IR 05000341/1988013

Enforcement Conference Rept 50-341/88-13 on 880413.Major Areas Discussed:Review & Discussion of Enforcement Options Re Four Potential Violations of Licensee Security Plan

ML20151X880
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	04/20/1988
From:	Creed J, Funk D, Mallett B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151X878	List: IR 05000341/1988013 ML20151X873
References
50-341-88-13-EC, NUDOCS 8805040277
Download: ML20151X880 (3)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III  !

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Report No. 50-341/88013(DRSS) j Docket No. S0-341 t.icense No. NPF-43 l Licensee: Detroit Edison Company 2200 Second Avenue .

Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name: Fermi 2 Atomic Power Plant [

Meeting At: Region III Office, Glen Ellyn, Illinois i Meeting Conducted: April 13, 1988 Type of Meeting: Enforcement Conference ,

Date of Previous Security Inspection: March 10-18, 23-24, 1988 Inspector: - '# -

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Y[/Y88 Donald E. Funk, J Date r Physical Security Inspector

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Reviewed By: % 21r o f!B8 i@imes'RTCreed, Chief Date LSafeguards Section e Approvec By: )$

Bruce S. Mallett, Ph.D., Chief Ylst/ff Date Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch l Inspection Summary

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Inspection on April 13, 1988 (Report No. 50-341/88013(DRSS))

Areas Discussed: Included a review and discussion of the enforcement options pertaining to four potential violations of the licensee's security plan -

relating to a series of personnel failures involving security organization and access control program failure {

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I 8805040277 880421 PDR ADOCK 05000341 g DCD .

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DETAILS 1. Key Persons Contacted Detroit Edison Company B. Sylvia, Group Vice President W. Orser, Vice President, Nuclear Operations S. Catola, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering J. Flynn, Legal L. Goodman, Licensing Supervisor R. Kelm, Director, Nuclear Security M. Candela, Personnel Security Supervisor Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III C. Norelius, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards B. Mallett, Chief, Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch R. Knop, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3 J. Creed, Chief, Safeguards Section R. Cooper, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B W. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector C. Anderson, Enforcement Specialist P. Pelke, Project Inspector D. Funk, Jr. , Safeguards Inspector 2. Enforcement Conference An Enforcem. .it Conference was held in the NRC Region III office on April 13, 1988, as a result of the preliminary findings which identified four apparent violations of NRC requirement The report (No. 50-341/88010(DRSS)) was transmitted to the licensee by letter dated April 13, 1988. The attendees of this conference are noted in Paragraph 1 of this repor The purpose of the conference was to: (1) discuss the aoparent violations, the significance, cause, and the licensee's corrective actions; (2) determine whether there were any aggravating or mitigating circumstances; and (3) obtain other information which would help determine the appropriate enforcement actio NRC Representatives stated that the weapon-related incident appears to represent failures of several personnel to be adequately responsive to this type of situatio It was also stated that the access control incidents may be attributed to programmatic weaknesses on the part of the license The licensee began by saying they did not believe any of the violations were of a nature that they should be considered a Severity Level III or higher. The licensee also stated they felt security has much improved over the past ten months to a yea ..__ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ .- __ _ . _ _ _

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The licensee handed out documents describing the licensee's synopsis of the incidents, corrective actions, and root cause analyses. The licensee stated the weapon-related incident, identified by Detroit Edison, could be viewed as a violction of the Fermi 2 Physical Security Plan. The

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incident invulved a trained, qualified, and arved security officer ,

3 removing his weapon during an argument and pointing it at another office !

Additionally, the victim and a witness, both security officers failed to !

innediately notify Security Supervision. The delay in notification  ;

! hampered management's ability to assess the matter and caused an -

t investigation to take an additional two day ;

r i The corrective actions included disciplinary action to the officers  !

a involved, meeting with and individualized letters to members of the '

security department, training security supervisors in conflict resolution, and incorporating the weapons policy into an existing procedure. The ,

licensee closed this portion by saying they do not condone the actions of t any of the Security Officers involved.

t Concerning the access control program failures the licensee related, it l also was licensee identified and is contrary to the Physical Security i Plan. Their corrective action included detailed written ouidance and a detailed audit of program components. They expressed their belief that

, the Access Authori:ation Program is one of the foundation blocks of a j good performing nuclear utility.

j NRC representatives reiterated its position that no final determination !

on the potential violations have yet been made and the licensee would be ;

notified by separate correspondence of NRC's decision regarding ,

enforcement action l l

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