inability to pass through the second floor' airlock on a1 number,'
    *4 of-occasjons!1Also, the airlock interlock ma) functioned in the pos;t       Jr> #
                <
'

t3 ' inspector pursued whatr7 '

   :. ' ' actions scramwere timebeing;taken periodJonto Apr,il-14L199 :The: liability of the airlock.1 .
'

improve theire The.cogn,izant system engineer indicated that the whole

   '

3' , s

 .   , interlock / door framejassembly is under consideration for;
            .

f' o 'R' <

   , replacement. Licensee actions to improve door reliability is a y[ *
                ,
   , f openjitet (341/90011-01(DRP)).. c f "      - -  -    '
                 ,

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         -
           '
            ,
  , b? ,0n August 1, 1990,lthe inspector reviewed red tag record (RTR) -         #
   ' ?90-0803;and' equipment tag record (ETR)
   '      t E90-0804 implemented'in     }.

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support ofc a HPCI? system outage and noted .the> following: + -

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    (1) Containment valve E41-F600, was appropriately repositioned      .

closed to support the outage b'ut neither RTR nor ETR specifiedl the valve be closed, (The RTR had, originally; included E41-F600 g , but the valve was later deleted from the RTR.) - ,

    .
      . .     .

l- 1(2) The Mylar.. drawing used to spect fy the mechanical

  -

1 tagging boundary was not in conformance with the ETR in that' the Mylar designated E41 F141 as a boundary valve but the ETR

 <
     ,specified the upstream valve E41-F028 as the boundar (3) Section 14 of the ETR form was marked as N/A indicating'thatino Mylar drawing was " marked up" to: support the ETR. Howeve Mylar drawing 6M721-5708-1 had been ". marked up to reflect the  ~
     . tagging boundary.'    4  s
                ,
  "  (4) Valve E41-F028 was' included in the ETR and was closed to conservatively act as a' secondary containment boundary 1      during the HPCI maintenance activities, However, operating personnel indicated.that E41-F028.was also closed for
            -

L, ,  ! h i protection relating to the maintenance to be done on the HPCI~ drain pot level switch. Therefore, E41-F028 should have been ' included in the RTR as wel *

             >
 '
    (5) The'ETR specified removal of. fuses:F7 and F8-from panel
             '

H11-P617. This would cause closure of E41-F028'which is a normally open valve.(when.HPCI is'in standby). . No separate) line item was included to physical.1y close;the, valve first nor ,

     . to verify'its position before removing' power to the valv ,
        ,
        >
         .c ,
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When brought'to the attention.of plant' management, a review was' s <

. > initiated by the operations..' department and a' critique prepare rs This matter is considered an unresolved item (341/90011-02(DRP)) V+
  /  pending completion of inspector. review ofslicensee followup acti,ons.*      <
               ,

E R- ' * On August 4,1990, the licensse reciuced ' power and ' entered into b' #

                ~ ' '

single loop operation by manually shutting down the B reactor

             '

t V'4, i recirculation (RR) pump. This action was required to allow repairs

              .
              -

N

                ;.

_

   '

to the associated RR motor generator set tachometer? The inspector . , , , .

   , C reviewed licensee preparations for the evolution as well as. observed       ;

plantactivitiesthroughoutthetimetheunitwasoperating(in:

         ~
   '

4 < .e e' . single loop. All activities. evaluated' appeared acceptabl .

             . ,  ,

i

    . Supplemental. training of?theLoperators4was apparent, operating and;;       -
 ; '

surveillance procedures had been revised to include:the'new 5

             '
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  ,
    '

Technical _Specificationrequirementsforsingleloopoperationiand'i ap main.tenance planning was" satisfactory to< adequately , perform the MG- *

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   -  ' set work;    1   U s s"  y      ,

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4". The inspector did note that while"the unit was in single lo'op ' t operation wit _h the remai.ning loop at'near minimum flow,:the control i

                '
' <   room core flow recorder was , indicating :loEcr than. expected, a.When,       7 4     theLreactor engineer'was. questioned onsthis L he indicated that this       #
                '

1 , , m , was characteristic of the-recorder and had been identified.during

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L s, initial startup, testin Subsequent' discussions with a nuinber of' ,

   ,  licensed operators revealed,"however, that they were not aware of-       ,

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 ,

this phenomenon. 0perations a nagement committed as a result to . ' y' 1

    ., better disseminate the information to the operators via=a procedure
                 '

'7

  - -  > revision.'a nd ' inclusion of such into; ongoing training. In addition,' g   .
                %
   ,  ' Technical: Engineering istcurrently evaluating.a potential- hardware; "      -
                 :;

upgrade to alleviate the low flow inacct. racy.; The. ins'pector will , . j:

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continue to follow resolution of this matte c .

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d; During routine reviews of the Nuclear. Shift Supervisor'(NSS) Work *H

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Request log during the inspection period,ithe inspector:noted on twos J ' E U

  .
   . occasions that work requests (0050900723 and G480890822) which hart       '

h,i

   " , ipreviously been completed, were sti,1liincluded in the. log.' This, log       ;  ,
 ,.
   ,,-

conta. ins' copies' of each,WR cover. sheet currently approved for work ' ' 7 ;'e >]

 +

and is maintained as a reference for the NSS. _ Upon complett e of a i .

    'WRJthe associated WR coversheet is supposed to be'removedifromtthe'        .

l 4 11ogi" Additionally, the) computer printout also used to list those WRs' '..

. '
    : currently 4 working alsofstill listed the subject WRs in each ca u. In 1 * J (, j-       3
   '

both~ instances, when brought totthe attention of*the NSS;.the WRs'* '

                +
                ,
                 , ;
 .,   ' were removed from,  thellog and the~ computer printout update q
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       - 4 ,. . ,

3 y, q L0n August,2,1 1990, the inspector reviewed red tag record (RTR)'.>

  '
  , and' equipment' tag record (ETR) E90-0310 for a tagout of HP,CL
  '

a <

              '
                -
  ,   valve E41-F400. and iound both the. RTR and ETR satisfactor '
 -
   "

Subsequently, operations performed the tagout and entered into the 1

  ^

applicable Technical Specification LCOs11n preparation'for the  ;

,    maintenance' activity (inspection of the target. rock valve).     .

J

  ..  > However; maintenance personnel could not perform the work because       "

i the required, scaffolding had not been erected. The LCOs were ' 5, subsequently cleared'and; operations returned the_ valve to service , i

                 "

y o'Lwithout the scheduled work being performed.; <

              *
+                  ' During r'outine. plant tours. the in's'pectors noted numerous material .      ,
,
,s    condition discrepancies'in the reactor. building and the residual heat         ;
  .
                 '
*
  ~   removal complex.that shoul#5 havelbeentidentified orJrectified by3 = .

operators on-their routine tours' HThese discrepancies included smal1~ w

         .

puddles of oll:under EDGs, oil on a pump motor casing from ani> , overfilling,'no deficiency notice tag on a leaki_ng pump ~ seal,La: .y  ;

,     manlif t chained to safety related pipingi ladders. and other ,     n
               ,

t equipment not proper 19 lanyarded, a removable: rail.ing found. leaning J ', ' ,

    'against a Division I reactor building differential pressure local        .

indicatorn and clear plastic on the refuel floor; ;0nce these

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              "
   +  matters were brought to the operating: authority's attention'they      'i "

j were.immediately rectified. Refer;to paragraph 2.c. for further , ' '

        "~

action-by thei license '

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g. . On August 1, 1990.theiinspector witnessed the on' shift response to a s

*  "

lon of condenser vacuum transient ! Onshift personnel utilized thes C 5

    *
    . appropriate procedures"and conservative. operational practices,to W '         *
 ,    . reduce power in' parallel with determining the cause of. the condenser"         .
>     vacuum. loss. > Following a< greater than 15 percent power reduct. ion,
"
    . Lplant stabilization and rectification of the problem, the unit was'         ;
  ,

returned to 100 percent' power With'no , deficiencies noted. j .

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   .NEviolationsordeviationswereidentifiedinthisare ,;
            *
 -[,_4,[ Month!yMaintenanceObservation(62703)l(55050)('55150)
 
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,   Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and comp >nents (<(f; _     *

3 + . listed below were observed toLascertain'that theyswere conducted in m ' , i accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes , ' y -

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  *  o" standards and in conformance with> technical, specification L . % o,  c .d'4l ,

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I LThefollowingitemswereconsidereddurihgthiEreview: I wconditions for operation were met while components or systems wereJ 4 thelimNi -(ay){ f

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1'

'
   . removed from svice; approvals were,obtained prior to initiating the,    -

fs s work; activities wore accomplished using and/or approved procedures and werepl,; . f , inspected;as applicable; functional testing calibrations were+

  '
,  -s;           #
 '

performed prior.to returning; components or systems to service; qualitf

            %}',
- '
  -

control records were' maintained; actiW ties were accomplished by ? , ,

. , .

qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; (' i 4 1. . y

 .j  radiological controls were implemented; and firC prevention controls were    ..i '." i1
  ,

implemente ; '

       ',
  -

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  , Work requests were reviewed to determine.thelstetus of outstanding job <

and to assure that priority is' assigned to safetyrelated equipment , maintenance which may affect system pe~rformanc '

           '

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       ,, .
       , ;
   :The following maintenance' activities were observed or reviewed:-
  + . PM G480890822 Replacement of(Solenoid Assembly T41-F409  ' '
   .- PM E093900126 RCIC Turbine Mainteriance! <
   . WR.0010900722 RR MG Set B Tachometer' Replacement
   . WR 0010900708- Seal Weld. Body:to. Bonnet on 821-F0280'   .
       ^
     (Outboard MSIV)/
   . 'WR'005D900627 Rebuild of'the Diesel Fire Pump
   . WR 0010900718 Troubleshooting; Closure' of RWCU valve G33-F004 L    ,

WR 0140900621 Troubleshootingiof Gas Detector for Primary ' l ', Containment Radiation Monitor

         ,
       .y   ,.
 *

Following completion of maintenance"on d e MG Seti thelinspector verified s that the system was returned to service properl Regarding preventative maintenance (PM) G480890822, the inspector-noted that although the work.was scheduled;to begin and be completed on the day shift on July 18, 1990, start of work was delayed until: early afternoon. The delay was due'to incomplete job data in'then work packag Thel Instrument.and Control (I&C) technician spent lthe morning obtaining wire splice ~ requirements.(Raychem hea.t shrink insulation "as ' built" information sheet) and torque values'of valve mounting b'o'lts.J Work was,further delayed when the soldering iron

'

proved to be inadequate for the gauge of wire involved. The initial

    ~

and subsequent delaysLresulted inLthe PM being turned over to thei afternoon I&C shift. The turnover betweenLthe two shifts was. good.'  !

, ,    Further work delays were~ experienced.when the Quality Assurance (QA)    e
   ; inspector had difficulty interpreting Reychem data sheet splice t    i l
,~             i
  '
  /  instructions and did not have the required tool. to stify wire ~ '   ,
             '

dimension " 4 ,

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     .The QA inspectorsleft;the works, area to. resolve splice uncertaintie J     with the I&C. shift foreman. The foreman determined that the QA'          ci, t
   ,   inspector.was unfamiliar with Raychem splices to. fiberglass           -
                     .

R insulated wiring. After further discussion between the. foreman and ,

  >1'. QA inspector,; agreement was reached and the work was complete Post   ,

t maintenance testing wasicompleted later in the even.ing .approximately ,

4 l ,,, 6 eight hours behind ! schedule.. f ' ? . . 'j i ,

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                 ,
                     ;
 .[.c    *E-Theinspectordeterminedthatthefollowingfactorscontributedto'

'

    "  the delays!
         '
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     ;         ?    ,

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      (1)There,wasnoI&C.formanon'the{obuntil5:30)p v  .. ,  ,
            ,
                 .
                 '   ',

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.  .a    (2) Splice: requirements, necessary tools, and'mouni.ing. bolt =torquey          Ci i
  "

V . ~ 'information were not incorporated into the' work package. The 1 o y l 7,i F *'

      ,  maintenance planner who prepared the work package was not.sure          m

'_ H' f ~o f the wiring and splices associated with the-solenoid valve- . d l' . J and,;therefore, placed a note'in;the work packaget for the I& ? 'k " l

   *
     . technician lto contact Plant Engineering'when the splice had '         "
 ; *
  , (s V    been inspected in,the fiel S,
            -

I vt cit (3) ,The: QA inspecEor's was u nfamiliar with the required splice,  ? I

,

9- ,W j , .and Raychem application. y % ,%

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a g Ma b : Tl= I&C technicians, 'when performing: work activities were- following'  ; - pf 3 @T ap ropriate procedures andydemonstrated an efficient and competent , n! o  ; ' ~

    ,  manner.#        i  >-   -   ' .i

/

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       ~
        . f  n -a :    o   j   ..'

L- , EIn a related matter, the'inspe'ctor pursued as to why the associated , /' . Ij ,

    '

actuatov was not, inspected during the solenoid replacement.This 5

                    #
                    's i"  '
  ,
  '
   -

actuator had been, targeted ,for inspection fo11owing1the fai. lure of a ' '

                    ,
                     '
'

s

 '"   -
     '

similar= damper actuator *in the immediate area (see open item ';J

' '    "  341/90005-04)   earlier in the year. . The inspector. ascertained that' ).*        '

ii i I

). i
    '

the actuator should have been inspected, but the< inspection was; 1 l jf,, , dropped-until the next system outage in late August because of a , . l,

 '

o ,. lack of' spare parts, and there was no system engineerin , f' l

 -
 '   'g' - representativei at the scheduling meeting to explain the need for the' L          '
                    '

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    >

B inspection. ' As corrective; action Technical . Engineering began sending : . R4 ' .

     ' the system engineer and a general technical engineering representative
     '
    ,

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     : to the weekly system outage' scheduling . meeting ~

Jt

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                   '  ,'

2:

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             ,  .
               .
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                    +

b; Regarding PM E093900126, the inspector observed a detailed pre-work: , briefing by first-line supervision. which discussed potential probleo '

                    . ~,
     < areas, QA hold points individual assignments, and contro'Hroom ,

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                  '
                     ;

e f? ' coordinatio Specific emphasis 'was' placed on the replacament of - g y oil filter elements,. due to the mfined space within which the l X mechanic would be working y

              '
                -
                  *   l
           -  ,
                  ,
         ,
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s P During the conduct of work,'thel inspector noted:

  . ,
      (1) Good _ supervisory _ control;      ,
              . ,;
                     ;
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      (2) Good material control'and area cleanliness practice .
           .
               .
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   (3)~Themechanicsperforme$ efficient 1runderdifficultconditions
           .
               ;
 <
    (i.e. , heat / humidity' and physica11/ confining spaces).        -
     , .   ,

r-(4) The QA inspector verified theiappropriate steps of"RCIC Steam Turbine Maintenance Procedure', NPI 35.204.001,-Revision 20.-  ! However, PM E093900126 had been modified deleting some of the  ; previously required work, but reforences to QA verification 'j points in NPP-35.204.001 were not correspondingly deleted fro ; the work request. J Section '4.19 ( 5tep 6) of NPP-35.204.001,  !

  -  " Verification of Backlash Reading," could not be performed        '
.

because the turbine.had not been.abysically disassembled to . the point where a backlashireadirg could be-effected. A decision  :

 ,. was made.to complete the RCIC tureine preventive maintenance
      ~
             ,

t and to have management authorize appropriate changes to PM  :* E093900126 andNPP-35.20$00 a, +

      ~  w       :
   (5) The RCIC system subsequently failed its post maintenance'        l
 ,   testing'(PMT) on' July 19,. due,to oil leaks on the turbine' oil       *
               .
   ;- filter assembly. . .The difficulty in physically accessing th .

f

   . oil filter canisters and positioning the gasket was highlighted-      ,

4 ~7 "as a potential problemtduring the pre-work briefing earlier that day.t However, thelindividtal who replaced the oil filter' s .

               ] ;
  #,

elements was not present at the; briefin a"

,   ,
      ,,
       <
        .
         .

4, , .,

   ' Interviews with mechanical maintenance personnel indicated that T       !

a RCIC turbine oil filter changeout was a difficult job and often ^ t

               :'
 .O  J'resultedinleakageduringPMTnecessitating-reworkin.some       -
, , , _ ,  cases. A record review of oil filter changeouts on the RCIC      3,  .i
  ' * - '
:) *
   %,E093900126)

turbine indicated thatfive theprevious.work had oil' to be redone only;once (PM

               -
             .
>
 ,,  -
   -   in the    filter change '  ~ ., ,  l
 [,
         ~

, , 'The rework was performed by day shift on July 20,'1990R The I , s

'               '
 ;
   ,. inspector observed the mechanics remove the oil filter     .
            % >

canisters and noted the extremClimitations on the mechanic's -f

'

mobilitycreatedbythe%filterLassembly'slocatio ,

      '

l The inspector determined, thrcugh interviews, that the RCIC ,

system PhT was successfully c(mpleted the evening.of July 20, ..

              '.
              *,

p approximately 24 hours behind schedul l

 ..
      ~
   : Subsequently, the RCICisystem Was declared inoperable .to
    'astall an external oil: purification unit to improve'the oil     ,
               <

quality. The licensee"is ' unable to obtain oil acceptable to ~ the GE specification directly;from.the' barrel. Therefore, when '

               ,
   ;the. makeup oil was added under this work request purification        7 efforts were'necessary.--Nornially, makeup. oil is taken'from,the       j
 "

HPCI oil system instead of from the warehouse. Upon cleaning

'

the oil the. system was declared operable.. Presently, the ' r licensee.is determining what actions are necessary to preclude d repetitio m ,

       !

P

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     (6) The inspector'also determined, through' interview,s!,- that the-
,j) J       mechanics who lubricated the RCIC Room Cooler, a related '        , yi
,
 >
  ,
   .
     ..
     - activity which was being performed simultaneously with the RCIC
    #

turbine maintenance, had difficulty obtaining grease guns;and ,

                   ;
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1 * the correct lubricants from the tool issue. room. ' Similar  : ' sI >

                   ;

observations were made in Paragraph-4,, inspection report - ) l ! l

   '
 .

o t i e 341/90009. The inspector confirmed through~ interviews with-the' ,

                  >;

maintenance department _ management that a problem with grease

    ?- 3  gun availability and lubricants did exist; . Additional grease o         !
 &    -
     ,
      -

guns were,obtained and administrative controls!were implemented ,l

,, ,
  ;
  ',
  -   +
     *
      (inventory of grease guns'in tool issue room)'to' improve future
      : grease' gun availability. The;related lubricant. issue involved         ;
 '
     , . the' elapsed shelf life of~1ubricant'in'the tool issue roo ,

A requisition forsthe lubricant had beenjinitiated by tool i

   .

issue room' personnel due to approaching. shelf, life expiration,

   '

but untimely actioniby warehouse personnel'on the requisition , d i _

      ' led to.the delay in1 obtaining the lubrjcant on July 19, 1990..'         '

LMaintenance management,is following up on the lubricant

               '
                '
              '
      ' requisition' dela ,
         ,
           ,
            ,
             '    * ' '  I
         *
          ., ,!  L.1 A
 
 ;  , ' c .s  Regarding,WR 014D900621 the; review of;this' maintenance activity was
                  '

cj generally through record review. The work documented on'the work j request planning comment sheet appearedito' resolve the inadequate .; instrument reading deficiency., , However, ' based lupon theldocumentation, there did not appear to-be a systematic approachoto troubleshootin l

        ,   ,         j
    ' Regarding WR 0050900627, the inspectoi noted;that a 'venaS         *
                   )

representative and. vendor mechanics were present for_the diesel. fire  ; pump overhaul work. . They had more up to-date, vendor information' than , -l o the licensee because the licensee's vendor' interface with the diesel 1

,     pump manufacturer was weak with no routine periodic contact-made to          I keep the manual current. The' new information wasitherefore
     : incorporated into the' licensee's procedure " , ,
              <
                  '
            > bo  ,     ?

, During the installation of new cylinder headsia locating. pin i , t -

     ~ interference problem was identified. Specifil: ally, the old head )

had two locating pins and the new ones four, iTwo of(the pins were . ground off and the installation proceeded sat.isfactorily? The. ' , j p inspector pursued as to why there would be a' difference.1 The-  : f,, licensee contacted.the vendor and determined that+the number.of

                 "

W' ' ' locating pins is a variable in manufacturing and has no technical j a

 '

bearing on pump performance. The inspector.was satisfied!

  .

b

 , .

L J c Duringinstallationof;thestartfngmotora' potential-ovetorquing i , of a mounting. bolt. occurred. ,The mechanic' attempted to1 torquetthe t ,

                   ;

1J bolt to 270 f t-lbs but ~ the socket broke,during the torque' attemp ;l '

                  ,
    '   ~

Li In review of this situation the inspector determined thaththere were [ , ' ' N E, a ' discrepancies as to the, bolt torque requirements.in the maintenance

  "

E ,

y procedure Previously, the licensee. had identified this' problem butf a1 4

1 Ll t

  *   m had not yet changed'the procedure; it was. targeted for revision ati H         ;jf y
'
 .<
    "

its next two year update' In discussions between the planner land >

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 '}  N   craft personnel, the planner ascertained that there were problem W <     . ,
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 .
 .
  '

with the maintenance procedures for' torquing but he was not able;to , ,

               !j
%*V     ascertain;the proper values. Therefore, the procedures were used 7      A'

! for validation with technical engineering and the vendor representative, , . ! : . present. However, these safeguards did not assure that the correct- i I!T * ~ !' > torque value of.135 ft-lbs instead of 270 ft-lbs'was used i ' 9 [ ci 'l

             "~

attempting starting motor mounting. bolt installatio ' L .

               ':
, o,. . .
               !
      .   . ,   .

A weakness was noted~1n the:mannertin which the potential .

            .
               ,

overtorquing was dispositioned. _ Numerous' phone calls were made but: l

   .  ,the engineering authority which dispositioned the' matter never       ;

inspected or reviewed inspection documentation of-the bolt and'the- 4 I mounting surface.' 'The inspector independently ascertained that the

   ,

two' components were acceptable for continued us .

            ,

Followingtheinspector'sobser'vationithelicenseeconbuctedan I

    ' accountability meeting and-determined: ,,  1       -
  '

w w <

    . TheN was a misunderstanding df holes. bet 5een maintenance and       '
    '         '

technical engineering.:

             '
        *      ,
               '
 ,  ,         ,
               ,
    . Engineering personnel did not comp 1stely. follow through. wit' ;

s resolution of' the torquing proble + l

        . s . . . .     .
    < . Generally, goo'd attention to' detail was maintaine *
  .

i ,

   . 'The licensee issued the' accountability. meeting minutes as required L     reading to engineering and maintenance personnel, reviewed the vendor       ;
    . contact list and is upgrading the diesel fi,re pump vendor manua '
  ,             .
         ~

va  ; e[ During the first two. weeks cf July;the licensee perfsrmed .a forced .'"

        . .
               '

l i  : outage. The initiator.of the. outage was a tubet eak l in the number 5'. '

               ' feedwater heater. 'The major scope of the; outage,was to: improve the'      ,

L'A , performance of the feedwater/ extraction; steam system o The inspector reviewe'd the licerfsee's. leakage: log to Ascertain how-the licensee targeted the worst leakingLvalves for, repair'during the forced outage. Due to the' condition >of the, log'(nontspecific

   '
             +

information), the inspectorfcould not determine,how'the Walve . O,

               '*
 ,
.. selection was made. The inspector contacted the operating authority      y
#     who indicated that a plant walkdown was performed 72 ~ hours prio6to,       ;
,
    , shutdown.to identify the worst valves because,the leakage. log:did nots f provide enough useable information to" identify the valves with the .     ..
  .. f greatest leakage. Also? the licensee indicated that the radwaste; w 1 W   supervisor had been. tasked to improve the leakage determination      , *,. I capability and make the. leakage logt a living useable documentii ,. H'     ("t
 ,   ,
  • .C , W Licensee initiatives. to improve leak' reduction log capsilityc s an. / ,

4Jr;*i g-g b, ',) . ;

    '

open item (341/90011-03(DRP)).

         '

6 .6 ,

              '
              " 3' '

q  ?

    ,,boodoutagescopecontrolwasmaintained. The resultsiof_thk 4 u      9Di u[' I
    <

s

 ';
 ,   i bslance of plant repairs- significantly reduced radiation' exposure to       -
    .' workers / operators during the startup'as compared to the' dosages k     ;
              '

z i[

, ,
 #
   ,  received during the previous. forced outage startup:in April.1 NQ . if jl s  . .

3x*" No violations or deviations" were identified in this~-are M f - c'm  ;

         '
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i: a Monthly Surveillana Observation (61726)~ (* '

                     )
            ,       ,   -t
      , ,

The inspectors obseEved surveillance t'esting re' quired by Technical; ' d

 *

Specifications and verified that: testing was performed _in accordance *

'

with adequate' procedures,' test instrumentation was calibrated;-limiting ,

 '

conditions'for operation were met, removal and restoration 1of th , ,

'

affected components were accomplished, test results_ conformed withi , Technical Specifications and procedure requirements;and wereireviewed by '

                     '

s personne'l~other,than the~ individual directing the test, and'any deficiencies ' identified during the testing were properly reviewed and! '

                     ,

resolved by appropriate management personne '

               . , y,c     #  ,

j

      . m  .. .  .   .
               .m .
'-

The inspectors witnessed the following test activities:  ; v- -

                    ,
       
   '
    . 24.207.08  s  EECW Pump;and Valve Operability Test-     .
                .
                  -    I
                     '
                 .
   .
    . 44.303.251 ',   EECS - Reactor Vessel, Water Level      
,        ,
         -(Levels l1~,J2 & 8), Division 1,' Channel A
         .
                     '
       -

FunctionalsTest . ,

                  '
    . 24.203.02'    Division 11: CSS Pump and Valve,0perability,          1
    <

and Automatic Actuation. * . o g,

    . 24.203.03    ; Division II CSS Pump and Valve Operability,          r
   '      '

and Automatic Actuation " ,

    . 24.30Y.14    LEmergency. Diesel. Generator    11 7'  4;      i
             't
    ,   * '

t Start.and Load Test -  ;

    . 44.210.030 o    PCMSifunctional Surveillance
                     '

( ., 64.210.031rb A >PCMSCalibration'SurveillanceC, ,-

                *
       .J'

o ,,

         -t - ,,,   .
             .
              <
              -
               ,     . 1
                   ;g;  i a.- .Regarding 24.203.03, the inspector noted.that.duringToperation of
                   '

7 - L e' > > d

   ,  the screen, Division indicated II core thatspray total core pumps, spraythe flowERIS was unknow Plant Status 'The summary _l f     .

inspector lthen questioned the control room operator concerning the, *

 ,

J discrepancy.J,The operator. indicated the raason wasinot known; 'A .$ e e -

   ,  Subsequent, followup with the plant computer configuration. department 1         1 ( M-1,g    '
     . (PCCD) personnel, revealed that:the particular I.D. point-Was         *

L' '

    * configured such that both CS loops were' required to be in operation ij @"a J i'
   ~
'
-
   /   to give indication to the.ERIS Plant: Status screen. Additionally l1         .,
, .,   f  the inspector learned that the same configuration existed for;the,RHR'            n
    <                 m I'  *   loop to evaluate flow. inputs appropriateness to'the ERIS'ofsummary theslogicfscreen,. and subsequently PCCD initiated informed a: review,. -
                   ,

yi!

                    ! ,

t . the inspector that' potential design change (PDC) 11785 wasyinitiate'd s l[ L; f t

~

toresolve'thejssue,g '

               %    .g!~  ,;
         ',   ,,L
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     '            *
     ,

4.) 7, Jy . 1 s ,

                ,

fi yj

  >
   ^ Regaiding 24,307.14; during,perfo'rmance of;the'EDG fast startE the", ?            ->.

y M

  '
    .. ' inspector noted,that the licensed operator conducting the'testfmad'i         e  y ', W  -

a

&*    i use'of &'two. way radio to. communicate with the control room; / 4 i          "

a 4 ,

                    !s$'

l * However,OperatiodsStandardNok119d" Communication," specifies' . ;! '

   'M  that use of radios was. prohibited in,EDG switchgear areas. lWhen i
  .
                  .c r   "

l Tt .

   ,

A 7,. i brought to the attention;of operations management, the inspector lwas K r>. I

                  +;JF
                     !
,?     _ informed thatithe standard was in error'and that a review;)fyall
'
'
  , .
    '
                     ' '
                     .}
     ,operatingLstandardsfwas, currently,being performed by operations" [ '
 ,

management.% , - Em i (; ,

                    *

j F,c ,& . ,) - f ,' " nr , s ,

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           .
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The inspectors reviewed records of completed. surveillance tests.

l;.

             .

The review was to determine that the. test was accomplished within:the required Technical Specification. time interval, proceoural steps ~_were l properly initiated,lthe procedure acceptance criteria were met,.

'
 , independent verifications were accomplished by people other than those l

performing the~ te'st, -and-the tests were signed in and out of the~ control l room surveillance log' book. The surveillance ~ tests reviewed were: ,

                ,
  ,. 24.000.0 ,  . ; Shiftly! Daily, Weekly.and 51tuation Re'q uired-Attachment 1   -Surveillances        *
  . . 24.110.05   RPS - Turbine Control;and St'op Valve     .   *

j~

      .,

Functional Test . i , ,

  . :24.138.06   Jet Pump Operability Test .   . .
                !

'

  . 24.202.01   SRV Vacuum Breaker Valve Operability Test'        ,
  . 24.208.03   Division'II EESW Pump and Valve Operability       :
     ,   Test '  .
            ,
              -   .
  .- 24.307.017   EDG 14 Start and. Load Test      *
                ,
,
  . 24.402.'01   Drywell and. Suppression Chamber Breaker Operability Test
  . 24.413,01   Division ~I and II Control Center Chilled Water Pump;and Valve Operability Test -    t    i
  . '24.501.07   Diesel Fire Pump and= Engine Operability Test       a
  ..

27.000. Shif tly, Daily.nWeekly~ and ^$ituation Required ~

      '

Performance Evaluations- , r

                ;
  . 42.309.01  <

Division I/II Weekly 130/260'VDC! Battery m

    .

Check: + , .,

                .
                '
  . 44.010.001  - RPS - Reactor Steam Dome Pressure,.       c l
'       Division I, Functional Test
             '
               '
              '  ^

44.010.128 ' APRM E Channel Functional Test

     '

L 4 91 RPS

  /, .44.010.129   RPS -!APRM F Channel Functional Test    tl 9
             '

y ~. 1

  ./ #,44.010.162   ' Flow Unit C Functional Test      5  -

t

  -. 44.010.166-   Flow Unit C Calibration  '
           .  ' p' !r x    ,

,s_ l: ' r fo'. .-

  -

44.020.101 '

     ,' , NSSSS' . Fuel. Pool Ventilation Exhaust'

Radiation, Divisiion.I~ - Channel A Functidnal , T I i

       . Test
         ,
          .
            .
             .
             *

i

              '

i '/ ^ '

                -

1 . <' . ;44.020.103 NSSSS'- Fuel Pool Ventilation Exhaust "J d 4 Radiation Monitor Division I;-Channel;. - ^* 1 4 9 .

     ,
            '

s f

   '       '

,4 y V ,

      - Functional Test!      .  '
              / ;%  ;:
  ,
   *
    %   c Divisionil Functional  ; .
             *~

e? nk

 #
, ,   . 44.030.069-   ' ECCS - Reactor Recirculation: Pump B DP,     "
               ,
                '
.       Division I. Functional-   '   , - i  J f# ;

N

    .
  . 44.040.001 ~
      .ATWS/SRV: Low' Low Set  Reactor.Vesseli      _ L-Pressure Division I Functional. Test'       y
,   . 44.210.051-   RCS'- Interface Valve Leakage Pressure .       t Sir!

fji h , l i-

              ~
 "

a Monitors LPCI and Shutdown Cooling Channel

   .    ' Functional / Calibratio it  - 4i
"
  . 44.210.056   .RCS - Interface Valve Leakage Pressure     .'
 -
       . Monitors Core Spray, HPCI, and RCIC Channel-Functional / Calibration  ,
            ,
  . .54.000.006   fAPRM Calibration        -
        +    ,    ,

s

        '

1 f

     ,
                ,
       ,  -  . ,_ #    .., .
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:ni'4m/ gp     /        .
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                '
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           .
            '

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    -

54.000.00 Core Performance Parameter Check' . <e e e 74.000.018 A .I *

 -
    .

ChemistryShiftly,72 hour,andl Situation L y Attachment 2 Surve111ances f

              '  '
                 ;

Chemistry Routine Surveillances

              '
. f' , ,4.000.019  .        ; + <  "
'
   ,  Attachments 6 & 7 '   :,   , e  -
             ,.
              '
                .
        '
                 . ;;
               '
    *        4     -

u

.,
  ,
  ,

DuringLthe review of situational ~ required surveillances for hourly fire _ ' . ,

                 '

M  ! *, watch rounds, the. inspector noted that the-time for.one of the rounds'was j i ! 7g '

   , s,igned off before the actual completion time. J The inspector inquired $ W        ,

intosthis situ'ation and determined it had been standard practice to signP , J

                 '

g off;the hourly round at the end of?each hour-'versus the actual completion f', * 3,o 40 _ ,

  %% ; time of the'round,. The licensee retrained fire watch' personnel to sign          <
                 ,

' off using the actual cMpletion time <and reviewed'the; fire watch records-( - %) - ;1,'

      ~

to ensure that no fire Jwatch was ' missed? These actior.s! resolved the - <

                 ,
                  '
 ,   .'inspectorts;. concern'ia this are i-  <( ;  # ,

71 s

  .  .         str ,
              '
  *             '

I ( , g , fio violatioqs o'r y lations were ident'ified inithis area. "

     .
      . ,         ; t followup 'of Evenig (93702):.    ;;' .      ;
   "               ,
 '
    ,During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several events,-       .,
                 "

u" ' some of which required prompt' notification"of'the NRC pursuant to.10 CFR '

H' y 50.72; .The inspectors' pursued thei eventsionsite with' licensee'and/or i In each case.cthe? inspectors verified that the
   ,')G other NRC officials._ notification was correct'.and timely, if, appropriate,,that thei p_' ,    ? was'.taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were conducted'.

H within regulatory requirements and that corrective' actions would prevent

                 -

i L ,l; -future recurrence. LThe specific eventstarefas.follows: ' i

.
 '

1: S Unplanned ESF actuation - closure of outboard containment isolation:

'

y valve G33F004 -on July 16, 199 (, o l

                 >
'J ,  ,   The< inspector reviewed the licensee's actions upon' isolation of the         l reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system with the closure of G33F00 '

y 27 > # ,

            .
                 -~ 1'

Jihe onshift operations staff, assess'ed the potential causes of the!

          ~
-
 '

isolation'and took electrical current readings.at' specific points in l

"

N e the RWCU circuit to isolate =the circuit of. concern. Theisuspect

  '

circuit dealt'with the K2 contacts from standby liquid control (SLC)! ? '

    ' i ni ti ati on.. During the! troubleshooting the open circuit no longer       -
                 '

e was present indicating a spurious actuation of the K2 contactst The g' inspector interviewed the operator involved in taking the= reading l

    '

and determined that the individual had adequate understanding,  ! u 6 ,? expertise and reviewed the wiring diagrams prior to troubleshootin , . # a

, o'     Subsequent inspection'by electricians did not identify any         >

c q- pickup / dropout voltage discrepancies with the K2 relays.~ The "

                 :
.
'7 ,
  , _
   ,  inspector noted that an appropriate.tagout and LCO logientries s
-  7   associated with1SLC were made for the relay inspectio .

j{b + , x ,

              . d  .

u r, g Present licensee actions are to" inspect the wiring between the relay' f

'

r and the relay contact for a problem land,'potentially; replace the, % i c relays to allow laboratory analysis.E DER 90-0431 was issue'd on(thiix ' t W event along with LER 90-00 Followuptof.these future activities 1. t r * '-  ;

.
'

aff 3q y - s jillsbeaccomplishedundertheLERffo110wu n

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  &  .. Reactivity Transient - inadvertent closure of- the A outboard MSIVE     l
              '
   '

i

    '
     ~during periodic surveillance testing on July' 26,.1990. While at 100 percent power and performing the MSIV. channel functional test the
            '

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!!              +
    . operator pushed the close, button instead'of the test button."~This' >    f 4='   r
    . cresulted in'a momentary power spike to approximate 1y'117 percent. I     t ' ,;
 . g wi The, operator recognized the valve closure and reopened the valv T, l
 ' '
  !
    ', ,LThe licensee evaluated.the barriers affected by the transient (fuel,"    f
              'j l ,,    c piping , reactor recirculation seals) and determined that no   ,'
              ~
" '
 "
  *   / degradation occurred., ,The licensee evaluated operator performance
,_
    '
     ' and perfomed a human factors review off control room controls for. N , '     ,

6ff- " additional-improvements. 'The< licensee evaluated the overall plant 'f - t' response and.detei.nined that the plant responded as: designed and

'
     , within the design bases of the facility. All_ reviews were  4    -
    -

accomplished in a timely manner. The inspectors independently 1l reviewed the transientiand reached the same ' conclusions in terms of (Lt

*   !

plant respons '

         ,
         ,
'

The licensee verbally reported the transient via the ENS network = l within four hours of the transient termination. The only * , .t outstanding inspector question at the end of the inspection perio'd

'

rested with,whether the 100. percent thermal power limitation had . '

              !
     ~been exceeded ~and if'so whether a LER under License Condition 2 '

was warranted. :This' matter will be pursued'in the next inspection < period along with the results;of the human factors revie LossofENS"phonecircuiton; July 19, 1990'. ': Design Weakness;- identification during a licensee initiated safety

,
 .

system functional < inspection. that the control. center HVAC was not

 >
   ,

in compliance with all' applicable codes on July 26, 199 ,

 -

Specifically, the' chlorine detection system-did not fully meet IEEE '

>

n

   ,
     <

279 for. single failure. The' initial review by the licensee of the' *

            '
'
     ' matter" concluded that the ventilation' system was= operabl The     ,

lice'nsee's evaluation will be provided to the appropriate NRC -

            <

a ,

     " technical ~ group for their review. LER 90006 was submitted on      '

l August 27, 1990. . La, s e. ' Lagging Fire - observation and extinguishing of flames on the -

     ' exhaust'of EDG 13 on July 6, 1990. .T_hirty seven minutes into a;     *

routine diesel run a lagging fire was observed in the exhaus .; p,' manifold area.: The operator extinguished the flames with a hand;, a ! held fire extinguisher prior to actuation'of the automatic' fire

        '
          '
'
 ,    suppression syste i
  .     . -  >
           '

In a previous' inspection report (341/90003) a fire of the same i l- [E- D nature 7: curred on EDG 14 on March 3, 1990,.The licensee's interim - i

     'f corrective action was to routinely wipe down the leaking oil, by      ;

n  ; operationa and the system engineer. , However,- as noted' earlier: the

              ~
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Loil:cleanu3 by' operations was not being, accomplished rigorously'and,

,
     ,the'systen engineer was not present for this particular ru ,

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     ,
            ,   j 1     J Following this fire, operations management re-emphasized the need to'

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wipe ^down.the EDGs through a night order.and in discussions with 6

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              !
    ' .' Tapplicable on-shift personne ,  F#m          p
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 ", Followup of Licensee Event Reports (92700). s
        .
         *

i 4' > 7~

      ,,   .
         ,.

l

 ,  Through direct' observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and4 c

d ' review of records, the following event reports were, reviewed to determine .l that reportability. requirements were fulfilled,;immediate corrective

'
  ->           !
'  - ,,  action was. accomplished, and corrective' action to prevent recurrence had     f been accomplished in accordance with technical specification ; (0 pen) LER 89038, Reactor Scram When Fire Occurred in the Vicinity    H E     of the Main Turbine'., The licensee. Identified three general areas y     for corrective action.- The first,: remove the damaged insulation     ,

pads and cleanup any traces of oil; secondly, to perform an r l- accountability l meeting between management and individuals involved ,

" ,    in the maintenance activity on the turbine;_and thirdly, enactsthe-   ,'  ;
'

accountability actiort plan as described in memorandum dated December , 26, 1989. The inspector noted that the action 1from th . accountability meting addressed a critique of the lessons learned - r from the event to all supervision; to revise the turbine lube; oi , ,

            -
  '
-
'

3 flush procedure to make sure that bearing vibration probe a '

          /

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 '

penetrations were properly ~ sealed 'at the beginning off the lube oil e t flush; and; revise the procedure for. insulation installation to 4 *

           ,

i ,

           .~ .
 *

inspect,for the presence of oil and evaluate-the potential' fire ' v m

 ,
  *
  -  hazardd The inspector discussed'with..the licensee whether these-     n
  ".

last two actions resulting from the accountability meeting ~ involving 'p3 procedural changes should be' considered corrective actions;onder the *

,

J LE The licensee responded that the resulting actions from the v 1 * t accountability. meeting were not necessarily. corrective actions under

            '
            .
  .

the LER. Therefore,.the inspector considered,that the corrective . .

           *

e !$ actions as stated in'the LER were not sufficient to preclude'a future'< d

'   '

turbine' generator' fire but that the internal 1 actions associated with .

            ::
           '

the accountability meeting were (when considered with the other; 7

          '

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    . actions. stated in.the LER). This matter was discussed with licensee   ;

personnel as to whether, the corrective actions stated in th '

          .
          . ' 'ta g -

accountability meeting should be.. included in a revisionLto the LER. [ , e. o h' i , The licensee stated that they would take that under consideration.- ?j This LER will remain'open contingent upon future revisio , In additien'to the hbove LER, the inspector. reviewed the followir g 4 Deviation Event Reports (DERs).

'

         >
          '

L >

       , .
        '
    (1) DER 90-0188,- . dealing with the qualification of some control room envelope plank walls and.the south control room vestibule..'The    o inspector-requested the engineering documentation supporting the    ,

operability determination of control. room integrity and qualification of the vestibule's revolving doo This 1 information was transmitted to NRC Region.III;for review and evaluation: l

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L , l (2) The inspector reviewed DER 90-0373 which documen W an even I l,, ;where design calculation (DC).4550 revised setpoint values for ,  ; l, '

    , _the main condenser.high pressure _NSSSS tr$ This._was'done'to     l L,      support a Technical Specification change a quest. - The DC was         !
    '

annotated to identify that.the new values were only. valid upon '

  ,

issuance.of the: Technical, Specification. However, during a

     : periodic review of I&C procedure 44.020.059,c"NSSSS-Condenser-
                '
               ,   ,

Pressure, Division I' Channel Functional; Test," the individual; '

                  )

o trip unit setpoints'were revised to be consistent with these new l

    , DC values. Subsequently, on June 2, the revised procedureLwas ' >         ;

I , used inlthe. field and one trip unit actually recalibrated to th ., new value before discovery was made that the trip setpoint

./     values.were in error. The error.was corrected, no technica1 ' '

specification limits' exceeded', an'd' licensee;astions to evaluatea

                  '
                '

4 root cause initiated. To track for adequate resolutionnand 't.# ' '7 t: closure, this matter is' considered an opensitem

            '

y bo j, (341/90011-04(DRP)). , ,

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s No Yio1ations,or deviations were identified in this area.' r

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                  :

3 , m ,t ' y+ e

 

8.I[Me'dicalDrillObservation > > 4 [ y .7Y / $ 99 % rpa

            ,

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                 ,
   ) Following the poor performance in the' medical. portion'of the emergency-;
  '

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t preparedness exercise of February 15, 1990 the licensee committedsto t ~g f( , , ~- E * / . repsform the drill. On July 19,'1990 the, inspectors witnessed the, 4 i y , 2 repeat n.maical drill. The drill entailed player response to'ose' injured' A^ N '

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  -
  ,e and; contaminated victim on the third floor of1the reactor:bu11' ding. .
   +
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,    Th'e inspectors determined, based upon the drill s'cenario and performance /, <j[4        i  ( #

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   '.of the controllersJthat the licensee was able to' establish accept'able' "         v -

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 ;  ; conditions to evaluate the' drill participantsR        'h". c/**'
              .

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 /  Theparticipantspromptlyresponded;tothe' injury._withtheonsitenu/ sir @N N h'.
-   staff providing the medical attentionC Timely" emergency classification,.

offsite notifications and ambulance request:were made. .The' area around' nI p l

( 'l  the drill accident, sit, wastproperly posted and good crowd. control maintained...The medical' response to:the victim was appropriate.and'       ',

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                #

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professional. There was a-concerted effort;by'the participantsito contro scenerio-assummed c9ntamination which increased the duration that the' s victim remained injhe reactor building. ' DueLto some poor, health. physics - 0 practices, the conta91na_ tion control efforts mere.not: Offective'. iSome' .I

,

noted examples were resp'onse individualsitouching theircface with N scenarlo-assummed: contaminated: gloves'andprotectiveclothingand.alio0ing * i , . the injuped individual's clothing to contact ,th~ej contaminated floor.- L Transference of the victim to the; ambulance; team was appropriate with a; ' documented medical; turnaver, contamination' map and dosimetry; provide i l ,

     ,

e r . _ . . . s .

              - .
   ' Foll'owing the drill the inspector ascertained    t that the ability to provide" l    medical. attention during affshift hours rested' solely with. operators.>       ,
  '

Also,1 nocdrill had_ ever bien conducted without. the;dayshift' nursing a ' e-E , staff.; .This item was .'also identified by the ;1icensee as an actiongi. te '

               ,
 +
       ..
          '
           .
           ,.  & ;
  ~ By.the end~of the inspection period the licensee had made preparationsJto perform another medical drill _in August;without . nursing staff t
'
             ,

participation and plans.were'being made to increase'the number of e ,,' , w ,

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'c  .,  .,. p,ersonne. l   rece ,iving, firs,t aid training., Tte' inspector, considered   '
                   -
                    '

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g licensee initiatives to increase first aid capability and.im' rove p the

, '  ,

radiological interface while'providing medi:a1 attention an open item e 1rb

  .3 4 ,
    (341/90011-05(DRP)).    ,
             ,
              ,
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                    {ij

" iZebra Mussels 1, $ g , , J .

                  ,   d
                   '

e In inspection report _341/89025 paragraph'3.b., the inspector provided an ,4

,   y   initial status of licensee effortsito deal wi h the 2ebra mussel infestation on Lake Erie." In November 1989, tollowing mechanical             -e
   , cleaning  of the general' service water (GSW)1in'.ake structure,1 clam-trol          a
                    -

a

 *  "(a chemit.a1 n.olluscicide) was injected into moi t-of the GSW system and the;,             i
  &  ' fire protection main' header. Due to the' celd k ster, temperature at the

-

,
  ,

time an. approximate 1 mortality of 65 percent.was observed in sample boxes  ; off the'GSW system. Subsequently, tne ' licensee inspected the diesel fire -

,?    pump's. discharge piping at its' relief valve in J tnuary'1990;with no-        '

evidence of m'ucsels;

                  '
         '
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     .     ~   <         >>
 *

1 ,

              '    ,   a A permit was received from the " state o'f Michigan ' 'or the routine use of .J            Lu
   '

clam-trol. :;Thesnextlapplicationfof' clam-trol was performed.on July 2, -

  <  1990. Following that'applicatio'n an; apparent 100: )ercent mortality-         '
                     ,
    ! occurred. The' remains' of the-dead mussels clogged th'e, smallest tubed          '.    ;
    '

heat' exchanger in the GSW system. Following a dectease in a-GSW heat" t

. exchanger performance, maintenance personnel obsert id th'e . remains of the
   ,
    . mussels;on July 22, 1990. Over the. weekend of July 28/29, 1990, the licensee inspected / cleaned the'GSW system heat exchMgers. 3 Licensee j'

j-intentions are to apply clam-trol every spring and 1all.-

   '
      ,    ,r .
         '
            '
  .10[ Management Changes        **

,

   ,
    " .  ,, .  .    ; g During,the inspection peribd a number of, personnel.ank organizational-
                     '
                 ,

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  '
    ?ichanges occurred. . .These+inc16ded:         -

1 ^ , , , For$ation of a.new organizational unit NuclearJssbrance The

                .
    ,
                    ,

i e + . departmentsgincluded in the'new entity' were QA,1 security, plant j ' safety,'and nuclear sei 'ces.- g, - ,'

 ;      w a        .e  .     :
                 "    ^
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 . . The QA manager was app,ointeushead of: nuciear a'ssuf,anc s
      '
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       -

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J Theheadofplantsafetywasl appointed'headof;Q . ,_

                   ,

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                  ?
                    ,  , .;-  ,The a'ssistant-to"t'he-plantLmanager     was appointed heak of plan ,,
        *

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y safety;

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1 - ' N !Theoutagemanagerwasappointedassistahlto.theplattmanager.)[ , ,.7

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  - The' radiation protection superintendent was.appointedi utag #

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     . manage .q
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t, _ $ 'ThE $diatibn^ protection manager's duties were elevated to inc1hde- 't

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 .d
     .the duties of.radiat' ion: protection 1 superintendent;'
      <
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  -
    '.-  .The assistant to the senior vice? president, was appointed head.of        s?   i,j W
   .

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    ~
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     .

nucleariservices.- . 1O ~?;' s - , 7b -\ 15 > + , .  : . u + ,' .

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   ._ ~ The operations'vice president was appointed senior vice president
    .with the' departure of the senior vice president to another' utility.=     '
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         -
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       ~
   . The plant manager was appointed assistant operations vice president     i assuming the duties-of the operations vita presiden '

[ . The operations superintendent was appointed plant manager but; maintained the operations l superintendent function until a new ,, l superintendent is appointed.- ,

             .

Theinspector;reviewedthequalificationsoflthe-individualsassociated j with ANSI 18.1 - 1971 related positions (except QA manager which was;

,
,   ' discussed with Region III-Division of, Reactor Safety)'and noted no. discrepancie * ,
          '

6 1 Regional Requests ,.

             .
             '
   . ?The inspector > confirmed in discussion with the plant manager:an .

L , engineering management that Generic Letter 90-05 was received by.th . licensee and was underc review in accordance with a regional  :; management! verbal reques '

            ,,
  ,

, .

   . In a memorandum dated July 5,1990, the Director of Reactor Prdjects, l
  . Region III, requested that the Michigan resident' inspector staffs'   '
   , ensure that theirilicensee's were aware, oft the positions being taken '   '
             ,

Il by the domestic low level wasteisites to~potentially deny waste- , access. The inspector inquired into the matter'and found the: . s licensee was well aware.of the' situation'., 1 On. July 17, 1990, the inspector was requested'by regional management , to assess the licensee's methodology for conducting control' rod .

             '

scram timing. This was_a~ result of inadequacies. identified at Nine; '[ Mile Point where'the testing was found to be performed without i isolating thel individual drives being; tested from the CR0 pumps; ' General Electric (GE) had earlier recommended that the testing be:  ! performed with pumps isolatedd Thet inspector reviewed surveillance-procedure NPP-54.000.03, " Control Rod Scram:. Insert Time Test," and-

   " verified consistency with GE recommendation '

12.1' Unresolved items ,

          .
           ,  [
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Q # Y .; *-

   . Unresolved items are matters about which more' infdrmation is required in '

or. der;toascertain-whethe_rtheyareacceptableitems,violationsLor- n,(#ri

           '
           ~
             '
         , i

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   - deviations'. An unresolved; item disclosed ddring the inspection i.si e discussed in Paragraph 1 m
          <  ;" t ;
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1 Open Items /v a, i 'u y, 4 <0 ,

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 )!   Openiitems' are matters which have been discussed with the licensee,;which     !

L

 ,
  '

will.be reviewed further by.the inspector, and which-involve some actio'n[# ' ' ,~; , O, ' on:the'part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during > - . .% ~

  '  .the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3.a, 4.e, 7.b(2) and m   q r
."    -

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1 Exit Interview (30703) -

                 '
    'The. inspectors met with' licensee' representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
                   '

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                   +

b- ' on August 24, 1990, and. informally throughout the inspection period and

': 7   o summarized the secpe and findings of the inspection activities. The            {

a1 inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of t.he- ,

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