IR 05000341/1988034

Enforcement Conference Rept 50-341/88-34 on 881118.Major Areas Discussed:Apparent Violations to 10CFR50,App B Identified & Info Pertinent to Cause,Extent,Treatment & Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence of Problems

ML20196E044
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	12/05/1988
From:	Eick S, Harrison J, James Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196E035	List: IR 05000341/1988034 ML20196E030
References
50-341-88-34-EC, NUDOCS 8812090262
Download: ML20196E044 (4)

Text

F. , . .

. .

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-341/88034(DRS)

Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43 Licensee: The Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48266 Facility Name: Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Station

!

Meeting At: Region III Office, Glen Ellyn, Illinois -

Meeting Conducted: November 18, 1988 Type of Meeting: Enforcement Conference Date of Previous Inspection: September 6 through October 6, 1988 d?fdle-ui{h~

Inspectors 6SoniaEick ji

/2/.r#r

/ . Da te'

/~ dwleh-

' '" ' ' '""

,

~/'/"

Fite WM Approved By: 'J. D. Harrison, Chief ( 9O Engineering Branch Date Inspection Sumary ,

Meeting on November 18,1988(Report No. !a0-341/88034(DRSM Areas riscussed: Apparent violations to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B were

'

icent fied by the NRC and information pertinent to the cause, extent, treatment and .orrective ac. tion to prevent recurrence of the problems were presented by l the licensee. The analysis and disposition of the apparent violations !

will be presented in subsequent communication t

,

l

!

8912090262 G91205 FDR ADOCK 03000341 i O FDC

T

-

.

. .

,

DETAILS Persons Contacted Detroit Edison Company (Deco)

B. R. Sylvia, Senior Vice President W. S. Orser, Vice President, Nuclear Operations S. G. Catola, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Service R. E. Ballis, Supervisor, Nuclear Engineering G. Cranston, General Director, Nuclear Engineering L. C. Fron, General Supervisor, Plant Engineering C. R. Gelletly, Supervisor, Special Projects, Nuclear L. Goodman, Director, Nuclear Licensing P. Marquardt, General Attorney T. L. Riley, Supervisor, Compliance R. B. Stafford, Director, Nuclear Quality Assurance and Plant Safety F. J. Svetkovich, Assistant to Plant Manager General Electric (GE)

D. A. Harmon, Lead Plant Perfomance Engineer Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC)

A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator, Region !!! ,

C. J. Paperiello, Deputy Regional Administrator '

J. W. Cliffced, kegicnal Coordinator, OD and DRO  :

R. W. Cooper, Section Cntef, Region III i D. H. Danielson, Section Chief Ragion Ill S. D. Eick, Reactor inspector, Region III J. J. Harrison, Chief. Engineering Branch, Region III  !

R. C. Knop Projects, Branch Chiet, Region III  ;

H. J. Miller Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region !!! L D. R. Muller, Acting Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects,  !

Region III P. R. Pelke, Project inspector, Region III .

W. G. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspec*.or, Femi l W. H. Schultz, Enforcement Coordinator, Region !!! '

J. F. Smith, Reactor Inspector J. F. Stang, Project Manager, NRR f Enforcement Conference i

As a result of apparent violations of NRC requirements, an enforcement conference was held in the Region !!! office on November 18, 1988. The l preliminary findings which were the bases for these apparent vinlations '

of NRC requirements were documented in NRC Inspection Report m 50-341/88025(DRS) and were transmitted to the licensee by letw dated i November 9, 1988. The attendees of this Conference are noted in '

Paragraph 1 of this report,

,

. - _ .__. _

- . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __

. . _ .

,

'

. .-

. ..

,

I The purpose of the conference was to: (1) discuss the findings l identified during the special safety inspection conducted i September 6 through October 6, 1988; (2) determine whether there l were any mitigating circumstances; (3) obtain other information f which would help determine the appropriate enforcement action; and i (4) detemine what corrective actions had been taken by the licensee and what actions would be taken in the futur !

l In opening the conference, the NRC representatives identified the r following apparent violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B:  !

Criterion 111-Design Control: Failure to require adherence to  !

controlled torque switch setting criteri *

Criterion IV. Procurement Document Control: Failure to require that contractor personnel be trained to install and set switches on  !

motor operated valves (MOVs).

,

l

Criterion V-Instructions, Procedures and Drawings: Failure to l provide effective MOV switch installing and setting procedure [

I

Criterion XVI-Corrective Action: Failure to provide prompt corrective actio The licensee briefly reviewed the history of motor operated salve switch [

settings at Femi from the standpoints of design, maintenance and l testing. A review of the corrective action completed during the 38 day [

outage followed alon OperatedValveIMOV)gwithadescriptionoftheLongTermMotor Program. The subjects covered included: [

.

The .'omal issuance of controlled MOV torque switch settings and l the revision of procedures to ensure their us [

The training of personnel (both licensee and contractor) to be used for MOV wor '

The revision of procedures to correct discrepancie * The additional training of personnel in root cause deteminations i to improve the recognition and appropriate response to potential !

generic problem !

!

The extension of the knowledge gained on safety related valves to Balance of Plant (BOP) MOV The licensee also provided a discussion of the benefits of separating the torque switch bypass function from the valve position light rotor I The conclusion presented was that the modification was unnecessary, not (

cost effective, and offered a potential for additional problem [

As a result of additional engineering analysis performed prior to the l Enforcement Conference, the licensee found that earlier analyses had

._

l

. .- . . ..

been overly conservative and that only one valve (B31-F031B) was actually inoperable, instead of three, as originally determined. The licensee pointed out that the test program outlined by the Confirtiatory Action Letter (CAL) was proposed by DECO and that it was an aggressive, ,

immediate and thorough program. The licensee also noted that the Long term Program was highly responsive and that it extended well beyond safety ;

related MOVs and included both critical and non-critical valves. The Long !

Term Progran extends through 1995 and entails numerous improvements in -

procedures, trending, documentation and coordination of infonnation, f

,  ;

The evaluation and disposition of the apparent violations will be ;

presented in subsequent coomunication !

!

>

i

) ,

l i

I

J s f

i h

! l l [

I k

i b

'

!

,

y l

t

!

i i [

!

!

!  !

!

+

!

l 1 ,

!

<

l l'

l 4 i

'

I