IR 05000341/1998004
| ML20217K282 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217K250 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-98-04, 50-341-98-4, NUDOCS 9804070185 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20217K282 (17) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIONlli Docket No:
50-341 License No:
NPF-43 Report No:
50-341/98004(DRP)
Licensee:
Detroit Edison Company (DECO)
Facility:
Enrico Fermi, Unit 2 Location:
6400 N. Dixie Hwy.
Newport, MI 48166 Dates:
November 13,1997, through February 26,1998 i
inspector:
C. O'Keefe, Resident Inspector Approved by:
Bruce Burgess, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6
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9004070185 980331 PDR ADOCK 05000341
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
. Enrico Fermi, Unit 2 NRC Special Inspection Report No. 50-341/98004(DRP)
This inspection covered aspects of licensee inspection of failed irradiated fuel, as well as other fuelinspections for possible debris, and related activities. The design basis and licensing basis for the fuel handling and storage system was reviewed. - Two violations and one deviation were -
identified.
Operations
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The inspector concluded that operators were unfamiliar with the prerequisites required to
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be performed prior to granting permission to move fuel and conduct fuel inspection activities. This appeared to be due primarily to a lack of administrative control and documentation. In addition, control room operators were not as involved in the movement and inspection of fuel as they would be during refueling activities.
(Section O1.1)
Operators did not question the practice of storing fuel in the fuel preparation machine
(FPM) ovemight, even though this practice was not specified in the goveming work request or discussed during shift briefings. When the inspector questioned the practice, the nuclear shift supervisor acted conservatively to place the bundle in question back in the normal storage rack until the issue could be further evaluated. The licensee intended to store fuel ovemight in the FPM, but did not document the intent, did not brief it during the shift briefing with plant operators, and did not evaluate the acceptability of storage of spent fuel in the FPM prior to its use. A deviation from a regulatory commitment was identified. (Section O1.2)
The complex evolution involving fuel inspection was performed without an appropriate
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level of administrative controls. The work request used to control the evolution was inappropriate to the circumstances for which a violation was issued. The inspectors concluded that the limitations of using a work request contributed to unclear roles and responsibilities for operators and other supervisory personnel. Licensee corrective actions for this problem were appropriate and comprehensive. (Section 03.1)
Enoineerina The inspector concluded that the licensee did not analyze far or implement adequate
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criticality controls for fuel bundle disassembly and handling of multiple fuel rods simultaneously, which was considered a violation. The condition was briefly considered and dispositioned informally without using any documented analysis, since none was available onsite. Subsequent analyses demonstrated that no potentially critical configuration existed.. However, the first of these analyses was not available for more '
- than a month after the fuel inspection. (Section E3.1)
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The inspector identified a lack of formal design control measures and documentation for the FPM's upper travel limit and radiation monitor interlock. No regulatory requirements
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. The inspector concluded that the licensee had an informal training and qualification
process with respect to refueling and associated work tasks. No specific deficiencies related to training activities were identified and workers were observed to be knowledgeablw of the work activities. However, knowledge weaknesses were noted in emergency response to a fuel handling mishap. (Section ES.1)
Plant Support The inspector observed that radiation protection personnel were closely involved in all
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phases of the preparation and execution of the fuelinspections. Workers were obscrved to follow good radiation worker practices. The inspectors observed goed foreign material -
controls and tool accountability during the work. (Section R1.1)
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x Report Details Summary of Plant Status This inspection covered fuel inspections conducted over the period of November 13-19,1997, and subsequent licensee response to NRC concems. The plant was operating near 96 percent power during the fuelinspections. The fuelinspections were intended to locate and determine -
the cause for two failed fuel bundles, retrieve foreign material from a previously inspected bundle for source determination,' and visually inspect 24 bundles for the presence of foreign material.
1. Operations
' Conduct of Operations
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01.1 Conduct of the Irradiated Fuel Inspection and Operations' involvement a.
Inspection Scope (86700. 71707)
The inspector used Inspection Procedures 86700 and 71707 to evaluated the adequacy
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of the licensee's spent fuel handling activities and to determine whether or not these activities were in t,onformance with the Technical Specifications (TS) and applicable regulations. The inspector reviewed operator logs, surveillance test documentation, applicable administrative procedures, fuel inspection procedures and work requests. ' The briefing notes used to brief operators prior to beginning the inspection were reviewed with the licensee supervisor. Inspection findings were discussed with a nuclear shift supervisor (NSS) and the Operations Superintendent.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector identified that the licensee did not have an administrative procedure that applied to fuel handling during plant power operations. Because the reactor was operating at high power, plant conditions were significantly different from those that would exist during a refueling outage. Thus, the only existing administrative procedure, MOP 13,
" Conduct of Refueling and Core Alterations," normally intended for a refueling outage, was not utilized by the licensee. Instead, the fuel inspection activities were conducted using a work request.
The inspector noted that after the first day of fuel inspections, the control room logs did not contain entries that documented the granting and removal of permission to conduct fuel movement and inspections in the spent fuel pool. Also, the control room log did not document the verification _ of prerequisites or other related information normally required to i conduct any safety related procedure. These types of log entries were observed during
~ the previous two refueling activities. The inspector discussed the lack of log entries and documentation with _ supervisory personnel from operations and reactor engineering, and -
logs of the work status were subsequently kept.-
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Technical Specifications did not directly address fuel handling outside a refueling outage.
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The inspector attempted to determine what controls were being used by questioning the Nuclear Assistant Shift Supervisor to determine what equipment was verified to be operable prior to granting permission to start. The Nuclear Assistant Shift Supervisor replied that it was unclear what equipment was supposed to be available. The inspector determined that the lack of clarity was because The applicable work request (000Z975403) was not present in the control room for
operators to review (only one official copy of a work request was allowed to exist).
The work request specified some prerequisites directly and many indirectly by j
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specifying performance of numerous procedures (also not available in the control room).
The work request did not clearly define which prerequisites were required to be
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completed prior to granting permission to move or inspect fuel, or which were required to be reverified daily.
No narrative log was kept on the refueling floor to document verifications and work performed. The inspector was eventually able to determine what prerequisites were specified for the work. All appropriate prerequisites and pre-use checks were determined by the inspector to have been met, but few were documented.
The inspector verified that control room operators were kept informed of fuel movements, and that a status board of fuellocations was kept current in the control room. However, the inspector noted that operations personnel were not directly participating in the fuel handling and inspection activities, and did not discuss the status of the work during shift tumover briefings. Operators appeared to have minimalinvolvement in the evolution. As further discussed in Section 01.2, operators maintained the fuel status board updated without recognizing or questioning that fuel was left overnight in the fuel preparation machine. This contrasted significantly with practices observed during the previous two refueling operations.
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l The inspector noted that the task manager was acting as a supervisor for the contractors and was actually performing tasks including fuel inspections, recording equipment entering the tool control area, enforcing foreign material control practices, and acting as spotter for fuel bundle movements. The inspector noted that the assignment of multiple
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responsibilities limited the effectiveness of supervisory oversight.
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Conclusions The inspector concluded operators were unfamiliar with the prerequisites required to be performed prior to granting permission to move fuel and conduct fuel inspection activities.
This appeared to be due primarily to a lack of administrative control and documentation.
In addition, control room operators were not as involved in the movement and inspection of fuel as they would be during refueling activities.
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Se 01.2 Temoorary Storaae of Fuel Without Adecuate Analysis and inadeouste Confiouration Control a.
Inspection Scope (86700)
The inspector identified that irradiated fuel was being stored ovemight in the fuel preparation machine, and questioned the basis for this practice with the NSS and task manager for the work. Licensing basis documents, seismic qualification documentation, and system prints were reviewed and discussed with applicable members of the licensee's staff, b.
Observations and Findinas
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b.1
. Temporary Fuel Storage The inspector identified on November 17,1997, at the conclusion of work activities for the day, that a fuel bundle remained in the fuel preparation machine (FPM). The FPM is an air-operated, chain-driven fuel bundle elevator mounted to the side of the spent fuel pool.
A worker stated that a fuel bundle was stored overnight in the FPM to facilitate the prompt start of work the next day. This same practice had been used overnight on November 14 - 15,1997, and again over the weekend November 15 - 17. The inspector -
determined that the storage of spent fuel in the FPM was not briefed with either the operators or the contractors, nor was it documented in the work request. Also, licensee senior management was unaware of this practice. The NSS was not aware that fuel was being stored in this manner, even though control room operators had been updating the fuel status board.
The inspector questioned whether the storage of irradiated fuel in the FPM while unattended was reviewed and approved. The licensee had no list of approved storage locations for nuclear fuel. In response to the inspector's question, the NSS ordered the bundle retumed to the spent fuel pool storage rack on November 17 until the issue could be clarified. The inspector identified that Procedure 23.710, " Fuel Handling System,"
Revision 25, Precaution 3.7.4, stated " Fuel in Spent Fuel Pool shall only be stored in storage cells designed for fuel storage." This did not appear to be met when storing fuel in the FPM. However, as the above statement is only a precaution in the procedure, this was not considered to be an adequate basis for a violation. To assess the suitability of using the FPM as a storage location, the inspector questioned whether the seismic analysis for the FPM bounded the configuration existing during the observed storage periods, and whether adequate water shielding was available above the bundle.
b.2 Seismic Qualification Documentation Table 3.7-15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) listed the FPM as seismically qualified, with no amplifying information provided. The inspector questioned whether the configuration assumed in the analysis bounded the configuration used during the fuelinspection and storage of irradiated fuel. The following fixtures were deterrnined
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a lower rotating inspection fixture
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an upper rotating inspection fixture
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a non-destructive examination fixture for an individual fuel rod e
The attachments were installed by vendor personnel but not clearly documented When
- the inspector questioned what attachments had been added to the FPM, the nuclear fuels group requested that vendor personnel provide the information from memory due to lack-of documentation.
The licensee evaluated for a two month period the basis for reporting the FPM as seismically qualified in the UFSAR. The licensee was originally unable to locate a report from the vendor, contracted to complete an analysis, and stated that a seismic analysis had been completed and was acceptable. Based on discussions with the vendor, the licensee was able to determine that the analysis had been performed. Once the analysis was received,. engineering personnel concluded that the analysis provided a sufficient margin to bound the extra weight added to the fuel preparation machine at the time of the inspection. However, cognizant engineering personnel were unaware of the limitations of the analysis and had not considered the potential impact caused by adding inspection fixtures to the fuel preparation machine prior to making the configuration changes. This was considered to be indicative of a weak understanding of the design and licensing basis for the fuel handling system and poor configuration control and documentation.
Violations involving 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion ill were consiliered. However, because the original seismic analysis bounded the actual as
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found configuration, the technical and regulatory significance of these issues were
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considered to be minimal.
b.3 Available Water Depth The inspector questioned whether the TS 3.9.9 requirement to maintain at least 22 feet of water over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies had been met when irradiated fuel had been stored ovemight and over the weekend in the FPM. This TS was specific to fuel stored in the spent fuel pool racks, but the intent clearly applied to fuel storage in general.
As configured, the licensee estimated that a bundle stored in the FPM in the fully down
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position had only about 20.5 feet of water on top. Regulatory Guide 1.25, " Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors,"
specified assumptions to be used for analyzing potential fuel handling mishaps, and specified_23 feet of water to absorb fission product gases. This discrepancy was not
. recognized or analyzed by the licensee. This was determined to be a deviation from the UFSAR commitment to Regulatory Guide 1.25. (DEV)(50-341/98004-01)
In response to this issue, the licensee committed to evaluate the applicable conditions required to store spent fuel with the intent of specifying approved fuel storage locations.
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c.
Conclusions Operators did not question the practice of storing fuel in the FPM ovemight, even though this practice was not specified in the goveming work request or discussed during shift briefings. When the inspector questioned the practice, the NSS acted conservatively to place the bundle in question back in the normal storage rack until the issue could be further evaluated. The licensee intended to store fuel ovemight in the FPM, but did not document the intent, did not brief it during the shift briefing with plant operators, and did not evaluate the acceptability of storage of spent fuelin the FPM prior to its use. A deviation from a regulatory commitment was identified.
O3 Operations Procedures and Documentation O3.1 Inadeauate Administrative Controls for Handlina irradiated Fuel a.
Inspection Scope (71707. 86700. 62707)
The inspector investigated the administrative controls being used to control the complex job of inspecting multiple fuel bundles. Work requests, task procedures, and briefing notes for the fuel inspection, as well as administrative procedures for refueling were reviewed. The inspector interview 3d workers and operators associated with the evolution to determine their understanding of the controls in place.
b.
Observations and Findinas
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The inspector identified that the licensee did not have a single administrative procedure j
goveming the handling of nuclear fuel when not in a refueling outage. Instead, the fuel
I inspections were performed under Work Request 000Z975403.
The work request was considered by the inspectors to be inadequate for administrative
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control of this complex evolution. The work request specified performance of a number of
procedural activities without adequately specifying the work scope or sequence of the J
work. This document did not adequately specify administrative controls, such as:
Prerequisite testing prior to using the refueling bridge for moving fuel.
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Preventive maintenance and surveillance testing for all necessary equipment.
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Minimum work group manning and supervisory oversight.
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Narrative log keeping requirements.
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Prerequisites were dispersed throughout several procedures, and the procedures
were not available for operators when permission was requested to start fuel inspections each day.
The work request assigned responsibility for the evolution only to the Refuel Floor
Coordinator (RFC). The inspector determined that no RFC was formally assigned to the job, and that the actual supervisor was not qualified as an RFC.
By using a work request, the level of rnanagement review for this work was minimal. The inspector noted that the licensee had performed similar irradiated fuel inspections in June 1997. In preparing for the June 1997 fuel inspections, the licensee formally screened the job and concluded that it did not require the increased controls of an
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Infrequently Performed Test / Evolution because the personnelinvolved were experienced due to a similarjob being performed in 1994. No formal screening was performed or required for the November inspections, even though the fuel leak was an order of magnitude larger than the previous fuel failures at the site.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Work request 000Z975403 did not contain information required to control the work scope and sequence associated with fuel inspection activities. Based on the lack of appropriate work controls, work request 000Z975403 was considered to be an instruction inappropriate to the circumstances, which was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. (VIO)(50-341/98004-02)
In response to the inspector's concerns, licensee senior management placed a moratorium on all work activities in the refueling area until the issues were adequately addressed. This action resulted in significantly delaying completion of the inspection of bundle YJ7119. The licensee is in the process of creating a new administrative procedure for controlling work activities in the refueling area that are performed with the reactor at power. As part of this effort, a review team was created to perform a detailed review of the work performed, procedure adequacy, documentation, and work practices related to the fuel handling and storage system.
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Conclusions This complex evolution was performed without an appropriate level of administrative controls. The work request used to control the evolution was inappropriate to the circumstances, which was a violation. The inspectors concluded that the limitations of using a work request contributed to unclear roles and responsibilities for operators and
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supervisory personnel. Licensee corrective actions for this problem were appropriate and
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comprehensive.
11. Enaineerina E3 Enaineerina Procedures and Documentation E3.1 Inadeauate Criticality Controls Durina Fuel Disassembly a.
Inspection Scope (86700. 71750 )
The inspector observed portions of inspection activities for the two failed fuel bundles and reviewed applicable procedures. One fuel rod was observed to have a 360-degree circumferential crack and the licensee decided to remove adjacent rods to better observe
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the failure without disturbing it. The inspector reviewed available documentation for criticality controls and discussed the issue with reactor engineering supervisory personnel.
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b.
Observations and Findinas During the inspec, tion of the bundle YJ7119, the initial visualinspection indicated a 360-degree circumferential crack at the bottom of inner fuel rod 85. The integrity of B5 was suspect, so adjacent fuel rods were removed to allow visual inspection of the damaged rod. Up to four rods at a time were removed from the bundle, and were hung individually from temporary hooks attached to the fuel pool railing.
The inspector was concemed that removing individual fuel rods from the known, safe configuration of the fuel bundle could potentially result in a critical geometry. The inspector identified that the licensee had not established specific controls to prevent inadvertent criticality caused by changing the fuel geometry during removal of fuel rods from a bundle. Also, the work package did not include steps to cover added controls for removing more than one fuel rod at a time. Additionally, an analysis was not available that delineated how many fuel rods could be safely located in the same vicinity during this Work.
Reactor engineering personnel believed that the licensee-approved vendor procedures provided for removing multiple fuel rods. The inspector pointed out that the procedures did not prohibit such actions, but provided no guidance or limitations. One procedure, 246-GP-43, " Fuel Rod Accountability," provided an administrative tracking process to ensure that fuel rods were replaced in their original location, but no storage or criticality controls.
After the inspector raised the issue, the licensee obtained a letter from General Electric stating that 14 rods from a GE11 bundle could be safely stored together. The inspector subsequently identified that the licensee had only evaluated removing a single fuel rod at a time (Safety Evaluation 89-0138).
The inspector determined that another contributing factor for this condition was the lack of a clearwork scope definition. Station workers had recognized that because the work scope had changed from removal of a single rod to multiple rods from a bundle, there was a need to stop the work and consider how to safely proceed. The situation was discussed with reactor engineering supervision. However, no one involved considered that additional controls were appropriate to prevent a critical geometry, and a revisionto the work package was not considered. Based on a brief, informal discussion on this issue between the licensee and a vendor supervisor, the licensee concluded that inadvertent criticality was not a concern based on engineering judgement. However, neither applicable procedures nor other available documentation were referred to in reaching this conclusion.
General Design Criterion 62 required that criticality in the fuel handling and storage system be prevented by physical systems or processes, preferably by use of geometrically safe confi0urations. The inspector determined that the contractors had two styles of geometrically safe fuel rod storage racks available for the inspection, but had recommended using the hooks to avoid the need to subsequently decontaminate the racks. A lack of criticality controls during fuel bundle disassembly was considered a violation of General Design Criterion 62 as described in the attached NOV.
(VIO)(50-341/98004-03)
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- The licensee was in the process of reviewing all fuel handling evolutions to determine actual and appropriEte criticality controls. Corrective actions were not yet formulated at -
- the completion of this inspection.
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Conclusions -
The inspector concluded that the licensee did not analyze for or implement adequate criticality controls for handling multiple fuel rods simultaneously, which was. considered a violation of General Design Criterion 62. This potential for a critical configuration was briefly considered and dispositioned informally without using any documented analysis,.
since none was available onsite. Subsequent analyses demonstrated that no potentially critical configuration existed.
E3.2 : Inadeouste Control of Eauipment Desian Safety Features a.
Inspection Scope ( 37551. 37700 )
The inspector noted that the vendor-supplied rotating inspection fixture used in the FPM during this fuel inspection was placed under the bundle, resulting in the irradiated fuel being six inches closer to the SFP surface. The inspector reviewed documentation to determine if the six inch difference was appropriately evaluated. The inspector questioned the fuel handler who had reset the chain stops.. The design basis for the upper travel limit for the FPM was reviewed, including design change documents and
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Observations and Findinas The FPM was equipped with chain stops designed to prevent an irradiated bundle from being raised too close to the surface of the spent fuel pool. This was intended to ensure adequate shielding for personnel. The inspector noted that a GE document stated that a special rotating inspection fixture would be supplied for the inspections. This fixture was six inches thicker than the normal fixture, and would be placed under the bundle in the FPM. This necessitated resetting the chain stops to account for the extra bundle height.
The UFSAR stated that the FPM's full upward travel chain stop was required for personnel protection, and must be strictly controlled administratively. However, the inspector determined that there was no documentation as to whether the actual setting accounted for the special fixture's height. The inspector questioned the fuel handler who had checked the chain stops and determined that the stops did not actually require adjustment to account for the thicker lower rotating inspection fixture, although this was not clearty documented. The inspector reviewed Work Request 000Z978296 and determined that the work step could not be followed as written. The work step stated:
" Adjust the chain stop on the fuel prep machines to allow at least 6 ft of water
- above top of fuel per 23.710."
The inspector noted that Section 4.1 of " Procedure 23.710", set the chain stop using an indirect measurement to obtain 6 feet of water depth. With the thicker inspection fixture installed, following the procedure would have resulted in only 5.5 feet of water above the
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top of the fuel. The work request did not state that an abnormal fixture height needed to be accounted for in the setting of the chain stop. The inspector attempted to verify the basis for the specified setpoint for the upper chain stops. The system engineer stated
that the setpoint for the chain stop was measured by placing a dummy bundle in the FPM at a depth of 6 feet, then measuring the corresponding distance between the footplate and a point on the carriage. This indirect measurement allowed setting the chain stop without a bundle in the FPM, and was implemented as a procedure section in 23.710.
The inspector determined that this method of calculating a setting for a design feature of the FPM was informal, lacked adequate verifications, and was never documented. The setting represented a non-conservative change from the original vendor-specified setpoint of 6 feet 3-3/4 inches to 6 feet 0 inches and was never evaluated. It was conservative relative to a similar TS limit for the refueling bridge grapple. Also, a plant modification package for installing a radiation monitor interlock to stop the FPM travel did not document the setpoint or basis, and no functional check of the interlock had been performed since original Mstallation.
The inspector determined that the FPM was not identified as a quality piece of equipment, and it did not perform any safety function. Thus, the formal design control measures of j
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B did not apply to the FPM. However, the personnel protection i
function for the FPM was clearly important. It was directly analogous to the upper travel limit for the refueling bridge grapple, which was controlled by TS.
j The licensee acknowledged the importance of this design function. In response to these concerns, engineering personnel began a design and licensing basis review of all fuel handling system equipment. Specific documentation deficiencies were scheduled to be corrected.
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Conclusions The inspector identified a lack of formal design control measures and documentation for the fuel preparation machine's upper travel limit and radiation monitor interlock. No regulatory requirements were violated.
ES Engineering Staff Training and Qualification E5.1 Refuelina Floor Worker Qualifications a.
Inspection Scope (86700)
The inspector reviewed training and qualification records for individuals performing work during the fuel inspections, both for the licensee and the vendor.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector identified that licensee personnel involved in fuel handling activities received little formal training. This included the refueling floor coordinators. Familiarity with the work was gained primarily through on the iob training. The only formal qualification associated with fuel handling was for refueling bridge operators. Personnel who were considered to have the necessary skills and experience by licensee management were not formally designated as such.
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The inspector determined that the licensee placed a heavy reliance on the experience and expertise of the vendor's personnel. The licensee did not take any action to determine the amount and content of training provided by the vendor to the workers hired at Fermi. While quality assurance inspector certifications were verified properly, familiarity with the work procedures was not checked. This was important because the licensee designated the vendor's procedures as reference use procedures, so the procedures were not required to be in-hand and followed step by step.
The inspectors questioned licensee personnel supervising the fuel inspections about response to fuel handling mishaps. Responses indicated a lack of detailed knowledge and training for such situations. The inspector reviewed all applicable station procedures for responding to a fuel handling mishap and concluded that the procedures only addressed a high radiation or airborne radioactivity condition. A lesser mishap was more likely based on industry experience. The inspector identified that the licensee did not have a specific procedure for combating irradiated fuel damage while refueling. However, interviews with senior reactor operators indicated that sufficient guidance to respond was available. Licensee management stated that procedural guidance would be improved in response to this concern. Procedures from other nuclear stations were under review at the conclusion of this inspection.
c.
Conclusions The inspector concluded that the licensee had an informal training and qualification process with respect to refueling area work tasks. No specific deficiencies related to training were identified and workers were observed to be knowledgeable of the work activities. However, knowledge weaknesses were noted in emergency response to a fuel handling mishap.
111. Plant Support R.
Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Excellent Radiation Protection Support of frradiated FuelInspection a.
Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspector observed radiation protection support and radiation worker practices for irradiated fuelinspection activities. Briefing notes and work instructions were reviewed.
b.
Observations and Findinas Radiation protection personnel were closely involved in all phases of the preparation and execution of the fuelinspections. A radiation protection technician experienced in refueling area activities was assigned continuously to support the work. The inspector observed excellent support of the work. Radiation and contamination surveys were promptly taken as conditions changed.
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Workers were observed to exercise good radiation worker practices. Communications of expected changes in radiological conditions were made prior to any changes.
Contamination control was good, and no personnel contamination events occurred during the work.
The inspectors observed good foreign material controls and tool accountability during the work. A member of the licensee's Independent Safety Engineering Group was observed conducting a surveillance of these practices and promptly initiated corrective actions for minor deficiencies identified during the surveillance.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors observed that radiation protection personnel were closely involved in all phases.of the preparation and execution of the fuelinspections. Workers were observed to follow good radiation worker practices. The inspectors observed good foreign material controls and tool accountability during the work.
IV. Manaaement Meetinas X.
Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on February 26,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
- Licensee D. Cobb, Operations Superintendent P. Fossier, Plant Manager E. Heitzenrater, NSS, Operations
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T. Hsieh, Nuclear Fuels Supervisor
.W. O'Connor, Manager of Nuclear Assessment N. Peterson, Acting Director, Nuclear Licensing J. Plons, Technical Director T. Schehr, Operating Engineer S. Stasek, Supervisor, independent Safety Engineering Group
- J. Thorson, Nuclear Engineering Supervisor W. Tucker, Supervisor Nuclear Fuels and Reactor Engineering Group NRC A. Kugler, Fermi 2 Project Manager, NRR
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t INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 37700:
Design Changes and Modifications IP 40500:
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 62707:
Maintenance Observation IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities IP 86700:
Spent Fuel Pool Activities ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-341/98004-01 DEV frradiated Fuel Stored Overnight in the FPM 50-341/98004-02 VIO Inappropriate Instruction for Fuel Handling 50-341/98004-03 VIO Lack of Critical Controls During Fuel Bundle Disassembly Closed None.
Discussed None.
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t LIST OF ACRONYMS USED DEV Deviation -
FPM Fuel Preparation Machine GE General Electric NRC.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSS Nuclear Shift Supervisor -
RFC Refueling Floor Coordinator TS Technical Specification UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report VIO Violation 17