IR 05000341/1998009

Insp Rept 50-341/98-09 on 980511-15.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Performance Re Physical Security for Facility

ML20248J910
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	06/04/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20248J899	List: IR 05000341/1998009 ML20248J894
References
50-341-98-09, 50-341-98-9, NUDOCS 9806090356
Download: ML20248J910 (12)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 Docket No: 50-341 License No: NPF-43 Report No: 50-341/98009(DRS)

Licensee: Detroit Edison Company (DECO)

Facility: Enrico Fermi, Unit 2 Location: 6400 N. Dixie Hw Newport, MI 48166 Dates: May 11-15,1998 Inspector: G. Pirtle, Physical Security inspector Approved by: James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety 9806090356 990604 PDR ADOCK 05000341 G PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Enrico Fermi, Unit 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-341/98009 This routine announced inspection evaluated several aspects of licensee performance relating to physical security for the facility. The inspection also addressed several previously identified finding Facilities and equipment observed were operational and well maintained. Two Vehicle Barrier System (VBS) gates required installation of a mechanism that increased the effectiveness of the barriers. One of the VBS gates was compensated for an excessive period of time (Section S2).

- Security procedures and records reviewed were adequate. A weakness was noted in reference to compensatory measures for certain type of alarms, and the method of

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evaluation of the cause for alarms (Section S3).

- The security force performance improved significantly since the previous inspection and was considered a strength (Section S4).

- Self-assessment efforts were effective and offered flexibility (Section S7).

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Plant Support Report Details S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment a. Insoection Scooe (IP 81700)

The inspector reviewed the condition of security equipment and facilities required by the security plan. The equipment observed included, but was not limited to, search equipment, intrusion alarm equipment, alarm assessment equipment, equipment within the alarm stations, and portions of the Vehicle Barrier System (VBS). Facilities

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observed included the main access facility and both alarm station b. Observations and Findings Two of the Vehicle Barrier System (VBS) gates were compensated for because they did not have a functional mechanism required to provide an added level of protection (the specific mechanism required is considered Safeguards Information and exempt from public disclosure). One of the gates was compensated for about nine months, the other gate barrier was compensated for about two weeks. Attempts to correct and modify the existing mechanism, evaluation of other altematives prior to ordering a new design of the mechanism, and the extended delivery time for the new designed mechanism contributed to the time required to make the necessary modifications. Insta!Iation of the required mechanism to eliminate the need for further long term compensatory measures was completed by June 1,199 ,

Other equipment observed was operable and functioned as designe c. Conclusions Facilities and equipment observed were operational. Two VBS gates required installation of a mechanism that increased the effectiveness of the barriers. One of the VBS gates was compensated for an excessive period of tim S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation a. Insoection Scooe (IP 81700)

The inspector reviewed selected procedures pertaining to the areas inspected and also reviewed appropriate logs, records, and other document b. Observations and Findings Current practices in reference to false alarms that were generated for other than zone intrusions (tamper alarms, etc) were different than addressed in the security plan. The security plan identifies a false alarm (cause of alarm unknown) rate without

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distinguishing between intrusion and other types of false alarms (such as tamper l

alarms). Compensatory measures other than those identified in the security plan were employed for nonintrusion alarms (such as tamper alarms). Although the practice may be acceptable, it is other than is described in the security pla A weak practice was noted in reference to the method of evaluation for causes of alarms (false or nuisance). During observation of alarm station operations, the inspector noted that in some cases the recorded cause for an alarm was based on delayed officer response to the alarm, rather than by immediate closed circuit television (CCTV)

assessment available to the alarm station operators. The observed practice showed that in most cases, if the cause for the alarm could not be determined by immediate CCTV assessment, a security officer was dispatched. Upon arrival, the security officer may see birds in the area, for example, and call in the cause for the alarm as birds (nuisance alarm-cause known). The station operator accepted this delayed cause assessment rather than the initial CCW assessment results which showed no cause for the alarm (false alarm). The lack of an adequate technical basis for such delayed assessments to supersede the immediate assessments provided by the CCW system constitutes the weak practice observed by the inspector. Such a practice results in alarms that should be recorded as " false alarms" being recorded as " nuisance alarms."

This issue is a concern because the number of false alarms per day is the primary ongoing measure for monitoring system reliability. When an alarm zone receives a specified number of false alarms, the alarm zone is considered unreliable and certain actions are taken. The practice observed could well result in the perimeter alarm system havbg a much higher false alarm rate, and therefore less reliable performance, than is currently known by the security force. The licensee agreed to evaluate this inspection finding (50-341/98009-01).

Procedures reviewed were well written and reviewed at appropriate time interval Procedures were in sufficient depth to describe the tasks to be performed. Records and security logs reviewed were complete and accurat c. Conclusions Security procedures and records reviewed were adequate. An Inspection Followup Item was identified in reference to the method used to determine the cause for an alarm (50-341/98009-01).

S4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance a. Insoection Scoce (IP 81700)

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The inspector toured various security posts and observed performance of dutie Security event logs and other records pertaining to security force performance were also reviewe l

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b. Observations and Findinas The previous inspection report noted that 13 security event reports were caused by security force errors within a three month period. Within the past six months,12 security caused loggable events were recorded and 7 of the 12 were caused by the uniformed force. The security department (uniformed and support staff) went for a period of 54 days without any logabe incidents caused by error Personnel observed on posts and at the alarm stations were knowledgeable of post requirements and no deficiencies were noted. The inspector observed a task performance evaluation being conducted for a person being certified as an alarm station operator. The evaluation pro ess was very extensive and thoroug Conclusions The recurity force performance had significantly improved since the previous inspection and was considered a strengt S7 Qual!ty Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities a. insoection Scoce (IP 81700)

The inspector reviewed the most current Nuclear Quality Assurance audit of the security program and other documents and programs used by the security department for problem identification and resolutio b. Observations and Findinas Eleven self-assessment evaluations were completed by the security department since January 1998, and seven more self-assessments were scheduled by the end of June 1998. The CARD (Condition Assessment Resolution Document) program was used to monitor and track all self-assessment findings. Monitoring and trending of performance for 18 security related areas (e.g. compensatory measure hours, equipment maintenance, personnel errors, compliance evaluations, etc) were also complete Security department self evaluations since January 1998 included review of routine -

records and logs, review of security training records, security drills / exercises-1998, and several other areas. The security department has 10 personnel trained in root cause analysis, and three personnel have been designated for root cause analysis for security issue The most recent Nuclear Quality Assurance audit of the security program (No. 97-0119) '

was thorough and very well documented. Approximately 360 hours0.00417 days <br />0.1 hours <br />5.952381e-4 weeks <br />1.3698e-4 months <br /> were expended during the audit effort. Nine Deviation Event Reports and one observation were identified in the audit report. Audit findings were identified pertaining to material i searches; safeguards information markings; security procedures; protected area searches; and background investigation results. The audit findings were addressed and

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corrected in a timely manner by the security staff. The report also addressed progress in resolving previous findings, and extemal findings, violations or other items (to include NRC findings). Conclusions Self-assessment efforts were extensive, effective in identifying problems, and accurately tracked and resolved by the security staff. The self-assessment program was considered a strengt Miscellaneous Security and Safeguard issues S (Closed) Unresolved item (Recort 50-341/94009-04): Security badges were prematurely or inadvertently activated. On July 12,1994,31 security keycards were mistakenly activated for a one day period prior to completion of all background investigation elements. Only two of the 31 keycards were used for protected area access. All 31 personnel were eventually granted unescorted access to the protected area. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement actio S8.2 (Closed) Unresolved item (Recort 50-341/94009-05): An escort was inattentive and could have lost control of visitors. On June 13,1994, a site employee observed two individuals who appeared to be sleeping sitting in a vehicle within the protected are '

The employee who observed the individuals did not advise their supervisor of the situation in a timely manner. One of the individuals observed asleep was an escort for personnelin the vehicle. On June 14,1994, the security department became of the situation and initiated an investigation. All Radiation Protection department personnel were briefed on escort responsibilities as part of the corrective actions. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement actio S8.3 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item (Recort 50-341/96008-01): Security Plan revision was required to identify the primary weapons used for response force members. The security plan was revised to address this issu S8.4 (Closed) Insoection Followuo Item (Recort 50-341/96008-02): An increase in loggable security incidents caused by security force errors was noted. During this inspection the security force performance was considered a strength (Refer to Section S4 for related information)

S8.5 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item (Recort 50-341/96015-02): The NRC was monitoring Security Excellence Plan (SEP) goals pertaining to experience / training, turnover, and performance. Although the SEP has been completed and considered as effective in monitoring goal attainment, the areas noted above have been incorporated into the Nuclear Security business plan for 1998. We will continue to monitor progress on a 1

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S8.6 (Closed) Unresolved item (Recort 50-341/96015-06: A required element of the security force physical examination (testing for glaucoma) was not completed for some personnel. Eight security personnel were not tested for glaucoma during their physical examinations in December 1996. After this deficiency was discovered in January 1997, the personnel were tested for glaucoma and all of the individuals passed the test. The security department also verified that all other security force members met existing physical examination requirements. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement actio S8.7 (Closed) Unresolved item (Recort 50-341/97002-09): A visitor was not adequately monitored while within the protected area. On March 7,1997, a security officer performing vehicle escort duties remained with the vehicle (which had to keep the engine running) while the vehicle driver exited the vehicle to perform some function in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle. During this period, the visitor was under view of another person, but the other person did not assume responsibility for escorting the driver as assumed by the security officer. Although a badged person had the vehicle driver under observation during the period of time in question, neither person clearly understood who was responsible for escorting the driver. Both badged personnel assumed the other person was the escort for the vehicle driver. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement actio S8.8 (Closed) Unresolved item (Recort 50-341/97012-10): A designated vehicle was inside the protected area but was not on the designated vehicle list. The vehicle was authorized to be within the protected area as a designated vehicle. The vehicle was inadvertently dropped from the designated vehicle list when the list was updated. The list was corrected when the error was noted. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement actio S8.9 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item (Recort 50-341/97012-02): Several procedure weaknesses were noted relating to the Vehicle Barrier System (VBS). Five weaknesses were identified within the security plan (revision 27) or security procedures pertaining to the VBS. The weaknesses noted in the security plan revision and procedures have been correcte X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of the licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on May 15,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined or inspection findings discussed during the exit meeting should be considered as proprietary or safeguards information. No proprietary or safeguards information was identifie .

I PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee P. Fessler, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Operations A. Antrassian, Compliance Engineer R. Cook, Compliance Supervisor C. Danish, Security Response Force Supervisor T. Duffy, General Supervisor Security Operations T. Dungy, Nuclear Security R. Fitzsimmons, Supervisor, Access Authorization J. Korte, Director, Nuclear Security A. Kowalczuk, Manager, Nuclear Support J. Louwers, NOA Auditor J. Milton, Supervisor, Security Operations Support R. Orwig, Security Specialist N. Peterson, Nuclear Licensing Director T. Stack, Assistant Director, Nuclear Security S. Stasek, Supervisor, Internal Safety Evaluation Group J. Stucx, Security Force Manager, initial Security NflG C. O'Keefe, Resident inspector, Fermi 2 i

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 92904 Followup - Plant Support IP 81700 Physical Security Program For Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Ooened 50-341/08009-01 IFl Evaluation of False Alarms For Perimeter Alarm System Closed 50-341/94009-04 URI Several Security Badges Were inadvertently Activated 50-341/94009-05 URI Inattentive Escort W; thin The Protected Area 50-341/96008-01 IFl Need to Revise The Security Plan to Identify The Primary Weapon Used by The Response Force 50-341/96008-02 IFl increase in Loggable Security incidents Caused by Security Force Errors 50-341/96015-02 IFl NRC Monitoring of Certain Security Excellence Plan Goals 50-341/96015-06 URI A Required Element of The Security Force Physical Examination Was Not Being Completed 50-341/97002-09 URI Control of Visitor Within The Protected Area 50-341/97002-10 URI A Designated Vehicle Was Allowed Protected Area Entry Without Being on The Designated Vehicle List 50-341/97012-02 URI Some Procedure Weaknesses Were Noted For the Vehicle Barrier System

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CARD Condition Assessment Resolution Document DER Deviation Event Report IFl . Inspection Followup item VBS Vehicle Barrier System VIO Violation i

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PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Deviation Event Report No.97-0359," Failure of an Escort to Monitor and Control a Visitor",

dated March 7,1997 Condition Assessment Resolution Document No. 97-13082,"NRC inspection Followup ltem 97012-02: Procedure Weaknesses Pertaining to the Vehicle Barrier System", dated October 2, 1997 Deviation Event Report No. 97-0005, " Medical Concerns identified During Security Physicals",

dated January 24,1997 Condition Assessment Resolution Document No. 98-12775," Designated Vehicle Operated By an Escorted Individual", dated May 5,1998 Deviation Event Report No. 94-0244," Escort Failed to Control visitor in Protected Area", dated January 16,1994 Deviation Event Report No. 97-0369, " Failure to Follow Procedures When Processing Designated Vehicles into the Protected Area", dated March 11,1997 Deviation Event report No. 94-0297, " Access Granted to Unauthorized Personnel", dated July 15,1994 Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit Report No. 97-0119, for Period Between June 9-27,1997 Compliance Report No. 97-0128," DER Corrective Actions Effectiveness Review (June 1996 -

June 1997)", opened July 1,1997 Compliance Report No. 98-0043, "100% Review of Nuclear Security Training Records", Opened February 25,1998 Nuclear Security Overtime Bar Graph for 1998 Quality Trend Analysis Summary Report (Nuclear Security inappropriate Actions) from January 1996 through February 1998 Nuclear Security Maintenance report for April 1998 Compensatory Measure ilours for 1998 Security Mistakes Tracking Report January - April 1998 Nuclear Security Administrative Procedure SEP-SE1-03, " Internal Compliance Evaluations",

Revision 4, Approved February 2,1998

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Fermi 2, Quality Assurance Conduct Manual MQA11, Revision 0, Approved August 26,1997 Security Event log for Period Between October 1997 and April 1998

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