IR 05000341/2021001
ML21124A128 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Fermi |
Issue date: | 05/04/2021 |
From: | Nestor Feliz-Adorno Reactor Projects Region 3 Branch 4 |
To: | Peter Dietrich DTE Electric Company |
References | |
IR 2021001 | |
Download: ML21124A128 (18) | |
Text
May 4, 2021
SUBJECT:
FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2021001
Dear Mr. Dietrich:
On March 31, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Fermi 2. On April 27, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000341 License No. NPF-43
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number: 05000341 License Number: NPF-43 Report Number: 05000341/2021001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-001-0035 Licensee: DTE Electric Company Facility: Fermi 2 Location: Newport, MI Inspection Dates: January 01, 2021 to March 31, 2021 Inspectors: T. Briley, Senior Resident Inspector T. Taylor, Resident Inspector Approved By: Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Fermi 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Improper Storage of Nitrogen Bottles in the Reactor Building Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.12] - Avoid 71111.15 Systems NCV 05000341/2021001-01 Complacency Open/Closed The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated NCV of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1, "Procedures," for the improper storage of material in the reactor building. Specifically, on multiple occasions the inspectors discovered carts of compressed gas cylinders near safety-related equipment that were not restrained in accordance with plant procedures. Examples included missing chocks, inappropriate standoff distance, storage of equipment not in accordance with existing engineering analyses, and exceeding restraint weight limits.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000341/2020-002-00 LER 2020-002-00 for Fermi 71153 Closed 2, Valid Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generators During Partial Loss of Offsite Power.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On March 5, 2021, the unit was down powered to 62 percent rated thermal power for planned maintenance and control rod pattern adjustment. The unit was returned to rated thermal power the following day. The unit remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Division 2 residual heat removal (RHR) while Division 1 RHR and RHR service water was out of service for maintenance during the week ending January 16, 2021
- (2) Division 1 control complex heating ventilation and air conditioning (CCHVAC) while Division 2 CCHVAC was out of service for maintenance during the week ending January 30, 2021
- (3) Division 1 emergency diesel generators (EDG) 13 and 14 while Division 1 mechanical draft cooling tower was out of service for maintenance during the week ending February 13, 2021
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Radwaste building, second floor and mezzanine, balance of plant switchgear room on January 22, 2021
71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
(1) (Partial)
P4400B001A heat exchanger on Division 1 emergency equipment cooling water (EECW)
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
(1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during power maneuvers for a planned down power on March 5, 2021
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator requalification graded scenario in the control room simulator on March 10, 2021
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1) (Partial)
Spent fuel pool level instrumentation
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Emergent work and preparations for alternate diesel fire pump installation due to diesel fire pump blow-by test failure, fire water suppression system jockey pump pressure regulator repair, and combustion turbine generator (CTG) 11-1 ground indication troubleshooting during the week ending January 30, 2021
- (2) Emergent work on EDG 12 fuel rack abnormal position, visual annunciator system power supply low voltage, and planned high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system maintenance during the week ending February 20, 2021
- (3) Planned maintenance on CTG system (CTGs 11-1, 11-2, 11-3, and 11-4 out of service) and emergent work on west gland seal exhauster following abnormal operation during the week ending March 6, 2021
- (4) Condensate storage tank vortex suppressor installation during the week ending March 27, 2021
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Operability and functionality of Division 1 64B and 64C 4160-volt safety bus degraded voltage relays following identification of a design calculation error, as documented in condition assessment resolution document (CARD) 21-20658
- (2) Operability and functionality of the diesel fire pump following failed blow-by test, as documented in CARD 21-20687
- (3) Operability and functionality of hydraulic control units and Division 2 safety-related instrumentation due to improper storage of nitrogen bottle carts, as documented in CARDs 21-21373 and 21-21805
- (4) Operability and functionality of CTG 11-1 following low lubricating oil temperature, as documented in CARD 21-22139
- (5) Operability and functionality of Division 1 EECW due to temperature control valve controller abnormal operation and trip of Division 1 CCHVAC, as documented in CARD 21-21951
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)
(2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Main steam line 'A' and 'C' low reactor steam dome pressure setpoint change (permanent)
- (2) Installation of alternate diesel fire pump (temporary)
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Division 1 non-interruptible air system testing following air dryer relay replacement during the week ending January 16, 2021
- (2) Agastat time-delay relay calibration prior to replacement in HPCI valve control circuit during the week ending January 9, 2021
- (3) Division 2 CCHVAC testing following system maintenance during the week ending January 30, 2021
- (4) Division 1 EECW make-up water tank outlet isolation motor operated valve testing and diagnostics following preventative maintenance during the week ending March 27, 2021
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Division 1 nuclear steam supply shutoff system (NSSSS) reactor low water level 1 and 2 channel functional testing during the week ending January 16, 2021
- (2) Review of change in surveillance frequency for procedure 44.030.254, "ECCS-Reactor Vessel Water Level (Levels 1, 2, and 8), Division 2, Channel D Functional Test" during the week ending March 27, 2021
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) Standby liquid control pump and valve testing during the week ending January 16, 2021
- (2) Reactor core isolation cooling system pump and valve testing during the week ending February 6, 2021
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Emergency preparedness tabletop drill on February 4,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.01) ===
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 2020-002, "Valid Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generators During Partial Loss of Offsite Power" (ADAMS Accession No. ML20244A365). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Improper Storage of Nitrogen Bottles in the Reactor Building Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.12] - Avoid 71111.15 Systems NCV 05000341/2021001-01 Complacency Open/Closed The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated NCV of TS 5.4.1, "Procedures," for the improper storage of material in the reactor building.
Specifically, on multiple occasions the inspectors discovered carts of compressed gas cylinders near safety-related equipment that were not restrained in accordance with plant procedures. Examples included missing chocks, inappropriate standoff distance, storage of equipment not in accordance with existing engineering analyses, and exceeding restraint weight limits.
Description:
On February 12, 2021, the inspectors identified a cart containing 12 nitrogen gas bottles that was not restrained in accordance with plant procedures to reasonably ensure it would not adversely impact nearby safety-related equipment during a seismic event. During operation, the nitrogen is used to periodically recharge the hydraulic control units (HCUs), which helps position or scram the control rods and contain safety-related components. The cart was stored adjacent to an opening leading down to one of the reactor building corner rooms.
Several safety-related instruments associated with the RHR system and reactor recirculation system were directly below this opening. This cart was at a location that was not one of two engineering-approved locations for the storage of nitrogen carts. In addition, it was not restrained in accordance with procedure MOP23, "Plant Storage," Revision 6. Specifically, the cart did not have a required wheel chock and was tied off to a handrail that the procedure stated was acceptable for up to 400 pounds when the cart weight was 2,600 pounds. The inspectors notified the licensee, who then moved the cart away from the floor opening.
In the following days, the inspectors identified additional nitrogen carts improperly stored adjacent to the HCUs. The carts were missing the required number of chocks and staged too close to the HCUs given their width and height per the requirements contained in MOP23.
One of the extra nitrogen carts was subsequently moved and attached to a concrete wall nearby pending removal from the building. However, a few days later the inspectors identified that the cart was missing one of the required restraints for that temporarily approved storage location. The licensee subsequently discovered that one of the two normal staging locations for the HCUs had been previously moved without engineering approval as required by MOP23.
Corrective Actions: The permanently approved location that had been moved was analyzed by the licensee for the new location and found to be acceptable. All nitrogen carts located outside of the permanently approved locations were removed from the reactor building. The licensee also performed several walkdowns of the reactor building to eliminate any remaining storage concerns with other equipment. Additionally, the licensee initiated a common-cause analysis to further review the issue.
Corrective Action References: CARDs 21-21805, 21-21373, and 21-22200
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to properly restrain nitrogen carts stored in the reactor building was contrary to licensee procedure MOP23, "Plant Storage," Revision 6, and was a performance deficiency. Examples included missing chocks, inappropriate standoff distance, storage of equipment not in accordance with existing engineering analyses, and exceeding restraint weight limits.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to properly restrain nitrogen carts stored in the reactor building led to reasonable doubt regarding the operability of nearby safety-related components.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) based on answering 'no' to all the questions in Section A of Exhibit 2. Specifically, the licensee performed engineering evaluations and reasonably determined the operability/functionality of equipment would be maintained under worst-case seismic conditions.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, the licensee made assumptions regarding the acceptability of the storage of nitrogen carts in the reactor building. Further, the licensee did not recognize and plan for the possibility of additional storage issues as evidenced by the additional issues identified by the inspectors after their initial notification of the issue to the licensee.
Enforcement:
Violation: TS 5.4.1, "Procedures," requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented. and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
Contrary to the above, since at least February 12 to February 26, 2021, the licensee failed to implement a procedure recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Specifically, Section 9 of Regulatory Guide 1.33 states, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. The licensee established procedure MOP23, "Plant Storage," Revision 6, to implement storage and staging requirements of equipment during, in part, maintenance activities that could affect the performance of safety-related equipment. However, the licensee did not implement MOP23 when preplanning and performing maintenance activities involving compressed gas cylinders as evidenced by the following examples:
- The procedure required carts in the reactor building to be chocked and imposed spacing requirements between the carts and safety-related components based on cart dimensions. However, multiple compressed gas cylinder carts in the reactor building were not chocked and staged too close to safety-related components given their dimensions.
- A compressed gas cylinder cart was tied off to a handrail that MOP23 stated was acceptable for up to 400 pounds. However, the cart weight was 2,600 pounds.
- Procedure MOP23 required the storage of compressed gas cylinders in the reactor building to be approved by engineering. However, a compressed gas cylinder cart was stored at a location that had not received prior engineering approval for that purpose.
- Compressed gas cylinders temporarily used in the reactor building were required by MOP23 to be tightly mounted to structures with at least two restraints. However, a temporarily secured compressed gas cylinder cart in the reactor building was mounted to a structure with only one restraint.
The start date of the violation was unknown because information was not available to reasonably determine or estimate when the licensee first stored the compressed gas cylinder carts in the reactor building as described above. The inspectors identified the violation on February 12, 2021, and the licensee restored compliance on February 26, 2021.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 27, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. P. Dietrich, Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.04 Drawings 6M721-5734 Emergency Diesel Generator System Functional Operating BL
Sketch
M-2847 Control Center Air Conditioning Air Side Reactor Building Z
M-4325 Water Side and MISC Chiller Inst Control Center A/C AG
System
71111.05 Drawings A-2033 Radwaste Building 2nd Floor Plan El 613'-6" & 2nd Floor AC
Mezz El 628'6"
Fire Plans FP-RDWST Radwaste Building Zones 22, 23, 24, and 25 6
Procedures MOP11 Fire Protection 23
71111.11Q Miscellaneous Power Profile March 5, 2021 Downpower 0
SS-OP-904-2101 Evaluation Scenario 0
Procedures 22.000.03 Power Operation 25% to 100% to 25% 106
23.107 Reactor Feedwater and Condensate Systems 154
23.108 Extraction Steam and Heater Drains 94
23.109 Turbine Operating Procedure 96
71111.12 Corrective Action 21-22263 NRC Identified - Concern with the Ability to Evaluate 03/11/2021
Documents Emergency Action Level for Lowering Spent Fuel Pool Level
Resulting from
Inspection
Engineering EDP 37088 Install Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation to Comply with 0
Changes NRC Order EA-12-051 Guidance
71111.13 Corrective Action 21-20649 Fire Header Pressure Low After Replacing P80-F407 Fire 01/22/2021
Documents Header Jockey Pump Discharge Backpressure Regulator
21-20687 Diesel Fire Pump P8000C001 Failed Blow-By Test 01/25/2021
21-20761 Received Main Control Room Alarm 11D64 CTG 11 01/27/2021
Transformer Trouble
21-21476 Fuel Rack at Max Fuel on EDG 12 with Machine Shutdown 02/16/2021
21-21496 MTG Accidental Energization Relay Tripped 02/16/2021
21-21497 Received 4D65 Generator Protective Relaying Operated 02/16/2021
21-21498 While Performing 4D65 Initiating Device IPCS Point for 02/16/2021
Reverse Power is Incorrect
21-21537 Received 5D28 02/17/2021
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
21-21542 Low Alarm Power Found on VAS Paddleboard 7RD-6 02/17/2021
21-21850 Temporary Loss of Brest Bay Feed to Tag Line 02/28/2021
Drawings 6SD721-2500-02 One Line Diagram 13.8KV BE
Engineering 80127 ECCS Pump CST Vortex Suppression Device C
Changes
Miscellaneous 20210301 T-1 Schedule Evaluation (03/01/2021 03/07/2021) 0
CTG-11-1 Clearance: R1100-000574 03/01/2021
Transformer - 11 Clearance: R1200-000129 03/01/2021
Troubleshooting Referencing CARD 21-21497 02/17/2021
Plan
Procedures 11D64 CTG 11 Transformer Trouble 10
23.106 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System 118
MWC15 Elevated Risk Management 20
Work Orders 53877347 DCP-80127 Install a Vortex Suppressor on the CST Core 03/23/2021
Spray / SBFW Standpipes P1100
71111.15 Calculations DC-6447 Auxiliary Power System Analysis [PROPRIETARY] F
Calibration P44K803A-SS Division 1 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water 07/24/2016
Records Temperature Control
Corrective Action 10-22622 CTG 11-1 Lube Oil Tank Temperature Low Alarm 03/26/2010
Documents 19-24615 Diesel Fire Pump Engine SWI [Severe Wear Index] > Action 06/18/2019
Level B
20-21494 High SWI on Diesel Fire Pump Engine 02/11/2020
20-25557 NQA - RF20 - Work Order Review of Blow-By Test and Oil 05/05/2020
Change of Diesel Fire Pump
20-30097 Diesel Fire Pump Engine (Spare) High Blow-By Cause 09/10/2020
20-30292 Lessons Learned from Prompt Investigation into Diesel Fire 09/16/2020
Pump Engine High Blow-By
21-20328 DFP Engine SWI High 01/11/2021
21-20658 Unsupported Conclusions for Degraded Voltage Relay 01/22/2021
Performance During LOCA Transient DC-6447
21-20687 Diesel Fire Pump P8000C001 Failed Blow-By Test 01/25/2021
21-21951 Division 1 CCHVAC Chiller Trip 03/02/2021
21-21952 Valve Inoperable 03/03/2021
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
21-21995 Spare HPCI and RCIC Flow Controllers are Obsolete with 03/04/2021
Zero in Inventory
21-22138 CTG 11-1 Unit Trouble on Low Lube Oil Temperature 03/08/2021
21-22139 CTG 11-1 Unit Trouble on Low Lube Oil Sump Temperature 03/09/2021
21-22169 Toolboxes on RB-3 not Stored Properly 03/09/2021
21-22170 Temporary Power Carts Staged on RB-1 Should be 03/09/2021
Removed if not Needed
21-22200 Potential Trend Identified in Storage of Items in the Plant 03/10/2021
That do not Meet Requirements of MOP23
21-22416 ACMP Recommendations not Fully Followed for DFP SWI 03/17/2021
Corrective Action 21-21373 Nitrogen Cart not Stored IAW MOP23 in RB 02/12/2021
Documents 21-21805 NRC Concern Nitrogen 12 Pack not Stored IAW MOP23 02/25/2021
Resulting from Requirements
Inspection 21-22128 NRC Identified: Various Housekeeping/Plant Storage Issues 03/08/2021
Identified on RB-1, RB-B, RBSB SW Areas
Miscellaneous ACMP 19-007 Diesel Fire Pump Engine B
ACMP 21-003 Diesel Fire Pump - Engine 0
Procedures 23.324.01 Operation of CTG 11-1 From CTG11 Peaker Yard 1
24.207.08 Division 1 EECW Pump and Valve Operability Test 83A
MMA08 Scaffolding 19
MOP23 Plant Storage 6
Work Orders 46574671 Calibrate CTG 11-1 Instruments, Pressure and Temperature 03/07/2019
Switches
54305120 Perform Blow-By Test to Determine Engine Health 07/17/2019
60510990 Replace P44K800A 03/18/2021
71111.18 Corrective Action 12-24521 Review BWROG SC05-03 Analysis 05/16/2012
Documents 19-26921 Alternate DFP, Failed Loss of Offsite Power Test 03/13/2019
21-21167 Alternate Diesel Fire Pump Flow Concern 02/07/2021
Engineering 37580 Change to Main Steam Line Isolation Low-Pressure Isolation 0
Changes Setpoint, Analytical Limit, the Allowable Value, and Nominal
Trip Setpoint Revision in Support of Tech Spec and Safety
Limit Change
DCP IP-ENG-001 Alternate Diesel Fire Pump 0
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
- 21-0001
Fire Plans FPEE-21-0002 Evaluation of TM-21-0001 - Temporary Diesel Fire Pump 0
Procedures ARP 7D2 Diesel Fire Pump Trouble 11
Work Orders 59086275 Implement EDP-37580 for B21N676A 02/01/2021
59086430 Implement EDP 37580 for B21N676C 02/01/2021
60088154 Installation WO for TM-21-0001 Alternate Diesel Fire Pump 02/05/2021
71111.19 Corrective Action 21-21949 P4400F602A Stem Nut Lock Nut Found Loose During 03/02/2021
Documents Periodic Thrust Test
Drawings I-2221-05 HPCI SYS- Pump Discharge Isolation Valves AD
I-2451-13 NIAS Division 1 Dryer P5002D012 Controls N
I-2611-34 Main Control Room Multi-Zone Unit Electric Heaters O
Division 2
Miscellaneous MCAR G-1 Final Report for Limitorque Motor Operator Valve Stem Lock 05/15/1980
Nut Staking Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1
and 2
Procedures 35.318.007 Time-Delay Relays 43
Work Orders 53086927 Perform MOV Thrust testing (P4400F602A) 03/01/2021
54714285 Replace Agastat Relay in P50P402A, Division 1 NIAS Dryer 01/07/2021
Control Cabinet
56873119 Replace Agastat Relay R3200S016-057 (PM G240) 01/07/2021
58802759 Replace the M Contactor and CR1 Relay for MCC 72F-5A 01/28/2021
Pos 2B-R
71111.22 Corrective Action 21-20242 LPIV #3 Card A12 and A14 Slot Location Need Modification 01/08/2021
Documents for Installation
21-20546 44.030.254 Approaching Critical Date and not Scheduled 01/20/2021
21-20547 44.030.252 Approaching Critical Date 01/20/2021
Drawings M-2082 Standby Liquid Control System AB
Miscellaneous ODMI 20-007 Spurious NSSSS Channel D Isolation Signal 0
TE-B21-20-062 Risk Evaluation for Frequency Extension of ATWS- 0
RPT/ECCS RPV Level and Pressure Surveillances
Vendor Manual Analog Trip Unit C
VMR1-50
Procedures 24.206.01 RCIC System Pump and Valve Operability Test 87
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
44.030.254 ECCS - Reactor Vessel Water Level (Levels 1, 2, and 8), 52
Division 2, Channel D Functional Test
Work Orders 54698574 Perform 24.139.02 SLC Pump and Check Valve Operability 01/08/2021
Test
54714301 Perform 44.020.003 NS4 Rx Low Water Level 1 & 2 01/11/2021
Division 1, Channel Functional Test
282654 Install Test Jacks and Jumpers to Support NSSSS 01/11/2021
Surveillance
71114.06 Miscellaneous ERO Tabletop Session 02/04/2021
Procedures EP-101 Classification of Emergencies 43A
71151 Miscellaneous Licensing Performance Indicator Safety System Functional 01/08/2021
Failure (SSFF) IRIS Data Entry, Verification, and Approval
Industry Reporting Information System Performance 01/21/2021
Indicator Summary Report
71153 Corrective Action 20-27545 Loss of 345kV Due to Mayfly Infestation 07/02/2020
Documents
Procedures 27.322 Mayfly Infestation Preparation Plan 0
15