IR 05000341/1989021

Insp Rept 50-341/89-21 on 890717-0905.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety,Maint, Surveillances,Followup of Events,Ler Followup,Assembly/ Accountability,& Management Meetings

ML20248C356
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	09/27/1989
From:	Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20248C348	List: IR 05000341/1989021 ML20248C343
References
50-341-89-21, NUDOCS 8910030431
Download: ML20248C356 (17)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No.' 50-341/89021(DRP):

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Docket No. 50-341 Operating License No. NPF-43 Licensee: Detroit Edison ComG :y 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI' 48226-Facility Name: Fermi 2-Inspection At: Fermi Site, Newport, MI Inspection Conducted: July 17 through September 5,1989 inspectors: W. G. Roger S. Stasek G. O'Dwyer P. Pelke

. . Af 27f$y Approved By: M. ng,Cbief Reactor Projects Section 3B Date Inspection Summary -

Inspection on July 17 to September 5,1989 (Report No. 50-341/89021(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Action on previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; followup of events; LER followup; assembly / accountability; and management meeting Results: One unresolved item was identified (Paragraph 3.e). Six open items were identified (Paragraphs 3, 4,'and 9). Overall, the licensee continued to operate the plant with a proper perspective toward safety. However, cases were observed where operator cognizance of equipment configuration was questione Examples include the return-to-service of the Standby Gas Treatment system l (Paragraph 3.e) as well as the Primary Containment Radiation Monitoring System isolation valves (Paragraph 3.j).

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. 2 DETAILS 1.. TPersons Contacted-l- Detroit Edison Compan P. Anthony, Licensing S. Catola, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering _and Service *@ G. Cranston, General Director,. Nuclear Engineering

D. Gipson,' Plant Manager

• @ L. Goodman, Director of Licensin *

R. McKeon, Superintendent, Operations-

• @ R. Matthews, Superintendent, Maintenance-

' @ R. May, Director, Nuclear Materials Management -

• @ W. Orser, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• - J.' Pendergast', Compliance Engineer-F. Svetkovich, Assistant to the Plant Manager G.- Overbeck, Director Nuclear Training

T. Riley, Supervisor, Compliance

A. Settles,' Superintendent, Technical Engineering

@ B. R.~ Sylvia, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations

R. Stafford, Director, Quality _ Assurance

R. Thorson, Outage Manager W. Tucker, Assistant to the Vice President U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• @ W.~ Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector

S. Stasek, Resident Inspecto ~@ R. Cooper, Chief,' Engineering Branch, DRS

@ B. Drouin,_ Project Inspector

@ P. Eng, Licensing Project Manager, NRR

@ W. Forney, Deputy Director, DRP

@ R. Knop, Chief, DRP Branch 3 G. O'Dwyer, Resident Inspector, Perry

@ C. Paperiello, Deputy Regional Administrator

@ P. Pelke, Project. Inspector

@ A. Walker, Reactor Inspector

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• Denotes those attending the exit meeting on September 18, 1989.

@ Denotes those attending the monthly management meeting on August 15, 198 The inspectors also interviewed others of the licensee's staff during this inspectio . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (Closed) Violation (341/88037-04(DRP)): Qualification of Core Spray Piping. The corrective action and the inspection review for this issue was documented in an NRC letter to the licensee dated July 23, 198 _ __ __= _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ -

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- ; .. (Closed) Open_ Item (341/89002-05(DRP)): ' Lack'of a master refueling control: document. Procedure NPP 35.710.004, " Refueling Sequence,"

was issue c. -(0 pen)' Unresolved Item (341/89002-03(DRP)): Operation without maintaining proper crywell-to-torus differential pressure (dp). The

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1 NUTECH analysis to address negative dp conditions during containment-venting operations was completed!and the report issued to DECO by a

' letter dated May 9, 1989. . NUTECH concluded that an adequate margin exits up to a dp of minus 9 inches WC. However, additional

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. structural loadings of up to 40 percent were indicated.and revision of certain acceptance criteria;in the non-conservative direction was

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required in the analysis. The inspector subsequently forwarded the-analysis to Region III for review by NRR personnel with expertise in the subject area. The licensee _has revised system operating' procedure NPP-23.406 to incorporate cautionary notes to address the operating limitations imposed as a result of the NUTECH analysis. This item will continue to remain open pending completion of NRC revie ' (Closed) Open Item (341/89018-07(DRP)): Operator response to drywell sump' leakage. Alarm Response Procedure 2D96 was apprcpiately revise (0 pen) Violation (341/88037-01(DRP)): Red-lining of drawings. The licensee completed the 100 percent reverification of all red-lined

. drawings.for temporary modification and engineering design package The' inspectors will select another sampleof red-lined drawings to ascertain the adequacy of the corrective action (0 pen) Open Item (341/89011-07(DRP)): Implementation of the

' lubrication program plan. Since the previous review in July 1989, the person assigned responsibil.ity for implementation of the program resigned. A new person has been assigned and the inspector met with him-to exchange information regarding program status. No significant progress was made since July due to the personnel turnove On August 23, 1989, during implementation of Work Request E267890628, maintenance journeymen inadvertently greased the EDGSW pump R30010006 with Shell A1vania 2EP instead of RHRSW pump E11510001C as required by the work reques The CEC 0 database specifies Shell Alvania 2EP for both pumps. This'information was appropriately verified in a conversation between the maintenance supervisor and the lubrication engineer. The correct pump was subsequently lubricated. The inspector toured the RHR building and noted that the following pumps were missing name tags: RHRSW pump E1151C001C and the EDGSW pumps for EDGs 12, 13, and 14. The maintenance supervisor committed to have'name tags installed on the

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pumps. A DER was written to document this event. The inspector noted that the maintenance supervisor attached copied pages from the November 1988 lube manual to the DER as justification that the appropriate lubrication was used in both pumps. This is a concern ,

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to the inspector in that copies of the old lube manual were to be removed from the plant in response to the lubrication program action pla i

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On August 15, 1989, DER 89-0907 was written for the North CCHVAC fan bearing failure identified during disassembly and inspection of the motor to determine if the bearings were greased properly (Work Request No. 008C890224). The system engineer was to submit the damaged components to the licensee's Corporate Engineering Research Department (ERD) to determine the root cause of the hearing failur t (0 pen) Violation (341/89011-03B(DRP)): Mounting torque values were not specified in the work package for the East Hydrogen Recombine DER 89-0500 and DER 89-0786 were written to document the violatio The inspector reviewed Procedure NPP-35.000.240, Revision 21,

" Bolting and Torquing," which was revised on June 22, 1989, to clarify when torque values or prestressing instructions are required and where they are obtained. The inspector reviewed Revision 1 of Procedure NPP-PS1-01, " Planning of Maintenance Activities."

Section 6.1.7 now references torquing during the work planning phase, and the Work Request Planning Checklist was revised to include torquing as a separate line item in the specific requirements section. This item will remain open pending closeout of DERs 89-0500 and 89-0786 and incorporation of the " Lessons Learned" into the next continuing training cycle for maintenance journeymen and foreme (0 pen) Violation (341/89011-03A(DRP)): Failure to complete an LC0 sheet when temporary batteries were connected to supply the normal loads of 24/48 VDC battery R3200S001. Memorandum NP-TE-89-0060 was placed in the plant Night Order The inspector verified that all shifts reviewed the memorandum through a review of Night Order sign-offs. NPP-47.310.02, "24/48 VDC Quarterly Battery Check," was revised on August 21, 1989, to include in the general precautions and limitations that if the normal batteries (or cells) were to be removed from the system, the system would not be considered operable and if the normal batteries or any portion of the normal battery was removed from service, the loads would also be considered inoperabl Alarm Response Procedures ARP 9D18 and 10067 were revised on August 24, 1989, to state if 48/24V DC System was being supplied by temporary batteries, Procedure 23.310 was to be referenced for Technical Specification instrumentation to be declared inoperabl Paragraph 8.1.2 of NPP-23.310, Revision 9, lists the Technical Specification instrumentation considered to be inoperable while temporary batteries are in service. Procedure NPP-35.310.002,

"24/48 VDC Electrical System - General Maintenance," was revised on June 6, 1989 to add a Technical Specification reference per DER 89-026 The inspector could not find this reference in the body of the procedure. Procedure NPP-35.310.001 was appropriately revised to reflect the precautions and limitations from memorandum NP-TE-89-0060. The inspector reviewed Revision 5 to ST 0P-315-064-001,

" Plant DC Systems Training Manual." Appropriate changes were made to the systems interrelations section and the lessons % rned sectio However, Section 5.1 contained a note which stated, "the equipment listed may be affected by placing a 48/24VDC battery charger in service to the float mode of operation. Some of these systems are ESF actuatiores and if actuations can be attributed to voltage spiking, they are considered expected and not reportable." The inspector is

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concerned that this note conflicts with the intent of the deportability requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). .This item wil1~ remain open pending further review of this note.and the

. procedure changes referenced abov (0 pen) Violation (341/89011-06): Inadequate fire watch trainin .This issue is documented ~in DER 89-0789 assigned to Training and iDER 89-0565 assigned to' Maintenance. Informal fire rated assemblies training was completed by maintenance personnel on May 5, 198 I&C. personnel completed training in June 1989. Revision 2 of Fire Watch Training Lesson Plan No. LP-FP-512-001 was issued on July 19,.

1989. . The duties and responsibilities of fire watches were clarified in the' plan. Training Work Requests-(TWRs) 89-01351, 01352, and 01353.were written to (1) include the specific event in the latest presentation of maintenance training, (2) establish an annual training requirement for fire watch classroom training, and (3) require all GMJ maintenance personnel to attend training and qualify as a fire watc The TWRs are scheduled to be implemented by January 1,199 '

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Urgent required reading was completed by'all licensed operators in July 193 It specified that when a fire barrier is to be breached, fire watch responsibility will clearly be established. Just before the-fire barrier is'first breached, the organization requiring the-breach will contact the control room NSO. The NS0 will then put in the control room log the name of the fire watch and their organization. A Personal Training History System (PTHS) monthly-report is now issued to all shift supervisors which indicates those individuals that are currently qualified in the standing of a fire watch. The annual requalification training will'also be tracked by PTH This item will remain open pending closeout of DERs 89-0789 and 89-056 .- Operational _ Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period from July 17 to. September 5,1989. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of'affected components. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated'for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control During the inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the following systems to verify operability by comparing system lineup with plant drawings, as-built configuration or present valve lineup

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lists; observing equipment condi4 ons that could degrade performance; and. verified that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning,

-and calibrate * Standby. Gas Treatment System (Divisions'I and II)-

• Standby Liquid Control System

• Emergency _ Diesel Generators Nos. 11 and 12

• - Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control Units (South Banks)

• Thermal-Recombiner. System (Divisions I and II)

• Control Center HVAC System The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barrelin These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conforrance with the requirement;~ established under-technical-specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures, Following the July 9,1989, station air compressor failure event (Reference Inspection Report 341/89018, Paragraph 6) the inspector questioned whether the non-interruptible air system (NIAS) should have been classified as an engineered safety feature (ESF). On August 31, 1989, the inspector met with the plant manager, general supervisor plant engineering and the supervisor of compliance and special projects. The results of the meeting were:

(1) The licensee would submit a Technical Specification explicitly on the NIA (2)~' All valid automatic initiations of the NIAS compressors would be reported through voluntary LER (3) Engineering would review the NIAS against the physical separation and Appendix R requirements for an ESF syste This matter will be revisited upon conclusion of the engineering revie During review and discussion with licensee personnel the inspector ascertained that all the control room annunciators were powered from the same power source. The inspector discussed this matter with licensee managemen Subsequent to the discussion a PDC was initiated to provide an automatic throwover switch to a backup power sourc This is considered an open item (341/89021-01(DRP)). On August 21, during a walkdown of a portion of the control center heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (CCHVAC) system, the inspector noted that the filter train ductwork housing access panels were missing 8 of the lockwashers (7 on one panel, 1 on the other)

installed on the mounting bolts. In addition, one lockwasher was not installed properly and two of the bolts were found loose. This was communicated to the plant maaager (who was present at the time)

who committed to have the situation rectified. Subsequent followup

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with the system engineer revealed all the bolting for the access panels had later been checked and reinstalled as needed. The-subject deficiencies stemmed in part from weaknesses in. implementing the return-to-service process as well as poor work performance by craft personnel. The problems apparently occurred as part of work activities within the filter train on the previous two days. The timeframe for performing.the work was limited and maintenance

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personnel greatly expedited the job. The work package L -(W.R..001C890819), only provided general direction on reinsta11ation l .of the access panels (i.e., step 17, " Reinstall Housing Cover"),

L relying on craft capability to properly perform the required step (s).

No-inspection requirements were designated, and any supervisor checks of the work performed did not identify the problems. Additionally,

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the post-maintenance testing that was performed would not-have-identified thit problem. Subsequently, operations returned the system to servic During a walkdown of control room panels on the morning of August 4,

'the inspector noted a loss of valve position indication for Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) (E11-F068). The control room operator initially replaced the subject light bulbs with no success and subsequently dispatched an operator to the Motor Control Center (MCC) who determined the control fuse for the valve had " blown".

The fuse was immediately replaced and control room position indication was restored. When questioned whether a Deviation Event Report (DER) would be initiated, the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS)

responded that one was not required unless there was a generic-concern or repeated failures of that' fuse or type of fuse. When further questioned upon the method for trending matters of this type, the NSS indicated that logbook entries would accomplish that function. Upon returning to the control room later that day, the inspector found that no logbook entries had been made documenting the fuse failure. Upon prompting by the inspector, a late entry was nade to identify the earlier proble During the walkdown of the Standby Gas Treatment System on August 23, the inspector noted that the top-most latch on the access door for the Division I After-Filter housing access door was in the unlatched position. When the condition was brought to the attention of the operating authority, an operator was dispatched and verified the latch was not properly made-up. He then tightened the latch and performed a check of all other latches (on both SBGT divisions) to verify no others were mispositione '

Subsequently, the inspector ascertained the latch was apparently left mispositioned following completion of surveillance procedure NPP-43.404.01, " Standby Gas Treatment Filter Performance Test Division," conducted on August 15-16, 1989. A review of the completed procedure revealed that the engineer who had performed the independent verification of latch position was not truly independent of the work activities on the SBGT train in that he was involved with specific door manipulations prior to performing verification of their proper (as-left) configuratio In addition, Procedure

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Section 6, " Independent Verification Sheet," steps 6.1, 6.2 and , were not performed upon completion of the procedure. Despite this, L the procedure was subsequently reviewed by the operating authority, the Technical Specification LCO " cleared" and SBGT Division I was returned-to-service on August 16, 1989. Pending completion of the inspector's review this is considered an Unresolved Item (341/89021-02(DRP)).

f. During the period the inspector performed a followup on Deviation Event Report (DER) 89-0785, " food and Water Supply in Main Control Room," which addressed an apparent deviation from an FSAR commitment to maintain a five day supply of food in the control center comple The inspector verified that no food supply was, at the time, provided in the control center and that no relaxation of the commitment was previously allowed. Subsequently, the licensee purchased and staged

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freeze-dried food as well as bottled water within the control center to comply with the commitmen g. On August 24s the inspector observed an attempted start of the Torus Water Management System (TWMS). System Operating Procedure NPP-23.144, " Torus Water Management System," was used to perform the evolution; nowever, during the startup sequence, the pump discharge relief valve lifted causing approximately 30 gallons of suppression pool grade water to relieve to the area around the TWMS pumps (which are located in the HPCI cubicle). When the inspector questioned the operators, they indicated that a design problem existed in the TWMS in that the pumps are each rated for 50 percent flow capacity but the piping is 100 capacity. This means that to avoid a runout condition, both pumps must be in operatio The procedure reflects this situation by requiring a start of the second pump shortly after the first is started to avoid the eventual damage if only one was routinely operated. However, if the timing of the second start is too quick, the pump discharge relief valve may lift, periodically contaminating a portion of the HPCI cubicle. The licensee is currently evaluating the system design. This is considered an open item pending completion of the evaluation (341/89021-03(DRP)).

h. During a plant tour, the inspector noted that DNT Tag No. 003483 was attached to the East Hydrogen Recombiner Blower Motor. Further review determined that corresponding Work Request 0110890509 was pending to replace the mounting bolts with new bolts meeting the specification. The Work Request referenced DER 89-0506 which stated that during a field walkdown for determining the material type of four 1/2 inch mounting bolts for the East Hydrogen Recombiner Blower Motor, it was observed that the installed bolting may have been replaced by Maintenance. This was further verified by licensee inspection of the west motor mounting bolts. No documentation was found to provide justification for the chang The DER was dispositioned use-c.s-is based on engineering evaluation; however, the DNT and Work Request were not cancelled as stated in the DE The inspector brought this to the attention of appropriate maintenance personne . - _-____________ - -_- __ _

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- During walkdowns of' control panels the inspector noted apparently elevated temperatures in the condensate storage tank (CST) on'a'

number.of' occasions during the inspection period. Values varied

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from approximately 105-115 degrees Fahrenheit. The inspector then

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questioned operators as to whether a maximum' allowable temperature was specified. : Operators indicated that only a lower limit was specified. They also informed the inspector that the control room recorder was potentially inaccurate due to an apparent ~ intermittent ground on.the thermocouple' wiring and troubleshooting was in progres It was subsequently decided that a local reading would be taken i the interim and'the value logged in the CRNSO log once per shift until. repairs on the thermocouple were complete Upon reviewing the FSAR, the inspector found that Figure 6.3-1, L Sheet 2, specified a maximum limit of 100 degrees Fahrenheit for the CST during the accident mode. When the additional information was provided to licensee personnel, Deviation Event Report (DER) )

No. 89-0796 was initiate '

The inspector subsequently inquired as to whether CST temperature was an input in the G.E. transient analysis. The licensee reviewed 0PL-3, " Transient Protection Parameters Verification for Reload-Licensing' Analysis," and ascertained that an upper bound for CST temperature was specified as 120 degrees Fahrenheit. When further questioned as to whether the 120 degree Fahrenheit temperature was exceeded, the ii n see reviewed the associated strip' charts for the month of July 1989 and determined CST temperature had exceeded the 120 degree limit on several occasion (Maximum temperature was 131 degrees Fahrenheit).

-The basis for the 120 degree Fahrenheit limit was subsequently evaluated and a determination was made that the upper limit was established for HPCI piping design considerations and not-specifically for any transient analysi Moreover,-the maximum value of CST temperature specified in OPL-3 had earlier been revised to 140 degrees Fahrenheit in support of the cycle 2 reload analysis analyzed as acceptable by G.E. to be consistent with piping design specifications for.HPCI/RCIC in the UFSAR. The licensee is currently reviewing the UFSAR for consistency in this area and will revise the applicable UFSAR sections as neede Since, the CST upper temperature limit has been revised to 140 degrees Fahrenheit, the occasions where actual temperatures exceed 120 degrees Fahrenheit to a maximum of 131 degrees had minimal safety consequence Since this was an example of where an UFSAR value was not translated into an operational limit, the inspector questioned whether the other initial values assumed for transient analysis and documented in the OPL-3 listing had been translated into operating limits. The licensee committed to perform such a review. Pending completion of licensee actions on this and subsequent inspector review, this is considered an open item (341/89021-04(DRP)).

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.. On August 16 at 2058 hours0.0238 days <br />0.572 hours <br />0.0034 weeks <br />7.83069e-4 months <br />, the licensee performed a swap-over.of the

"A" reactor. protection system (RPS) from its alternate supply to the motor generator set (normal. supply). This is a dead-bus transfer L and certain isolations occur. Following completion of the swap-over,-

these isolations are-normally' reset and any valve realignments are returned.to normal. This evolution is specified in Procedure 23.316,

"RPS.120 VAC and RPS MG Sets," and operators utilized applicable portions for;the swap-over. However, although Enclosure A of the procedure'specifically delineated the equipment affected by the swap-over, Primary Containment Radiation Monitoring System (PCRMS)

isolation valves T50-F450 and T50-F451 which had properly' closed during the swap-over were not. reopened, thereby causing the PCRMS to be inoperable. Moreover,'no independent verification of these valves was made as required by plant administrative controls, and the next shift turnover failed to identify the mispositioning. 'The

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l E condition continued to exist until approximately 0810 hours0.00938 days <br />0.225 hours <br />0.00134 weeks <br />3.08205e-4 months <br />, following a second turnove At that time the oncoming Nuclear Shift Superviso identified that the valves were mispositione . Technical Specification 3.4.3.1 requires the PCRMS to be operable in Modes l', 2, and 3. With the PCRMS inoperable, the Tech Specs required grab samples every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Because the mispositioning was discovered within approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> after it occurred, the Technical. Specification was not violate In response to'this event, the licensee conducted a review and, prepared a formal critique (No.89-011). The root cause of event was failure to adequately follow administrative procedures t (1) conduct a complete shift briefing prior to the swap-over, (2) to' independently verify correct valve configuration afterwards, and (3) to conduct adequate panel walkdowns at shift turnover. The inspectors will continue to monitor licensee performance in this are No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were

' performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente ;

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Work requests.were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs 3 and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment j maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed:

WR W351890525 Recalibration'of EDG No. 12 Jacket Coolant Pressure Switch and Gauge WR 0110890718 Troubleshoot / Repair RPS MG Set A WR 014C890811 CC Emergency Air Division II Rad Monitor Trouble Following completion of maintenance on the RPS MG Set, the inspectors verified that the system had been returned to service properl On August 19, 1989, during a surveillance test on the CCHVAC system, operators noted a burning smell in the control room. Subsequent investigation determined the cause to be the Division I CCHVAC Recirculation fan T4100C047 which had seized while in operatio Following completion of the work the inspector reviewed the associated work package (Work Request No. 001C890819) used to repair the fan, vendor manual, and equipment history. The licensee replaced the damaged belts, bearings and manufactt. red a new shaft. The systems engineer was to send the damaged shaft and bearings to the Engineering Research Division (ERD)

for failure analysis. The ERD analysis will be reviewed in conjunction with followup of the lubrication program (0 pen Item 341/89011-07(DRP)).

PDC 10193 was written to waive the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> belt run-in requirement of Procedure 35.000.224 since this would place the unit in an expired LC0 and would require a plant shutdown. PDC 10195 was written to accept the licensee fabricated shaft since it was made'from an uncontrolled vendor drawing, Buffalo Forge Dwg. 5W-55683, Revision Measurements were taken from the old shaft and compared to the vendor drawing to establish like for like replacemen The shaft was manufactured from ASTM 108, Grade 1018 steel bar. The inspector contacted Buffalo Forge and determined that the current drawing revision is H, which calls for Grade 104 However, the vendor stated that manufacturing the bar from Grade 1018 is acceptable. If the licensee would have purchased a shaft from Buffalo Forge it would have been made from Grade 1045. Disposition of PDCs 10193 and 10195, whether the PDCs were the appropriate mechanism i to be used in this case, whether the licensee plans to make Dwg. 5W-55683 a controlled drawing, and whether the licensee should have spare shafts stocked is an open item (341/89021-05(DRP)).

The inspector reviewed the equipment history for T4100C047 and determined  !

the licensee had replaced the bearings and manufactured a new shaft in October 1984 (PN21-969036). Apparently, the pillow block on the fan side bearing had shifted during fan operation destroying both bearings and scoring the shaft, and the shaft ground out one side of the housing shaft hol PMs on T4100C047 were subsequently performed in July 1986 and April 1988. The periodicity in 1986 was one year and was changed to every refueling outage because a plant shutdown is required to work on this fan. The inspector reviewed the PM Event Evaluation Data Sheet for

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T4100C047 prepared by the licensee's contractor as'part of the PM program review. The evaluation determined that there had been no corrective

. maintenance indicative of problematic operation and recommended the PM periodicity be increased from every refueling outage to every other refueling outage. The licensee had not yet-evaluated the ' contractor's-

recommendation. The. inspector noted that the vendor manual had no lubrication periodicities greater than one year. The licensee's review of the PM-Event Evaluation Data Sheet for T4100C047 and the inspector's

'further review of other PM event evaluations is an openl item (341/89021-06(DRP)).

No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

.The. inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications and verified that: testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limitin conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of.the affected components were accomplished, test results conformed with

. Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed l by personnel other than the individual directing ~the test, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspectors witnessed the following test activities:

24.202.01 HPCI Pump Time Response and Operability-Test at 1000 PSI 24.206.01 RCIC System Pump and Valve Operability Test 24.404.04 Division II SGTS Filter and Secondary Containment Isolation Damper Operability Test 43.404.02 Standby Gas Treatment Filter Performance Test Division II No violations.or deviations were identified in this are .' Followup of Events (93702)

During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several events, some of which required prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. The inspectors pursued the events onsite with licensee and/or other NRC officials. In each case, the inspectors verified that the notification was correct and timely, if appropriate, that the licensee was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were conducted within regulatory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent future recurrence. The specific events are as follows:

July 18, 1989 Unplanned ESF actuation due to overvoltage trip of RPS Bus A EPA breake August 19, 1989 Unplanned ESF actuation due to shorting of test lead during surveillanc _ _ _____ _ _ _ - -___ _ - _____

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August' 20, 1989' Initiation.of plant shutdown due to breaching of

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common ductwork for= division of CCHVAC for maintenanc ! August'30, 1989 Unplanned ESF actuation through personnel error when a wrong fuse was pulled during maintenanc .Regarding the August 20, 1989 event, a failure of the Control Center HVAC (CCHVAC)/'A" recirculation' fan (T4100C047) required breaching the filter train housing which-is common to both CCHVAC division. When repairs / testing

.of the~ fan exceeded one hour, Technical Specification 3.0.3 required a unit shutdown be initiated. This in turn,: was an entry condition into the licenseets emergency plan and an unusual event was declared. .The work on-the recirculation fan was completed and the unusual event subsequently terminated and both divisions of CCHVAC declared operable. See Paragraph 4 for review of CCHVAC maintenance activitie No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Licensee Event Report Followup (92700)

Through direct observations,. discussions with licensee personnel, and i review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification (0 pen) LER 89013, Actuation of the Standby Gas Treatment System and' Isolation of the Reactor Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning. This event was internally documented in DER 89-072 The inspector verified that an Accountability Meeting was conducted on July 3,1989, and required reading of the LER and DER was completed by the I&C Repairmen and Supervisors. An "LER Reduction Input Sheet" was generated by the acting General Supervisor Maintenance /I&C which is to be used by I&C Repairmen / Technicians to identify other configuration problems which may result in LERs during work performance. On August 24, 1989, the inspector questioned I&C Repairmen and determined that they were unfamiliar with the LER Reduction Input Sheet. 'The acting General Supervisor committed to route the sheet to all I&C Repairmen / Technicians along with an explanation of its use as required readin PDC 10577, " Improving Testability of Reactor Building Vent Exhaust Radiation Monitors," was written on July 19, 1989, to install multi-contact keylock switches on Panels H11-P883 and H11-P884 capable of bypassing the trips and alarms for D11-K808 and 011-K81 The PDC is scheduled for disposition in December 1989. This LER will remain open pending implementation of the PDC disposition and completion of required reading on the LER Reduction Input Shee (Closed) LER 87019, Revision 1 & Revision 2, Missed Surveillance of Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) C02 System Due to Incorrect  !

Scheduling. This event resulted in a violation of Technical i

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' Specification (TS) requirements 4.7.7.3.2. The inspector ver.ified-the Surveillance Scheduling and: Tracking (SST) General Calendar Summary j Report' listed the frequency of performance of the required portion of the subject Surveillance Procedure, "SGTS CO2 System Manual Actuatio Puff: Test," Revision 20, as 72 weeks which satisfied the above-mentioned j-Technical Specification and corresponded to the frequency of every

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.18 months'specified in the LER. Revision-2'of the LER stated that a

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Technical Specif scation - Surveillance procedure cross-reference report .

had been developed and was available as a reference _to prevent recurrenc On August 8,- 198:., licensee scheduling personnel.provided to the inspector.the computer program and various printouts. .They adequately; cross-referenced TS 4.7.7.3.2.b.2 to the applicable surveillance procedure and vice versa'. - The inspector verified that the hard copy of the cross reference report was maintained in the control , roo The computer program ~and printouts kept in the Main Control Room and by scheduling personnel also cross referenced equipment part I.D. .

numbers to applicable surveillance. Revision 2 of the-LER stated that:to prevent recurrence'a detailed. technical review'of all LTechnical Specification surveillance requirements and their corresponding' surveillance procedures would be; accomplishe This review was completed on December. 31, 1988.- The results-will be evaluated by the'NRC during future inspection' activitie This LER is closed, (Closed) LER 87026, Reactor Water Cleanup' System Isolatio .No violations or deviations were. identified in this are . Assembly / Accountability Exercise On August 9, 1989, the licensee conducted an assembly /a' c countability exercise to verify compliance with the requirements of Fermi's Radiological 1' Emergency Response Pla'n (RERP). During a. prior exercise on June 14, 1989, a weakness was identified in the subject area as documented.in inspection report 341/89019, in that all personnel within the protected area were not accounted lfor within the required 30 minute timeframe. The resident inspectors observed the August 9 exercise from the control room and the Technical Support Center (TSC). No deficiencies

.were notedi all personnel within the protected area were accounted for within the required timefram . Review of M&TE Program (35750)

.During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's

> program for control of Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE). The

', inspectors verified on a sample basis that instruments required under the program were properly stored, were uniquely retrievable, that calibration periodicities were properly selected and enforced, and that M&TE was issued by trained personnel familiar with program requirements to qualified users as delineated by the training departme _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ __-_-

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In general, the program appeared to be adequate. However, two areas of apparent weakness were identified. The first involved issuance of M&TE during after-hours when the M&TE cage was not routinely manned. From discussions with maintenance and operations personnel, the inspector ascertained that I&C supervisors were responsible for issuing M&TE after hours and were trained in the requirements. Keys to the cage were controlled by the Nuclear Shift Supervisor who would issue the keys to I&C supervision only. However, administrative procedure NPP-MT1-01,

" Measuring and Test Equipment Program," does not specifically address the after-hours process. Additionally, examples were found where an-individual-had documented on the M&TE sign-out log issuance of equipment to himself. The second area of weakness involves the number of instruments that fail their periodic calibratio From discussion with personnel in the onsite metrology lab, approximately 30 instruments per month on average failed recalibration and an investigation as to consequences of instrument usage must be performed. Further discussion with personnel revealed two concerns in this area. One was that the required investigations were not being performed within the program's limit of 30 days due to workload and manpower constraints. The second was that approximately 50 percent (15 per month) of the recalibration failures were the direct result of physical damage to the instruments during use in the field. The licensee is currently evaluating the subject areas, both as a result of inspector concerns as well as (in the case of timeliness of investigations) to a QA audit (No. 89-0140)

which was performed in May-June 198 Subsequent to the inspector's review, a request for further evaluation of the licensee's M&TE program was requested of NRC Region II Pending further inspector review and licensee resolution of the apparent areas of weakness, this is considered an open item (341/89021-07(DRP)).

10. Monthly Management Meeting 1 On August 15, 1989, a monthly management meeting was conducted at j the NRC Region III office. The topics are stated below along with

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a short synopsis of what was discusse Plant Performance The licensee indicated that the plant had operated continuously for ,

almost 150 days. The licensee provided performance indicators in a '

number of categories with no negative trends noted. Trending of significant adverse to quality reports broken down into procedural, hardware, and personnel error root causes was provided reflecting positive trends except for personnel errors in the last 60 day The increased personnel errors centered in the electrical and mechanical maintenance departments. The licensee attributed the increase to the reorganization of the maintenance departmen Maintenance performance was considered the area needing the most management attentio _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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Korkshop'forSeniorManagement DECO made a presentation on. actions to help senior management work

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survey. identifying the strengths and weaknesses'of the Fermi organization. Upon conclusion of the survey the consultant provided a 3 day workshop tailored around the results of the surve I General Maintenance Topics The . licensee discussed some of the current major equipment problem These~ problems included repetitive station air compressor failures and damage incurred to the circulating water pumps. The air compressor failures appeared to have been caused by past maintenance p'ractices to the feather valves and not rotating operation of the three 100. percent capacity air compressors. The circulating water pump problem was caused by local vortexing at the entrance'to the intake structure. An intake structure modification is anticipatect to significantly reduce the vortexing. Maintenance indicators wers also presente Refueling Outage Preparation The licensee indicated that over 600 work packages needed the planning completed. Almost all of the engineering design packages (EDP)'had been issued. A number of these packages still needed the material provided from vendors to support the outage. The licensee had established a paperwork closure team to expedite closure of work packages and an EDP ownership program for nuclear engineering personnel to ensure proper implementation of the change and prompt resolution of any problem 'The Deputy Regional Administrator pointed out, given the current-

^ state of outage preparation, that this outage will require

'significant management attention. This attention will be necessary-

.to assure that activities are carried out in an orderly and controlled manne Diagnostic Team Commitment Progress The licensee provided a progress report on the commitments with all appearing to be on schedul On September 1, 1989, the licensee met with NRC Region III management in Glen Ellyn, Illinois. The subject of the meeting was the deferral of a commitment to install modified reactor vessel level / pressure instrument racks during the first refuelinq outage. The licensee presented the history as to why the racks tere needed, compensatory measures being taken until the racks are modified and the reasons why the rack modification was not ready for installation. At the conclusion of the presentation, NRC Region III management tentatively L accepted the licensee's request to defer the modification to the second refueling outage pending a formal request in writing.

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i, Unresolved' items are matters.about which more information is required L in order to ascertain whether.they are acceptable items,. violations or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection'is discussed in Paragraph .' Open Items y

/- Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensec., which h will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action

!, on the part of the' NRC or licensee or both. 0 pen items disclosed durin the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3, 4,.and '1 Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives.(denoted in Paragraph 1)

on September 18, and informally throughout.the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. 'The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with~ regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The' licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary. The licensee acknowledged the findings of.the inspectio i

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